

The Complete Manual of Close Protection Training



The Modern Bodyguard

NOW INCLUDES THE NEW U.K. S.I.A. LICENSING TRAINING

Peter Consterdine

**RECOMMENDED
READING BY EDEXCEL**

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PREVIEW - UK LICENSING

The landscape of the Close Protection industry in the U.K. changed markedly in 2006. This was caused by the implementation of new legislation, specifically the Private Security Industry Act 2001, which came into force for CP operatives in March 2006, past which point it would be illegal to work in a 'contract' CP role with a license.

The Act brought much needed regulation to the U.K. contract security industry and prior to the CP licensing deadline, wheel clampers, door supervisors and traditional security guards had all gone through the rigours of the licensing process. This involves, for all sectors, mandatory training, identity checks and police criminality checks.

For security guards and doormen there had been, for some years, recognised certificated courses which, if already held by an individual, could count as dispensation from part of the prescribed, statutory training. The CP world had no such history, with training being delivered officially by police firearms units and specialist military outfits and commercially, by a host of disparate training companies, some with questionable experience in the business and less than satisfactory training programmes.

With the prospect of licensing looming, consultation took place with industry worthies to put together a range of National Occupational Standards for CP, which would, eventually, become the basis for a list of what are known as 'Core Competencies', around which training delivery by approved organisations would be given. The core competencies have been developed by the regulatory body established under the act - the Security Industry Authority or S.I.A. It is the S.I.A. who issues the license (which runs for three years).

Whilst all this may seem of little consequence to those readers outside the U.K., it is interesting in that any person wanting to work in this country will be required to hold an S.I.A. license and already a number of foreign nationals have obtained licenses and my own

Company has used a Swedish operative who has taken the trouble to become licensed. For the moment, however, I'd like to carry on with outlining the new training/licensing process. For someone coming into the industry, with no previous acceptable training history, it has been decided that a minimum time requirement of 150 hours of directed training is necessary to deliver the core competency subject matter.

One, hopefully, vital change is that any training provider who wishes to become an approved centre to deliver the S.I.A. CP training, is, supposedly, required to submit their training manual to an S.I.A. approved Awarding Body for it to be 'mapped' against the content of the 15 core competencies. Already, only a few months into the process, only one awarding body - The Buckinghamshire Chilterns University College (BCUC) is strictly following this guideline. It's also clear that a large number of training providers, with little if any practical CP experience have simply decided to add the CP to their training matrix. So far, rather than 'clean up' the fringe element within the CP training industry, the doors appear to have opened wider with even less scrutiny of standards.

That having been said, on balance, formalised, statutory training and licensing has to be a good thing and below I've laid out how the National Standards became core competencies illustrated by examples from both pieces of work. Interestingly, having reviewed the areas of competency and set these against the Modern Bodyguard, I feel the book is 85%-90% in line with requirements. Where it falls short is certainly in the area of legislation, the competencies now including legislation to do with Misuse of Drugs and Licensing and, controversially, such issues as 'Control & Restraint'. Personally, I have strong objections to a number of the inclusions, C & R not being the least of them. C & R has no role to play in CP work, but its inclusion is as a consequence of the fact that holding a CP license allows an individual to operate as a door supervisor or security guard, hence the inclusion of the issues to do with drugs and licensing legislation and the need for Conflict Management and C & R.

These areas should not have been included, as future generations without the benefit of knowing the rationale behind their inclusion, could mistakenly believe that issues such as C & R have always been a part of CP training.

These legislative changes in the U.K. must also be set against the wider, international situation. Since the book was last updated, we have had 911, Public Transport bombings in Spain and the U.K., the invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraq invasion and post invasion carnage and a host of other international terrorist horrors. There is no doubt that on the back of a worsening worldwide situation, is a realisation that security is not, any longer, the 'distressed purchase' it used to be. International corporations are certainly more conscious of the need to protect their assets, be that people or property and, clearly, there has been a positive impact on the demand for security training, consultancy and manpower supply.

The Private Military Contractor (PMC) can no longer be considered in the same light as the military, mercenary operations of previous years and if Iraq has proved nothing else, it is the need for commercial security contractors to deliver protective services, not only for commercial organisations engaged in reconstruction but for U.S./U.K. government agencies. One problem which I feel has emerged from the Iraq/Afghan situations is the blurring of the distinction between the work of PMC's and commercial close protection work. Whilst circles of activity certainly overlap and having a 'detail' in Iraq, looking after a U.S. diplomat, obviously has elements common to looking after a corporate CEO, what is clear however, is, how the more extreme the environment, the narrower the SOP's, if for no other reason than all unnecessary travel is restricted.

An escort detail in Iraq will move from A to B, no different from an armed military convoy, with little, other operational activity. Whilst in the commercial CP world we could be planning for a night out in downtown Moscow with a principal, the same won't be happening in Baghdad. It comes as a shock to individuals who have left military service, become engaged in private military work in Baghdad, to return to the U.K. to find that they still require 150 hours of CP training.

New Occupational CPS Standards

What I want to look at is one Unit from the National Occupational Standards for Close Protection and then gives an overview of the S.I.A. 15 core competencies. The National Standards were developed into 10 units with sub-divided elements and below we have listed the 10 units and looked, specifically, at Unit 6, which has 2 principle elements within it. Some elements such as PCP 2 has 6 elements within it and, unfortunately, space does not allow us to illustrate the whole range of the National Standards.

PCP 1 - Assess level of threats and risks to principals

PCP 2 - Plan and prepare to minimise threat and risk to principals

PCP 3 - Liaise and communicate with principals and others

PCP 4 - Establish and maintain secure environments

PCP 5 - Communicate effectively in the workplace

PCP 6 - Maintain the safety and security of principals whilst on foot

PCP 7 - Maintain the safety and security of principals whilst in transit

PCP 8 - Respond to trauma and medical crises

PCP 9 - Use control and restraint to support close protection

PCP 10 - Respond to potential conflict whilst providing close protection

As explained above, the occupational standards are grouped into Units of Competence, with Elements within those units and each standard comprises 3 components;

Performance Criteria - specifies the benchmark against which workplace performance can be specified or measured. Each criterion should contain an observable work activity or outcome of activity; together with the benchmark against which performance is to be measured (sadly we're into the 'Speak' of the modern education protocols).

Range Statement - specifies categories of items that can vary when carrying out the activity described by the element title, thereby impacting on competence. These categories and items that each contains should only identify those things that are significantly different and potentially require different skills, or knowledge to deal with them in the workplace.

Knowledge Criteria - specifies the critical knowledge and understanding required in order to perform the work activity competently. The body of knowledge specified by the criteria should underpin the successful achievement of the work activity that is described in the element title. It therefore describes the 'must know' aspects of knowledge, not the 'could know', or 'nice to know'.

We have taken one of the Units as an example before looking at the S.I.A core competencies. It would be impossible to include every core competency, but unit PCP 6 should give a good overview.

Unit PCP 6 - Maintain The Safety and Security of Principals Whilst on Foot

This unit defines the national standard of occupational competence for a close protection officer maintaining the safety and security of a principal whilst on foot. This unit therefore sets the standard for you to:

- **Maintain close protection escort on foot (Element PCP 6.1) and**
- **Respond to incidents affect the safety or security of your principals (Elements PCP 6.2)**

You must be able to maintain effective communications with the principal and other members of your team whilst providing foot escort, and confirm that your principal understands how to respond to any signal or command given. You should follow standard operating procedures for foot escort formations and continually assess situations to take appropriate action to deal with potential threats to the principal. This means that you should also be aware of situations when the principal is subject to surveillance or other unauthorised observation, and take appropriate action.

When you have to respond to incidents, you should be able to take immediate responsive action, giving clear instructions to the principal and taking account of any medical condition of the principal. You should maintain the health, safety and welfare of the principal, yourself and colleagues and be prepared for secondary or subsequent incidents that could compromise the safety or security of the principal.

Unit PCP 6.1 - Maintain close protection escort on foot

Performance criteria: you must be able to -

- a. confirm the principal knows and understands how to respond to any signal or command given to them by you or other member of the protection team;
- b. balance the level of foot escort protection with the personal and professional requirements of the principal;
- c. maintain effective communications with the principal and other members of your team whilst escorting the principal on foot;
- d. use appropriate personal protection equipment to maintain your own safety;
- e. follow standard operating procedures for foot escort formations and protection procedures to avoid or minimise risks and threats to the principal whilst on foot;
- f. negotiate hazards in a way that maintains the safety and security of the principal;
- g. continually monitor and assess situations that could pose risks to the principal and be prepared to take appropriate action to respond to these risks;
- h. recognise when the principal is subject to surveillance or other unauthorised observation, and take appropriate action; and
- i. give clear and concise instructions to the principal and team members where appropriate, following standard operating procedures.

Range statement: you must be competent to deal with the following types of -

- 1. threats from: verbal attack, thrown objects, physical attack (unarmed), physical attack (weapon), firearms, explosives, hysterical crowds.
- 2. escort formation: normal (box, vee, diamond, individual, loose, tight); emergency (cover, evacuation).
- 3. protection procedures to: avoid hindrance to principals, maintain safe distance between perceived threat and principals, allow protection team to react to incidents, avoid dangerous routes.
- 4. hazards: corners, doors, lifts, escalators, stairs, crowds, uneven surfaces.

- 5. situations that are: life threatening, non-life threatening, not directly related to your principals.
- 6. responsive action: evacuation, cover (principal), aggressive response, passive response.

Knowledge criteria: you must know and understand -

- 1) the typical behaviour of your principals when walking under close protection and how this influences your operational methods;
- 2) the signals and commands that are used on foot escort duties and how to follow them;
- 3) the role and responsibilities of protection team members;
- 4) the capabilities and limitations of typical personal protection equipment available to you;
- 5) the sources and nature of potential threats to your principals when walking and how to identify them;
- 6) foot escort formations and how to use them effectively in close protection;
- 7) the standard operating procedures or practices for negotiating hazards and how to follow them;
- 8) surveillance techniques and how to respond to them (counter and anti-surveillance measures);
- 9) the actions that you are authorised to take to respond to potential or actual threats to your principals; and
- 10) the need for clear and concise instructions when providing close protection on foot.

Unit PCP 6.2 - Respond to incidents affecting the safety or security of your principals

Performance criteria: you must be able to -

- a. prioritise and take responsive action to deal with potential risks to the principal, following instructions from your team leader where appropriate;
- b. give clear and concise instructions to the principal and team members where appropriate, following standard operating procedures;
- c. act within the responsibilities of your role in the protection team;
- d. maintain the health, safety and welfare of the principal, yourself and colleagues whilst taking responsive action to deal with threats to the principal;
- e. take account of any medical condition of the principal that could influence what responsive action is taken;

- f. minimise the threat of harm or injury to others who are not directly involved in incidents;
- g. when necessary, use only reasonable force required to maintain the safety and security of the principal, yourself and colleagues; and
- h. be aware of and prepared for secondary or subsequent incidents that could compromise the safety or security of the principal.

Range statement: you must be competent to deal with the following types of -

1. responsive action: evacuation, cover (principal), aggressive response, passive response, counter-surveillance
2. threats from: verbal attack, thrown objects, physical (unarmed) attack, physical (weapon) attack, firearms, explosives

Knowledge criteria: you must know and understand -

1. the signals and commands that are used on foot escort duties and how to follow them;
2. how to encourage your principals to follow commands or instructions, whilst respecting their position or status;
3. the role and responsibility of protection team members;
4. the capabilities and limitations of typical personal protection equipment available to you;
5. the sources and nature of potential threats to your principals and how to recognise them;
6. how to respond to signs of potential attack on your principals (body language, suspicious behaviour, potential weapons);
7. implications of response reaction times and how to minimise these times;
8. what action you are authorised to take to deal with incidents that could compromise the safety and security of your principals, yourself and colleagues;
9. how to use reasonable force to maintain the safety and security of your principals, yourself and colleagues, and current relevant legislation that covers the use of force; and
10. how to recognise actual and potential weapons.

It was then necessary for the S.I.A. to take these new occupational standards and turn them into areas of 'Core Competencies' along with training Aims and Objectives

The 15 S.I.A. Core Competency Training are as follows:-

- **Introduction to the roles and responsibilities of the close protection operative**
- **Threat and risk assessment**
- **Surveillance awareness**
- **Operational planning**
- **Law and legislation**
- **Interpersonal skills**
- **Close protection team work**
- **Reconnaissance**
- **Close protection foot techniques**
- **Route selection**
- **Use of close protection vehicle techniques**
- **Search awareness**
- **Incidents and dilemmas**
- **Venue based security**
- **Communication and conflict management skills**

To see how one of the areas of core competence relates to the national occupational standards, I have just illustrated below the aims and objectives of the first core area and where, in the national standards, one would find the detail.

Session 1: Introduction to the Roles and Responsibilities of the Close Protection Operative
Aim

- To introduce and explain the roles and responsibilities of the close protection operative.
- To introduce and explain the roles and responsibilities of the close protection team.

Objectives By the end of this session trainees will be able to:

- Explain the purpose and diversity of the close protection sector
- Give examples of notable close protection incidents; successes and failures
- Explain the different between a client and a principal within the role of close protection
- Explain the different roles within a close protection team
- Explain the roles a close protection operative may undertake whilst working alone
- State the professional attributes of an effective close protection operative

- Explain the range of equipment available to the close protection operative
- Explain the purpose of close protection training and licensing
- State why it is necessary for a close protection operative to be responsible for their own continual professional development (CPD)
- Give examples of the different types of people to whom close protection operatives are required to provide personal protection and describe the different tasks involved
- Explain the need for a close protection operative to be flexible and act in a professional manner during an assignment
- Explain how working alone affects how a close protection operative carries out his/her role

As you can see above, depending upon the core competency, only certain of the national occupational standards will be referred to. Whilst this all may seem extremely complex, delivered in modern training 'speak' and, in some cases, irrelevant to the job we know we do, it is, on the whole, a great leap forward and everyone concerned with the development of standards and core competencies should be applauded. In some ways, having set out to design a zebra, the committee has given it two humps, a long neck and spots, we will always in the design of industry standards end up with a consensus, committee view.

As mentioned earlier, *The Modern Bodyguard* and also *Travelsafe* are listed as recommended reading by one of the Awarding Bodies, who are responsible for the approval and processing of the examinations and practical assessments from their training providers.

Also by the author;

'Streetwise' – Personal Security & Self Defence

'Travelsafe' – Travel Security

'Fit to Fight' – Training for Combat

HANDLING INCIDENTS & DILEMMAS A 'CORE COMPETENCY'

Below is an outline of some of the issues to do with this area of 'training competence'. Personally, I would not have made this a separate competence as the whole of CP work is a constant, never ending battle about choices and options. A dilemma is just that - a fancy word for a choice and in a CP environment we are making decisions based on numerous options every day. I've tried here to give more of a feel for this area.

All vehicle drills, for example, are a mix of procedural SOP's i.e. 'Tactical Convoy' work and IAD's i.e. 'Evasive Driving' (offensive and defensive), that may be employed if things go wrong.

Again, if we think about vehicles, it is all about choice, i.e. vehicle types, numbers, quality, capability, routes, order of march and so on. It's all to do with making informed decisions based on a lot or, more usually, very little information.

The two, broad constituent parts of a close protection operation are:-

The execution of **Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)**, designed to cater for the security of a principal whilst on foot, in vehicles, housed in a residence, office, hotel, venue, public appearance, both domestically and internationally.

