Intelligence Analysis for Urban Combat

A Monograph
by

MAJ Charles W. Innocenti
Military Intelligence, U.S. Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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Major Charles W. Innocenti

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Approved by:

Lester W. Grau	Monograph Director
COL James K. Greer, MMAS	Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.	Director, Graduate Degree Program

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Abstract

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS FOR URBAN COMBAT
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The US Army intelligence community, recognizing the urban combat challenge, is revising intelligence techniques to provide analysts with a better methodology for urban combat. This paper examines current techniques for analysis and determines if they provide an analyst with a logical method for identifying indicators of potential threat COAs against US forces in urban combat. These techniques are pattern analysis, weighing indicators, and wargaming enemy and friendly capabilities. This study reviews the analytical techniques in four historic case studies to determine if applying these techniques would have identified indicators of enemy COAs. The four case studies were the battle for Hue in 1968, the US Marine involvement in Beirut from 1982-1984, and the battles for Grozny in 1995 and in 1999. This paper concludes that while the basic techniques for identifying indicators of threat COAs work, some changes should be made. First, all three techniques must be used simultaneously, without an over reliance on a single technique. Second, intelligence analysis should not simply focus on threat patterns, but must anticipate changes in those patterns. Analysts who understand a threat's goals and capabilities can use the three techniques to anticipate changes in a threat's pattern of activities. Finally, current urban analysis techniques overemphasize an analysis of an urban area's terrain at the expense of a detailed analysis of a region's culture, history, and demographics, which are major factors in determining threat actions.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Few battlefields today present the United States (US) Army with as many problems as urban combat. Ask any US commander or planner today what type of combat he would most want to avoid, and the answer, in all likelihood, will be fighting in an urban environment. The problems involved in urban combat affect every aspect of a mission and have the potential to expand into monumental proportions. Considering that it cost the Soviets in excess of 100,000 dead to take Berlin in 1945, fighting in cities is a serious topic.[1]

Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, posits a future in which the near term chances of the US Army becoming involved in urban combat are very good. The FM explains that current and future threats will try to capitalize on perceived US vulnerabilities while, at the same time, avoiding perceived US strengths. *FM 3-0* states that, "Adversaries will also seek to shape conditions to their advantage."[2] Urban terrain negates many of the advantages of US technology. It also allows a less sophisticated enemy to engage US forces on a more equal footing and to inflict unacceptable losses on US forces in a direct challenge to US resolve.[3] In short, urban combat presents the US Army with multiple challenges.

BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

The US Army intelligence community, recognizing the urban combat challenge, is revising intelligence techniques to provide analysts with a better methodology for urban combat. As current US manuals are revised, intelligence analysis techniques should also be revised to ensure that they aid commanders and staffs in understanding the threat they face in an urban environment. To do so first requires understanding the issues confronted by intelligence analysts.

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[1] Cornelius Ryan, *The Last Battle* (New York: Popular Library, 1966), 520.
[2] Department of the Army, *FM 3-0, Operations* (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001), 1-9.
[3] Ibid.

When trying to assess and predict enemy actions in today's urban combat environment, an intelligence analyst faces two major issues. First, the enemies that the US could face on an urban battlefield are more diverse than were expected during the Cold War. Second, although terrain appears to be a major factor affecting urban fighting, it is hardly the only factor. The complex system of a city demands that an analyst understand more than just urban terrain and its affects on urban combatants.

From the end of the Second World War to the fall of the Soviet Union, the American military focused on the Soviet Union as the primary threat. In doing so, the US intelligence community studied Soviet methodology as the key to understanding and predicting Soviet actions. US Army manuals documented Soviet history and tactics so that soldiers and officers could understand the patterns of Soviet warfighting. The US military perceived Soviet warfighting as inflexible and predictable. Intelligence officers built inflexible and predictable templates in an attempt to predict likely threat courses of action (COAs) based on Soviet tactical patterns.

The fall of the Soviet Union ended the focus on a single threat when predicting future enemy actions, yet the current tactical intelligence procedures still rely heavily on pattern analysis to develop threat COAs. *FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis* and *FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* explains the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process in detail. Step three in the IPB process is identifying and evaluating the threat to determine threat capabilities and patterns of operations.[4] In step four of the IPB process, these threat capabilities and patterns of operations are adjusted for weather, terrain and the local situation. Potential enemy COAs can be determined from this. After determining threat COAs, staffs draft reconnaissance and surveillance plans to detect indicators that confirm or deny these enemy courses of action.[5] Lacking a single threat to focus on, and lacking comprehensive studies of the tactics of potential enemies, tactical intelligence officers are hard pressed to determine threat

[4] Department of the Army, *FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1994), 2-30.

actions. Without a comprehensive understanding of specific urban warfare tactics, how does a tactical intelligence officer determine the indicators for threat COAs for urban combat?

The second major issue concerning urban combat is consideration of the factors that influence the fight. Enemy attempts to negate US advantages by using complex and difficult terrain are nothing new. In *Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945*, Michael Doubler explains how German forces negated US mobility and firepower by fighting in cities.[6] The Japanese did the same when they defended Manila in 1945. Shaping the battlefield by negating an adversary's strength is a prudent measure for any military force.

Terrain, however, is only one aspect of these battles. The entire environment influences combat. History, culture, and demographics, also determine the nature and outcome of a fight. An analyst must determine the extent that these factors affect the actions of those combatants in an urban fight.

STRUCTURING THE STUDY

RESEARCH QUESTION

Would an analyst who uses the current techniques for identifying indicators of threat actions be able to adequately determine the urban tactics of a threat in a mid intensity conflict? This monograph focuses on current techniques for analysis and determines if they provide an analyst with a logical method for identifying indicators of potential threat COAs against US forces could in urban combat. This paper focuses on mid intensity conflicts. Mid intensity is defined as:

> The limited use of force for political purposes by nations or organizations to gain permanent or temporary control of territory through the use of regular armed forces. This form of conflict does not include the use of nuclear weapons. Mid intensity conflict may include some or all of the techniques and characteristics of low intensity conflict.[7]

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[5] Ibid, 2-39 - 2-52.
[6] Michael D. Doubler, *Closing With The Enemy: How GIs Fought The War In Europe, 1944-45* (Lawrence, Kans: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 283.
[7] Department of the Army, *FM 33-1, Psychological Operations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1987) Glossary - 2.

While some elements of low intensity conflict may also be involved during mid intensity conflicts, all of the case studies are mid intensity conflicts.

METHODOLOGY

The monograph employs a two-step historical analysis. The first step reviews the intelligence analysis techniques prescribed by current doctrine. This step answers the following questions:

1. What are the current techniques for identifying indicators of enemy actions?
2. How are these techniques employed?
3. What are the key factors that these techniques consider?

The second step applies these techniques to historical cases. The four case studies include the battle of Hue in 1968, the US Marines involvement in Beirut in 1983 and the battles for Grozny in 1994 and again in 1999. These case studies represent scenarios similar to those that U.S. forces could find themselves in should they become engaged in a mid intensity conflict in the near future. These case studies also reflect situations in which combatants chose to confront a modern high tech army inside a city. The battles for Grozny in 1994 and 1999 were specifically chosen since the combatants were able to adjust their tactics for a second battle in 1999 based on lessons learned from the first battle in 1994.

This study then reviews the analytical techniques in each case study to determine if applying these techniques would have identified indicators of enemy COAs. The study then shows how to use these techniques and how to identify any shortcomings the techniques may have. It focuses on the following questions:

1. How are these techniques employed to determine indicators of future threat COAs?
2. Would these techniques be effective in determining indicators that a threat will change his tactics?
3. Would these techniques provide enemy indicators when no apparent initial pattern exists?

Supporting information is mostly secondary source material, however, whenever possible, primary source information is included.

Chapter 6 determines what, if any, issues arise after applying these techniques to the case studies. This chapter also identifies any consistencies in issues between the case studies. Recommendations are made in the conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF DOCTRINE

What are the current techniques to identify indicators of enemy actions and how should an analyst employ them? These are found in the current US Army FMs related to intelligence operations.

FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (1994) and *FM 34-3 Intelligence Analysis* (1990) are the key US Army manuals that discuss procedures for intelligence analysis. *FM 34-130* explains the US Army's Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), which analyzes the threat environment and determines probable enemy actions. The FM focuses on determining enemy capabilities within the constraints of weather, terrain, and the enemy's doctrine to determine potential enemy COAs. However, *FM 34-130* does not reveal specific analytical techniques to determine indicators of adopted enemy COAs. These techniques are found in *FM 34-3*.

Chapter Six in *FM 34-3 Intelligence Analysis* discusses the analytical portion of situation development. The chapter begins with determining answers to the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR). These requirements directly relate to what actions the enemy will take to affect the friendly commander's mission. The FM begins with an examination of enemy capabilities in order to determine the enemy's most likely COAs.[8]

[8] Department of the Army, *FM 34-3, Intelligence Analysis* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1990), 6-1 - 6-4.

To narrow the scope of the analysis, Chapter Six describes the factors of analysis. These factors focus on understanding the enemy's doctrine or methodology and other factors that affect the implementation of that methodology. These factors include the enemy's use of mass and economy of force, composition of the enemy force one echelon up, significant enemy activity outside the friendly unit's area of operations and the enemy's tactics. The effects of weather and terrain on the enemy are also considered. Additional techniques include determining the enemy's use of mass and economy of force by determining enemy boundaries and relating them to assembly areas (AA); computing strength in terms of committed forces, reinforcements, and supporting elements and comparing them to each AA; analyzing enemy allocations of available lines of communications; and identifying potential enemy objectives and relating them to known enemy dispositions.[9]

TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYSIS

Chapter Six of *FM 34-3* then discusses specific techniques that analysts can use to identify indicators of future enemy actions. The first technique is pattern analysis. *FM 34-3* explains that, "Pattern analysis is based on the premise that the enemy's course of action results in certain characteristic patterns that are identified and correctly interpreted."[10] An analyst working with this technique organizes his information on the enemy and attempts to identify reoccurring events or indicators associated with enemy actions. Once the analyst correctly identifies these events, the presence of these events and indicators predicts associated enemy actions. *FM 34-3* contains only a single paragraph on pattern analysis and does not go into any detail on how to actually implement this technique.

Weighing indicators is the second technique used to identify indicators of future enemy actions. Analysts experience problems when confronted with multiple events associated with multiple enemy actions. The problems are complicated further if the actual enemy COA does not

[9] Ibid, 6-7 - 6-9.

have the most events associated with it. When faced with this dilemma, the analyst may determine which events or indicators weigh more in his determination of the enemy COA. *FM 34-3* includes three procedures that can be used individually or in combination to help weigh indicators. These procedures examine the origin of the indicator, utilize the principle of mass indicators, and examine those indicators that are difficult to fake.

When determining the origin of the indicator, *FM 34-3* states that, "In brief, all indicators stem from either military logic, doctrinal training, organizational constraints, bureaucratic constraints, or the personality of the commander."[11] Military logic assume that there are basic answers to most military problems. For example, artillery supported of a unit requires that the artillery is within range of the targets affecting the supported unit. Otherwise, the artillery is not supporting that particular unit.[12]

The second consideration is the enemy's training. Training may override one's own military logic when determining specific answers to specific military problems. The example provided in the FM states that while both the US and Soviet doctrine advocate moving artillery forward to support an attack, they differ on the use of artillery in direct fire. Frequent use of direct fire artillery would not occur to a US artilleryman.[13]

The third consideration is organizational constraints. A military adopts its structure based on resources, experience, perceived threats, and other factors. Patterns of activities are derived from the particular structure of a military unit. Units with four subordinate units will naturally do things differently than those units with three subordinate units. A mechanized unit will operate significantly differently than a light infantry unit.[14]

The fourth consideration is bureaucratic constraints. Most military units are large bureaucratic organizations that establish routines for routine activities. Planning, execution, and

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[10] Ibid, 6-9.
[11] Ibid, 6-10 - 6-11.
[12] Ibid 6-10.
[13] Ibid.

logistics support are some of the key activities that require routine procedures for efficient realization.[15]

The fifth consideration is the personality of the commander. Each commander has unique strengths, weaknesses and idiosyncrasies. Many commanders deviate from doctrine when they are more comfortable with doing things that they are familiar with in ways that have proven successful in the past. At the same time, a commander may not do things that he is unfamiliar with or that have proven unsuccessful in the past.[16]

The second procedure for weighing indicators is the principle of mass indicators. This procedure assumes that the enemy will use deception to introduce false indicators. However, lack of resources will limit the number of false indicators. By focusing on those indicators of major commitments of combat resources, the analyst can interpret the true enemy COA.[17]

The third procedure is to weigh those indicators that are the most difficult to fake. The analyst uses his knowledge of the enemy to determine the relationship of key specific indicators with regard to specific enemy COAs. He then determines the simple mathematical probability of an enemy COA based on the presence of a particular indicator. An analyst can also examine the time sequence of events. The required time to conduct certain activities based on the location and routes eliminate or highlight enemy COAs. Finally, the analyst can make a subjective assessment of the enemy's combat effectiveness based on tangible and intangible factors like morale, training, and reliability to determine if the presence of specific indicators should be considered.[18]

The final technique to identify indicators of future enemy actions is to wargame friendly and enemy capabilities. In this technique, the analyst considers the enemy capabilities and their choice of COAs in light of the enemy's perception of friendly capabilities. The analyst then mentally wargames enemy capabilities based on this perception in search of the more

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[14] Ibid, 6-11.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid, 6-11 - 6-12.

advantageous COAs. Once he identifies the potential enemy COAs, he uses this as a basis to identify the related indicators. *FM 34-3* warns however, that the analyst must remain objective and not fall into the trap of mirror imaging. He must truly put himself in the mindset of the enemy to use this technique.[19]

DOCTRINE FOR URBAN OPERATIONS

Current US Army intelligence doctrine lacks an analysis of threat actions within an urban environment. *FM 34-3* does not contain any specific guidance on modifications to the techniques for analysis when considering urban combat. *FM 34-130* also lacks specific considerations for urban combat. It does include some examples of IPB products, such as overlays and matrixes, which can be used for analyzing the enemy in an urban area. However, there is very little explanation or specific guidance for considering threat actions within urban areas, and the section that includes these examples is oriented toward noncombatant evacuation.[20]

The primary US Army manual for urban combat is *FM 90-10 Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT)*, published in 1979. It does include sections on enemy tactics for defending and attacking cities and villages. However, these sections are clearly based on the tactics of the former Soviet Army, with its motorized rifle battalions, regiments and divisions.[21]

The manual does provide a good study of urban combat. It includes attacking and clearing enemy strong points, employment of mines and obstacles, weapons effects and employment, and urban terrain analysis. This manual is a good start, however the focus on old Soviet tactics does not address the current tactics of potential threats.

