https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/lend-lease-eastern-front
>There is little doubt that the Soviet Union took on the lion’s share of fighting the German Wehrmacht during World War II. It is estimated that the Red Army inflicted about 70 percent of the battle deaths the Wehrmacht suffered. Losing some 25 million people in the four-year slog, the USSR and the Red Army conducted combat operations on an unprecedented scale over an area roughly half the size of the United States. Every Soviet citizen was drawn into the conflict as large segments of the communist country were overrun and occupied by German forces. In defending “Mother Russia,” this catastrophic event still reverberates in areas comprising the former Soviet Union and is remembered as the “The Great Patriotic War.”
>Lend Lease to the Soviet Union
>Assisting the Soviet war effort American Lend-Lease eventually transferred over $11 billion dollars of goods to Soviet Russia—roughly the equivalent of $250 billion today. Those shipments included 400,000 vehicles, 14,000 aircraft, 13,000 tanks, 8,000 tractors, 4.5 million tons of food, and 2.7 million tons of petroleum products, as well as millions of blankets, uniforms, and boots, and 107,000 tons of cotton. While a significant effort on the part of the United States, official Soviet history claims that only 12 percent of airplanes, 10 percent of tanks, and 2 percent of artillery pieces from Lend-Lease were used in the fight. Downplaying the American contributions, Nikolai Voznesky, chairman of Soviet State Planning Committee (Gosplan), reported that Lend-Lease amounted to only 4 percent of Red Army material production. This statement was readily repeated by Soviet apparatchiks during the Cold War despite an unclear definition of just what “material production” they were actually referring to
>Countering Voznesky’s assessment, his statistics appear to reflect only deliveries made in 1941–43, when Lend-Lease was initiated. Apparently, his numbers did not include 1944–45 delivery figures, which were much more substantial. When considering how much Lend-Lease support was delivered and what percentage it reflected overall Soviet production, exact numbers are problematic. Given the paranoid nature of the Soviet government and its officials, trustworthy or verified production figures during the Stalin era are hard to acquire. Any numbers related to this topic have questionable fidelity or accuracy, and after the emergence of the Cold War, the 4 percent figure probably reflects the political environment following VE Day with Soviet leadership was loath to give any significant credit to the Western powers. However, even if the 4 percent figure has some basis in fact, Lend-Lease provided critical supplies and equipment at times when the USSR was at a tipping point. Such supplies not only enabled ailing Soviet industrial and agricultural efforts, but, more importantly, arrived at crucial times in the war.
>In March 1942, as American production capacity was ramping up, the Soviets were still reeling from the initial German offensive. Concerned the Soviets might still capitulate, Roosevelt made the USSR the top priority for Lend-Lease deliveries. Ultimately, aid to the Soviet Union constituted about 23 percent of the total Lend-Lease program. To facilitate a quicker response to Soviet requests, the president removed the requirement for the Communist state to justify its equipment or raw material requests. Additionally, these requests were honored with no quid pro quo required on the Soviet part. However, such accounting was still required by other nations receiving American Lend-Lease support. Underscoring the Soviet priority set by FDR, deliveries of equipment often competed with American concerns. Some argued that aid to the USSR undercut support for American armed forces and its ability to equip its own military.
>American aluminum alone accounted for 42 percent of Soviet supplies of the metal. Helping Soviet refinery operations, Lend-Lease also provided aviation fuel that equaled over 50 percent of what the USSR produced during the war. In addition, the United States shipped to the Soviet Union a Ford tire factory so they could produce tires for military vehicles.
The Eternal Burger. So much for your efforts Mr Ford.
>Addressing this need, Americans provided almost 2,000 locomotives along with 11,000 railcars to help ship goods and equipment from factories to the front.
>Additionally, over the course of the war, the Americans delivered over 400,000 trucks and other vehicles to the USSR. During the same period, Soviet factories produced less than 200,000. Given the size and scope of the challenges in the vast Russian steppe, trucks were key in moving various classes of supply and labor over hundreds of miles. After the war, even Premier Nikita Khrushchev reported that the USSR was dependent on Western vehicles for its tactical advances in Stalingrad and Berlin.
Stalingrad, the famous battle where American forces singlehandedly defeated the pesky Germans.
>So prevalent were American designs that they remained part of Red Army equipment sets for years after the war. Even versions of the famous “Katyusha” rocket launchers used by the Red Army were often placed upon American-built Studebaker US6 2.5-ton trucks. The American vehicle became the standard mount for the 1,800 BM-13N Katyusha models produced. Soviet soldiers were so impressed with the quality and performance of American vehicles that the term “Studebaker” became synonymous with excellence. Khrushchev, who succeeded Stalin, recalled, “After Stalin’s death it seemed that all our artillery was mounted on American equipment.”
Verily, Toyota is studebaker.
– Random ISIS grunt
>Even before the war, Stalin’s domestic policies resulted in food shortages across the USSR with an estimated five million people dying from starvation, and Soviet food stocks were insufficient even before the 1941 Nazi invasion. Such shortages were exacerbated as the Wehrmacht occupied the most productive Soviet farmlands in Ukraine and the northern Caucasus.
>These occupied areas previously produced or housed 38 percent of the grain, 84 percent of sugar supplies, 60 percent of sunflower oil, 38 percent of the cattle, and 60 percent of the hogs. Adding to the country’s agricultural woes, many of the horses used in farming were commandeered for military use while tractor production was reconverted for armored or tracked vehicles. Furthermore, farmhands and manual labor became scarce as the nation mobilized its population to either fill its military ranks or employ workers in war-related industries. Reflecting the occupation and its effects on Soviet agriculture, grain production fell from 95 million tons in 1940 to 29 million in 1942. In conjunction, all elements of Russian agriculture suffered, with potato production falling from 75 million tons to 23 million tons, and meat declining from a prewar figure of 4.7 million tons to 1.8 million.
>While most of the American 4.4 million tons provided subsistence went to the Red Army, it allowed for domestic production to feed civilian populations. In the first few months of 1943, American produce alone accounted for 17 percent of Red Army calories along with half the fats consumed by uniformed personnel. Adding protein to the Red Army diet was Hormel Foods, which provided its signature tin-packed SPAM canned pork and ham products.
>Even Khrushchev quipped that “without SPAM, we should not have been able to feed our army.”
SPAM, the well known "victory pork" that gave the noble Red Army the necessary strength to crush the evil nadzees.
>As early as 1943 at the Tehran Conference, Stalin reportedly said: “The most important things in this war are machines. … The United States is a country of machines. Without the machines we received through lend-lease, we would have lost the war.” By late 1943, Stalin acknowledged that Lend-Lease already had a decisive impact on the Soviet Union’s survival. Massive aid would then enable Soviet counteroffensives. Khrushchev credited the trucks and equipment received after Stalingrad with enabling the Soviet mechanized offensives of 1944 and 1945, observing: “Our losses would have been colossal because we would have had no maneuverability.”
>Despite being overlooked in many circles, the foundation for victory on the Eastern Front had much of its roots in the United States. Such sentiment was echoed by Khrushchev declaring in his memoirs: “If the United States had not helped us, we would not have won the war,” continuing that “we shouldn't boast that we vanquished the Germans all by ourselves.”
Hitler refused to develop the nukes because that was too unfair, dirty and ultimately evil.
When dealing with the Jew and his lackeys, be ruthless beyond evil. Evil doesn't enter the equation. Only results matter.