The **'Actions On Drills'** or **'Immediate Action Drills'** which a protective detail will instigate should a planned for or unplanned and unexpected incident, such as an attack, take place. Immediate Action Drills (IADs) are, by their very nature, a reaction to something happening, but should be structured, appropriate, rehearsed (trained) and instantaneous.

Threat and Risk Assessments, Intelligence Gathering, Principal Profiling, and planning, will all lead to the placing of sufficient numbers of people, with the correct resources and appropriate training, so as to create the safe and secure environment the task demands. To

have a whole area of competence about handling incidents and dilemmas seems superfluous, as by its very nature every area of operation is about eradicating the probability of incidents and contingency planning if they occur. However, we're now constrained to have to deliver it and the following overview may help:-

DEFINITIONS

Dilemma

“A position where each of two alternative courses (or all of the foreseeable courses) is eminently undesirable; (loosely) a predicament; a problem”. Chambers Concise

Incident

“A minor event showing hostility and threatening more serious trouble; a brief violent action e.g. bomb, explosion”.

It is necessary to point out that in reality all of CP work is a dilemma as there is always a range of alternate courses of actions, compromises and certain imperatives which, often, never lead to a perfect outcome.

All security is in some way a compromise, as it is impossible to perfectly guard a principal's security whilst at the same time allowing him or her any freedom of movement. A CP operation compromises not only a principal's freedom, but demands more money for more manpower and the more personnel involved, the more overt the operation becomes and so it goes on.

For example, an excessive number of PES and overly tight foot formations could be a serious compromise to a principal's image. Overly enthusiastic tactical convoy drills can create dilemmas, particularly where, say, a traffic light change may create the dilemma for the VIP driver to run the red light or stop and brake the convoy.

At each step of a CP operation, from the planning stage to execution, we are constantly making choices and, most importantly, we should continually endeavour to brainstorm a comprehensive range of 'contingencies' which allow us to prepare for the possibility of a range of incidents - some inconvenient (a burst tyre) to more serious (a personal assault) and determine a range of immediate responses to same.

Preparatory to looking at specific incident handling issues it is important to consider decision-making processes when handling dilemmas or incidents.

In very basic terms, an incident is something which is untoward and has a probability of occurring, however remotely. In most instances, by the very nature of incidents, they will

take a CP team by surprise. By contrast, a dilemma is something which poses a problem, the solution to which is cognitive and for which we may have time on our side. A dilemma is, by other definition, a 'tactical choice' and, for example, we may have the dilemma of vehicle choice where, operationally and for security reasons, we may prefer the principal's vehicle to be suitable but innocuous, whereas the principal may wish to use his own, possibly high profile car.

There is a marked contrast between incident handling and tactical choices and no more so than in the cognitive aspect of resolving issues. If an attack takes place, appropriate reactions (IADs) must be instantaneous and also become part of what is known as the 'startle response'. Training in reactionary drills, which is not inculcated sufficiently to be a startle response will often be delayed and ineffective. The success of any attack is predicated on the basis of surprise and any reactionary delay by CP team members will only add to the potential for success of the attack.

Reactionary drills are not required to have a cognitive element, rather they should be instantaneous trained responses, linked to an on-going awareness of the environment and people within that environment. It is a physiological fact that during moments of high stress and immediate threat, the body's defensive mechanisms i.e. parasympathetic nervous system shuts down unnecessary functions such as digestion and also cognitive responses. At times of immediate threat, the body is geared for flight or fight, not thought.

Dilemmas, on the other hand are often not immediate and any CP operative will be faced with a range of these from traffic problems, to decisions on suspect packages, from cancelled hotel rooms, to vehicles breaking down in remote areas, to loss of communications, to choices between hotel floors or hotel rooms, to briefing clients on potential threats.

Some issues may result in simple 'management inconvenience', and whilst embarrassing for the CPOs, may not create a security breach. Having a client's Bentley clamped is however both embarrassing and a security issue.

The subject heading should, more appropriately, be entitled 'Contingency Planning', as this, more correctly describes the process through which a CP detail endeavours to foresee all potential eventualities and plan accordingly.

Our intelligence gathering and detailed communications and liaison with the principal, the family, the managing agent, or company officers, the police and others involved, will elicit the information we need to plan effectively for what we assess are the risks a client may face.

What has to be factored in to the protective operation is that in the civilian, commercial CP world, there are budgetary constraints which will limit our choices and resources, as well as the fact that the client can, ultimately, have the last say, unlike an 'official' protectee who has to follow orders or commands of his/her protection officers.

Unless there is a clear acceptance of this fact, civilian CPOs will labour under the illusion that what they are doing will work effectively at all times. In reality, there is nearly always a compromise on manpower, vehicles, equipment and empowerment (i.e. no special powers). For a civilian CP detail therefore, contingency planning is paramount, as we are more likely, than not, to be facing options, changes and compromises nearly every day of the operation.

It is a truism that individual members of a civilian CP team must be capable of making 'command decisions', as they will often find themselves without recourse to a comprehensive command structure, via which difficult decisions will be made. For example, there are times when a CPO may be required to double up as a CP driver/BG and may have to resolve the dilemma of the issue of vehicle security and parking, as the car may be left unattended whilst he/she escorts the Principal. This dilemma may be exacerbated by the fact that the Principal evinces that he or she will not need a personal escort and that the CPO will remain with the vehicle.

There is often the dilemma of having a Principal 'housed' in a particular hotel, but team members located in another. A team leader will then have to decide whether he details team members to a roster to carry out 'corridor' duties during the occasions when the principal is in his room or whether, with a detailed briefing to the Principal about personal security and in the knowledge that the hotel is very secure, that it will not be necessary to detail anyone to this task. Trusting one's VIP in this case is one of the considerations. I've personally had a Principal act out of character and let a prostitute into his room who robbed him of some personal items. I was in a different hotel.

Elsewhere, we have discussed the dilemma of disclosing the client's name when reconnoitring premises – hotels and venues and the decision-making is to do with the compromise of releasing security information weighed against the inability to carry out certain, necessary duties i.e. searches, if we do not.

Residence Selection

Selection of suitable accommodation is a good example of security dilemmas.

A. Urban. Generally lacking in privacy, congested traffic, ample cover for opposition

surveillance, but on the plus side, good communications and satisfactory police and emergency services response.

B. Suburban. In many ways similar to the urban environment, but in general better privacy. Less cover for opposition surveillance. Police cover is normally less constant, but reaction times will still be good.

C. Rural. Often isolated, and whilst more privacy, there will be more opportunity for opposition surveillance. Limited choice of escape routes, communications more difficult and emergency services may take longer to respond.

Types of Accommodation

As with location of accommodation, the types available offer a wide range of differing security aspects:-

A. Hotels. Used to handling VIPs; easy administration; frequently good security measure available; good cover from emergency services; possible to take over an entire floor as access control is then made relatively simple but opposition surveillance can be concealed within the general hotel population.

B. Terraced Houses. Linked buildings may have easy access in the roof space but access to this type of house by opposition is often limited.

C. Country Houses. Rarely overlooked, normally of very solid construction, plenty of scope for zoning and provision of a good safe room but mostly isolated.

D. Apartments. The top floor offers most advantages but comes with possible limited escape potential. Control of keys is vital, but difficult to achieve.

Dilemmas may be those which we face during planning choices or those which we encounter during the execution phase of an operation. For example, having, at the planning stage, selected the most suitable accommodation, a feature of the security of that accommodation will often be the vetting of deliveries to the accommodation.

Dilemma arise when unplanned for deliveries arrive that have not been listed on the daily occurrence log. The dilemma will then be to accept the item with any attendant security risk or have the item returned to the inconvenience of the Principal.

Incident handling is, by contrast, more prescriptive in that a range of immediate responses is often mandated for dealing with the most likely incidents that could occur.

Vehicle Anti-Ambush

The overriding aim of any security operation is to prevent an attack from taking place. All the measures taught in personal security, tactical driving and anti-surveillance are designed to prevent the enemy from being in a position to mount an ambush and the correct

application of tactical driving skills, combined with an appearance of alertness and professionalism will assist in persuading a potential attacker that an attack on this particular principal would not succeed. It would be inappropriate, however, to rely on the above as our sole means of protection and in the event that an ambush is sprung, there are a number of reactive principles that must be applied.

1. Protect the Principal
 - a. Body Cover
 - b. If the vehicle is armoured, leave the principal in the vehicle unless it is immobilised.
2. Remove the principal from danger
3. Fast, aggressive action
4. Do not attack the ambush
5. Beware of decoys
6. Use appropriate drill

Drills

There are 3 basic drills which can be used with either a single car, a 2-car or a 3-car convoy.

A. Drive or ram through. This drill should be used when the attack comes from the side but the road is clear, or when the road in front is partially blocked by a lightweight vehicle.

B. Reverse out. This drill is appropriate when the road is blocked to the front by a substantial obstacle such as a fallen tree or a heavy goods vehicle, coach etc.

C. Evacuate on foot. This drill should be used when the road is effectively blocked to the front and rear.

Variations to the basic drills.

A. Transfer car drill. If the situation would allow either a drive-through or a reverse out, but if the principal's car is immobilised, then the principal may be removed from his vehicle and placed in the escort vehicle, which then makes its escape.

The response to an ambush has to be rapid and must be constructive. This can only be achieved by constant practice by the PES and the drivers. A hesitation, a misunderstanding between the principal's driver and the PES or an inability in the first instance to recognise the situation as it develops, could cost the principal his life.

As an example of incorrect response, we can look at the attack on Gen. Kroesens in August 1981 in Heidelberg. The 2-car convoy with PES vehicle behind Gen. Kroesens's car was

stationary at pedestrian lights, at which no pedestrian was waiting. The attack, using RPG7 and automatic fire came from high ground on the left of the convoy. The Principal's driver stalled the engine of the armoured Mercedes. The PES debussed and engaged the ambush with their .38 revolvers.

I have wanted to give an overview of this one area of competence, which in their wisdom, the powers that be have decided stands alone, whereas, in reality, handling incidents and dilemmas is another title for all CP work. It's a bit of committee-designed horse which has ended up with stripes, 2 humps and long neck!!

CHAPTER 1

PERSONAL SECURITY

It might help to start with a definition of Personal Security and the following particular one, drawn from many sums it up well, that:-

“The object of Personal Security is to reduce the risk of kidnap, assassination or criminal act by the application of certain principles and procedures to normal daily life.”

We will look at the three overriding Principles in a moment, but before that we need to put the subject of Personal Security in its correct context. The definition referred to principles and procedures and it is in this respect that confusion often arises. It is not confusion, I feel over basic terminologies as, hopefully, readers will be able to make the distinction between principles and procedures, rather it is confusion about how to describe Personal Security.

Often when you read articles or training notes, both civilian and military, you begin with a heading “Personal Security” and by the middle of page one you’re into the do’s and don’ts of how to arrange office furniture, household security and vehicle security considerations. This I feel is where the confusion arises.

“Personal Security” as a heading is the ‘brass plate’ over every aspect of our daily lives and the life of our Principal and how we act and perform our duties and procedures. These procedures are those we will look at in detail in the other chapters, where it concerns the operating considerations of fixed **locations** and where it affects those drills and procedures in movement and **travel** either on foot or otherwise.

But back to the principles. There are three which cover the subject and, if you like, are in the ‘header tank’ from which they flow into every aspect of our work and daily lives.

These are:-

‘That the individual is responsible for his or her own security’

‘That the security measures must be commensurate with the threat’

‘That constant awareness is the cornerstone of good personal security’

Responsibility for Own Security

If you were to pick up a booklet from the Metropolitan Police on Personal Security or a similar booklet from the Northern Ireland office, you would see emblazoned on the first page the principle stated above. This is an unassailable and unalterable principle. We, and equally our clients, are responsible to ourselves for our own security. All security is a compromise and in the field of close protection, that compromise is between the requirements of security and the demands of living as near normal a life as possible by the VIP. Many appreciate that they must modify their behaviour in such a way as to give security the best chance to work, but it is purely personal choice and individual responsibility as to whether they will compromise at all and, if so, how far. It has always been an accurate statement that if you have a client to look after who lived and worked in a sealed mineshaft, you would still only have a 75% chance of protecting him. We will come back to the conceptual side of this principle when we look at **Kidnapping - Prevention and Awareness**.

Security Commensurate with the Threat

From our Threat Assessment, we should know our requirements in terms of manpower and equipment, having categorised the level of threat and established our resources and, hopefully, finances to cope adequately. This brings us to the second principle which is probably more often compromised than any other, as in the real world the threat to a client, set against their ability or willingness to pay for what we might professionally believe the correct solution is often at odds. You will be reading a great deal about ‘high’ and ‘low’ profile escort work in this book and for most of the time in the real world you will be required to organise your protective effort in a ‘low profile’ manner, irrespective of the assessment one has made and the requirement, possibly, for a high profile display to act as a deterrent factor. This is obviously a major compromise, but one that will be imposed on us by client wishes. By definition, lowering the profile will lower protection. On the other side of the coin, it is often too easy, particularly with people new to the work of close protection, to become over-enthusiastic and treat every job as a **Category 1** risk. They can become as much a problem on a job as someone who is ‘switched off’ most of the time and it is this last aspect that really, for me, defines the essence of personal security.

Constant Awareness

It is in this area that people, all too often, fail consistently to make things work. This is regardless as to whether they are a Bodyguard or a client. It is difficult even for trained

people to stay alert. Going about a daily routine, be it domestic or work, soon becomes a matter of habit and, as a consequence, a person 'switches off'. Staying alert and 'switched on' is a trained skill. It is not something you say you will do and magically it happens. Saying to yourself that you will stay alert is a conscious gesture and will be held in the forefront of your mind until another thought enters and this is measured in seconds, never mind minutes, hours or even days and, as a consequence, any conscious effort is short-lived. A system needs to be adopted around which an individual can train for awareness for it to become unconscious and subliminal, but permanently working or 'on guard'. If I were to drop you in a jungle tomorrow you would be alert because quite patently it's a bad place to be. Situations breed awareness through obvious risks, but in a normal daily, routine life this won't happen, so we need a system to adopt which will keep us switched on.

Security procedures without the attendant correct mental approach or mindset by people who are responsible are pointless, yet often such procedures are allowed to become so routine that they are predictable, visible and cease to have any deterrent or preventative effect. We are faced with THREAT - this is the basis of our business and we need to look at threat from 3 perspectives:-

1. THREAT AWARENESS
2. THREAT EVALUATION
3. THREAT AVOIDANCE

THREAT AVOIDANCE

THREAT EVALUATION

THREAT AWARENESS

The Threat Pyramid

The second and third areas are reactive and totally in the hands of the first, support principle in the pyramid. Evaluation is a function and is determined by time! One is incapable of evaluating if time is negligible or even non-existent. If you have only a split second to evaluate danger a correct response won't happen. What you'll have, instead, is a classic freeze, or panic and chaos, although usually frozen immobility. One can only evaluate a potential threat if enough time has been made possible by being aware and recognising, at the first opportunity, a change in one's environment which may be unfavourable. This may be a seemingly innocent accident ahead, parked vehicles at a venue, roadworks new to a written route recce, or people in the street that seem out of place. This is awareness and this is where it has to work at a sub-conscious level.