The same comments can also be applied to *FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to Urban Combat*, published in 1982. This manual focuses on tactics, techniques and procedures for

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[18] Ibid, 6-12.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Department of the Army, *FM 34-130*, 3-77 - 3-90.
[21] Department of the Army, *FM 90-10, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1979), 2-1 - 2-7, 3-1 - 3-12.

battalion level and lower combat. It contains a good amount of basic information on urban tactics and terrain analysis, but it also focuses on Soviet tactics.

Most of these manuals are due for revision. However, until these manuals are officially replaced, they represent current approved US Army doctrine. While many basic aspects of urban combat will remain constant, it is clear that intelligence analysis of threat doctrine and future threat actions in an urban environment are dated.

CONCLUSION

The first step of this study identified three doctrinal techniques for conducting analysis: pattern analysis, weighing indicators, and wargaming friendly and enemy capabilities. Current intelligence doctrine emphasizes understanding the enemy's doctrine as a prerequisite to analyzing future enemy actions. Current US Army doctrine on urban combat focuses on the tactics of the former Soviet Union. Specific guidance about intelligence analysis other than terrain analysis is limited.

The next chapters utilize the three doctrinal techniques to analyze the four case studies. Each case study involves urban combat in a mid intensity environment. The intent is to determine if implementing these techniques would provide an analyst with a logical procedure to determine the likely enemy COA.

CHAPTER THREE

THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE AND THE BATTLE FOR HUE

The Tet Offensive of 1968 stands out as one of the most important campaigns of the South Vietnamese conflict. Many consider it the turning point in the war.[22] In the early morning hours of 31 January 1968, North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) forces conducted an extensive attack across South Vietnam. NVA and VC objectives included key military installations of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and US forces throughout South

Vietnam. In addition, NVA and VC forces attempted to seize and retain several major cities inside South Vietnam to include Saigon and Hue. The campaign raged for several weeks, and as late as 24 February 1968, US and ARVN forces were still fighting for final control of the city of Hue.

The pre-offensive perceptions of the military leaders of both the United States and the Vietnamese Communists are important to understanding the conflict. By 1967, the US military believed that they were winning the war in South Vietnam. Militarily, US and South Vietnamese efforts had seriously reduced NVA and VC forces, and had limited communist recruiting inside South Vietnam.[23] Pacification efforts successfully denied South Vietnamese populace support for the Communists.[24] The lack of manpower and the US bombing of North Vietnam caused a major decline in the quality of life in North Vietnam and food shortages had reached critical levels.[25] General Westmoreland, Commander of the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), felt confident that his strategy was working.[26]

North Vietnamese Communist leaders also felt that they were unsuccessful on the battlefield. Serious debate inside North Vietnam highlighted the effectiveness of US and South Vietnamese efforts while considering what could be done to reverse these successes. Questions arose concerning the current wisdom of continuing the long-term strategy. North Vietnamese leaders felt they could continue the fight even if it meant a change in strategy. Further, they felt that there were serious allied weaknesses they could exploit.[27]

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[22] James R. Arnold, *Tet Offensive 1968* (London: Osprey Publishing, 1990), 91.
[23] M. K. Lietz, "Why the North Vietnamese Launched a Major Military Offensive During Tet 1968." (Master of Military Art and Science thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 120-121.
[24] Ibid., 143-151.
[25] Ibid., 155-161.
[26] James J. Wirtz, *The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 117.
[27] John Hughes-Wilson, *Military Intelligence Blunders* (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 1999), 173-178.

PATTERN ANALYSIS

After a force has been fighting an opponent for some time, patterns of activity eventually emerge. The technique of pattern analysis can identify indicators. Such was the case in South Vietnam. US intelligence analysis identified a three-phase communist strategy that progressed from the creation of a political and guerrilla organization, to the establishment of larger forces for strategic mobility, and finally to large scale attacks to annihilate the enemy. These analysts also determined that after the deployment of US forces, the Communists either had given up on or did not have the ability to carry out the large-scale decisive offensive operations that were part of the third phase.[28]

Before the 1968 Tet Offensive, the NVA and VC forces primarily conducted a defensive fight and appeared to have lost the initiative to the allies. The last major offensive operation mounted against the Americans was a series of battles within the Ia Drang Valley in 1965 during which they suffered severe losses. In 1966, the allies assessed that ARVN forces held the initiative in the southern part of South Vietnam, and the VC refused to engage any allied forces in battle during July and June of that year. In the Central Highlands, the Communists did not conduct any major operation during 1966 and 1967.[29]

At what point does a force change its tactics? The Tet Offensive represents a drastic change in the NVA and VC tactics that had been employed up until that time. If a force is not having success with its current tactics and the long-term outlook for the accomplishment of its goals is bleak, then the force will quit the conflict, modify its ultimate goals or change its tactics. By 1967, it was clear that the North Vietnamese would not end their struggle to unify Vietnam under Communist control. However, it was also clear that the North Vietnamese leadership felt that the

[28] Wirtz, 102-104.
[29] Lanning and Cragg, 170 and Lietz, 109-111.

struggle could not continue as conducted and that drastic measures were needed to change the situation and regain the initiative. This realization set the stage for a change in tactics.[30]

By November 1967, US intelligence had obtained communist documents and other information outlining instructions for the initiation of major attacks by the NVA and VC against allied forces.[31] The indications that the Communists were about to launch a major attack resulted in intelligence analysts focusing on a "Battle of the Bulge" analogy. US military leaders viewed the upcoming attacks as a desperate gamble similar to the German offensive of 1944 on the western front. When looking for a similar type of NVA and VC operation, US analysts focused on the battle of Dien Bien Phu. They expected the enemy to attempt a major military victory similar to Dien Bien Phu against isolated objectives such as Khe Sanh to obtain a victory and regain the initiative.[32]

However, when looking for future indicators, analysts using pattern analysis must consider all previous enemy actions without focusing prematurely on a single operation. Another major operation that the Communist leadership had tried in the past was a major offensive linked to a general uprising. In August 1945, Ho Chi Minh initiated a general uprising to assist his Communist forces in ousting the Japanese occupational forces and seizing control of what became North Vietnam.[33] Again, on January 13, 1951, Ho Chi Minh and General Giap made three attempts to induce a general uprising connected with a major offensive. The uprising was accompanied with Giap's standard diversionary attack to hide the actual offensive. This time the offensive was unsuccessful. Despite the success or failure of the offensive, the Communists considered this as a way to bring about decisive results. A closer examination of enemy patterns in major offensives would have shown a pattern involving general uprisings, diversionary attacks,

[30] Lietz, 191-200.
[31] Hughes-Wilson, 181-183.
[32] Wirtz, 128-135.
[33] Lietz, 11.

and decisive operations.[34] These patterns are important when considering other enemy aspects such as available combat forces.

The conduct of past urban combat is also important when considering potential changes to current tactics and operations. Prior to the Tet Offensive, neither the NVA nor the VC tried to seize and hold a city as part of an operation. This attempt to seize and hold major South Vietnamese cities, such as Hue, appears to be a drastic change in the tactics of the NVA and VC. However, when considering their past actions, it falls in line with the past pattern of operations conducted by the NVA and VC.

Prior to the Tet Offensive, the Communist forces used 'hugging' tactics in which their forces would operate as close to the American forces as possible during combat. This prevented the US from effectively using their superior artillery and air power and made up for the NVA and VC lack of firepower.[35] The communist move to urban combat also negated Allied artillery and airpower while providing extra protection for the Communist forces. The move into the city was not as radical as it may have seemed. The pattern of hugging Allied forces to avoid their superior firepower matches indicators of an intent by NVA and VC forces to fight urban battles.

These seizures of major cities were a direct attempt by General Giap, Commander-in Chief of all North Vietnamese forces, to create a general uprising within South Vietnam that would drastically alter the war.[36] This general uprising is an essential element of the third part of the three phase North Vietnamese Communist strategy called "Dau Tranh."[37] The migration of South Vietnamese to the cities in 1967 meant that a large portion of the population was now urban. Consequently, urban combat was a logical site for a decisive battle.[38]

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[34] Ibid., 74-77.
[35] Arnold, 30-31.
[36] Lt. Gen. Willard Pearson, *Vietnam Studies: The War in the Northern Provinces 1966-1968* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), 94-97; John Hughes-Wilson, 176.
[37] Lietz, 59-65.
[38] Lietz, 143.

When using pattern analysis to develop indicators, the analyst must remember several key points. Once a pattern of success or failure of enemy tactics is established, the analyst must constantly look for indicators that the enemy will change his tactics. Further, he should always consider the wide range of enemy tactics when looking for changes to enemy patterns. Enemy perceptions of their situation and their opponent's situation will drive changes in tactics, therefore the analyst must consider changes in tactics through the perceptions of the enemy. Finally, when determining indications of a change in enemy tactical patterns, the analyst should consider using the technique of weighing indicators.

WEIGHING INDICATORS

The technique of weighing indicators can be effective. However, this technique has to be used in conjunction with pattern analysis to be effective. All three procedures for weighing indicators could have been applied.

The first technique of examining the origin of the indicator provides indicators of what the Communists intended. US analysts who discounted a major Communist offensive felt that the Communists did not have the necessary forces and therefore disregarded indicators that they intended to do so. The analysts saw a major Communist offensive as a violation of military logic. These analysts had developed a detailed order of battle of the NVA and VC that showed a major decline in combat strength. This information, along with their assessment that the sympathies of the South Vietnamese people had significantly shifted away from supporting the Communists, dictated that a major Communist offensive at this time made no military sense - particularly one that focused on urban combat.[39]

Further complicating this view, was the threat to the US outpost at Khe Sanh. Clear indications showed that NVA forces were massing for a major attack on US positions along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and on Khe Sanh. If the Communists were desperate and needed a

[39] Wirtz, 262-265.

decisive battle to change the war, an attempt at another Dien Bien Phu might make sense and would follow a pattern they had established when fighting the French. Their lack of forces and logistics dictated that while they might be able to threaten the allies near the DMZ, they could not threaten allied forces and urban areas further south without violating the military principles of concentration and mass.[40]

Perception is key to understanding each side's military logic. From the Communist leadership point of view, they had the forces required to conduct this operation. VC reports to Hanoi painted a picture of continued sympathy and support for the Communists in South Vietnam. These reports downplayed VC losses while Communist propaganda attempted to minimize the effectiveness of allied actions. Communist leaders perceived that they had the support needed for major operations. By 1967, allied intelligence had a more accurate picture of the strength of the VC and support in the south; however, they did not view the situation through the eyes of this enemy even if the enemy perception was an inaccurate one.[41]

The personality of the commander is also a basis for indicators. General Giap believed that a general uprising in South Vietnam would add additional forces. By recruiting additional fighters from the urban areas as well as from ARVN units that might turn against US forces, he could realize the additional forces required to conduct and sustain a major offensive.[42] General Giap would sacrifice the lives of thousands of soldiers and fellow sympathizers in an effort to gain victory - even if that sacrifice was a risk at best. In a word, General Giap was "bloodthirsty" and a risky operation was in line with the pattern of his previous behavior and military logic.[43]

Simply looking at mass indicators does not present a clear picture of enemy intentions, but combining this with pattern analysis and weighing indicators reveals a clearer picture of

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[40] Wirtz, 266-268
[41] Lietz, 182-189.
[42] Wirtz, 263.
[43] Dr. James H. Willbanks, Instructor, Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, interview with the author, 28 September 2001, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. written notes.

intentions. By mid 1967, there were indicators that the NVA was massing troops for an attack on Khe Sahn. Their location near the DMZ provided NVA troops with artillery support from positions inside North Vietnam. This supported the analogy of another Dien Bien Phu since mass indicators supported the idea that if the Communist mounted a major offensive, it would be in the north and not in central and southern Vietnam.[44]

Pattern analysis and analysis of the time sequence of events would have shown that the principle of mass indicators must be balanced with the enemy's attempt at deception. General Giap consistently employed deception and diversionary attacks to protect his force against superior US firepower. Pattern analysis would indicate that the enemy would attempt to divert attention away from the primary operation. Analyzing the time sequence of events would show that there was a time lag between the diversionary actions and the actual main effort in order to obtain the desired allied response. Pattern analysis and the time sequencing technique would also show that the diversionary attack would have to be large enough to divert the allied attention away from the main effort. The diversionary attack on Khe Sahn was preceded by a mass of indicators that caused the allies to move away from the actual intended objective.

Enemy perceptions also affect the procedure of assessing the enemy's combat effectiveness as part of the technique for weighing indicators. While the analysts could make the subjective assessment that the NVA and VC did not have the ability to conduct a major offensive operation based on current facts, this assessment would have been wrong within the context of the enemy perception of themselves and the situation at the time.

[44] Wirtz, 266-270.

WARGAMING FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES: THE BATTLE FOR HUE

The technique of wargaming friendly and enemy capabilities can be applied to the Battle of Hue. When wargaming capabilities, it is important to understand the significance of potential enemy objectives. One can start by asking why take and hold the city of Hue?

Both the US and the Communists appreciated Hue's importance to the Vietnamese people. The Vietnamese considered Hue to be the cultural and intellectual center of all of Vietnam. It has a long history filled with tradition and was the imperial capitol of Vietnam years before.[45] General Westmoreland understood the importance of Hue. In a February 1966 strategy meeting with President Johnson, he considered a Communist attempt on Hue probable. He stated that, "Taking it would have a profound psychological impact on the Vietnamese in both the North and the South, and in the process the North Vietnamese might seize the two northern provinces as bargaining points in any negotiations."[46] His words were almost prophetic.

The population within Hue was a significant military factor. In the spring of 1965 there had been antigovernment protests, and the leadership in Saigon was a bit suspicious of the citizens of Hue.[47] Being the intellectual center of Vietnam, support in Hue would do much to legitimize the Communist cause. The movement of the South Vietnamese from the rural areas to the relative safety of the cities was robbing the VC of support. This was especially true in the region where Hue was located, as allied pacification efforts were meeting with increasing success.[48] Hue was growing in importance as a potential decisive point for the Communists.

Hue was an inviting military target. The Citadel, a large ancient fortress was located within the city limits. Its large fortified walls, moat and the bunkers left over from the Japanese occupation made it key terrain for anyone attempting to take or defend the city. Hue, however,

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[45] George W. Smith, *The Siege at Hue* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 7.
[46] Ibid, xvii.
[47] Ibid, 7.
[48] Lietz, 143-147, 132-133.

was an open city.[49] The only actual combat forces within the city were an under strength ARVN infantry company within the Citadel, and an ARVN tank company located in the southern part of the city.[50]

Important allied headquarters were also located within the city. The headquarters of the 1st ARVN Division was located within the citadel. The 1st ARVN Division was considered the best ARVN regular army division, and its commander Brigadier General Truong, was considered the finest ARVN senior combat commander by the Americans. In addition, the MACV US advisory compound was located on the south side of the city. Both of these headquarters were lightly defended.[51]

Confirmed intelligence reports located major enemy units near Hue before the attacks began. Prior to the attacks against other urban areas on 29 January 1968, allied forces knew that the 4th and 6th NVA Regiments were within ten to twenty kilometers of Hue. Intelligence reports had located four of the battalions associated with these NVA regiments in positions that essentially encircled the city.[52]

An initial analysis shows that the enemy was capable of seizing and attempting to hold Hue. NVA units were equipped with modern Soviet and Chinese Communists weapons. The regiments opposite Hue were infantry units equipped with an assortment of small arms, including AK-47s, machine guns, RPG-2s and RPG-7s, 82-120mm mortars, and 57-75mm recoilless rifles.[53] When comparing the number of allied forces within Hue and the identified NVA forces outside and near the city, the NVA has a clear numerical advantage. Even with the ARVN tank company, the allies lacked sufficient force and infantry to prevent the communist's seizure of the

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[49] Brigadier General (Ret) Edwin H. Simmons, "The Battle for Hue," The MOUT Homepage. Internet, available from http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/hue.html; accessed 22 August 2002.
[50] Smith, 7-11.
[51] Arnold, 16; Smith, 9-14.
[52] Major Miles D. Waldron and Specialist. 5 Richard W. Beavers, "Historical Study 2-68: Operation Hue City" (Historical Monograph, San Francisco: HQ Provisional Corps Vietnam, 1968. typewritten), 4-6.
[53] Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, *Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnam's Armed Forces* (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1992), 82-83, 105-107.

city. The NVA had a very favorable combat ratio. They could seize and temporarily hold the city.

The initial disposition of forces and the location of the Citadel aided the Communists. The Citadel was an ideal fortress for an infantry defense. The infantry regiments were located within a days march of Hue and there were no major allied units within the city to prevent them from seizing the city rapidly.

The location of key allied headquarters within a relatively unprotected area made Hue an even more inviting target. The destruction of the 1st ARVN Division's headquarters and its commander would complicate any allied response and would provide a great psychological victory. The benefits would be even greater if the attack on Hue was not just an isolated fight but part of a much larger operation.

When attempting to retake the city, the American and ARVN forces faced a moral dilemma. They needed additional artillery, armor and air support to retake the city, especially when trying to root out the defenders within the Citadel. The only alternative was to take significant casualties. This placed the Americans in an unfavorable situation. Mass firepower would certainly cause major destruction to the city. The Americans might destroy the cultural center of Vietnam in order to save it. For those ARVN soldiers who lived and who came from Hue, the prospect of destroying their own home would not be a pleasant one. In addition, the South Vietnamese reaction to the US destruction of Hue would not be favorable.[54]

Taking Hue would support the objectives of the enemy force. Ho Chi Minh's battle cry of, "Defend the North, Free the South, and Unite the Country," essentially established the strategic goals of the Communists. Lacking the military power to destroy allied forces in the south, the Communists tried to create a favorable political and psychological situation in the south that

[54] Lester Grau, Foreign Military Studies Analyst, interview with the author, 18 July 2001, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. written notes.

would lead to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Once the Communists assessed that time was no longer on their side they accelerated the process through rapid action.[55]

Seizing and holding Hue contributed to the attainment of these goals. The capture of the cultural center of Vietnam struck a psychological and political blow to the south. The chance to destroy key ARVN headquarters elements also weakened the South militarily and psychologically. The moral dilemma faced by the Americans of destroying Hue to retake it alienated Americans and their participation in the conflict from the South Vietnamese people. Finally, the mass killing of anti-Communists in Hue by VC and NVA forces was a psychological blow to the South Vietnamese government.

Wargaming enemy and friendly capabilities would have alerted the local Marine forces to the impending enemy actions. The Marines entered the city after it had fallen to the NVA forces without any clear idea of what was happening. Had they wargamed enemy and friendly capabilities, they would have had an idea of what kind of situation they could face before the attack. Intelligence gained from the growing attack on Hue would have provided the Marines with a much better appraisal of what was about to happen.[56] When combined with pattern analysis and the weighing of indicators, an even clearer picture could be developed.

CONCLUSIONS

An examination of the Tet Offensive and Battle for Hue in 1968 reveals several key points. First, an analyst should not focus on only one technique but should use a combination of the three techniques to determine indicators of an impending attack. This is especially true when one considers that the NVA and VC forces changed their tactics and subsequent goals for this attack because of ongoing allied actions. Second, analysts had to understand enemy's perceptions of themselves and their situation before they could effectively use any of the techniques, but this was especially true of pattern analysis and weighing indicators. Third, examining and

[55] Waldron and Beavers, 93-97.

understanding enemy aims and potential objectives was important in determining COAs through wargaming enemy and friendly capabilities.

In the Battle for Hue, the terrain, and the population were vital aspects to consider when looking for indicators of enemy COAs. The city and population were vital factors in the selection of Hue as a target for NVA and VC forces. The population in Hue and throughout South Vietnam probably had the biggest impact on the battle. When they did not rise up against the government and American forces as part of the offensive, the NVA and VC forces were crushed by allied counteractions.[57]

CHAPTER FOUR

THE US MARINES IN BEIRUT 1982 - 1984

The US Marines' were deployed in Beirut, Lebanon from August 1982 to August 1984. Their initial deployment was part of the US Multinational Force (USMNF) from August 1982 until February 1984. The US Marine's remained deployed in Beirut after the peacekeeping mission to act as the external security force for the United States and United Kingdom (UK) Embassies in Beirut until August 1984. Although their missions were peacekeeping and security, their actions ranged almost the entire urban scale of conflict from peacekeeping to low and mid intensity conflict. Before the Marines left, they had suffered 238 killed, 151 wounded, 40 non-battle related injuries and 7 wounded as the result of accidental weapon discharges. Most of the Marines killed were from the suicide bombing of the Marine barracks, however, they had already suffered 7 killed and 64 wounded before the suicide attack. By the end of the deployment, 20 Marines were killed in events separate from the suicide attack on 23 October 1983.[58]

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[56] Hughes-Wilson, 202-203.
[57] Leitz, 199-200.
[58] Benis M. Frank, *U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984* (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1987), 149-153, 140; Eric Hammel, *The Root: The Marines in Beirut August 1982-February 1984* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1985), 429-432; Major Ronald F. Baczkowski, "Tactical Lessons for Peacekeeping: U.S. Multinational Force in Beirut 1982-1984," Internet, available from http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6453/beirut.html: accessed 30

In June 1982, Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon in Operation "Peace for Galilee" with the aim of eliminating the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from southern Lebanon and Beirut. The Israelis hoped that the removal of the PLO would end violence on its northern border and lead to a friendly government in Lebanon. During the invasion, Israeli forces fought both PLO and Syrian forces that occupied parts of southern and central Lebanon. The Syrian forces tried to avoid a full-scale war with Israel, but fighting with the PLO forces was extensive. The operation culminated in the Israeli siege of Beirut from July to August 1983 and resulted in the evacuation of the PLO by the USMNF.[59]

The Marine mission can be broken down into three phases. The first phase was the US Marines' involvement as part of a US-lead effort with French and Italian forces to evacuate the PLO from Beirut. This mission lasted from 25 August to 10 September 1982. During the second phase, US Marines (as part of the USMNF) provided security in the Beirut area to allow the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to carry out their responsibilities. This phase lasted from 22 September 1982 until about 23 October 1983.

Although the Marines did not receive a new mission after the 23 October bombing, their actions emphasized force protection. From January 1984 until the end of the USMNF peacekeeping mission in February 1984, the Marines focused attention primarily on the defense of the Beirut International Airport.[60] Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3/8 returned in the spring of 1984 to act as the external security force for the new US and UK Embassies in Beirut. Their mission lasted until late August 1984 when the overall Marine presence ended and they departed.[61]

August 2001. 9; Colonel (Ret) Darrell Combs, Former Executive Officer for BLT 3/8, interview by the author, 25 October 2001, written notes, Leavenworth, KS.

[59] Colonel Michael Dewar, *War in the Streets* (United Kingdom: David and Charles, 1992), 69-77.

[60] Baczkowski, 8-10.

[61] Combs.

PATTERN ANALYSIS

The first Marine units deployed did not use pattern analysis because of their lack of detailed information about the situation in Beirut. Marine units that deployed later, however, were able to implement this technique. Before their second deployment to the region, BLT 3/8 compiled information produced by Marine units inside Beirut to develop a database that assisted them in using pattern analysis. BLT 3/8 compiled information from patrolling reports, photographs, message traffic, and intelligence summaries while they were still at Camp Lejeune and enroute to Lebanon. This information allowed BLT 3/8 to become familiar with the situation rapidly and to develop a database that helped them identify patterns before their arrival in Beirut.[62]

The frequent rotation of Marine units and staffs had a negative impact on the mission and the use of pattern analysis. Each Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) deployed to Beirut for an average three and one half months. This relatively short tour hampered continuity and Marine units did not fully appreciate the impact of changes on their mission and the situation in Beirut. For example, the Marines based the initial tactical deployment of their forces on a careful consideration of tactical requirements and the need to separate potential combatants. The Marines based their initial boundaries on the location of the occupying Israeli forces and the Muslim population in an attempt to separate the two. When the Israeli forces left, there was no adjustment of the Marine boundaries based on the new conflicts between the Christian and Muslim populations. It appears that subsequent Marine units did not consider redrawing boundaries even though earlier MAU staff members commented later on the need to adjust the boundary.[63]

Lack of continuity also affected the local perception of Marine impartiality. Colonel Mead, the commander of the first Marine unit to begin the actual peacekeeping mission, observed hostile actions carried out by the LAF against Palestinian and Muslim civilians including the bulldozing

[62] Ibid.
[63] Baczkowski, 28-31.

of Shia shanty dwellings in West Beirut. He was concerned how association with the LAF might jeopardize the perception of Marine impartiality. Soon after Colonel Mead's departure, the newly deployed 24th MAU began training the LAF. Later, the 24th MAU began combined patrols with the LAF through Muslim populated areas in east and west Beirut. It is not known whether the new commander knew about the previous actions of the LAF against the local Muslim population and if he fully understood the impact that his relationship with the LAF on would have on Muslim perception of Marine impartiality.[64] Clearly, the lack of continuity frustrated Marine analysts' attempts to identify fully and to understand the patterns of activity within Beirut.