Many years ago, an American combat pistol instructor, Jeff Cooper, developed a system of Colour Codes to give security personnel a matrix or schema of visualisation to enable them to have both a system of accommodating changing threat levels, combined with action

triggers to enable automatic responses to take place following a perceived change in threat. We use that system today as a visual reference and the four states of 'condition' being **White, Yellow, Orange** and **Red**.

Condition White, or 'switched off' is where 95% of people spend 95% of their time, complete with, as we say, a 'headfull of seagulls'. These people walk around completely unaware of their surroundings and are blind to the proximity of potential danger. They are mentally and physically unprepared for an attack. People in this condition have no time to recover from the 'startled' response they go through when an attack takes place.

Aldo Moro's bodyguards were unable to return fire against their attackers and, in fact, their weapons were found to still have the safety catches on.

Condition Yellow is used as a reference point to visualise that sub-conscious and subliminal state of awareness, where we should all be 100% of the time. In this state we are permanently 'switched on'. Totally aware of our surroundings and inherent dangers and changes which may take place - a part of our sub-conscious is constantly 'on guard'. We are relaxed but permanently alert. If we look back at the Threat Pyramid this relates to the area of Awareness.

Condition Orange is a state established by dint of a perceived change, for the worst, in our environment. This is where the evaluations should take place - the awareness which is condition yellow buys time to evaluate a potential problem and to act accordingly. Given that we are still probably talking about seconds to act, we must have a series of trained responses which are our 'actions on' drills and for which we need an **action trigger** to remove decision making. We go into orange when we spot either a person, vehicle or a situation which is out of place or suspicious. This is the last opportunity for Evaluation as illustrated on the pyramid.

Condition Red - this is the condition where the visualisation acts as a trigger and removes decision. Decisions are those things we consider after breakfast and arrive at a conclusion by lunch. Decisions have no part to play in a situation where the wheel comes off and action is called for. That action may be flight or fight, whichever is appropriate, but hopefully, through awareness we have bought ourselves sufficient perception and time to flee.

Personal Security is a state of mind - it is about a 'condition' and that condition is constant awareness. How we train for that constant awareness is another matter and we can only touch on it briefly. We arrive at a 'sub-conscious' awareness through the practice of Commentary Work. Commentary driving, the bases of all Tactical and Advanced driver training is applied not only to driving, but to all aspects of daily life, either walking or whilst

at home or in the office. For however long it takes, we have to articulate out loud what we are doing, what others are doing around us, what we see, how and why we are acting the way we are and what our reactions will be, given those circumstances around us. We verbally describe every facet of what we see and what our senses tell us, so that after a reasonable period of time, we can cease to articulate, yet find that sub-consciously we carry on the dialogue. The habit of awareness has now been formed and we never lose it. A subliminal dialogue carries on below our conscious level and it is this which keeps us switched on in Condition Yellow. Changes are noticed, people evaluated, circumstances assessed for normalcy, things out of place or absent are noted and our conscious brain informed. We are no longer WIDE ASLEEP.

All successful kidnap and assassinations happen because of one final factor and only one - the *element of surprise*. Skill at arms, evasive driving, martial arts, reactive drills, are pointless and valueless if you are taken by surprise and have no time to shoot, drive, fight or flee because you are still trying to make sense of what's happening around you. Awareness is the only skill which may save your life.

Kidnapping - Prevention and Awareness

Security is about ensuring that all links in the chain are as strong as each other. In general terms this may be **manpower, procedures, equipment** and **systems**. In Executive Protection however, the main link in the chain, the *executive*, or *protected figure*, must take on the responsibility of doing a number of things on his or her own behalf. The individual must take an active role in their own protection. The individual should be considered as a main resource in his own protection.

Often however, he will be as good as the educational briefing we have given him as to the self-protective procedures and tactics. An individual must be made aware, in a balanced way of the seriousness of the risk, without them mentally and even physically withdrawing from daily life. As we have mentioned when discussing compromise - effective counter-surveillance measures, avoidance of routine, awareness training - must all fit in with the Executive's lifestyle. Again only experience will allow a professional security adviser to know what and how best to present a programme of self-protection strategies, so as to avoid an excessive build up of fear, yet ensure that a true appreciation of the seriousness of the situation exists.

As we know, kidnapping or assassination are normally only embarked upon after long periods of detailed surveillance. This selection of a victim may hinge on a wide variety of factors and once a victim has been initially selected, the need for detailed information on all aspects of their lifestyle will increase. Information is needed to fill out the plan of attack.

There is considerable work to be done by the terrorist organisation (as you will see when we cover ‘**Terrorist Tactics**’ in Chapter 3). Often surveillance of a potential victim will be carried on around the clock, at home, at the office, socially and in transit, to establish the point where they believe they will catch the victim by surprise and off-guard. A vulnerable victim is one, therefore, that will present the terrorists with easy means of attack and a safe escape. Usually such a victim will have little security, but more importantly, is unaware of the danger and blind to maybe days and weeks of close surveillance. He will not be alert to the presence of danger until it is too late and whatever security measures are in place will be of little use.

The Executive must therefore have strategies of self-protection for both himself, his members of family and staff, which should work whilst at home, travelling, at the office and socially. An Executive of prominence and/or wealth is vulnerable at all times, but most likely to be vulnerable in transit, near the home.

Limiting Information

As we pointed out, terrorists need information to plan and execute an attack and consequently the basic self protective strategy for an Executive, his family and staff is to limit and control the following kinds of information:-

- 1. Movement patterns, habits, general lifestyle of him and his family.**
- 2. The Executive’s business and travel plans, itineraries and mode of travel.**
- 3. Physical layout and details of the Executive’s home and office.**
- 4. Facts about the organisation or corporation the Executive is employed by - his responsibilities, his associates, activities of the organisation or corporation.**
- 5. Details on the security measures and procedures for the Executive and his family, security in operation and that being planned.**

Patterns and Habits

Despite limiting the above, it is all too easy for an Executive, his family and even CP teams to develop patterns of behaviour and habits that offer to the trained terrorist, vital information in the use of planning and executing an attack. Daily routines, by their very nature, fall into natural patterns. The more necessary an activity is, the more likely it is that it will fall into an observable pattern. It is this pattern that becomes the basic planning element of the attackers action. Such patterns are as follows:-

- 1. The Executive’s daily travel time and route to and from his office.**
- 2. His wife’s pattern of shopping, visiting friends, driving the children to school, picking them up, social activities.**

3. Information of a corporate nature gleaned from both internal and external sources as to future arrangements.

4. By observations of pattern, complete information on the extent of the protective effort.

Surveillance

The attacker, be he kidnapper, assassin or criminal, attempting to observe the Executive and his family's behaviour patterns, will usually employ one of the following methods of surveillance:-

1. Vehicle, not always a car, slowly cruising around the area of the home and passing in front of the house at several different times of the day.

2. A vehicle where occupants may be visible, parked at an angle from the house further up the street.

3. Empty vans in the same situation.

4. Patrolling of the residence or office by other means which could include the following:-

a. Individuals or couples on a motorbike

b. Combinations of men, women, children

c. Mother walking with a pram

5. If there is a park or open space across from, or within sight of the office or the residence, then the following may be used:-

a. All the family combinations and activities listed above

b. Rotating couples

c. Picnics or small parties

6. Repair crews (seemingly not achieving much).

7. Phone calls to the house or office, frequently at all times of the day and night where the caller will ask innocuous questions or a specific question about the whereabouts of a member of the household.

8. Door to door salesmen, surveys, religious god-botherers.

9. Following by any number of vehicles; following when Executive or family members are on foot.

Given the above, we can brief our Principal on the most favoured methods of surveillance and how he and his family members and staff can learn, with our help, to note any patterns or sudden changes in their immediate environment and those often obvious, (if one knows what to look for), and consistent efforts to survey their movements, habits and locations. Train your Executives to write down descriptions of individuals and vehicles including VRNs (vehicle registration numbers) and notify any suspicions to you and the police.

A pattern of behaviour is easiest to observe and provides needed planning information. The prevention of kidnapping and assassination calls for varying as many of the daily patterns as possible. The Executive must be convinced of the need to vary his commuting to and from work, his wife to vary her shopping and social habits and to establish a variety of different routes for taking the children to and from school. Changes in these patterns make it difficult, if not impossible, for attackers to establish precisely when and where an Executive and his family will be at a given time.

It may be that you will not be with your client at all times. Often you may only accompany your principal when he travels abroad, but you owe it to your VIP to ensure that when you are not there he acts in accordance with certain basic personal safety principles. Some other general guidelines you can give them are as follows:-

- 1. If he has a choice of company pool vehicles, make him use them.**
- 2. When walking, walk in company wherever possible and discourage him from walking anywhere at night.**
- 3. Do not use the same restaurant, club, place of entertainment or other public place regularly.**
- 4. Let the police know of any threats or the possibility of threats which may arise from public or commercial activities. Keep your family in the picture and, wherever possible, your key associates and those trusted close employees.**
- 5. Advise family and business associates not to provide strangers with information concerning Executives or family.**
- 6. Avoid giving unnecessary personal details to information collectors in response to their enquiries on behalf of publications, such as business directories, social registers or research projects.**
- 7. Establish simple, effective signal systems which, when activated, will alert business associates, chauffeur, members of the family (and obviously if in attendance the BG).**

- 8. Educate your Executive to refuse to meet with strangers at scheduled or unknown locations.**
- 9. Ensure that an ‘Executive Tracking System’ is in operation so that family and colleagues are aware at all times where the individual should be and an approximate ETA, past which point certain actions should be brought into play. This should equally apply to family members.**
- 10. Know all phone numbers - office, home, police, security company.**
- 11. Establish some simple code words to confirm that everything is alright. Such code words can be used for Executive, family and business associates. They will need changing at intervals.**
- 12. Corporate press releases announcing promotions or Executives, should not list the executive’s home address, nor should they discuss forthcoming travel plans or other activities which will define the presence of an Executive at a particular location.**
- 13. Press releases should be either without a photograph or else should not show the executive in his office or work location. Use a neutral background for all photographs.**
- 14. Discourage the use of name boards on office doors or desks.**
- 15. Encourage a corporate ‘clean desk policy’ so that no information is available after hours to the not-so-casual observer.**
- 16. Do not have a designated parking space with the company name identified or that of the executive or his position in the company. Park in the general parking area.**
- 17. Senior Executives should not work alone.**
- 18. Do not leave travel papers on desks.**
- 19. Do not book restaurants in your own name.**
- 20. Avoid travelling at night.**
- 21. Vary social activities, if at all possible, which may happen routinely week in, week out.**

SUMMARY

Information about the victim is a vital element of a kidnapper's action, and is basic to any successful plan of attack. Another important part of the offender's action is his ability to catch his target/victim off guard. Executives can use a variety of preventive strategies and tactics to thwart kidnap planning and thus frustrate a successful attack.

A primary preventive strategy is to limit and control availability of the following kinds of information:-

- 1. Patterns of movement and behaviour.**
- 2. Travel plans, itineraries, and mode of travel.**
- 3. Physical layout and details of the home and office.**
- 4. Details of security measures for the Executive, the family and the home.**
- 5. Responsibilities and duties of the Executive.**

Pattern avoidance behaviour, adopting a low profile, awareness of offenders' surveillance techniques, constant awareness of the possibility of an attack, and defensible space design of the home and the office are some of the important strategies that may be practiced by the Executive and his family for their effective protection against this type of crime.

The following are some general do's and don'ts that we must brief our boss on when he is travelling alone or with a chauffeur in his car. In the civilian CP world we do not spend 24 hours at our boss's side and often may only be alongside him when he is abroad or on a special visit. With all personal security, these issues are as applicable to ourselves when looking at general vehicle procedures and some repetition is unavoidable, but often important to drive points home.

- 1. He should drive a nondescript car! (not always an easy one to get over.)
If possible in a foreign country, choose a car common in that country. License plates, if allowed, should be the same as those used by native residents.**
- 2. Change the car often, particularly if there are pool cars available.**
- 3. Know routes to and from work as well as the side streets.**
- 4. Vary the route to and from the office with the maximum flexibility such alternates allow. Vary times, mode of transport with a co-ordinated security plan.**
- 5. There should be never less than half a tank of fuel in the Executive's vehicle.**
- 6. Train him and his chauffeur to be alert. Look for possible ambush situations such as a lorry blocking the road, accidents, repair crews that don't seem too busy or are in the wrong position in relation to the repairs, cars or lorries with**

- several occupants parked by the road, unusual activity such as streets deserted at the wrong time of the day, following motor cycles with pillion passengers.
7. "Drive Ahead" - be alert beyond the limits of the bonnet, that is two or three blocks and a constant 360 degrees.
 8. Keep an adequate manoeuvring distance - use the lane nearest the centre of the road where possible.
 9. Before stopping to change a flat tyre, drive to a safe place.
 10. Drive the vehicle at normal traffic speeds and always under control.
 11. Be alert to possible following vehicles by constant use of rearview and wing mirrors.
 12. Be especially cautious when approaching side streets, access ramps, service roads and underpasses, as these are prime attack points for abductors.
 13. If attacked, do not leave the car. The car should be used as a defensive shield and it can be used for evasive action if training by the driver allows.
 14. The best defence against ambush or attempted abduction is alertness and as a consequence the ability to detect a potential hazardous situation. The driver or the executive should discipline himself by training to be aware and alert at all times and under any circumstances. If in doubt about any situation call for assistance.
 15. If there is any suspicion that the Executive is being followed, he must drive to a police station. Know the location of all police stations on the travel route. If none, drive to a busy area.
 16. Always drive with doors locked, windows closed or minimum two inches.
 17. If possible, do not drive through deserted areas. Kidnappers can set up an undetected ambush in these areas.
 18. Avoid stopping at traffic lights if possible by pacing your driving.
 19. Drive with a good distance between the vehicles in front, particularly a lorry. If the vehicle stops suddenly, there should be enough time and space to take evasive action and avoid being boxed-in.
 20. With a chauffeur-driven car, have pre-arranged signals worked out between the driver and Executive. It is advisable in high risk areas for the Executive to sit in the front passenger seat and keep a low profile. Do not read.
 21. Upon arrival at work, drive directly to a secure parking area.
 22. Avoid driving at night, but if this is necessary for a social function, try to travel with another party. Avoid remote areas of the city and the countryside at night.

Principal Briefing

As well as those drills and procedures whilst mobile, your Executive should be made aware of good vehicle protection factors.

- 1. Get him into the habit of inspecting the car before entry. He should look for:-**
 - a. Evidence of entry.**
 - b. Exhaust pipe blocked.**
 - c. Material in the tyre walls.**
- 2. Whenever possible, he should not park the car unattended and unlocked.**
- 3. Do not have the Company's name, logo etc on the car.**
- 4. Park the car in a locked and alarmed garage, never leave it parked on a street. If unavoidable, always park under a street lamp.**
- 5. Park in a general car parking area, not in a reserved bay with the Executive's name or position marked on it.**
- 6. The bonnet should have a lock as well as the petrol cap.**
- 7. Alarm and immobiliser should be fitted to the car.**
- 8. The car should be serviced by the organisation or by a local service station that has been given a thorough background check.**
- 9. Never leave keys, other than an ignition key with a service station or garage.**
- 10. Don't routinely use the same petrol station.**
- 11. Never leave parcels or papers in the car - leave it uncluttered so you can spot any unusual object.**
- 12. Check the garage before you leave it and when you return for signs of forced entry.**
- 13. Fit an emergency siren and use it with the hazard warning lights if attacked.**

Home Security Advice.