Was there a pattern of activity which pattern analysis could have used to predict the suicide bombing of the Marine barracks? There were similar incidents that preceded the attack on 23 October. On 18 April 1983, a terrorist destroyed the US embassy in Lebanon by driving a van into the embassy lobby and detonating the 2,000 lbs. of explosives that were loaded in the van. This attack killed 63 embassy occupants. Later, on 19 October, a remote controlled car bomb exploded in the path of a Marine supply convoy. Intelligence later determined that a pro-Iranian Islamic fundamentalist sect was responsible for the attack.[65] These attacks identified a belligerent with the capability of using cars and trucks loaded with explosives to attack targets.

However, while the Marines were aware of this capability, they were not prepared for an attack on the scale of 23 October 1983. Intelligence reports from 1 June 1983 up until the attack identified over a hundred car bomb suspects complete with car makes, models, and license plates. Indications of suicide attacks involving large trucks were lacking. This was key as the actual bombing involved a five-ton truck moving at high speed carrying some 12,000 to 16,000 pounds of explosive.

[64] Ibid., 28-31.
[65] Frank, 60, 93.

After the attack, Colonel Geraghty, commander of the 24th MAU, said that he had not anticipated an attack of the scale or manner as the one on the Marine barracks.[66] General Kelley, Commandant of the Marine Corps, later stated that the only similarity between the US Embassy attack and the Marine barracks attack was the fact that it was a terrorist bombing involving a motor vehicle. He emphasized the differences in the attacks by stating "The delivery system was totally different, as was every other aspect of the two incidents."[67]

Once again, when does one anticipate changes in preexisting patterns of tactics? The need to anticipate changes in redundant patterns begins with changes within the urban environment. By 23 October, the situation in Beirut had changed from what it had been when the Marines had first arrived. The local populace was now hostile toward the Marines. Marine actions openly supported the LAF over Muslim and Druse forces and the Reagan Administration's strongly supported Amin Gemayel as the Lebanon President-alienating the Muslims from the Americans.[68] Marine patrols met increased hostility, and the local press called the multinational forces the "international militia."[69] Militia began firing deliberately at Marine positions.[70] The populace in Beirut no longer felt that the Marines were impartial.

Other aspects of the situation in Beirut had changed as well. The Marines no longer thought in terms of peacekeeping. The stress of being in a hostile situation with strict rules of engagement changed the general attitude of the Marines from one of restraint to a general desire to use force.[71] Finally, the composition of the contending forces within Beirut changed. By 4 September 1983, the majority of the PLO was gone and Israeli forces were moving out of

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[66] Ibid., 102-103; Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, interview for Marine Corps Oral History Collection, 2 November 1983, quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 204.
[67] General Paul X. Kelly, Remarks to Senate Armed Services Committee, 31 October 1983, quoted in Benis M. Frank, 103-104,
[68] Frank, 88-89; Friedman, 193-195, 204.
[69] Hammel, 94-95; Friedman, 210.
[70] Hammel, 112.
[71] Baczkowski, 39-40.

Beirut.[72] With the Israeli departure, regular Syrian soldiers and Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen moved into Beirut to join in the fight for the city.[73] All of these factors affected the patterns of activity.

The Marines focused on the familiar pattern of belligerent actions and did not anticipate when the belligerents would deviate from that pattern. The 24th MAU became accustomed to constant artillery, mortar, rocket and small arms attacks. Although there were indications of possible car bomb attacks, these indications were mostly unclear. While the car bomb convoy attack of 19 October made the car bomb threat real, this particular attack was part of the previous pattern. Marine defenses focused on the pattern of activity they had seen in the past.[74] The Marines did not adequately consider how that pattern might change and translate that consideration into active defensive measures.

Without considering when or how that pattern would change, pattern analysis alone would not have led an analyst to anticipate the method of attack against the Marine barracks. To find those changes, one must use also use the techniques of weighing indicators and wargaming enemy and friendly capabilities.

WEIGHING INDICATORS

Weighing indicators as reflected in *FM 34-3* requires several changes before it can be effectively used for a situation like Beirut in 1983. These changes focus on working within an urban setting and examining the origin of the indicator or the reasons why the belligerent force exhibits a particular pattern. Demographics and culture affected the doctrine and tactics of those forces that targeted the Marines.

Changes in the demographics of the Beirut population affected the Marine mission. The demographics of the population were already in the middle of major changes before the Marines

[72] Frank, 81.
[73] Hammel, 279-280.
[74] Frank, 167-169.

arrived. The earlier fighting in southern Lebanon forced the Shia poor to move from the rural areas in the south to the Beirut suburbs. The Shia began to bid for power within the city. The result was a major change in the traditional power of the Sunnis and Christians. The departure of the Palestinians also left a power vacuum that the Shia sought to fill.[75]

The actions of the new Lebanese government, the LAF, and the Marines became even more important. The Lebanese leaders deliberately ignored the Shia when building support for their new government. Their actions, such as bulldozing Shia shanty villages in West Beirut further added to Shia animosity toward the LAF. In retrospect, Marine overt support of the LAF further alienated the Shia, who were emerging as a major power within the city and Lebanon itself. Because of this alienation, Syria was able to manipulate the emerging Shia elements to help them in eliminating the USMNF presence and influence.[76]

Culture also had significant impact on belligerent actions. The Syrians manipulated the Muslim culture within Lebanon to obtain their objectives. The introduction and backing of Shia Islamic Revolutionary Guard elements from Iran by Syria were conscious decisions to incite Islamic radicalism within Lebanon against Israel and the USMNF. The Shia within Lebanon proved to be fertile ground for the militarization of Islamic radicalism.[77]

The Marines, on the other hand, may not have fully understood and appreciated the complexities of Lebanese culture and the larger issues driving the Lebanese Civil War. The deployed MAUs received very little training on Lebanese culture, history, and background and that this impacted negatively their ability to remain impartial.[78] The preparation for deployment did not include an adequate portrayal or analysis of the larger issues and forces that were involved in the Lebanese Civil War. Although the MAU and Regimental staffs tried to provide

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[75] William Harris, *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars, and Global Extensions* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1997), 86-88.
[76] Ibid., 176-186.
[77] Ibid., 180-181, 186-188
[78] Backzowski, 39, 43.

information related to the big picture, the pragmatic concerns of what would happen across the street today and tomorrow dominated the Marine thought process.[79]

Culture also has an impact on why a belligerent adopts a particular pattern of doctrine and organization. The cultural and religious similarities between Lebanese and Iranian Shia led to the Lebanese Shia adoption of Iranian techniques in a holy war against Israel and the United States.[80] Islamic fundamentalism within the Muslim culture provided not only a pool of active participants but also the doctrinal base from which the suicide tactics against the US Embassy and the Marine barracks originated.[81]

Within an urban setting, human intelligence (HUMINT) is a vital source of intelligence for an analyst that weighs indicators and decides which indicators are those that are the most difficult to fake. Determining which indicators are the most difficult for a belligerent to fake or assessing combat effectiveness is ultimately a subjective assessment. The analyst makes these assessments based on information he has gathered on key factors relating to the belligerent. The complex terrain that an urban environment provides can seriously degrade sources of intelligence such as imagery and signals intelligence. Population and culture are key factors when considering the weighing of indicators. Extensive HUMINT is required for an analyst to assess these important factors.[82]

The Marines in Lebanon relied heavily on HUMINT to understand their environment and predict future actions by hostile elements. Marine patrols reported how the general population received them, the demographics of the population, and the description, location and abundance

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[79] Colonel (Ret) Darrell Combs, Former Executive Officer for BLT 3/8, E-mail to the author, 27 November 2001.
[80] Institute for Counter-Terrorism, "Hizballah (Party of God)," available from http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=15; Internet, accessed 11 November 2001.
[81] Boaz Ganor, "Suicide Terrorism: An Overview." Institute for Counter-Terrorism, available from http://www.ict.org.il/articles/aticledet..cfm?artlicleid=128; Internet; accessed 19 November 2001; Yoram Schweitzer, "Suicide Terrorism: Development & Characteristics," Institute for Counter Terrorism, available from http://www.ict.org.il/articles/aticledet..cfm?artlicleid= 112; Internet; accessed 19 November 2001.
[82] Russell W. Glenn, *We Band of Brothers: The Call for Joint Urban Operations Doctrine* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999), 28-31.

of handbills plastered on buildings along their patrol routes. All of these were important indicators of the changes that were occurring within the population of Beirut during the period the Marines were deployed within the city.[83] The relationships established between company commanders of BLT 3/8 and local contacts and the younger residents of Beirut provided a tremendous source of information and were vital to the intelligence operations of the MAU.[84]

Reliable and effective HUMINT, however, was not always available to the MAUs. Colonel Anderson, Commander BLT 2/6, complained that while his intelligence personnel were able to give him a good idea of what was happening in places like Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley, they could not tell him what was going on right outside their perimeter. He said he really did not have a good idea what the local populace was really feeling or thinking. The lack of specific HUMINT was also a major factor in the failure to anticipate the suicide attack on the Marine barracks. Although the Marines had received over a hundred indications of potential car bomb attacks, specific indications of an attack of the scale of 23 October 1983 appeared to be lacking. The Long Commission, which investigated the bombing incident, concluded that the HUMINT support was ineffective in providing the USMNF commander with timely intelligence.[85]

In an urban environment, HUMINT is vitally important when assessing demographic and cultural impacts on indicators being weighed. Simply using mass indicators without effective HUMINT prevents the analyst from discriminating effectively between indicators and intentions.

WARGAME FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES

During their security mission for the US and UK Embassies, the BLT 3/8 staff effectively used the technique of wargaming friendly and enemy capabilities to develop indicators of future actions by hostile elements. In doing so, they were well aware of the impact of the urban setting on their assessments. Their evaluation of the environment included the urban terrain and the

[83] Hammel, 104-105.
[84] Combs, interview with the author.
[85] Frank, 106, 167,173-174.

demographics of the population within their area. Their evaluation of the belligerents included the capabilities of the potentially hostile elements to conduct actions across the spectrum of conflict within an urban setting tied to specific goals.

When evaluating friendly and belligerent capabilities, the BLT 3/8 staff used a three level approach to examine urban terrain. In addition to belligerent capabilities on the street level, the staff also considered belligerent capabilities above and below street level. The staff identified a tunnel near the American University that ran underneath their perimeter that hostile elements could use as an infiltration route. The staff developed countermeasures to prevent hostile forces from using the tunnel and generated specific information requirements for their HUMINT network to answer. These actions were effective in preventing anyone from using the tunnel to enter their perimeter.[86]

The staff also considered belligerent and friendly capabilities for operating above the street level. The Marines controlled several of the taller buildings in the area and used them for observation. The BLT 3/8 staff developed a plan to use the observation posts on the tall buildings to be able to triangulate the locations of targets such as snipers and mortars that could fire into the Marine perimeter. They also considered potential belligerent observation posts using the taller buildings opposite their perimeter and determined what the belligerent could and could not see of the Marine perimeter.[87]

The BLT 3/8 staff evaluated all of the local residents within their urban area to gather intelligence gathering on hostile elements. The East German embassy lay within observation range of the Marine perimeter. The Marines suspected that the East Germans were passing intelligence to potentially hostile elements. To negate this, the Marines took security measures to prevent the East German from observing any activities that would indicate future Marine actions.

[86] Combs, interview with the author.
[87] Ibid.

The Marines also took similar security measures against the Israelis and even certain US citizens to prevent hostile intelligence gathering against the Marines.[88]

The BLT 3/8 staff evaluated hostile capabilities ranging from low to mid intensity conflict. First, the staff evaluated the capabilities of the local militias for indicators of actions such as sniper, mortar, artillery and terrorist attacks. Second, they evaluated the capabilities of nearby Syrian units for indicators of both unconventional and conventional attacks. The staff then used these indicators to generate specific intelligence requirements and incorporated the requirements into their reconnaissance plan. They sent their requirements to the next higher headquarters as requests for information that they could not answer with their own organic assets. This full-scale evaluation allowed the BLT 3/8 to function across the spectrum of conflict while deployed in a city.[89]

The staff of BLT 3/8 considered three basic scenarios when wargaming capabilities and actions by potentially hostile elements. The first scenario was an action taken by a hostile force to embarrass US forces and weaken the USMNF and US resolve in the region. The second scenario was an attempt by a hostile force to trick the Marines into firing upon the enemies of the hostile force in an attempt to threaten Marine neutrality. The third scenario was an attempt by a hostile element to involve the Marines in an action that the local or international media could exploit to further the cause of that particular hostile force.[90]

Would wargaming enemy and friendly capabilities have prevented the attack on 23 October 1983? Since the Marines had received over a hundred car bomb warnings this was one of the basic tactics to be expected. The fact that hostile forces had already effectively used this tactic to attack the US Embassy was a good indicator that they would use it again. Although the attack on 23 October 1983 was of a much larger scale wargaming hostile capabilities is an important task when considering new hostile tactics. By understanding current tactics, capabilities, population,

[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.

and culture in weighing indicators, wargaming friendly and enemy capabilities could have developed indicators of future hostile tactics.