Your Principal and his family, if they do not live in a residence with acres of ground and a Threat Level which demands a RST, must be their own first line of defence when at home.

The threat level may be such that you are only with your boss during working hours or the threat may be transient whilst a specific problem is sorted out. In this instance, you are going to have to act as security adviser and provide a list of do's and don'ts for the household security. The following is not a comprehensive list, but will serve for most situations:

- 1. Cancel deliveries of newspapers, milk etc. when away. Arrange for your home to be checked and any mail that has been left sticking out, removed.**
- 2. Summon assistance at the first sign of something unusual happening, dial 999, 911 or the emergency services number for the country.**
- 3. Site telephones away from the windows or where you can be seen through glass doors.**
- 4. Instruct all family members and staff to exercise discretion when answering the phone.**
- 5. Get callers to leave a name and number and call back.**
- 6. When entering rooms at night, always close the curtains before turning on the light.**
- 7. Use net curtains to restrict daytime viewing from outside.**
- 8. Use only the best in bolts, locks and chains. Fit mortice locks to doors.**
- 9. An alarm system which is comprehensive yet compatible with the lifestyle of the household.**
- 10. Panic alarms strategically placed, always in the bedroom.**
- 11. At night, light the outside permanently - don't simply rely on PIR, it can be beaten.**
- 12. Keep a mobile phone at all times in the bedroom.**
- 13. When answering the door at night, make sure that the person outside is in the light and you are in the dark.**
- 14. You must be able to identify someone at the door either with a CCTV system or viewhole - preferably not in the door itself. Use an adjacent window if possible.**
- 15. Light all approaches to the house and garage and keep all lights out of reach.**
- 16. Make a regular safety check at night to make sure all the doors and windows are locked.**
- 17. Ensure friends advise of intended visits.**
- 18. Keep dustbins, if possible, in an enclosed yard.**
- 19. Consider keeping a dog - a barking dog is one of the best early warning systems and deterrents.**
- 20. Make sure babysitters are familiar with all procedures, answering the door, calls etc.**

- 21. Observe the manner, dress and accessories of a caller (ie. coat over arm, briefcase, hand luggage) - does any of it seem out of place.**
- 22. Keep all emergency numbers to hand and by the phone.**
- 23. Be on guard if the telephone ceases to work - use an alternate phone (ie. mobile) and report it immediately.**

DO NOT

- Label keys so they can be identified, use a colour code if necessary.
- Leave the house in darkness when out.
- Put children in downstairs bedrooms.
- Allow young children to answer the telephone or door. As soon as they are old enough, teach them to dial 999.
- Allow children to intercept mail and open it.
- Leave a key under the mat, plant pot or other hiding place.
- Switch the hall light on when answering the door at night.

Remember, an attack will only succeed if you are caught unawares - **Always Think Before You Act.**

1. Am I following a set routine?
2. At what point would I be most vulnerable to an attack?

Reverse your thinking and plan surveillance on yourself and method of attack. Constantly look at your situation through an offenders eyes. How would they carry out an attack and, how, are you currently assisting them.



A good piece of kit. A telescopic mirror with integral torch from Allens is ideal to carry in the briefcase and for use in low threat situations for that cursory examination. Mirrors are no substitute for getting underneath.

CHAPTER 2

THE CLOSE PROTECTION TEAM

The heading is somewhat misleading, as the definition of ‘team’ might, in many instances, be a reference to only one man. This is low-level protection but, quite often, if the level of threat and/or depth of pocket to provide a solution to the problem is shallow, then one man will endeavour to cover as many aspects of a full team effort as possible. He may be Personal Bodyguard, Driver, Medic, Mechanic, Social Organiser and all-round security adviser. At the other extreme, a team may, if the threat demands, amount to in excess of 70 people, where the main functions of the protective effort are duplicated or even triplicated to account for major shift changes and ongoing team training. This level of protection is that which you would normally find in the rarefied atmosphere of Government or Military Close Protection. Having said that, it’s not uncommon to be on a job where, with various members of a Middle Eastern royal family, there will be 30-40 people employed over maybe two or three residences.



The PES ready for departure from the Residence

Broadly, however, there are certain functions which one needs to have in place. The 'protective effort' is a function of two principle factors:- The THREAT and the client's ability/willingness to PAY for the requisite level of security. a **Cat. 1**, which in reality would only ever likely be handled at government agency level, would be approximately 75 people, excluding the police or separate forces for residence security work or crowd control and would have the luxury of a command HQ group with a commander, two deputy commanders and a quartermaster.

The close escort sections, possibly three, each with three teams of four men, ie. twelve on duty at any time, three VIP drivers, that is four on duty at any time, two VIP vehicles and nine escort vehicles. This would give the luxury of three shifts in a 24-hour period. This is a typical military structure, but the basis of this organisation is where most civilian - commercial planning is derived.

A **Cat. 2** threat on the old military system would probably half this number of people and would work 2 twelve hour shifts. In addition to the numbers quoted, there may also be a doctor, liaison officer, a specific signals man, armourer and mechanic. In the real world of commercial CP work, many roles are duplicated. A 2 I/C (second in command) may also act as QM (quartermaster), a driver as mechanic and the PES team leader as liaison and possibly even Bodyguard.

We've already fallen into the use of terminologies, abbreviations and acronisms and need now to define some of the terms.

TL- Team Leader

BG - Bodyguard

PES - Personal Escort Section

RST - Residence Security Team

SAP - Security Advance Party

Before looking at each of the above separately, we need to look at how the level of resources for an operation are determined.

Planning The Protective Effort

“When arranging the protection of a VIP the first considerations will usually be, how many men are needed, and what sort of organisation and equipment is required.” The answers are determined by the following factors:-

- **Level and nature of threat**
- **The importance of the VIP**
- **The VIPs lifestyle and circumstances**
- **The Political acceptability of a Bodyguard**
- **Resources available - manpower, materials and finance**

Security Objectives

We protect against the following:-

1. Unintentional Injury

Vehicle accidents, random accidents, medical emergencies, special medical problems.

2. Embarrassing Situations

Media Control, public situations, corporate situations, private life, family matters etc.

3. Intentional Attacks

Criminal threat, random attacks, organised assault, terrorist or criminal kidnaping.

4. Management Convenience

On a more mundane level, the CP Team should ensure the smooth running of any visit or occasion with which their Principal is involved. They should put their logistic muscle to work. I say mundane, but a smooth running job, from the client's point of view, means a well planned job by us and one which has had the best opportunity for security not to be compromised.



Somewhere in the North African desert. Company vehicles ‘rolled’ by local drivers. A regular occurrence and one of the biggest physical risks.

Operation Of A Bodyguard Detail

“

STRATEGICALLY THOUGHT OUT AND TACTICALLY APPLIED”

The efficiency of a CP operation will depend on the type of men used and on the organisation and operation of the team. Bodyguarding is basically a tedious, routine occupation, which may be rendered even more tedious by inefficient organisation.

The following summarises the Operational side of CP work:-

1. Planning

- Intelligence gathering
- Advance security and logistics preparation

2. Operations Room (Control Room, Command Centre)

- Communications co-ordination
- Information exchange
- Manpower co-ordination
- Logistics management
- Special equipment service and management

These days in civilian CP work, as described in more detail elsewhere, we have simplified the old threat rating system of using a scale from 1 to 7, where level 1 is the highest category and level 7 the lowest. Broadly, we use only three levels and this is more properly dealt with in Chapter 4 ‘**Threat and Threat Assessment**’. Before we look at the various divisions of responsibility and functions of a CP team, let’s just summarise some of the principles of Bodyguarding and then see how the team operates.



Protecting by all round bodycover. Only many hours of practice will produce a well co-ordinated escort section.

Bodyguards are the ‘inner circle’ of the ‘Circles of Protection’ concept. The fullest possible protection is achieved by:-

Observation

Using their eyes to assess the situation around the VIP and reacting to events quickly in a trained, organised way where necessary.

Body Cover

- a. By shielding the VIP with their own bodies (hence the name ‘bullet catchers’).
- b. By shielding, using others ie. carefully arranging other people around the Principal.

Systematic Protection

Doing the job carefully and well. This is the element that tells others who have an unhealthy interest in our client, that the PES is skilled, vigilant and switched on.

Avoidance of Routine

Avoiding the habits and routine that infests the daily lifestyle of the VIP. This denies the potential kidnapper or assassin the ability to pre-plan.

Reconnaissance and Planning

Efficient reconnaissance, planning and clear concise orders.

Review of Security

There should be a constant review of security procedures. There must always be constructive criticism and feedback from team members. New members should be encouraged to think of new ideas.

Relations with VIP and Others

BG’s must at all times be polite, but firm in their dealings with officials and at times with their Principal. They must be confident, although tinged always with the requisite amount of diplomacy.

Operational Security

There must at all times be a careful watch on the security of an operation. Operations must constantly monitor whether they are inadvertently letting information leak from within the confines of the CP team. For example, the use of cellular telephones should be kept to a minimum.

Administration

Documentation, Personnel evaluation and re-training etc.

Chain of Command

See Chapter 19.

Constant Training

'Actions on Drills' (IADs) - in the event of a variety of potential incidents, when on foot or in vehicles, are constantly rehearsed and drilled and the procedural work such as Embus/Debus are constantly practiced. The PES/BG will also be skilled 'tactical drivers', good weapons handlers and well trained in emergency first aid and possibly advanced paramedic skills.



The various drills must be practiced continuously. These are usually the High Profile ones that are formal and overly structured. The hardest to get right are the Low Profile procedures.

Physical Fitness

In his own and the whole team's interest, it is vital that a CP operative is fit and well. He should have a high level of fitness (see Chapter 17).

Mental Alertness

All CP operatives should have an above average sense of alertness. They should have developed a sub-conscious ability to notice all detail within their surroundings and be sensitive to a complex range of things which may seem out of place. They must believe an attack is a possibility at all times. They must understand the problem that when they feel the most secure, they then are at the greatest risk, as their mental guard is down.

Sequence of Events

• Notification of task • Threat Assessment • Initial Liaison • Initial Advances • Appreciations • Warning Order • Operation Order • Team Recces • Final Liaison • OPERATION.

Equipment used in the Protective Effort

1. Operatives Equipment

- a. Identification
- b. Communications & alarms
- c. Firearms (if appropriate in the country)
- d. Travel & Administration

2. General Operational Equipment

- a. Transportation - vehicles, air travel etc
- b. Communications - permanent, mobile
- c. Operational Kit - medical, search etc
- d. Technical Equipment - ECM, explosive detection.

3. Principal's Protective Equipment

- a. Alarm systems - permanent, mobile
- b. Surveillance - permanent, mobile
- c. Physical barriers & lighting
- d. Armour - body, buildings, vehicles



Hotel alarm for any number of VIPs. Each VIP has an alarm, which when pressed, is relayed via the 'box' as shown in the top photograph, to the pagers shown alongside the alarms below. At the same time, the blue light flashes on the box, an alarm sounds and the pager indicates which VIP - by means of a colour code - has pressed his or her alarm.

The best way to protect the life of a VIP in the event of an attack is to remove him or her from the scene to a pre-determined place of safety. The Plan Of Action in all situations must be on the assumption that an attack will take place. The basic assumption must also be that the evacuation will proceed without difficulty. You must, however, have contingencies prepared and drills practiced if the following occur:-

1. The VIP may be killed or injured. The basic plan must continue, but the destination will now be a hospital. A police vehicle or an ambulance will now be the best option of evacuation.
2. One of the CP team is killed or injured.
3. An obstruction makes evacuation from the scene impossible. In such circumstances, cover must be provided at the scene until the obstruction is removed or the threat can be neutralised.
4. Travelling by vehicle - the vehicle is immobilised. A second vehicle should be on hand to evacuate and other contingency plans may also have to come into play.

It is our task to control as much as possible the following in relation to our VIP:-

- **Accessibility**
- **Vulnerability**
- **Schedules**
- **Routes**
- **Habits**
- **Attitudes**
- **Awareness**

Co-operation of the Principal

This may seem obvious, but often it is not a foregone conclusion. A CP team, appointed by the Board of a company through its lawyers and tasked with looking after a Senior Executive may only be accepted with reluctance. The following are some general guidelines to follow in all liaison matters:-

- 1. Interview the Principal, obtain his consent to protection and explain basic protective techniques, alternatives and compromises if absolutely required.**
- 2. Debrief him on any known threat or more information on a threat.**
- 3. Ascertain his likes and dislikes (see ‘Personality Profiling’), lifestyle etc.**
- 4. Obtain a schedule of his movements, and brief him on the requirement for as much advance notice as possible.**
- 5. Obtain medical history, blood group etc**
- 6. Obtain permission to ‘audit’ the security of his home and place of work.**
- 7. Ensure he is conversant with the risk to himself and his family - (then into the Personal Security briefing).**

Police CP Training Manuals will make you realise the enviable position their operatives are in, as they make a very clear distinction between security and lifestyle and their unwillingness to make any compromises. They will state quite clearly that the object of the protection they offer is to save life and limb, not to protect his reputation nor act as his valet and porter - how nice! In the commercial, civilian world, we often, to protect our longevity on the job, need to be prepared to compromise and be more flexible. Whoever appoints us, we are simply there by consent, which may be withdrawn at any time, leaving him with no protection, however compromised. We know what the ‘book’ says, but that can’t deal with the nuances and character traits we are faced with. An official CP team has the strength of ‘appointment’ behind them and they can be far more firm over security considerations and the guidelines of relationship are not blurred. I repeat, we can be firm, but must be prepared to be flexible.

We do become more on occasion than simply a BG, and the role is forever one of compromise in some way. In summary, the protective effort is dependent on all of the following taking place:-

- 1. Co-operation of the Principal**
- 2. Accurate threat assessment**
- 3. Methodical planning**
- 4. Correct resources in relation to threat**
- 5. Best use of resources**

Team Leader

If the budget allows, a CP detail could have an individual specifically tasked in the role as Team Leader, who will liaise with the ‘specifier’ ie. the company for whom the work is being done (or the lawyers). More often, the TL position is ‘roled’ into that of the Personal BG.

Bodyguard (Personal)

As a generalisation, we may refer to everyone in the team as a Protection Officer (PO), but this is usually a term you will hear when dealing with the military or government-organisation CP teams. We will generally refer to people as team members and define the roles as and when required. The term Bodyguard, as applied to that position, again determined by years of military organisation, refers to that person who will be closest to and personally alongside the VIP. Whilst he is most certainly within the personal escort section, we normally refer to him separately from the remainder of the team. The BG’s role, his procedures and emergency drills will be different from the other members of the PES to which he belongs. He is at the centre of the various ‘circles of protection’ and the BG’s role if he has full complement of PES who act as an ‘outer cordon’ is not to fight. His job is to provide the immediate body cover to the VIP and quickly, **by a physical effort and strong verbal commands**, move his Charge to safety. He will be relying on his PES to both engage, deter and inhibit any attackers, whilst at the same time also giving necessary body cover as an ‘outer layer’ to the Principal. To perform his duties and drills, the BG must endeavour to be at arms length from his boss or certainly within striking distance so as to be able to close with him quickly. The BG must establish a good working rapport with both the Principal and, his wife, if applicable.