CONCLUSION

The Marine experience in Beirut from 1982 to 1984 provides several insights into assessment of indicators of hostile tactics in an urban setting. First, although pattern analysis may not be an effective technique for analysts who lack an established database of belligerent actions, this procedure can be effective once the database is built. Frequent changes in forces and staffs can result in a lack of continuity and can negatively affect analysts who use pattern analysis but are not aware of the full scope of historic and current activities that can influence the mission. A key concern of pattern analysis is when will the current patterns of activity change.

Specific factors such as population demographics and culture are important when considering reasons why hostile elements adopt specific actions and doctrine. Reliable and effective HUMINT, however, is required to assess these factors and determine which indicators should be weighted. Finally, wargaming friendly and belligerent capabilities can serve as an effective technique to determine indicators of belligerent actions. Intelligence analysts can use this technique in conjunction with weighted indicators and pattern analysis to determine future changes to the pattern of actions and tactics of hostile elements.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE BATTLES FOR GROZNY IN 1994-1995 AND 1999-2000

The Republic of Chechnya had been a sore spot for Russia since its declaration of independence in 1991. In 1994, the Russian leadership decided to take military action to reestablish Russian control of the region. On 26 November 1994, Chechen opposition forces reinforced with covert Russian support entered the Chechen capitol of Grozny and tried to overthrow the government of President Dudayev. The Chechen militia quickly defeated this

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[90] Ibid.

opposition attack by unsupported armored forces. Russian President Yeltsin then decided to take overt military action and invade the Republic of Chechnya.[91]

On 11 December 1994, Russian armored columns began to move into Chechnya and soon the first major battle for Grozny that began would not end until late January 1995. On 31 December 1994, Russian armored forces entered Grozny and were quickly destroyed by Chechen forces. The 131st Motorized Rifle Brigade, which was one of the armored columns, lost 20 of 26 tanks and 102 of 120 armored personnel carriers. After extensive and bloody combat, Russian forces finally took the Presidential Palace on 26 January 1995. Nevertheless, the fighting was far from over.[92]

In August 1996, major fighting erupted again in Grozny as Chechen forces attacked and reoccupied Grozny. Negotiations resulted in the Chechens remaining in the control of the city and country and Russian forces withdrew. In late 1999 and early 2000, the Russians again attacked to regain control of Grozny. This time, however, the Russians had made major changes in their tactics and took a much more deliberate approach on their assaults against the city. By the end of February 2000, the Russians were again in control of the city. However, the latest Russian battle for the city resulted in almost total destruction of Grozny.[93]

The battles for Grozny are the most recent examples of urban warfare. The defeat of the Russian forces in their initial attempts to take Grozny not only illustrated the decline of Russian power, but also showed the growing complexities of modern urban warfare. The battles also demonstrated the strengths and weaknesses of each side as they learned from one another and attempted to adapt to the changing environment.

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[91] 2nd Lieutenant James Reed, "The Chechen War: Part I," *Red Thrust Star* PB-30-96-2 (April 1996): 13-15.
[92] 2nd Lieutenant James Reed, "The Chechen War: Part II," *Red Thrust Star* PB-30-96-3 (July 1996): 11-13.
[93] Timothy Thomas, "Grozny 2000: Urban combat Lessons Learned," *Military Review* LXXX, no 4, (July-August 2000): 57-58.

PATTERN ANALYSIS

The Russians failed to use pattern analysis to develop indicators of Chechen actions during the Russian planning for their first assault on Grozny. Russian planning for the 1994 assault on Grozny was dominated by their belief that this operation would be similar to the highly successful operations the Soviets conducted against Prague in 1968, Kabul in 1979, and Baku in 1991. Russian planners and analysts discounted any other threat reaction other than those encountered in these former coup de main operations. Consequently, they did not examine potential threat patterns concerning recent warfare within the region.

That Chechen tactics surprised Russian planners is incredible given the nature of the conflict and the recent history of the region. Before the first battle for Grozny in late 1994, a quick survey of broad patterns associated with urban combat would have provided the Russians with a starting point to anticipate Chechen tactics. A more detailed examination of the recent battle within Grozny itself would have also provided an even greater indication of how the Chechens would defend the city. For whatever reason, the Russians ignored these patterns and relied on their traditional operations relating to a quick large-scale coup de main against a hostile government.

Two techniques encountered by the Russian forces in their initial assault on Grozny were already used by forces similar to the Chechens. The first technique was the employment of hugging tactics by Chechens to discourage the Russian use of artillery and aerial attacks. Chechens fought as close to Russian units as possible so that the Russians could not use their superior firepower without endangering the lives of their own soldiers.[94] Hugging tactics were not unique to this conflict, but are a favorite of any combat force that must fight against another force that employs superior artillery and airpower. The North Vietnamese used these same tactics to survive superior US artillery and airpower during the Vietnam War. The Mujahideen also hugged the Soviets in Afghanistan so that the Mujahideen could conduct close combat while

[94] Lester Grau and Timothy L. Thomas. "Russian Lessons Learned From the Battles for Grozny." *Marine Corps Gazette* 84, no 4, (April 2000): 46.

avoiding Soviet artillery and air attacks.[95] Simple military logic would have predicted the use of hugging by the Chechens.

Another Chechen technique during the battles for Grozny was the wide scale use of the RPG-7 by the Chechens. The initial Russian entry forces moved armored vehicles without dismounted infantry. This capitalized on the strengths of the RPG-7 used by the Chechens. During the first month of fighting, the Russians lost 225 armored vehicles, which could not be repaired.[96] Chechen reliance on the RPG-7, however, should have been no surprise since they were known to be in Chechnya in quantity and were the only effective antitank weapon available to the Chechens.

The RPG-7 is one of the most effective and widely used infantry weapons in the world. It served as the primary weapon for the Mujahideen armored-vehicle hunter-killer teams during the Soviet war in Afghanistan and in 1992, was the favorite weapon of the Tajik rebels for attacking T-72s. The improved versions of the RPG-7 that penetrate reactive armor and the use of the RPG-7 as a helicopter killer in Afghanistan and Somalia enhanced its potential even further.[97] The Russians should have anticipated Chechen use of RPG-7s as a primary threat to their armored forces as well as their helicopters in any defense of Grozny.

The urban terrain of Grozny facilitated hugging and aided in the protection and mobility of the RPG-7 gunners. The restricted and canalizing terrain of the city provided anti-armor teams, armed with RPG-7s, with excellent ambush sites for armored vehicles and convoys.[98] The Chechens also used the multistoried buildings to stay out of the fields of fire of Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers, and to move in and amongst the Russian units. Chechen gunners

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[95] Aleksandr Sykholesskiy, "Artilleriya partisan: RPG v lokal'nykh vooruzhennykh konfliktakh" [The Guerrilla's Artillery: The RPG in Local Armed conflicts], *Soldat udachi* [Soldier of Fortune] (February 1996): 43, quoted in Lester Grau, "A Weapon For All Seasons: The Old But Effective RPG-7 Promises to Haunt the Battlefields of Tomorrow," *Infantry* 88, no 2, (May-August 1998): 7.
[96] Grau, "A Weapon For All Seasons," 8.
[97] Ibid., 7.
[98] Timothy L. Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat," *Parameters* XXIX, no 2, (Summer 1999): 95.

engaged Russian armored vehicles from sites where Russian tank main gun tubes and coaxial machine guns could not engage them due to limitations in elevation and deflection.[99]

Besides broad historical patterns, analysts also need to examine specific data pertinent to the situation to determine indicators of future enemy actions. The outcome of the Black Operation conducted by anti-Dudayev Chechens on 26 November 1994 provided clear indications of what the Chechens were capable of doing to defend the city. During this operation, Chechen forces used the techniques and weapons described earlier to destroy enemy tanks that were not supported by infantry and defeated the attacking force. Not only was this a description of Chechen tactics, but it also confirmed that the Chechens would stand and fight.[100]

Russian analysts should have closely examined this battle before their assault on Grozny in December to identify some of the patterns of Chechen tactics. They did not. The initial Russian assault used tanks that were not supported by infantry under the assumption that the Chechens would not resist occupation of their city. The result was a Russian disaster.[101]

The Chechens, however, did learn from the 26 November Black Operation. As Turpal-ali Atgeriyev, a Chechen unit Commander in Grozny, stated that, "26 November "Black Operation" gave us confidence. Our success was due to the fact there was no organized and well-planned resistance. No strategy, no clear defense line."[102] Despite assurances by General Grachev, the Russian Minister of Defense, that Russian forces would not assault the city, the Chechen leadership began establishing plans to defend the city immediately following the Black Operation.[103]

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[99] Ibid.; Grau and Thomas, "Russian Lessons Learned," 46.
[100] Timothy L. Thomas, Foreign Military Studies Analyst, interview by the author, 4 January 2002, written notes, Leavenworth, KS.
[101] Michael J. Orr, "The New Year's Eve Attack on Grozny," *Red Thrust Star*, PB-30-96-3 (July 1996): 14-15.
[102] Thomas, interview with the author.
[103] Zelimkhan Yandarbieyev, Brigadier General. "Interview with Zelimkhan Yandarbieyev: Part One," Interview by Maksim Shevchenko, Staryye Atagi, Internet, available from http://www.geocities.com /Pentegon/6453/chech.html; accessed 16 August 2001; Orr, "The New Year's Eve Attack on Grozny," 14-15.

By the time the Russians assaulted Grozny again in 1999, they had made substantial changes to their tactics. First, the Russians built up their logistical capabilities and isolated the city. Then they conducted detailed reconnaissance to locate Chechen concentrations and defensive preparations. Russian artillery then started to attack these Chechen concentrations. Later, four Russian sniper companies infiltrated into the city and continued to reduce Chechen forces. Only after Chechen resistance had been substantially reduced did the Russians begin deliberate assaults against a small portion of the city at a time to systematically partition and conquer Grozny. Finally, the Russians put a major emphasis on winning the information campaign and implemented strict controls on the media. All of these techniques aided this more successful Russian seizure of Grozny.[104]

The Chechens prepared for this Russian attack with defenses similar to those of earlier battles. These consisted of ambushes and strong points, trenches, anti-tank ditches, and sniper points.[105] However, the Russians delayed entry into the city until they set the conditions for successfully defeating the Chechens. Previously, the Chechens had practiced "the defenseless defense" or "let the situation do the organizing" where Chechen forces roamed the city attacking Russian forces at will. However, the Russian decision not to enter the city until Chechen resistance had been reduced rendered the former Chechen tactics ineffective.[106]

In response to these Russian tactics, Chechen forces looked to find and exploit Russian weaknesses. Overall, Chechen command and control became more centralized. Chechen forces inside Grozny focused on holes in the Russian siege lines around the city and began to leave the city. Chechen rebels then concentrated their attacks on the less defended Russian rear areas. Cities and villages to the south of Grozny that had previously been captured by the Russians also became the areas of renewed fighting as Chechen forces established new defenses to fight for

[104] Thomas, "Grozny 2000," 57.
[105] Ibid., 55.
[106] Thomas, interview with author.

control of these areas yet again.[107] Chechen forces changed their tactics from a positional defense to offensive hit and run tactics.[108]

The new tactics of Chechen fighting combined close combat Grozny style defenses with hit and run attacks on Russian rear areas outside the smaller cities. Many of the smaller cities and villages to the south of Grozny were fortified to force Russian forces into close combat where Chechen forces excelled. Chechen forces then conducted hit and run attacks on Russian rear units concurrent with the defensive fights inside the cities. Russian artillery, logistics convoys and rear service elements were prime targets for small unit hit and run attacks. The Chechens shifted from town to town to divide Russian units and prevent effective concentration of Russian effort.[109]

The development of these Chechen techniques was a logical adoption to the situation. The initial patterns in Chechen techniques followed the basic patterns from previous urban fighting involving forces similar to the Chechens. The Chechen pattern continued to be avoidance or negation of Russian strengths while focusing on Russian weaknesses. The Chechen patterns also remained within Chechen capabilities.