This means that the BG must be sufficiently chameleon-like to ‘fit in’ in most social and business environments. These make great demands on his use of protocol, which we look at in a later chapter. The BG must be someone for every occasion. Certain individuals who are experienced CP operatives never learn to relax or adapt to the various demands made on a personal BG.

Low Level Protection

On occasions, for the following reasons, the protective effort might extend to a single Bodyguard:

- **Threat not clearly defined**
- **Threat allocated a very low priority**
- **Threat reduced to a minor level**
- **Threat is against an organisation rather than an individual**

In the section on 'Planning the Protective Effort', we would look at the various considerations that enable us to determine manpower and equipment requirements.



The 2 photographs on this page illustrate the drills for a single BG. Without the benefit of a large PES, it may be necessary for the personal BG to attempt to both give body cover and return fire until he is able to move the Principal away to cover.

With the benefit of all full complement of PES, the BG would simply provide the body cover and not engage the attacker.



Apart from his team leader, (if he, the BG, does not occupy that role), it is the BG who would liaise with the principal or his secretary over itinerary and who will practically 'live with the boss'. He will probably be tasked to be low profile and often to the untrained eye, impossible to spot in the role he occupies. If you asked the average man in the street to describe the British Prime Minister's BG, they wouldn't have a clue what he looks like, but they see him nearly nightly on TV.

A Bodyguard must strike that very difficult and often impossible balance between a relaxed, confident approach to his boss and over-familiarity. He must be able to hold a cogent conversation across a wide range of subjects, but speak when spoken to and not answer questions which may have been rhetorical or not directed at him. He must know, however, when to interrupt with information that is pertinent, relevant and accurate to a particular conversation, if the result or decisions from which, would affect the client's well-being or safety had not that information coloured the decision-making. Whilst working recently in Russia, I had a Russian driver with excellent English skills, but who, embarrassingly, involved himself in conversations which were not directed at him. It was at times extremely painful and often impossible to shut him up. Being 'too busy' is death for a BG and he, like other members of the team, must know when to 'pull his neck in'.

Personal Escort Section (PES)

The remaining members of the PES are the ones who have the hardest job of all. They are charged with the close protection of their Principal and know that visible deterrence is a major factor in the prevention of a kidnap or assassination attempt, yet they will, in the civilian field, undoubtedly be tasked to be low profile. A highly trained terrorist will still be able to detect the 'protection group', whatever the profile and will be more deterred, in fact, by a team capable of providing good cover for the boss, yet at the same time not display their presence to the general public, than he will by a team which is all show and dark glasses and which makes up for a lack of training and procedures by pounds of waistline.

The PES provide their protection by being alert and by observation. They are constantly using their eyes and other senses to assess the changing situations around their VIP and are ready to act when occasion demands. Their drills will include giving body cover by shielding the VIP, with either themselves or even others in the vicinity who have been so carefully arranged around the VIP. Their most important weapon however, is their systematic approach to doing a job carefully and well. This is what tells others who may have an unsavoury interest in your principal that they should turn their attentions elsewhere. This deterrence factor is professionalism.



The 'Team' in Russia. The author is on the extreme left. The VIP vehicle is the up-market Chevrolet with the PES back up vehicle behind. For the SAP we used an old Lada.

Deterrence is somewhat easier if you can surround your boss with people armed with H & K MP5's, but despite what you might see in photographs in military magazines, this is not the real world of the modern BG. He will usually be unarmed, even when abroad and often for good reasons.

We're talking about High Profile and Low Profile. Nearly all procedure we study or read about in 'Official Training Manuals' are High Profile from Walking Drills to Embus/Debus work. They are designed to indicate a presence, but in the civilian Executive Protection field, there is a strong antipathy by the client to such overt displays of one's presence, however professionally managed. Quite often we end up running a surveillance job - keeping a constant watch on the VIP without him being aware of an escort being in tow.

The PES, if we refer to them collectively, operate through effective procedure. Such procedure as with all Close Protection work is:- we repeat

STRATEGICALLY THOUGHT OUT AND TACTICALLY APPLIED.

But in 99% of EP work, the requirement would be that they are applied in a low profile manner, so as not to become either an embarrassment for the Principal nor a hindrance in his daily existence. As we look in more detail at the specific areas of skills and procedures, we can amend the 'book' way of carrying them out to conform with reality of normal application.

Despite being a team member, this does not preclude an operative from exercising personal initiative at all times. He should get into the habit of searching everywhere and at all times - he should be wide awake and observant at all times. He should get into the habit of searching everywhere with his eyes, looking for the extraordinary, the unaccountable movement or idiosyncrasy of behaviour. He must respond immediately and if he sees an area of danger that needs to be covered, he must cover it. He must not seek directions from his team leader first - there will be not be time and the team leader may not be in a position to see what the operative has seen.

Dress

The personal BG, whilst always dressing in a manner synonymous with the VIP (see 'Protocol'), may be the exception to the remainder of the PES, who, in an effort to lower the profile, may 'dress down'. We will discuss in 'Walking Drills' the degree to which the cover provided on the street almost becomes a surveillance operation and it is in such circumstances, essential for PES members to 'blend in', even jeans and t-shirts etc. In the civilian world, the conditions that apply to the VIPs, as distinct from those who fall within the remit of the Military, Police, Special Branch, or the 'DPG', can be totally different. Where the profile is one in which the PES comes more into prominence and are more 'associated' with the Boss, then clothing must be synonymous with both the event and the dress of the Principal.

Demeanour

Very quickly, the Personal BG and, equally, any other member of the PES, must establish a rapport based on the mutual understanding of the tasks and responsibilities of each. The BG must quickly establish what he hopes to achieve and by what methods. Often he will be up against aides, colleagues and advisers of the Principal, who may attempt to interfere or offer contrary advice. Such intervention must be handled politely but firmly and all must be made to realise he is not subordinate to anyone in the organisation. He is responsible only for the safety of his Principal.

Having said that, the BG must work hard at cultivating relationships. Offer thanks when help is genuinely offered and ensure that good liaison is established early on with those people who have influence over the Boss, even if it is an office junior tasked with travel arrangements. Keep names in your notebook of all who help and take the time to send a

thank you note. Keep good liaison with those people tasked to be in charge of security at venues eg office managers, factory managers and the security officer.

Security Advance Party (SAP)

To ensure a CP team is ahead of the game, it needs to know ‘what’s over the hill’ both euphemistically and in reality. This is the role of the Security Advance Party (SAP). The SAP, as the name suggests, has the role of going on ahead in advance of the main VIP party. The SAP may, if cost is a problem, be simply one man. However, that would be considered less than the minimum required to perform adequately and is more normally two people ie. a driver and one other. They may have a number of functions, but in most circumstances they are primarily tasked with ensuring that the route the principal will be taking, is safe and secure, as is the venue he may be visiting. On occasions, if the circumstances demand and budget allows, there may be two SAPs in operation. One may be well in advance of the main party by some hours, having been tasked with the responsibility of searching and securing premises.

All team members should practice the routine of a methodical search and adopt a ‘pattern’ approach to room searching ie. top to bottom, left to right or whatever (see ‘Searching’). If a venue needs searching, other than in a cursory manner, then the threat or risk is high and the search should be done by a dedicated and qualified search team. Such a situation is unlikely to occur on a ‘Low Threat’ civilian op., except where, say, your Principal is attending a function at which there may be many people who are not only prominent and wealthy, but have a ‘High Threat’ category themselves. The venue security and securing would most likely be carried out by the Police and the SAP would simply have a liaison role to ensure the smooth entry and passage of their Principal into the venue.

A second SAP may be simply minutes ahead of the main party and whose function would be to ensure a clear and safe route and maintain close communications with the VIP vehicles. They will, with the assistance of the prepared route recce, ensure that there are no dangers or ambushes or on a more mundane level, logistics problems, such as roadworks or traffic jams which slow up or stop the VIP vehicles. They will be in constant touch with the convoy and be some five to ten minutes ahead if they are pre-checking the route.

If, however, there is only one SAP team, a decision has to be made as to how the team will be used, ie. whether they are well in advance searching and securing a venue or are simply minutes ahead of the main convoy, pre-determining the security of the route. There is normally a self-levelling factor at work, as the level of threat that would apply to most civilian CP operations rarely demands a full search team at venues to be visited. More often a SAP can adequately discharge both a pre-route survey and still leave sufficient time for the cursory examination, usually of the occupants of a pub, restaurant, office or even again,

relay the mundane information about parking for the debus operation at a theatre in town.

Whatever profile the VIP requires of his PES, the SAP will always be low profile. At all times they are covert, particularly at a venue or en-route, as their presence, to trained observers, could tip off a group as to the imminent arrival of the VIP. They must be equally covert en-route, even whilst they maintain a lookout for any suspicious people or vehicles. Following the arrival of the Principal at a particular venue, the SAP may be tasked to stay on and support the PES, or they may 'leapfrog' onto another venue and repeat the procedure again. The importance of the SAP to a CP operation is at times critical, although it is not often seen as having the glamour of the role of the BG and his PES.

It can often be a problem in establishing a budgetary requirement for the necessary manpower for an SAP and vehicle, but they are often the eyes and ears of the CP team and can also provide counter-surveillance for the team as a whole. In Chapter 7 - 'Travel' - we will look in more detail at Advance Security work. We tend to look at the role of the SAP as being simply the immediate 'pre-arrival security'. In reality, Advance work may take place weeks in advance, particularly if foreign travel is envisaged. The level of security checks and logistic planning takes a very substantial amount of time and we need to look at this as a separate item.

The Residence Security Team (RST)

"The Best Security is the man on the ground"

Despite the ever-increasing range of sophisticated and expensive physical and electronic detection available in the marketplace, the best security for a residence is the man on the ground. For most aspiring BGs, this is where they will serve a long and often tedious apprenticeship. CCTV, Microphones, Movement and Sensing Detectors etc etc, are all of little value, without the ability of people to monitor such equipment and provide the correct response through trained drills, should a problem occur. Evaluation should still be the preserve of trained people, however intelligent and discretionary such things as a fence might get. Also there is often no substitute for the Mark 1 Eyeball, during the day and the Mark 1 Ear at night.

The role of the RST is to *'Monitor the outer physical cordon of the residence and provide flexible inner cordon so as to'* -

- 1. Secure all means of entry**
- 2. Scrutinise all vehicles and visitors in and out**
- 3. Prevent the introduction of explosive devices, electronic bugs and unwelcome calls**

There is, however, little glamour or kudos in walking the grounds of a large estate, possibly in the rain, at night, day after day for twelve hour shifts. It is hard to stay motivated and easy to switch off and become bored and overly complacent, just mentally ticking off the days and another wage earned. It is also easy to feel forgotten and become embittered when you have to open the gates to allow your colleagues out or accompanying the Boss in his air- conditioned Mercedes.

The importance, however, of maintaining a good attitude to 'residence' work cannot be over-emphasised. A correct attitude each day will, if nothing else, get you noticed. And, hopefully, in time your work and performance will come to be appreciated to the extent you may move into other seemingly better positions.



Stag'd on' at the main gate. RST work can be long and boring, even if the views may be good. It can be hard to stay switched on all the time. Every vehicle and individual will be logged in and out as will all visitors.

Residence Security, like some of the other parts of a CP operation can measure their success in terms of nothing untoward happening - that's the way it should be and hopefully nothing happens because you are vigilant, doing your job and acting as sufficient deterrent. Often the tedium of routine can be relieved by a stint in the 'Ops Room', but one has to be careful who one allows to end up in charge of the communications network.

The RST, unlike the SAP and PES (if low profile is the order of the day) will never dress down. In the majority of cases they will always be 'suited and booted', with the availability of the ubiquitous waxed Barbour and a sturdy pair of shoes, as the Boss doesn't want his guests to look out of the window and see a collection of security personnel dressed for the disco or a house painting job.

The **Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)** and **Immediate Action Drills (IADs)**, will be looked at in detail in the chapter which deals with residence security, but the effective running of not only the security of the residence but also its general management is often down to the way a residence team conducts and manages its affairs.

Protocol

The application of good protocol, or the lack of it, is what, more often than anything, will lose a BG his job or the whole team their position. Protocol is about the ‘conventions’ of correct behaviour over a wide range of subject matter within a large number of various areas. A definition that adequately applies, I’ll quote from Jim Brown, MD of Excel Security:-

“To conduct yourself in a manner synonymous with the VIP and the situations you may find yourself in - Dress, Hygiene, Habits, Behaviour.”

Unfortunately, some people will never learn the nuances of protocol. They are what they are and the niceties of social conventions and behaviour are lost on them or simply they have no interest in embarking on a new learning curve. As a consequence, their ability to work alongside a VIP is nil and the chances of their moving up to positions of responsibility limited.

Be approachable. If the VIP speaks to you, speak to him. You must be approachable and he has to feel he can talk to you at all times. Off duty behaviour is equally important. Don’t get drunk. Keep good security and don’t discuss operational matters. Do not get involved in affrays.

Dress (general)

You will dress for the occasion and that may be in accordance with both your Principal and the requirement of the situation. Good liaison with regard to itinerary and the ‘dress code’ for an event will save any embarrassing gafs. Ask the Boss how he’s going to dress for an event. Contrary to what you may think, 99% of people who go to the Bolshoi are casually dressed, it’s very informal, but if you didn’t ask your Principal how he was dressing, you could easily overdress yourself without realising - if in doubt - ASK.

A BG or PES member has other considerations than synonymous dress with the Boss. The PES may find themselves standing outside a venue in poor weather and you should prepare for more eventualities than your Boss need accommodate for himself. Whilst an umbrella for use between the vehicle and venue may be okay for him, having to stay with the vehicle and not sit in it, will call for far greater reliance on wet weather gear.



The dress code for RST work is 'suited and booted'. As they are always visible they must always be dressed up. The only variations will be the addition of good waterproof coat and strong shoes. Umbrellas strategically placed in the grounds are a godsend.

Shoes must always be smart, but ultimately very sturdy, such as hard wearing, well made brogues and it pays to buy at the top end if at all possible. Top coats must be waterproof or highly shower resistant. Waxed jackets are these days worn for nearly every occasion and are seldom out of place. They have a problem, if there is a lot of movement, that they can be subject to condensation and the heavier variety are not that comfortable when sitting in a vehicle. Often it pays to remove a top coat immediately prior to a move and stow it in the boot.

Suits should preferably be dark - not black - but say dark blue. Avoid coloured or patterned shirts and stay with white or blue. Don't be too outlandish with the tie and be careful not to 'overdress' the VIP. Be conservative with a small 'c', but your appearance should be immaculate at all times. During the day a navy blazer and grey trousers will work, but always be careful with the choice of colour of shoes and socks. If in doubt, ask for advice. The cut of clothes is as important as the choice, with the correct length trousers, correctly cut jackets and correct collar size on shirts. Shoes always highly polished.

Summary

Clothes should be:-

- **Relative to the task**
- **Acceptable to the VIP**
- **Conservative**
- **Suitable**
- **Clean and well pressed**

Habits

Don't smoke, engage in personal - anti-social habits (too many to mention!). A VIP would like to feel proud of his security staff, not constantly wonder when he's next gong to fiddle with parts of his anatomy.

Hygiene

It should go without saying that basic personal hygiene is a 'bottom line' requirement. If you can't get this right, you'll have a problem with everything. Clothes should be regularly cleaned and personal hygiene regularly attended to. Always try to use odourless deodorant and avoid the use of strong scent or after shave.