Pattern analysis was critical to the Russian effort. The Russian failed to apply pattern analysis in their initial assaults on Grozny in late 1994. They failed to respond to established patterns of urban fighting and ignored prior engagements that could have provided specific indications for future enemy COAs. Russian success in their second major attempt to take Grozny in 1999, however, was based on a much better understanding of previous patterns of Chechen defensive tactics and the Russian responses to those patterns. But the continued

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[107] Thomas, "Grozny 2000;" 55; Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny," 91-92; Shamil Basayev, Chechen Field Commander, "21 Feb 2000 World Exclusive Interview with Field Commander Shamil Basayev," Internet, available from http://63.249.218.164/html/interviews2000.htm: accessed 22 August 2001.
[108] Sheikh Abu Umar Mohammed Al-Saif, Sheikh and Scholar of the Mujahideen in Chechnya. "27 Jan 2000 Interview with Sheikh Abu Umar Mohammed Al Saif, Shatoi." Internet, available from http://63.249.218.164/html/interviews2000.htm: accessed 22 August 2001.
[109] Adam Geibel, "Fighting in a Fortified Village in the Second Chechen War," *Infantry* 89, no 3, (September-December 1999): 19,21.

refinement of techniques by Chechen forces meant that the process of pattern assessment is a continuous process and the best place to start to look for the next pattern of enemy tactics is an assessment of one's own weaknesses.

WEIGHING INDICATORS

When weighing indicators, Chechen culture and demographics influenced the battles for Grozny more than traditional factors such as training, organization and leadership. The culture and population of the region affected every aspect of the conflict and specifically influenced Chechen combat effectiveness, organization and tactics. The personalities of the Chechen leadership were also a source of indicators of Chechen actions. Nevertheless, as leaders changed, the Chechen culture remained a constant throughout the conflict.

Chechen culture was the primary factor in determining the nature of the Chechen conflict. Chechen history and culture also played a significant role in their combat effectiveness. Chechens are noted for being great warriors. Despite the relatively small amount of Chechens serving in the Red Army in World War II, no less than fifty-six Hero of the Soviet Union medals were awarded to Chechen soldiers during the Great Patriotic War. Their participation in some of the great battles of World War II as well as events before 1995 clearly indicate that threatened Chechens would fight, even in the face of overwhelming odds.[110]

Chechen culture also influenced their military organization. The clan is a critical element of Chechen society. Chechen clans are called *taip*. A *taip* usually encompasses several villages. The average number of able-bodied fighters from a *taip* is about 600. These *taips* can be subdivided into units of about 150. These units are then further subdivided into smaller units of about 20. Members of these small groups do not fight away from home all the time, but usually

[110] Lieutenant Colonel Brian A. Keller, "Intelligence Support to Military Operations on Urban Terrain: Lessons Learned from the Battle of Grozny," Strategy and Research Project, U. S. Army War College, 2000, 25; Major Norman L. Cooling, "Russia's 1994-96 Campaign for Chechnya: A Failure in Shaping the Battlespace," *Marine Corps Gazette* 85, no 10 (October 2001): 64.

fight in shifts of about one week. When they are not in combat, they share their experiences with other members of the clan.[111]

The clan-based structure promotes small teams of combatants with very strong cohesion that are capable of independent actions. These teams are very effective in urban combat. The strong cohesion from the social network allows the group to withstand the extraordinary stress brought on by urban fighting. The structure also allows for tactical decentralization, which offsets momentary disruptions in command and control, a common occurrence in urban fighting. Sharing experiences and rotating fighting units further strengthens the overall unit by building upon lessons learned.[112]

The clan structure also influenced the techniques adopted by the Chechens in Grozny. Ambushes of ground elements based on multistoried buildings and hunter killer teams, and ambushes of Russian aircraft involving highly mobile air defense teams are all techniques that are possible when using small highly cohesive teams.[113] These teams were the basis for Chechen techniques such as "the defenseless defense" or "let the situation do the organizing." Given the cohesion and will of the Chechen forces, these techniques were well within the military logic for the employment of the Chechen resources in the defense of Grozny.

Before the Russian attack on Grozny in late 1994, there were differences within Chechnya based on social splits. First, the Chechen population in and around Grozny was diversified. Just as the *taip* provides cohesion, it can also create separation. The clans in the mountains of Chechnya are different from the clans of the plains. Mountain clans tend to resort to violence while the clans from the plains are more willing to compromise.[114] The urban Chechens within Grozny were further separated from the rural clans. Chechen inhabitants of Grozny tended to be

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[111] Dr. Theodore Karasik, "Chechen Clan Military Tactics and Russian Warfare," John Hopkins University, Central Asian Caucus Institute Biweekly Briefing, Internet, available from http://www.cacianalyst.org/Mar15/CHECHEN _CLAN_MILITARY_TACTICS.htm; accessed 22 August 2001; Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny," 90.
[112] Karasik.
[113] Ibid.

more liberal than the rural clans. The traditional clan ties were not as strong among urban Chechens as among their rural counterparts.[115]

Besides the social Chechen diversification, there was an ethnic split. A large population of ethnic Russians lived inside Grozny. These ethnic Russians also held the more prestigious and better paying jobs. This created resentment among the Chechens.[116]

Despite these splits, the Russians attacked Grozny in late 1994 and early 1995 with no regard for the impact on the population. The Russians did not conduct any evaluation of the population within Grozny. Therefore, they failed to understand that the Dudayev government was quickly loosing favor with the average citizen of Grozny, and that Russian efforts could have taken advantage of this. Before and during the fight for Grozny, the Russian Air Force conducted saturation bombing of targets that indiscriminately destroyed housing areas and nearby villages.[117] The Russian targeteers did not exclude cultural landmarks, hospitals, or markets from their attacks and their overall conduct toward the local population was callous at best.[118]

The Russian disregard for the population substantially affected the dynamics of the battlefield. The population within Grozny and the surrounding area quickly united against the invading Russian forces. Chechen elements that had previously been at odds with Dudayev's leadership rallied to his support.[119] Even ethnic Russians turned against the Russian federal forces. Once the population of Grozny united against the Russians, it provided the Chechen rebel forces with logistical support, intelligence, the ability to move rapidly and stealthily throughout the city, and a foundation for the information campaign against the Russians.[120] The Chechens consistently forced the Russian soldiers into situations where they had to choose between taking

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[114] Cooling, 59.
[115] Lester Grau, Foreign Military Studies Analyst, interview by the author, 7 November 2001, written notes, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
[116] Ibid.
[117] Cooling, 65, 62; Reed, "The Chechen War: Part II", 11.
[118] Major Raymond C. Finch III, "Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya," Foreign Military Studies Office, Internet, available from http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/yrusfail/yrusfail.htm; accessed 4 January 2002.
[119] Yandarbieyev, Interview.

either Russian soldier or civilian casualties.[121] The population became a major obstacle for the Russians that the Chechens were able to leverage throughout the conflict.

Other factors such as training and the personality of the commander were also sources of indicators of future enemy actions. Training in the former Soviet Army provided a base of knowledge for the Chechens. Most of the Chechens had served in the Soviet Army and had a working knowledge of Russian tactics. This gave the Chechen force a working knowledge of the tactics and equipment the Russian Army would use against them.[122] The Russians should have understood that while the enemy they would face did not have the equipment to stand toe to toe with them, the Chechens would understand the intricacies and weaknesses of Russians tactics.

The personality of the Chechen commanders could provide another indicator of Chechen actions. President Dudayev and Shamil Basayev were two important Chechen leaders who used their previous experience and knowledge to influence the fight for Grozny. President Dudayev was a former general in the Soviet Air Force who understood the inner workings of Russian politics. He understood that Moscow would not allow an independent Chechnya without a fight. He knew Russian military intervention would come eventually, so he prepared for the fighting well before the attack in late 1994.[123] Dudayev also passed on his in-depth knowledge of Russian air force tactics to his subordinates and rehearsed them in techniques to counter these tactics.[124]

Shamil Basayev was another prominent leader among the Chechen units fighting against the Russians. Before the conflict in Grozny, he had already gained considerable combat training and experience in Abkhazia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. He used experiences in fighting against the Russians to train a unit of highly skilled soldiers. His capture of a Russian hospital in

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[120] Grau, Interview by the author, 7 November 2001.
[121] Cooling, 66.
[122] Geibel, 22; Steven D. Feller, "Russian Military Performance in Chechnya," *Military Technical Journal*, no. 11, (June 1997): 28; Thomas, "Battle of Grozny," 89.
[123] Yandarbieyev, interview.
[124] Timothy L. Thomas, "Air Operations in Low Intensity Conflict: The Case of Chechnya," Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, Internet, available from http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/chechnya.htm; accessed 19 January 2002.

Budennovsk in June 1995 and his participation in the recapture of Grozny in August 1996 earned him a reputation as a courageous and effective military leader.[125] The tactics he used in these and other actions reflect his previous experiences.

Although these leaders had a great impact on the fighting, Chechen culture still dominated Chechen actions. Following his death in 1996, Dudayev was replaced by leaders who carried on with the same will to fight.[126] Yet, Russian forces completely disregarded any aspects of culture in their initial planning. As Russian Colonel General Boris Gromov commented, "Afghanistan should have taught us that when deciding on military operations, take account of all local characteristics: historical, national, religious, geographical, meteorological, and so forth. Nothing of the sort was done. The decision was adopted spontaneously, by all accounts."[127]

WARGAMING FRIENDLY AND ENEMY CAPABILITIES

Initially, the Russians either did not understand or did not closely consider both friendly and enemy capabilities and wargame those capabilities to determine indicators for future Chechen actions. The Russians based their planning on their past successes in overthrowing hostile governments and discounted any serious Chechen resistance. Consequently, the Russians did not look for indications of major Chechen resistance. The Chechens had a much better appreciation for both their own and Russian strengths and limitations.

Before the Russian attack in late 1994, a detailed examination of the facts associated with Chechen capabilities would have provided the Russians with insight into how the Chechens could defend Grozny. Russian analysts would have learned that Chechen forces possessed both the weapons and organization to conduct effective resistance against invading Russian forces. In addition, Chechen intelligence, logistics, communication, and support capabilities and the terrain in Grozny would further enhance the effectiveness of Chechen forces.

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[125] Major Raymond C. Finch III, "A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev," *Military Review* LXXVII, no. 3, (May-June 1997): 33-39.
[126] Thomas, interview with author.

From the beginning, Chechen forces possessed a vast array of weapons including a substantial amount of modern weapons. In 1992 and 1993 when Russian forces from the North Caucasus Military District withdrew, they left half of their military equipment behind in the Chechen republic.[128] Chechen forces also acquired weapons by stealing them from unprotected Russian supply and ordnance depots and buying them from black-market arms dealers.[129] "By one account the Chechens had 40 to 50 T-62 and T-72 tanks, 620-650 grenade launchers, 20-25 "Grad" multiple rocket launchers, 30-35 armored personnel carriers and scout vehicles, 30 122mm howitzers, 40-50 BMP infantry fighting vehicles, some 2000,000 hand grenades, and an assortment of various types of ammunition."[130]

Although initially small in number, organized Chechen forces did exist and continued to grow as the fight for Grozny grew closer. Upon assuming power, Dudayev organized a small professional military force. The fact that almost all Chechens had served in the Soviet armed forces greatly facilitated this process.[131] In addition, other organized forces existed that Dudayev could utilize. For example, the "Abkhaz" Battalion, a unit lead by Shamil Basayev, had the reputation of being fierce fighters. It came to the aid of Dudayev in August 1994.[132] Local villagers began forming battalion-sized units around 2 December 1994 and volunteers and mercenaries from surrounding republics started arriving as early as 5 December 1994.[133] Just before the 1994 attempt on the city by the Russians, the number of Chechen forces inside Grozny available to fight was probably around 2,500.[134]

Besides weapons and organization, the Chechen forces also retained the supporting infrastructure needed to fight the Russians. The local phone network and especially cell phones

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[127] Thomas, interview with the author.
[128] Feller, 31; Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny," 99.
[129] Cooling, 59; Finch, "A Face of Future Battle," 34.
[130] Sergey Surozhtsev, "Legendary Army in Grozny," *Novoye Vremya*, no 2-3 (January 1995): 14-15, quoted in Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny," 89.
[131] Cooling, 59.
[132] Keller, 21-22; Finch, "A Face of Future Battle," 35.
[133] Keller, 22.
[134] Grau, interview by the author, 7 November 2001.

provided Chechen forces with non-FM radio communications that are critical in a city. A vast array of human intelligence sources throughout the city, off the shelf signals intercept equipment such as scanners, and open source intelligence provided Dudayev with the intelligence capability he needed to monitor Russian activities.[135]

Finally, the urban terrain in and around Grozny assisted the Chechens. Its multiple-storied buildings and subterranean network proved the terrain and cover needed to engage and destroy enemy armored forces. Chechen forces used the multistoried buildings to increase their anti-tank capabilities by ambushing Russian armored vehicles from sites where Russian tank main gun tubes and coaxial machine guns could not engage them due to limitations in elevation and deflection. This technique allowed the Chechens to use their anti tank capability while offsetting Russian armored force capabilities.[136] As described earlier, the urban terrain in Grozny also allowed Chechen forces to employ hugging tactics to deny the Russians their superior indirect firepower.

Analysts must consider an opponent's objectives when determining how to use his capabilities to thwart those objectives. Dudayev's objectives were simple. He wanted an independent Chechnya. Knowing that he must confront a vastly superior foe that traditionally relies on extensive firepower, Dudayev and other Chechen leaders understood they must deny Russian use of their superior capabilities while at the same time leveraging their own capabilities as best they can. It is also interesting to note that Dudayev's objective for an independent Chechnya was a key rallying point for ethnic Chechens. For example, despite the fact that Shamil Basayev personally disliked Dudayev, he would still fight for him as long as his cause was one of Chechen freedom.[137]

Knowing Chechen capabilities and that the Russians would focus on Grozny as the decisive point in their campaign, Dudayev's attempts at embroiling the Russian army in an extensive

[135] Cooling, 65-66.
[136] Thomas, "Battle of Grozny," 95.

urban fight make perfect sense. Not only did it place him in a potentially superior military position; given the nature of the conflict it also established a good position to wage an information campaign for international support.

The Chechens had the capability to resist a Russian attempt to invade and seize Grozny. This should have lead Russian analysts to identify the indicators associated with Chechen capabilities of an armed defense of the city and begin looking for confirmation of those indicators. They did not. Despite indications of Chechen armed resistance, the Russians either did not look for or simply ignored indications of a Chechen military defense of Grozny. Russian units preparing to enter Grozny had almost no intelligence concerning enemy intentions, capabilities or dispositions.[138] Lack of reliable HUMINT also made intelligence gathering in Grozny difficult.[139] The result was a Russian catastrophe.

If the Russians had wargamed friendly and enemy capabilities to look for indications of future enemy actions, their considerations were extremely one sided. Not only did they discount enemy capabilities but also either ignored or failed to accurately assess their own capabilities as well. The Russians saw this mission as a repeat of former coup de main operations such as Prague in 1968, Kabul in 1979, and Baku in 1991. These operations had been highly successful against opponents with similar capabilities. However, the Russians did not consider the large amount of detailed planning and intelligence that was required for these former operations. In addition, Russian planners ignored their own limitations. The combat capabilities and overall quality of Russian forces available for this operation was not anywhere near what was required for such rapid strikes.[140]

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[137] Finch, "A Face of Future Battle," 35.
[138] Cooling, 65; Lester Grau, "Changing Russian Urban Tactics: The Aftermath of the Battle for Grozny," Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, Internet, available from http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/grozny.htm; accessed 5 September 2001.
[139] Grau, interview by the author, 7 November 2001.
[140] Ibid.; Finch, "Why the Russian Military Failed in Chechnya."; Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny," 89.

The Chechens, on the other hand, had a better appreciation for both their own and Russian capabilities and exploited their advantages. The Chechens focused their initial plans to fit their capabilities. Following the 26 November Black Operation, the Chechen leadership knew that war was imminent and Dudayev's staff began drawing up plans for the defense of Grozny. Zelimkhan Yandarbieyev, a Chechen Brigadier General and former president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, explained that, "Positions were distributed on approaches to the city, but everything in conformity with our capabilities."[141]

Subsequent Chechen actions adapted to exploit opportunities and their advantages. For example, after the initial fighting for Grozny began, Russian troops were reluctant to engage in close combat. This was especially true when Russian troops could not employ their superior firepower. Consequently, Chechen forces continued urban combat in the surrounding villages after they were forced out of Grozny.[142]

The Chechens also exploited their advantages in the information war. Chechens had experienced greater success in the information campaign against the Russians during the 1994 and 1995 fighting.[143] Chechen attacks on holidays or significant anniversaries were timed to draw attention to the conflict whenever international interest faded. This included high visibility actions such as the capture of a Russian hospital in June 1995 to draw attention to the conflict and to embarrass the Russian government.[144]

The lack of Russian appreciation for Chechen capabilities was one of the major reasons for their initial failure. The Russians did not initially wargame friendly and enemy capabilities to

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[141] Yandarbieyev, Interview.
[142] Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny," 91; Thomas, "Grozny 2000," 55; Michael Orr, "Second Time Lucky? Evaluating Russian Performance in the Second Chechen War," Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, UK (March 2000), Internet, available from http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/war/docs/JIRArticle.htm: accessed 16 August 2001.
[143] Timothy L. Thomas, "A Tale of Two Theaters: Russian Actions in Chechnya in 1994 and 1999." Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office. Internet, available from http://call.army,mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/chechtale.htm; accessed 5 September 2001.
[144] Major Gregory J. Celestan, "Wounded Bear: The Ongoing Russian Military Operation in Chechnya, "Foreign Military Studies Office (August 1996) Internet, available from http://call.army.mil/fmso/fmsopubs/issues/wounded/wounded.htm; accessed 4 January 2002.

look for indicators of future Chechen actions. The Russians did not initially identify what the Chechen capabilities were and what actions the Chechens could take to use them against the Russians. They did not use an understanding of Chechen capabilities to anticipate techniques the Chechens could employ against Russian weaknesses. Had the Russians initially understood and appreciated Chechen and Russian capabilities, they could have determined actions that the Chechens could employ to meet their goals. This could have included Chechen military actions and indirect actions that influenced public opinion. Once these actions were identified, the Russians could have developed indicators to confirm or deny Chechen actions and tasked their intelligence-gathering network for information.

CONCLUSION

The battles for Grozny illustrate the assessment of indicators for future enemy actions. First, broad and specific patterns of urban tactics do exist and analysts can use pattern analysis use to look for indicators especially when data from recent combat experiences exist. The Russians did not pay attention to recent patterns and were consequently surprised by the extent of Chechen resistance. However, the patterns changed as both sides learned from one another.

Second, both the Russians and the Chechens adapted to the changing situation by focusing on the other's weaknesses and using one's strengths within their capabilities. Chechen tactics focused on using their strengths in close combat against Russian weaknesses while seeking situations to offset Russian strengths. When the Russians attempted to offset their weaknesses, the Chechens changed from a direct defense of the city to raids against the Russian rear. The Chechens exploited Russian blundering to maintain the initiative in the information war.

Third, the Chechen culture and demographics affected every aspect of the conflict. Chechen culture was the principal force that influenced all the indicators and their combat effectiveness. Their warrior tradition and social organization resulted in an organization that had the cohesion to

fight and to withstand the psychological demands of close combat in an urban environment. The biggest mistake the Russians made in the campaign was to disregard it initially.

Fourth, wargaming enemy and friendly capabilities would have identified indicators of what actions the Chechens could take to resist Russian actions. The Chechens developed techniques that worked. Often Chechens acted in unconventional or nonstandard ways such as using RPG-7s against helicopters. The Russian failure to understand Chechens and their own capabilities were grave mistakes that prevented the Russians from determining future Chechen actions.

Finally, no single procedure to determining indicators would have been adequate alone. Even when patterns exist, they change due to the changing situation. Changes were based on capabilities and focused on the opposing weaknesses. Wargaming enemy and friendly capabilities determined these changes. Analysts had to consider the cultural and population aspects of the region to evaluate which indicators to weigh in both pattern analysis and wargaming of capabilities.

CHAPTER SIX

ANALYSIS

This chapter undertakes the second step of the historical analysis methodology by examining the three case studies for significant issues that answer the primary question. **Would an analyst who uses the current techniques for identifying indicators of threat actions be able to adequately determine the urban tactics of a threat in a mid intensity conflict?** This step also reexamines the case studies for issues that were consistent within all the studies. Examination highlights four points within current procedures used to determine indicators of enemy actions. First, in all three studies, an analyst should have used a combination of all three techniques to determine accurate indicators of the adopted enemy COA instead of using only a single process. Second, understanding the threat goal was instrumental in predicting threat actions and anticipating changes in threat patterns. Third, the culture, history, and demographics of the

region were critical factors that influenced threat actions. Finally, not only did these factors influence threat actions, but they also provided the analyst with the understanding needed to see the situation through the eyes of the enemy.

In all three case studies, an analyst should have used all three doctrinal techniques instead of simply relying on one technique to determine indicators of future enemy actions. Each technique has limitations that require an analyst to use the other techniques. For example, pattern analysis has limitations that require an analyst to understand and wargame capabilities.

Historical data is key requirement for pattern analysis. Pattern analysis examines data to determine consistent activities by individual elements in an organization. The analyst uses this process to identify a routine. Once a routine is established, the analyst is able to predict future actions of an organization based on the observation of the activities of individual elements. In both the case studies of Hue and Grozny, data existed that would have allowed analysts to use pattern analysis to look for indicators of future enemy actions.

Without historical data, however, an analyst cannot adequately conduct pattern analysis. In the absence of historical data, an analyst must then wargame the capabilities of both the friendly and enemy force to look for indicators. This was the case of the Marines in Beirut in 1983-1984. The absence of historical data at the tactical level in Beirut required BLT 3/8 to examine the capabilities of their potential threats. The BLT 3/8 staff wargamed enemy and friendly capabilities to determine how the enemy could use their capabilities against the weaknesses of the US Marines to achieve the enemy's aims. The US Marines then built intelligence requirements to look for indicators of those actions. They also incorporated intelligence requirements that monitored threat activities to build a historical database from which analysts could then determine routines.

The case studies also showed that a critical requirement of pattern analysis is to determine when and how the threat will change his pattern. Simply watching the patterns of enemy activity will eventually allow the analyst to see the changes in activity, but may not allow him to predict

those changes. Relying solely on pattern analysis to determine changes in threat routines, risks being surprised when the pattern first changes. The attack on Hue in 1968 and the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut are two examples where analysts did not adequately anticipate changes in enemy patterns and consequently US forces were surprised when these events occurred. To anticipate change, an analyst must first understand the goals of the threat force and then use the technique of wargaming friendly and enemy capabilities to predict pattern change.

Recognition of the endstate or goals of an organization are vital in understanding and predicting the actions of that organization. It is the first place to look to determine when an organization will change its pattern. In his book *In Pursuit of Military Excellence*, Dr. Shimon Naveh, former Israeli Brigadier General and current lecturer at Tel Aviv University, examines organizations by taking a systems approach and explains the importance of the aim to an organization. He uses Ludwig von Bertalanffy's General System Theory to define the aim as, "the cognitive force that generates the system and determines the directions and patterns of its actions."[145] This definition establishes the aim of an organization as essentially its ultimate goal or endstate. If an organization cannot obtain its endstate in a single action, it may also have intermediate goals or objectives that lead to the accomplishment of the endstate. It therefore stands to reason that an organization will change its pattern of activities when current methods either no longer make progress or anticipate not making progress toward an objective or goal of the organization, or when those goals change.

The case studies present several examples where organizations changed tactics because current tactics were not progressing toward their ultimate goal. The North Vietnamese leadership believed that they had to take new measures in their struggle for control of South Vietnam in 1968 because of the anticipated ineffectiveness of their past actions. Their decision to fight major urban battles was based on their bleak assessment of a long-term fight just as much as their belief

that the time was right for a general uprising in the cities. The Chechen's decision to move out of Grozny in 1999 and begin a new series of battles in the surrounding countryside combining urban defense with hit and run tactics, was based on the ineffectiveness of their "defenseless defense tactics" in the face of new Russian urban tactics. The Chechen losses in the defense of Grozny using "defenseless defense tactics" were counterproductive and no longer effective in attaining the ultimate goal of an independent Chechnya.

Organizations changed their patterns based on their capabilities and the weaknesses of their opponents. The tendency continues to be the avoidance of an opponent's strength while attacking the opponent's weakness. The North Vietnamese attack on Hue used their close combat capabilities in a city to offset superior US firepower. In addition, the lack of Allied military forces inside Hue facilitated the quick seizure of a strategic city. Shia suicide bombing with a large truck filled with explosives penetrated a US Marine perimeter that was not prepared for an attack of that scale. The Chechens' continued fighting inside the cities and villages outside of Grozny in 1999-2000 exploited their superior close combat capability against the Russians. Once outside Grozny, the expanded battlespace allowed them the time and physical space for hit and run tactics against relatively undefended Russian elements. In both instances, Chechen tactics interfered with the Russian ability to bring superior firepower to bear against the Chechens.

Understanding one's weaknesses is important in the process of determining pattern changes. An enemy will try to exploit his opponent's weaknesses. If an enemy does not have a capability to attack an opponent's weakness, then he may pursue actions to obtain that capability by either buying new equipment or using existing equipment in different ways. Consequently, an analyst should determine how an enemy could change his pattern by understanding friendly weaknesses as well as friendly strengths and determine how an enemy could exploit them.

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[145] Ludwig, von Bertalanffy, *General System Theory*, (New York: George Braziller, 1968), 2, 70, 76 quoted in Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), 5-6.

While pattern analysis and wargaming enemy and friendly capabilities are viable techniques for determining indicators of future enemy actions, an analyst must also use the technique of weighing indicators to predict enemy actions accurately. Individual and collective factors set parameters and constraints on enemy actions. Analysts must understand what these factors are in order to predict enemy actions. The process of weighing indicators examines these factors so that analysts can give weight to certain indicators based on the parameters and constraints on the enemy force.

The factors that overwhelmingly influenced all aspects of the fighting in each of the case studies were the culture, history and the demographics of the region. The 1990 version of *FM 34-3 Intelligence Analysis* lists the enemy's tactical doctrine, use of mass and economy of force, composition of forces, significant enemy activity outside your area, weather and terrain as the critical factors of analysis. The technique of weighing indicators also examines factors that determine why an enemy force presents a particular pattern. These factors include military logic, doctrinal training, organizational constraints, bureaucratic constraints, and the personality of the commander. While many of these factors are still pertinent in a post-Soviet threat environment, the factors of the culture, history, and the demographics of the region most influenced the conduct of battle in the case studies.