Be Prepared - each day on the job you should have with you, your own personal 'BG Bag'. This, for me, is a soft black carrier bag with a handle and shoulder strap. Don't use a hard case, as often you may need to squash it into a small area in the boot of a vehicle and nobody will take kindly to you having to fit a large inflexible case in it. Apart from anything else, it should contain the following:-

- spare shirt (unopened in the polythene wrapper)
- spare underwear
- spare socks
- spare tie
- deodorant
- toothbrush and paste
- small sachet shampoo
- sewing kit/range of buttons

Basically, it amounts to an overnight kit, which may be useful, if for some reason you do end up being out overnight, but also if you are out for over 12 hours or more. If you've been in the same shirt for fourteen hours, you've got problems and the same goes for socks and underwear. Also, if you've been physically active and sweating, you need to change or ideally, shower and change.

There are also the problems of spilling things on your shirt, losing buttons, breaking shoe laces - be prepared. You must at all times present a good image, so don't be caught out. I take my bag on a job every time and there's always somewhere you can leave it, either tucked away in a corner of the control room or in the boot of a vehicle. You'll also have all your other personal kit in it from weapons to little bits of food etc.

You can keep your mobile phone, spare battery and a charger with you in the bag. As the Team Leader or BG you are also usually encumbered with a sheaf of papers and having somewhere to keep them which will always be safe and reasonably to hand, is an advantage. Always keep a notebook and pencil on you at all times. You will often be given new instructions, telephone numbers etc, usually when in the vehicle and it's no good having your notebook in the boot of the car in your bag.



'Bugging Out' - practising part of vehicle anti-ambush drill.

Behaviour

Act sensibly. Chatting up waitresses, bar staff or getting too involved with members of the opposite sex is a no no - don't get distracted. Don't get caught swimming back to your Principal's yacht early in the morning from an assignment on another vessel (it's been done!).

Behave properly and in accordance with good social convention at all times. Don't be frivolous or overly serious and learn to relax and know when to talk and when not to. It's often impossible to learn the nuances of being with a Principal all day long and the correct manner and attitude to adopt. You are after all, simply an employee, but one who is allowed far greater access and proximity than any other person in his business - don't become 'over-familiar' and always apply common sense. Know when to move away if he appears to be in private conversation and be sensible as to who you know he is happy to be with, without you hovering around and breathing down his neck.

Social conventions need to be learned - forms of address, familiarity with all aspects of formal dining, dress, religious do's and don'ts and cultural pitfalls, these all require study and adherence to. Many overseas VIPs, particularly from Middle Eastern cultures, can be easily offended and the BG often won't even know he's done anything wrong, until he's looking for another position.



A 'briefing' of Team Leaders in the Ops room. As more information comes to hand, the 'Op Order' is constantly updated.

Close Protection personnel are selected on the following criteria:-

1. Intelligence, judgement
2. Initiative and attitude
3. Physical health, strength, agility etc.
4. Appearance and demeanour
5. Experience and background

Training will centre on the following:-

1. Operational team skills
2. Maintenance of physical skills
3. Maintenance of skill at arms with other CP operative equipment
4. Technical expertise - Communication security, ECM equipment, armour
5. Special duties - driving, medical, intelligence, counter-surveillance



Beirut in 1995. Whilst at this time, the war was over, it would be foolish to think that one is operating in a wholly safe environment and the Jewish shelling of South Lebanon in 1996, following terrorist action against them, highlights the point.

CHAPTER 3

TERRORIST TACTICS

We tend to believe that a well run CP/EP operation which maintains awareness and correct procedures, will act as a deterrent to a terrorist organisation. Quite probably in a large number of cases this is the case, but if a terrorist group is deterred from action by what would appear to be professional switched on security, we would never know, as they would simply turn their attentions to a softer option. The use of 'lead and follow' vehicles, hardening of the Principal's vehicle, residence and office should, we believe, all contribute to his improved safety. None of these measures helped, however, in protecting the life of the head of Deutsche Banke, Alfred Herrhausen, who was assassinated by West Germany's 'Red Army Faction' (RAF). Operating spasmodically, but successfully, they have been one of Germany's most dangerous left wing terrorist groups. It will pay us to look at one case study and see what lessons can be drawn.

Alfred Herrhausen, Chairman of Germany's largest bank, was an individual larger than his position at the bank. He was a senior Economist and Industrial Strategist and a personal friend and advisor to Chancellor Helmut Kohl. His assassination was not dissimilar in magnitude to that of a Head of State, as indicated by the £2 million reward offered by the West German Government for information leading to the capture of his assassins.

As a consequence of his prominence and importance, he was assigned a permanent Close Protection Team, which daily, whilst in transit, comprised of a lead vehicle, a follow vehicle and \$200,000 of armoured Mercedes, in which Herrhausen was driven. The RAF had never been deterred however, by the security provisions of 'Protected' targets. Out of 10 attacks on prominent people, 6 had protection of one form or another, either Bodyguards, Escort Vehicles or Armoured Vehicles. Three travelled in fully armoured vehicles and three travelled in a three car convoy.


Herrhausen lived in an up-market residential area of Frankfurt and habitually left home around the same time. Choice of routes close from his home was limited and involved driving through a Park area. Close to the site of the attack was a walking path, jogging area and parking area within the Park, giving the terrorists ample cover for surveillance, pre-planning and execution of the attack. Vehicles at the point of attack were slowed to approx. 30mph due to a school crossing and bus stop on the road and the road was prohibited to parked vehicles. Shortly after 8.30am on the morning of the attack, Herrhausen's armoured Mercedes was blown nearly 80 feet along the road, when some 22lbs of TNT, placed on the carrier of a child's bike, exploded some three feet from the side of the vehicle. The blast blew shrapnel through the right rear door into the back right seat, where Herrhausen habitually sat. He was fatally injured and bled to death shortly after the explosion, although his driver, miraculously, was only slightly injured.



Herrhausen's 2.8 ton armoured Mercedes. The site of the attack is behind and to the left of the vehicle.

The device had been triggered by a photo-electric cell, attached to one of the white posts which lined the street. The beam was reflected back from a mirror also attached to a post on the other side of the street. The terrorists, calculating the speed and length of the Mercedes, and seating position of their target, had previously calculated the position the bike would need to be in to explode as the front of the armoured vehicle cut the beam.

On the journey, the lead car which was some 200 metres in advance of the Mercedes, had passed the beam safely as it had been armed by command wire by a terrorist in a jogging suit who, with a small electric device and battery pack, had armed the bomb having been forewarned by a colleague by radio that the lead vehicle had passed the beam.




How the device was placed, armed and detonated. The sophistication of the method of detonation and arming the bomb was unique.

Some weeks before, 'workmen' had chiselled a line in the pavement in which to lay the command wire and cemented over it. The remainder of the command wire, which lay exposed through the park had probably been laid only that morning so as to escape detection.

The attack was a meticulously planned and spectacular coup for the RAF. The attack exposed serious flaws in the security measures. The lead car achieved nothing. Had it been an advance vehicle tasked to recce the route in detail, then it may well have been suspicious of the bike parked in a position which was discouraged on the particular road.

For all the reasons we know, the park area was the ideal choice for the terrorists, but equally, security should have identified the locale as one which would give cause for concern.

- Close to home with few alternates
- Traffic forced to slow
- Easy surveillance
- Tree-lined and bushy area
- Narrow road with
 1. Easy escape following the attack
 2. Ease of concealment, that is joggers/walkers/couples etc. during the attack



Plan view of the attack site - not to scale

The incident contains many of the common elements of a terrorist operation, but is elevated, if we could use the word in such an horrific incident by the planning and complexity of the method of attack. Many lessons can be learned from the attack, probably the main one being, that under certain circumstances a determined, intelligent, well resourced terrorist organisation will not be put off by a 'hardened target', rather see it as a challenge. Security cannot be complacent as a consequence of the fact they have large manpower and material resources. Constant awareness and the belief it will always happen to you, need to be maintained to enable observation, evaluation and avoidance to all come into play.

From an operational point of view the two lessons learned from this incident are:-

- a. Surveillance recognition
- b. Specific route survey

The surveillance was there to see if anyone had looked hard enough. Weeks of painstaking surveillance had been going on, not to mention the terrorists having to chisel away part of the pavement.

The value of a lead vehicle which is improperly tasked is also brought into start relief. Whilst they may have been on the lookout for potential ambush situations they missed the bicycle. The routine of the lead car was also so well known that they used it as a timer to arm the device.

Assessing the conclusions of just one incident is insufficient for a student to become fully acquainted with terrorist tactics and from the many Kidnap/Assassination attempts the following have merit in further study.

1. Attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan March 1980, Washington
2. Assassination of Col. Shaffer & Col. Turner, Tehran
3. Assassination Aldo Morro, Italy
4. Kidnapping Hans Martin Schleyer, W. Germany

There are, unfortunately, many other incidents to study, some successful and some not so. I would be comforting to think that those that were unsuccessful were so as a result of the preventative actions of the Bodyguards. Regrettably this, in the majority of instances, is not the case. Most failures can usually be attributed to 'balls up' by the attackers or a failure of something outside their control. With the element of surprise and undetected surveillance, the odds are stacked in their favour.

From 1970 to 1992 there was an increase in terrorist incidents from 298 to 5,400 in 1992 - a 1713% increase in the level of terrorist activity. The geographic split of total incidents in 1992 was as follows:-

Latin America - 28%

Middle East - 24%

Asia - 19%

Europe - 18%

Africa - 11%

This gives a very one-sided view of the level of worldwide risk. Domestic bombing incidents in the States from 1975 - 1984 amounted to some 10,100 according to the FBI - 'Summary of Bomb Incidents'. The breakdown was 7,100 explosive devices and 3,019 incendiary devices, which resulted in 279 deaths and 1,600 injuries, yet the figures quoted at the beginning of this section attributed no terrorist incidents as happening in the U.S. Add to this the huge and growing problem of organised crime and acts of extortion, leveraged by the threat of or actual violence and the actual total for what one could consider domestic terrorism is huge.

I have only wanted to give a brief overview of Terrorist Tactics, as the subject and history is vast and any student of Close Protection needs to be well versed in the work. There is a vast amount of information available to study on either regional terrorism or individual incidents and this can be accomplished as a separate exercise to this book.

CHAPTER 4

THREAT & THREAT ASSESSMENT

The best protection for a client is the one that affords the appropriate level of security with the minimum intrusion to the Principal's normal lifestyle. The key to establishing the correct level is the Threat Assessment.

Threat

In the world of Close Protection security, the basis of all planning of the protective effort is derived from the Threat Assessment. The threat assessment defines the current situation, the historic development, the methodology or MO of the terrorist group if one specific group is identified and determines the resultant category of threat in which we place our Principal. Once prepared, the assessment is not concluded or static, rather it forms the basis of a dynamic, ever-changing assessment as more current information comes to light. A threat assessment can be as broad-based as simply the political stability or otherwise of a whole country, or conversely, it can be as narrow as the threat posed to a client by simply one person. In every case however, it has many threads and facets.

Who Is At Risk?

Very obviously we think of Royalty. They are symbolically linked with the State and an attack on them, as with Senior Government Ministers, particularly those responsible for and in sensitive posts eg. the Northern Ireland office, is an attack on the State. Any Government official is at risk as are Embassy staff and senior or, even not so senior Military Officers, as well as senior Police Officers. The above people usually all fall within the Official orbit of the Police, Special Branch and Royal and Diplomatic Protection Groups. Foreign minor Royalty, Industrialists, Chief Executives and Senior Management of companies or people who have a specific threat, do not fall within the remit, normally, of the Government and Military Protection Services and they and their advisers must look to commercial civilian operations to provide their close protection.

What Generally Are They At Risk From?

Large public companies, like Royalty and Government are symbolic of and associated with the well-being of National States and the assassination or kidnapping of their owners or senior management for effect or financial gain is similarly seen as an attack on that Nation State.

The enemies range from the Terrorist Groups, into which broad heading we will dump Anarchists, Maoists, Leftists, Rightists, Nationalists to Psychopaths and Criminal Groups, as well as the Principal himself. Criminals, maybe from an ever-increasing variety of Organised Crime Groups or would-be extortionists, opportunists, or individuals engaged in industrial espionage. Information is money and the loss of information, products and market advantage will harm your Principal and his business. The damage can be occasioned to both the individual and the companies they own or work for.

Motivation of Possible Attackers

Knowledge of the motivation of an attacker might give some information as to the type of attack which could be expected.

- Political
- Religious
- Potential Martyrs
- Mentally Disturbed
- Sense of Grievance
- Personal Vendetta
- Financial Gain
- Competitors

John Miranda, a sacked worker, holds a gun at a former colleague's head at the end of a 6-hour ordeal. Miranda had already shot his former supervisor and stood with a shotgun barrel taped to a colleague's head with his finger taped to the trigger.

He started a 60 second countdown at the end of which he had threatened to kill the hostage. When the count reached 15, Tom MacNeal, the hostage, tore away from the tape and grabbed the barrel. Miranda fired twice, missing, but Police marksmen opened fire and shot him dead.

There is an increasing trend for people with a real or fancied grievance to exact revenge (note the knife in his right sock).



The threat can manifest itself in a number of ways.

Assassination

- By Shooting (long-range\short-range)
- Bomb
- Rocket
- Knife
- Poison

Usually, however, at close quarters some 95% of all assassination attempts are with a handgun, but one must not ignore the variety of other methods used.

Kidnap

- For Financial
- Political
- Hostage Taking

Kidnapping is far more complex, takes more time plan and can involve a small army of people, particularly in the planning and recce phase. Kidnapping usually involves 3 stages:-

- 1. The Abduction** - taking of a person against their will and often the moment of greatest danger for the attackers.
- 2. The Concealment** - hiding them in a secret place - often in extreme conditions, which in itself can have lasting and damaging effects on the mental state of the victim.
- 3. The Demand** - which can be either in the form of action eg. release of prisoners, granting of political rights, or for money, weapons, escape facilities etc.

Fear

- Telephone Calls
- Public Announcements
- Release of embarrassing information
- Surveillance - prolonged and detailed
- Intimidation

Criminal Activities

Too many list

In the vast majority of cases, the potential target for such attacks as listed, has little or no influence on the concerns that weigh so heavily on the shoulders of his would-be attacker, but these potential assassins and kidnappers seem capable of realising that any incident, however small, will have the effect of drawing considerable attention upon all the parties concerned, but particularly their own cause.

How We Categorise The Potential Threat

The old system of having between 1 and 7 categories as previously mentioned, was essentially a method of establishing manpower requirements. They were based on a worldwide study and body of experience, but contrary to the popular view of the category rating, did not relate directly to the threat but to the level of protection given. For example, a Head of State in a peaceful country where the threat is low, may have only required, say a Cat. 4 degree of protection, that is some eight men, four cars divided into two teams each with two vehicles. Yet Cat. 4 may also have been given to a prominent Diplomat in a foreign country with a reasonable level of terrorist activity and a generally high threat level.

The geography of the situation is important in determining not only the level of the threat, but also the amount of protective effort required. Isolation on a desert island in the middle of the Indian Ocean, even for somebody with a high threat, may only necessitate an average level of protective resources. In the commercial world, we now broadly use a 'category of threat' rating system and use the simplicity of having between 1 and 3 categories, although there will be times when it would be necessary to give more flexibility to the threat rating and as a consequence, we can sub-divide the three broad threat categories as follows:-

Cat 1a. In considerable danger

b. An attack is suspected

2a. In some danger

b. An attack cannot be ruled out

3a. There may be a threat

b. Attack - a remote possibility

These could be summarised as follows:-

Cat 1.'Not if, but when'

2. 'Not when, but if'

3. 'Could be of interest to someone with ill-designs'

The manpower resources available to satisfy the protective effort are solely dictated by cost, unlike in Government work which is why we rate Threat not Resources. We would broadly therefore consider the following level of resources for each category.

Cat 1a BG

b. PES

c. Maximum protection of:-

Residence (RST)

Place of work

Places to be visited (SAP)

Use of electronic fortifications

Armoured vehicle

Cat 2 a. BG

b. PES

c. Some of the above

Cat 3 a. May get a BG

b. Routine search of place of work and residence

c. Escort section when needed

All these above measures are however - answers. They are the answers to the questions, problems and dangers highlighted in the Threat Assessment. But, the above are not absolute and often image, wealth and the ability to pay, has a larger influence on the composition of the protective detail than does threat. Middle Eastern royalty, even minor members, well removed from the seat of power, will often have resources applied to their protective effort that equates to a Cat. 1. risk - they can afford it, have been born to it, expect to have it and are not concerned about the overt presence of security.

A senior business executive, on the other hand, has not been born into such circumstances, often finds the presence of security personnel offputting and embarrassing and on many occasions, refuses to accept the level of threat that operating in some world geographies obtains. In this instance, despite the very real threat, a 'minimalist' protective effort is put in place on the basis that something is definitely better than nothing and that the corporate liability has in some way been underpinned.

Threat Assessment

If you were to put together a general Threat Assessment on the risk of travel and work in Russia - the assessment would look at the overall political situation and its on-going

stability. This would, as a consequence, very much determine the socio-economic condition in which the people find themselves and the state of both organised and general street crime. Such an assessment would form the background to the more detailed work for a particular region, city or even district or may concern itself with one specific organised crime group (OCG) that may have an interest in your client, or his company.

Once the potential threat has been evaluated, one can then determine the appropriate security measures to put in place to secure the risk. Where it is possible, such identified risks should be avoided altogether, but in the real world where they probably can't, efforts must be focussed on minimising such risks. Without an appropriate threat assessment one would be completely in the dark and have no idea as to the level of protective effort required, nor when, how or where a threat might manifest itself.

A definition for the threat assessment, as far as close protection is concerned is:-

“To assess all potential risks and weigh these against the security measures we can employ to negate them, prevention being better than cure.”

The definition states ‘To assess all risks’ and by this we mean ALL RISKS. Our aim is not simply to stop a kidnapping or assassination attempt - we are there to prevent harm from whatever source befalling our clients. This can include fire, theft, accidents, illness, harassment etc. Unless we have been directed otherwise, we are concerned with his total wellbeing and also with the smooth running of his daily existence and business or social arrangements. Anything that intrudes into the Principal's well being is a threat and should be included in the threat assessment. If the water in a city is undrinkable, even in their five star hotels, then such pollution problems should be contained within the threat assessment and your Principal advised accordingly.

The following principles or guidelines in preparing the threat assessment are as follows:-

The Threat Assessment should be:-

- Clear**
- Logical**
- Accurate**
- Relevant**
- Comprehensive**

To formulate your assessment, it is best broken down into separate subject matter. For most of us in the world of commercial security, we are more often than not, simply looking after the ‘prominent and wealthy’, where no specific individual threat has been made or exists. Given their position in society, however, or given the position of their companies as symbolic of a capitalist state, together with their individual wealth, they will be ideal targets for organised terrorist groups, organised crime gangs and the opportunist thief or extortionist.

The relevance of the interest by a terrorist group is raised if proposed travel would put your client in a country or region within which borders a particular group operates and where your Principal’s profile would fit the group’s known target profile. Whilst in their own shores they may only be targets solely from people whose interests are motivated by financial rewards and not political gain, whilst abroad they become symbolic targets through kidnap or assassination for political gain, and often even financial gain by an indigenous or international organisation.

If the threat is ‘non-specific’, as a consequence of position, wealth or prominence then there is an all-pervading threat that must be catered for, again it may be that your Principal perfectly fits the target profile of a terrorist group if he or she is abroad which would significantly alter your procedures and thinking. A specific threat from a terrorist group made many years previously to either the company, its employees and owners may become relevant today if a visit to the country of origin is proposed. We are then faced with the ‘*not if but when*’ scenario, as different from ‘*not when but if*’ that would normally apply.

As much data as possible should be collected and no attempt must be made early on to conclude security arrangements. A ‘list of threats’ can be constructed but bear in mind as you start to balance threats with resources that ‘**security must be commensurate with the threat**’ and the ‘security/convenience’ compromise. It may be that because of a specific threat which exists in say a particular country, if our VIP proposed a visit and has little alternative or choice to the contrary, then we, despite our views, will be unable to prevent the visit and must beef up our efforts accordingly.

So what goes into a threat assessment? If your client is going abroad, then a political and socio-economic assessment would be prepared as a background piece prior to the visit. If there were terrorist groups operating in that locale or equally, if it was an area of high organised street crime, we would want to identify such a threat and how it may manifest itself. We would need to know who they have directed their previous efforts towards and what is their modus operandi (MO). Do they shoot, bomb, kidnap, blackmail or extort? If they shoot, is it short or ‘stand-off’ range? Do they have a history of killing kidnap victims, if they bomb what is their favourite method of delivery? All these factors need to be

analysed before we decide on the protection required. No threat assessment can be complete without you having knowledge about the person you are protecting. What is he/she like? What does he/she do? - these are basic questions that may be asked and although these very basic questions will be answered, having this knowledge is never enough. We need every scrap of information about our client, but quite often we are only told what a client, his company or general ledger adviser wants us to know.

Often this is done out of ignorance, not out of overt secrecy, as they simply do not see the relevance of the volume of information that we know we need, that they do not. Not being fully aware of the client's business interests or religious beliefs can have serious implications. The information may not be offered to you on a plate and often what you have to dig for and what comes to you via roundabout sources, may have more relevance than what you are officially given. Ensure your Principal is not aware of a threat to himself about which you are blissfully unaware.

Let's look at some of the headings of information we require about our Principal. Some we may ask directly, some we will glean as the job progresses and as our relationship with the Boss develops. As an aide memoire we can use the 7 p's of Principal profiling:-

**People • Personality • Places • Prejudices • Personal History •
Political & Religious Persuasions • Principal's Lifestyle**

7 P's of Principal Profiling

All the associations, contacts, family by blood and marriage, friends, acquaintances etc.

People

Any of these relationships can be the cause of a problem for a variety of reasons, as equally many relationships can turn sour for a variety of reasons. We need to get to know about as many people as possible within our Principal's circles of influence.

Places

Places where people are born, work or live, all have importance to the threat assessment. Geographic implications will often affect the 'risks' if not the overall threat.

Personality

We included in a previous section, the Principal himself in the list of possible dangers. Certain people with a confrontational, abrasive style, often attract problems. Also many clients will put their own security at risk in the pursuit of an active social life and expect you to pick up the pieces. Is he basically a reasonable, approachable and steady individual. Is he tolerant, displays common sense or is highly emotive, particularly in decision making? Security conscious or not?

Prejudices

A client with religious and strong racial prejudices is a minefield waiting to be stepped on. A BG will need to ensure certain potentially hazardous encounters are avoided.

Personal History

The basic background information on the client - name, age, place of birth, marital status, previous and current nationalities, residences, languages, military service, awards, qualifications. Occupation and history, title, children and previous offspring by former marriage etc. Political and Religious preferences. Medical history, fitness, ailments, medications, blood group etc.

Private Lifestyle

A family man or a philanderer, mistresses, boyfriends, drinking habits, gambling habits. Sporting activities and pastimes. Does he drive or like to be driven, workaholic, alcoholic. Does he maintain a low profile despite prominence or seek a profile above his position. Tastes in food and drink etc. The more we know the easier the job will be.

It is important to make the distinction at this point between threat and risk. Threat, in the way we use the terminology, alongside the broad interpretation of 'Assessment' gives us a general threat level or category that we would place our VIP in. His prominence, position, wealth, lifestyle or his Company's area of operation, all conspire to put him under threat, however remotely. Equally we can categorise threat with a known specific threat ie. in the case of Salman Rushdie. Again, within fairly broad bands that threat level is often unchanging and as determined the level of our 'protective effort'.



A threat ignored. Martin Luther King shortly before his assassination. Like many controversial public figures, he had no option but to appear in public and hope for the best.

What does change however, and frequently, is risk. Currently you may be looking after an American businessman who is prominent and wealthy and active in a number of corporate areas. No existing threat obtains. If he decided, against our better advice, to carry out a business trip to Algeria then the 'Risk' would go through the roof. The Muslim Fundamentalist Terrorists in Algeria are sworn to kill all foreigners and so far have a list of foreign victims running into hundreds and 10's of thousands of their own people. Even on a more mundane level, the risk to your client can rise or fall simply by going on a shopping trip or a late night out.

Situation Awareness

Very adequately describes our on-going appreciation of the circumstances that surround us at all times of the day. This is what we must be constantly alert for, that is any changes in the environment which may increase the risks to our client's well being and as in all good personal security, acknowledging the changing face of risk is what means you are doing your job to the best of your ability.

CHAPTER 5

LOCATION SECURITY

I've coined this terminology for this chapter as a way of separating the elements of personal security from, if you like, the sub-principles and procedures which affect the planning of the protective effort for security at fixed locations. Broadly, these locations are:-

- 1. Residence**
- 2. Office**
- 3. Hotel**
- 4. Public Venues**
- 5. Restaurants etc.**

The 3 principles of personal security are still in the header tank and still flow into the subject matter of this chapter. Without client consent, none of the security measures we would wish to see installed at locations would take place. Again, in this regard, the Principal is taking responsibility for his or her own safety by allowing us a reasonably - and, certainly within the limits of '*security being commensurate with the threat*' - a free hand.

At the heart of all the security considerations we will look at for each location, one concept is common to all, that is DEFENSIBLE SPACE and NATURAL SURVEILLANCE. Whilst the following quotation was in particular regard to a residence, it is in some way pertinent to all fixed locations.

“Defensible Space is a surrogate term for the range of mechanisms, real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influence, and improved opportunities for surveillance, that combine to bring an environment under the control of its residents. A defensible space is a living residential environment which can be employed by inhabitants for the enhancement of their lives, whilst providing security for their families, neighbours and friends.”

Oscar Newman - Defensible Space.

The previous quotation, if you substitute inhabitants for workers or associates and office, hotel etc, for residence, you will find that broadly, the concepts outlined are relevant and we will look at how these symbolic and real barriers and defined areas of influence can be created even at public venues and the other locations.

**MAKE THE JOB OF THE TERRORIST HARD
AND THE LIFE OF THE VIP EASY**

The Residence

With Oscar Newman's quotation still fresh in my mind, we will look in some detail at residence security. In an ideal world, if we could have a part to play in the selection of a residence for a client, certain basic guiding principles should be applied. Often it is not within our remit to have a voice in the consensus of decision making and often, in any case, we usually have to deal with what is already on the ground. The following ideals should still be in the forefront of your mind, however:-

- 1. Co-located to work**
- 2. Privacy**
- 3. Screened/walled and easy to guard**
- 4. Not overlooked by high points**
- 5. The house to be multi-floored**
- 6. Helipad**
- 7. Location - Town, Suburbia, Rural**

The latter point is always, by its very nature, a two-edged weapon and isolation is the stone that sharpens both edges.

Isolation is of advantage because it inhibits most methods of surveillance by potential attackers which would work for them in town and it also provides good privacy. Strangers stand out in a rural community and if local lines of communication with the population are established and working, any undue interest by strangers in your client, his family, lifestyle and the property should be reported. It is also easier to co-opt the local constabulary to assist in anti-surveillance, normally a natural part of their daily work, than it would be the case in town, with over-stretched police resources. Also in towns, strangers do not stand out in the crowd.

Isolation will work however, against the residence, its occupants and security, should an attack take place. Rural locations have the disadvantage of not being well lit and they can be isolated. The occupants must look to their own resources and procedures to save the

day, as assistance, if it can be summoned at all, will take time to come and may be under-resourced to really have any part to play.

In town there is the disadvantage of slow moving traffic, but usually good route choice, good comms, with services and well lit. In the country, low traffic density, but probably few alternate routes. In suburban situations, you have the advantage of the potential vigilance of neighbours.

Plans and Drawings

The Residence Security Team should have achieved as 'in-depth' a study as possible of all plans, drawings, maps and photographs of all relevant locations. These can be used for the team to map out their own drawings and when complete, these should ideally show all or some of the following:-

- 1. Power, lighting points, switches (including mains)**
- 2. Alarms**
- 3. Security lights and fences**
- 4. Phones and phone lines**
- 5. Voids in construction**
- 6. Central heating**
- 7. Aerials and co-ax's**
- 8. Oil, gas, water pipelines/tanks**
- 9. Doors, windows, gratings - showing direction of opening**
- 10. Security bolts**
- 11. Flues and chimneys (in and out of use)**
- 12. Lifts and lift shafts**
- 13. Safe room(s), make of door, walls and ceilings**
- 14. Type of construction**
- 15. Helicopter landing site/zone**
- 16. Dead ground**

Building drawings should also be shown in

- **side elevations**
- **front elevation**
- **rear elevation**
- **floor plans**

All drawings should be classified as 'Restricted'.

Such detailed plans should be made of the residence and grounds, office, hotel and venues. They should show - plan changes - recent works and services.

Such plans enable you to:-

1. Best organise your patrols and 'stags'
2. CCTV coverage for dead ground
3. Lights and sensors
4. Carry out comprehensive searches
5. In order to be able to brief outside agencies, ie
 - a. Police
 - b. Fire Brigade
 - c. Hostage Recovery Team (HRT)

Sources

1. D.O.E. (Dept. of Environment) or equivalent
2. Town and Country Planning Office
3. Map and Air Chart Depots
4. Ordnance Survey Outlets (HMSO)
5. Civilian Architects Office
6. Civilian Builders
7. Land Agencies
8. The Owners

Do not discard old maps, plans, traces and overlays.
NEVER MARK ORIGINALS AND ALWAYS RETURN

Types of Maps, Plans and Drawings:-

1. Surveyors sketches
2. Secondary survey sketch and ground plan
3. Initial site plans
4. First scale drawings
5. Models
6. Projections
7. Engineers/Architects blueprints
8. Air photos

Scale Drawings

1. Electrical
2. Heating/ventilation
3. Carpentry and fixtures
4. Mains services etc.

In all location security, we are concerned with 5 aspects:-

- **Perimeter**
- **Building**
- **Procedures**
- **Do's and Don'ts**
- **Immediate Action Drills**

The first two are concerned with the physical considerations that is, construction, lighting, alarms, cameras, windows, doors etc. The other aspects are inter-related with the first two, as obviously the procedures are dependent upon the requirements placed on us given both the existing physical characteristics of a residence, its grounds and perimeter fencing. Often we have to make the best of an inherited, unsatisfactory situation, where the physical security is poor and which must be improved by stricter procedures and daily drills. When we take on a client and his residence, we need to carry out a full survey, which may include completely re-mapping the grounds and the house itself to establish the weak points, dead ground, natural vegetation and the benefits and problems it may cause. Recommendations would then be made to the client with regard to any improvements. We will initially look at the perimeter considerations and then work inwards towards the house. The aim is to secure all means of entry and prevent the introduction of explosive devices and 'bugs' and detect intruders.