In all the case studies, culture and history were the primary factors that affected the actions of the forces choosing to fight in an urban environment. In the first case study, the North Vietnamese focus on Hue was primarily due to the city's cultural importance in Vietnamese history. The North Vietnamese developed their strategy of "Dau Tranh" from the patterns of the battles they fought against the Japanese and French. In the second study, the Shia in Beirut influenced their adoption of suicidal attacks. The history of foreigners in Lebanon and the interaction of the different factions in and around Beirut, specifically the Moslems and Christians, influenced the goals and actions of all the factions in the region. Finally, the warrior tradition of the Chechens provided them with the basis for a very effective fighting force. The culture of the

Chechen clans or *taips* and the history of their experience in the former Soviet Army influenced Chechen tactics, organization, and leadership. The history of Russian persecution of the Chechens affected the overall conduct of the war.

The second major factor affecting the urban battlefield in all the case studies was the demographics of the city and surrounding area. The North Vietnamese counted on support from within Hue and other South Vietnamese cities in 1968 to carry out a general uprising against the South Vietnamese government. When the general uprising from inside Hue and the other cities failed to materialize, their offensive failed. The North Vietnamese failure to obtain the backing of the urban population was a critical failure. The large demographic changes in and around Beirut led to rearrangements among the power bases of different factions fighting for power. The Syrians were able to capitalize on those demographic changes and manipulate them for their goals. The Marines, caught in between these changes, did not sufficiently understand the impact of the changes and were consequently surprised by future violence. Finally, the Russians disregarded the demographics of Chechnya. They failed to take advantage of potential splits among the factions in and around Grozny. Russian indiscriminate attacks united the population against them and even alienated local ethnic Russians from supporting the Russian efforts.

A city is a multifaceted environment where the aspects of culture, history, and demographics are fused together to form a complex system. In this complex system, the factors of culture, history and demographics were the key influences as to how and why those who fought a superior force inside a city chose to do so. Current US Army intelligence doctrine, however, seems to be preoccupied with analysis of urban terrain at the expense of its culture, history, and demographics.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 99-16 notes that staffs often develop plans that are terrain oriented instead of enemy oriented when planning for urban combat

missions and that these plans often focus on the buildings in the built-up area instead of enemy actions. [146] However, this publication also focuses on urban terrain.

The same publication describes a MOUT Environment Framework as a step-by-step process for analysts to examine the urban environment while analyzing a mission. Of the ten steps in the process, the first nine are associated with analyzing the terrain of the city. It is only in step ten, the last step labeled "Other Significant Characteristics," that there is an analysis of such factors of history and demographics.[147] From an intelligence standpoint, the emphasis is overwhelming on urban terrain.

This MOUT Environment Framework is included in the current drafts for both the new *FM 34-3 Intelligence Analysis* and *FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield*. The expanded process has twelve steps, however, the first ten still focus on the terrain of the urban area. Only step eleven, labeled "Other Significant Characteristics" examines factors such as history and demographics, and step twelve examined the "Threat." [148] While there is no doubt that terrain plays an important role in shaping an urban fight, enemy tactics and actions are influenced by far more than just terrain. In each of the case studies those forces, namely the North Vietnamese, US Marines and Russians, who either disregarded or were ignorant of the factors of history, culture, and demographics suffered significantly because of their actions.

Understanding culture enables an analyst to look at the situation through the eyes of the enemy to predict his next action. Before an analyst can adequately understand the military logic of an enemy action, he must first understand the enemy. *FM 34-4* urges the analyst to see the

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[146] Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Newsletter: Urban Combat Operations: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures," No. 99-16, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 1999, 3-3.
[147] Ibid., 2-4.
[148] US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, *FM 34-3 Intelligence Analysis: Initial Daft January 2000*, (Fort Huachuca, AZ, 2000) G-5; US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, *FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield: Final Daft July 2000*, (Fort Huachuca, AZ, 2000) Chapter 5, 10.

battle from the enemy's viewpoint and warns against biases that lead to wrong conclusions while analyzing a situation.[149]

In the first case study, US analysts did not see the situation through the eyes of the enemy. The North Vietnamese had wrongly assessed their support from the population in the major cities such as Hue and based their plan for urban attacks on this assessment. US analysts looked at the situation through their own eyes knowing that it would be very difficult for North Vietnamese to gather the support needed to hold a city once they seized it. Consequently, they initially discounted indicators of major urban attacks by the North Vietnamese. They could not see the military logic of conducting urban attacks without looking at the situation through the eyes of the enemy.

"Thinking red" is a vital aspect of wargaming capabilities and conducting pattern analysis. When wargaming capabilities, the analyst must know how the enemy perceives his own capabilities and limitations. The analyst must also consider how the enemy can use these perceived capabilities to obtain his goals. The analyst must also determine if the enemy perceives that he is making progress toward those goals. Even if in the eyes of the friendly force the enemy makes progress toward his goals, if the enemy does not perceive it as so, he may break the current pattern of actions.

The 1990 version of *FM 34-3 Intelligence Analysis* is clearly written from the standpoint of facing a Soviet style threat. Today's threat environment, however, is much more diverse. Chechnya and Lebanon were conflicts between state armies and ethnic based organizations, which have fewer distinctions between combatants and noncombatants. When analyzing these tribe like societies, an analyst should take the viewpoint that Martin Van Creveld takes in his book the *Transformation of War* where he asserts that the society itself is the army.[150]

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[149] *FM 34-3* page 5-6.page 5-11- 5-12.
[150] Martin Van Creveld, *Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 56-57.

Consequently, a detailed understanding of the culture and history of the society provides the analyst with the lens through which he can understand the enemy's goals and see the situation as the enemy sees it. The analyst should then include a detailed study of demographics along with culture and history to understand the environment. This knowledge provides the analyst with a full understanding of the origin of indicators and the constraints on actions that will allow him to determine which indicators to weigh for future enemy actions. It is only after an analyst has a good grasp of the enemy that the combination of the factors of weather and terrain can provide the analyst with a full understanding of the situation.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

For the US Army, the problem of urban combat is a real one. There is a good chance that the US Army will face a situation similar to one of the three case studies examined. Consequently, US Army intelligence doctrine must adequately address urban combat. Intelligence doctrine must assist the analyst in providing the commander with the information he needs to make decisions on the urban battlefield.

This monograph reviewed the techniques in current US Army intelligence doctrine and determined if they adequately address the problems of modern urban combat. **Would an analyst who uses the current techniques for identifying indicators of threat actions be able to adequately determine the urban tactics of a threat in a mid intensity conflict?** This study concludes that, overall, the doctrinal techniques for identifying indicators do assist analysts in analyzing adaptable threats in an urban environment, however, current doctrine must be altered and expanded to reflect the current threat environment. Specific conclusions and recommendations related to this primary question follow. Each conclusion has a recommendation that should be included in the updated *FM 34-3 Intelligence Analysis*.

CONCLUSION ONE

Relying on individual techniques alone will not adequately assist the analyst in determining indicators of future actions. In each case study, the analyst had to use a combination of the three techniques to determine adequately the indicators of the adopted enemy COA.

RECOMMENDATION

FM 34-3 should emphasis the use of all three techniques concurrently to offset the shortcomings of the individual techniques. The analyst should use pattern analysis if he has a historical database that he can manipulate to determine the threat's pattern of activates. If he does not have a historical database, he should employ his intelligence system to build one. While he builds the database, he should use the wargaming of friendly and enemy capabilities technique to look for indicators and build the database. When the database is complete, he should then begin to use pattern analysis in combination with the wargaming of capabilities to look for indicators. The analyst should always use the technique of weighing of indicators concurrent with the other two techniques to inject the perceptions of the enemy into the process. He should also conduct all three techniques against the background of the threat's goal at the appropriate level to identify those actions that would advance toward that goal.

CONCLUSION TWO

Current doctrine does not explain how to anticipate changes in threat tactics. The description of Pattern Analysis in the current version of *FM 34-3* does not explain when or how an analyst can anticipate changes in the threat pattern.

RECOMMENDATION

When an analyst uses pattern analysis to watch the routines of enemy actions, he should always be looking for indications that the pattern will change. To anticipate changes in the threat pattern, the analyst should review the threat's progress toward their goal from the threat's

perspective. If the threat perceives a lack of progress or anticipates a lack of progress in the future toward their goal, then chances are good that they will change their current tactics.

Analysts can use the process of wargaming friendly and enemy capabilities to explore anticipated changes in threat tactics. Analysts should always understand the weaknesses in friendly capabilities that can offset friendly strengths. This is the best place to start when determining how a threat force might change its pattern of tactics to combat a friendly capability. After determining friendly force weaknesses, an analyst should then determine how the threat could apply his capabilities to exploit that weakness and offset the associated friendly strength. If a threat force currently does not have a capability to exploit the friendly weakness, the analyst should explore how the threat could obtain the means to exploit the friendly weakness. Consequently, if the friendly force presents a new capability that cannot currently be countered by the threat, the analyst should identify new friendly weaknesses and once again, wargame threat capabilities to anticipate the threat's counteractions(see Appendix A).

CONCLUSION THREE

The list of factors in *FM 34-3* are based on fighting a Soviet style force and do not assist the analyst in understanding a potential threat the US Army may face in the near future. *FM 34-3* does emphasize the need to look at the situation through the eyes of the enemy when anticipating future enemy actions, but the process of determining which indicators to weigh does not adequately show how to analyze a contemporary threat. Supplemental analytical processes stress the need to analyze the terrain of the urban setting with relatively little emphasis on the culture, history, recent issues and demographics of the region.

RECOMMENDATION

The technique of weighing indicators should be refined to include the analysis of several additional factors. Doctrine should strongly emphasize a complete analysis of the history, culture

and recent issues of the region so that the analyst can understand the enemy and see the battlefield from his perspective. Specific examination should be made concerning such aspects as the threat's customs, religions, belief in the cause, receptivity to friendly forces, willingness to violate international law, political and social economic factors, and technological sophistication.[151] These factors will influence and in some cases dictate how the enemy will be organized, how he will fight, and the enemy's interpretation of military logic.

It may also provide an initial understanding of the enemy's overall goals at the strategic and operational level that will help the analyst identify the enemy's intent and goal at the tactical level. Once the analyst has an understanding of the enemy's goal at all the different levels of war, he will have the knowledge needed to distinguish the patterns and potential changes to the patterns of enemy actions.

The next major factor to consider is the demographics of the urban environment and surrounding area. The analyst should undertake a complete study of things such as ethnic and cultural groups, religious groups, political party affiliation and factions, language, literacy, age distribution, and income groups.[152] The depiction of the population provides a map of the most important terrain within an urban setting. It is only when the factors of history, culture, recent issues, and demographics, are first understood, that the analyst can adequately give weight to individual indicators. It is also only after the analyst understands these factors that the addition of weather and physical terrain will then provide him with a complete understanding of the situation.

Finally, the current urban analytical framework or MOUT Environment Framework for intelligence analysis of urban fighting should be changed. The emphasis should not be on the physical terrain of the urban area at the expense of the factors listed above. The number of steps

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[151] Timothy L. Thomas, "The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat," *Parameters* XXIX, no 2, (Summer 1999): 93, 99.
[152] US Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, *FM 34-130 Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Final Draft July 2000*, (Fort Huachuca, AZ: 2000), Chapter 5, 40-41.

or level of detailed analysis required to understand the history, culture, recent issues, and demographics of the region should be just as in depth as the study of physical terrain if not more.

APPENDIX A

The Adaptable Threat

THE ADAPTABLE THREAT



The threat begins with goals (ends) in mind - what he wants to accomplish. Based on his current capabilities and intent, he begins with a pattern of actions that lead to the accomplishment of his goals (ends). The threat continues with these actions until either the threat changes his goals or he encounters an actual or anticipated lack of effectiveness in his current actions that lead to his goals. At this point, the threat changes his patterns of activity.

These changes in the threat's actions primarily involve adjustments to his capabilities (means) or intent (ways) oriented on attacking his enemy's vulnerabilities or weaknesses. It can involve either one or a combination of the two. If possible, the threat may seek new capabilities that he does not currently possess to exploit current or future vulnerabilities of his enemy. The threat does this within the confines of the environment or constraints. The environment includes the weather, terrain, demographics, the threat's culture and ideology, recent history, etc. The threat may also seek to change his pattern by changing the environment, if possible. He may seek urban settings for his confrontation with his enemy instead of rural areas or gain support from the local population.

The threat then implements his change in patterns to reach his goals. Finally, everything described above occurs within the confines of the threat's perception of his enemy and the situation, even if the threat's perception of his enemy or the situation does not correspond with reality. The analyst seeking to understand the threat must always try to see the situation through the eyes of the threat. Understanding the process described above provides an analyst with the basis to anticipate and to try to predict changes in a threat's pattern of activities.

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