A Principal's residence may be somewhat on less of a grand scale than an estate, such as a flat, or terraced accommodation, both of which have their own pro's and con's. Flats are far easier to guard, whereas terraced houses have the problem of access, either over the roof or through adjoining roofspace.

Perimeter

1. Outside wall at least 7 feet
2. Nothing on top of the walls to aid climbing
3. Nothing on top of the all to spoil eye-line
4. No trees close to the wall to aid climbing and provide observation points
5. Only 2 breaks in the main entrance
 - a. Main entrance
 - b. Secured and locked second entrance
6. Front gate manned at all times
7. No lights in security hut
8. Gate closed at all times
9. Search kit at main gate

Driveway

1. Silent policemen
2. Build a chicane in the drive if possible
3. Cut back shrubbery along the drive
4. Vehicle parking away from main house

Lighting/CCTV

1. House illuminated
2. Lights should eliminate blind spots inwards from walls
3. Ensure lighting does not create tunnels of darkness
4. Lighting should make up for blind spots in CCTV coverage

Building

1. Strong doors and frames
2. Blast-proof windows or film-coated - laminated is best, if possible
3. Shrubby cut back from close proximity to house
4. Alarmed - fire/intruder
5. Standby power. An isolated generator checked and locked. Located in the main building
6. Buy the best in locks and chains
7. If feasible and appropriate, bars on the ground floor windows, particularly those at the rear or in isolated areas which are rarely screened
8. Manholes and skylights secured
9. Fusebox camouflaged and secured
10. Ladders, tool etc. to be locked away
11. Laminated and wired glass
12. Bars on inside
13. Fit outside shutters
14. Use curtains and blinds
15. Ensure interior lights do not cast a silhouette on the blinds or curtains
16. Isolated and unmanned doors should be able to resist attack
17. Place lamps and candles strategically around the building

Remember

There are 2 ways to penetrate barriers **OVER - UNDER - THROUGH.**

All fences should be set a minimum of 2' into the ground. Dogs are excellent for grounds, particularly at night when your guards ability to see is severely reduced.

If your residence is town-based with no grounds or gardens, you have lost one of your 'zones of defence'. Entry off the street must be strictly controlled with, if possible, CCTV to identify all comers. An airlock system will be required to hold people until thoroughly vetted. The airlock can be unobtrusive, even to the extent it comprises a reception area with seating.

Alarms, Fences and Intruder Devices

Alarms are a two-edged sword. They can be used by an intruder to distract security, particularly to one area. Alarms should be 'Passive' - only security should know when an alarm is triggered. The Sentor portable intruder detector from Sensor Electronics Ltd is a very useful piece of kit. A portable, battery operated 4ft cone, it is equipped with 2 passive infra-red detectors set at different heights spanning out up to 40metres and 10metres in width. On detecting an intruder it will transmit a message on the security frequency. The device is ideal for watching dead ground and weak spots in the perimeter.

Fences these days are almost intelligent and can do everything except brew a cup of tea. They are discretionary and will let you know whether an intruder is animal or human. Knowledge of advanced technical facets of perimeter fencing and intruder devices is good to have, but remember, we are concerned with residential premises and not with the security of Vulnerable Sensitive Sites. Ground sensors and radar are unlikely to fall within your scope, although in certain countries, a residence may literally become a fortress.

'The Best Security Is The Man On The Ground'

We need to work on the principle of **'Defence In Depth'**.

The floorplan of the residence should ideally look something like this:-

Top Floor	-	Servants
Middle Floor	-	VIP
First Floor	-	Guests
Ground	-	Qm-OPS-Services

As mentioned elsewhere - keep the Ops room well away from the VIP floor or suite.

- **Only long-serving staff should be allowed into the VIP suite or be allowed to get close to the VIP.**
- **Staff vetting should be updated regularly, particularly abroad.**
- **Do not let servants have access to documents, equipment or weapons.**

- **No indiscreet talking amongst the CP team in front of servants.**
- **Explain to the family why a certain room layout is required. You may put lamps and phones in strategic places, only to have a family member move them.**
- **Brief servants according to the level of threat (need to know basis for fire drills, emergency exits etc).**
- **Brief family members on security procedures and drills on a ‘need to know basis’.**



*Above - bomb suppression lining for curtains.
A cheaper alternative to some more expensive options
and aesthetically more pleasing than coating the
windows with film.*

Procedural Do's and Don'ts

- Mail should be dropped off at the guard post, not delivered up to the house.
- All calls to come through Security.
- All delivery people escorted at all times and should be pre-arranged by appointment and check the delivery with the order.
- Check identity of all tradesmen. If a sudden change in personnel, check with the company before admitting.
- Laundry should ideally be done at the house and if not, get someone to go to the cleaners as distinct from having it delivered.
- All mail and van deliveries should be treated with caution - see bomb procedures - remember safe area use of radios within proximity etc.
- Double check all deliveries that are made.
- Do not accept any parcel or deliveries that turn up unexpectedly from unknown sources.
- Do not allow suppliers to leave goods on window sills or on the doorstep.
- Treat any changes in your regular deliveries such as post or milk, with suspicion.
- Ask regular correspondents to write their names and address on the outside of the envelope.
- Log all mail, both to and from, and times.

Remember

'A Secret Shared Is A Secret Halved'

- Burn rubbish. It gives a lot of information about the VIP.
- Never give the phone number.
- Never answer with the name of the residence.

- **Colour coded ID cards for the staff + photo.**
- **Scrutinise all vehicles and visitors IN and OUT.**

As with office security, you should know who is expected each day. VRN's, ID's, photos, should all be available. Visitors should be by appointment and all callers should be escorted to a reception room (the physical considerations of this room can be drawn from the 'Office Security' section).

In the event of the Boss having a party, then its all hands to the pumps. The guest list must be scrutinised and the 'Risk Assessment' re-worked should there be any visitors who may bring with them a higher threat than would normally obtain. Guests should stay within the function areas and not be allowed to roam the whole house. You should always try to identify those close friends who are allowed more freedom by your Principal and who enjoy a close relationship with him. Often such people will call without notice or appointment.

Key Control

There must be a strictly controlled Key Board in the Ops room, with clearly labelled hooks. The key board should be in a lockable cabinet and only the Ops commander should hold the key. Maintain a 'key log' and know where all the keys are at all times. Keys must be kept in neat order and not individually labelled. Never hide keys and endeavour for there to be as few keys as possible.

Safe Room

A 'refuge', 'keep area'. 'safe room', however you describe it, must be chosen, hardened and established. The safe room is where the VIP and his family will take refuge in the event of an attack, in circumstances where it has been impossible to evacuate them in time. Choice of safe room is conditioned by some simple criteria, the principal one being solidity.

The safe room must be capable of withstanding assault until help arrives. The location of the residence, in terms of its isolation has a large influence. A residence in Chelsea may have assistance there in minutes, but on an estate in Scotland, an early response could be an hour and even then that response would in itself be insufficient to render much assistance.

A natural choice would be a cellar. A steel door, hardened ceiling and walls with blast resistant coating, a water supply, toilet facilities. Separate comms. (NB. that mobile phones may not work in the cellar). A comprehensive first aid kit, kept permanently in the safe room and a panic alarm linked to the police. Gas masks and weapons.

Whilst cellars may be ideal, their isolation from the VIP suite can often militate against

their use. Seconds count in getting the family into the safe room and a complicated route, possibly in the dark, may not be the first choice. Ideally your safe room would not have any windows.

Security should also:-

- Check occupants of neighbouring properties, particularly new people.
- Check unoccupied premises and those under repair which have a clear view of the Principal's house and gardens.
- Become acquainted with all persons who call or work at the house, cleaners, milkman, postman etc. Ensure the Principal is fully conversant with the general daily procedures, particularly letter and parcel deliveries and all emergency procedures and drills.
- Ensure that any outside street lighting is functional at all times.

Emergency Drills

1. Attack

In the case of an attack by physical entry, you must establish a counter-plan, either - HOLD or RETREAT. If retreat, you must have a safe haven, an emergency RV plus transport always ready.

2. Fire

All occupants briefed on procedure and practice drills - Be Aware of a 'Decoy' fire alarm. Have escape routes planned.

3. Bomb Attack or Threat

Have an established search procedure. Remember - its your duty to search, not that of the Police.

Telephones

- Site all phones away from windows or side view panels in doors and ensure a telephone extension in the bedroom. Cellular phones may be better.
- Be on guard if the telephone ceases to work. Use an alternate phone (mobile) and report it immediately.

- Keep all emergency numbers to hand and by the phones.
- Instruct all family members and staff to exercise discretion when answering the phone. Information re: family members' whereabouts, arrival times and appointments must never be volunteered.
- Get callers to leave a name and number and call back.

If an anonymous call or telephone threat is made, the following actions should be taken:-

- Keep the caller talking as long as possible.
- Make notes or start a recording device (see Bomb Threat Checklist - Appendix 2).
- If calls persist, change the number.
- Don't be listed in directories.
- Consider using a directory intercept.

Control Room

When working on those estates where security is a permanent feature, a control room may be specially constructed. It will probably be adjacent to the main house, in an outbuilding, but if not purpose-built, then a suitable room within the main building should be identified.

Remember, a control room operates 24 hours a day and can be a noisy place, so its location should not be one which places it too close to family rooms. In reasonable proximity to the control room there needs to be a rest area with kitchen facilities for drivers, PES and Residence security to take breaks. This should be co-located to the ops room and under no circumstances must the ops room be used as a rest room, the ops room is a Post. The constant flow of people means ground floor rooms. An ops room needs to be positioned so that all hard wiring to the main house and the perimeter for video surveillance is as unobtrusive as possible. Endeavour not to identify the ops room to outsiders by having a large aerial on its roof. Use longer co-ax and place the aerial elsewhere.

Staff Briefing

As part of the duties of the RST, all domestic staff should receive a thorough security briefing. This would include the briefing on counter surveillance (see 'Office Security') and Suspicious Person Checklist (Appendix 1).

Copies of the following list should be given to all domestic staff and backed up by a security briefing. They should be conditioned to be suspicious and accept as normal, the need to report any unusual activities or enquiries.

- Keep all exterior doors closed and locked during the day.
- Close and lock all exterior doors at night.
- Close and lock windows and shutters and pull to, all window coverings at night.
- Do not admit strangers, peddlers, inspectors, survey or census takers or investigators you do not know, even if they are in uniform or have credentials. Tell them to call your employer or company office or call security immediately. Do not open the door to these people.
- Do not admit repair people unless your employer or security has told you to expect them.
- Do not accept packages unless you have been told by your employer to accept such a package.
- Do not give information of any kind about the family on the telephone, unless you are certain the caller is a friend you can identify.
- Any anonymous calls or threats or observation of anything unusual near the house, must be reported immediately to your employer or security.
- Make a note of the license number of any suspicious vehicle parked near the house.
- If any strange packet or object is discovered in the house or grounds, leave it alone and report it to your employer/security immediately. If no-one is about, then phone the police.

When Leaving a Residence

1. Vary the timings and routine of departure. Telephone ahead in code.
2. Examine the street - you're looking for anything unusual - people, vehicles, objects etc.

3. Use alternate exits such as rear doors, fire escapes etc.
4. Utilise all personnel for observation, before, during and after the exit of the Principal.
5. Always check comms prior to departure. Don't do this in such a way that you forewarn anyone interested that there is a 'move' afoot.

Residence Visits

On occasions, your Principal will pay visits to other residences, either for a short stay or possibly for some days. The following points should be borne in mind, but many of the items may not be feasible to adhere to, without causing a degree of friction within a household and as a consequence must be applied with common sense.

- Advance recce if possible.
- Careful route selection.
- Searching and securing the Principal's room.
- Vetting domestic staff.
- Control of visitors and guests (if no resident security).
- Suitable accommodation for BG and PES.
- Liaison with local police.
- Establish procedures with a RST.

Office

We are told that the chances of an attack taking place in a Principal's office is remote and that, generally, it is probably his safest location.

There are fundamental truths in such a belief, but as with all security, there are enough exceptions which disprove the rule. The assassination of the American Site Manager, John Gandy, in Istanbul is one such incident. Gandy worked for an American company, VBR, with offices in Istanbul. On March 22nd 1991, three 'Dev Sol' terrorists rang the doorbell of the VBR office. Seeing that one of the men was in 'Police' uniform, the secretary admitted the men who requested to see the Manager. Initially engaged in conversation with

Turkish Deputy Site Manager, they requested to know whether any Americans were in the office, identified Gandy, and took him to his own office. There they tied him to a chair and shot him three times, twice in the head and once in the chest.

The attack took place during Ramadan, at a time when the office janitor would be away at prayer and the staff level would be at its minimum. They were never caught and demonstrated that they possessed the ability to penetrate a 'hardened' area and strike at the foreign business community.

In general, given the high density of office workers and the difficulties experienced in penetrating the various layers of normal office layout and arrangements, terrorists are usually deterred from action in the workplace. There is too much which can go wrong and certainly too many people who may interfere, if only by accident. It is far more common to penetrate the work environment of a VIP by parcel or letter bomb or by potentially huge devastation caused by a car bomb in close proximity. In a non-perfect world we often, as the security team, inherit the existing residence and office and can then only endeavour to affect improvements in 'hardening' and procedures, accepting probably the main deficiencies in building choice and office location.

In an ideal world we may have a hand in choice of location, construction and layout (particularly in relation to the VIP suite). Whilst working in Russia and the Ukraine, I was involved and able to influence all of these factors in a number of office locations, which is the exception rather than the rule. If you do have an influential part to play in either the selection, construction or the fitting out, then keep things, as always, in perspective. The offices have to be capable of operating conveniently and if you go over the top either in the nature of your recommendations proving restrictive, or in the proposed cost, then they will take little notice of the important aspects of your report.

If we do have a part to play then the following considerations should be taken into account to achieve the ideal:-

1. Co-located to the residence.
2. Good approach routes ie. variety for a break in routine.
3. Assess the potential for 'stand off' attacks - the building should not be overlooked from either high ground or other buildings out to at least 1km plus.
4. Your choice of building should be one that you can control in total.

5. Failing that, endeavour to control the whole floor and make that the upper floor. (As with hotel choice, this means you have to pass every other floor on the way up). Therefore, if possible, have a private lift or separate access from the main building.
6. Ability to seal off in an emergency.
7. There should be good variations of entrances and exits and the use of stairs without access to other tenanted floors would be preferable to a communal lift or stairs.
8. The vehicle embus/debus point should not be overlooked and should be well lit.
9. The VIP vehicle should ideally be garaged and if not, guarded.
10. If your own building, then consider perimeter fencing, walls and suitable lighting. Lighting for rear areas and entrances.
11. Vehicle parking should not be immediately adjacent to the office and all vehicles must be checked and occupants vetted before being allowed access.
12. Do not choose a building with underground parking. (The extremist Muslim attack on the World Trade Centre illustrated the damage which could be caused by a car bomb in such a location).
13. If there is multiple occupancy in a building, install your own floor security with the minimum of shared facilities. Endeavour to have toilets, lifts, entrances, catering facilities, all within your floor's or your control.
14. Establish basic security of the compound, buildings and office space and control all parking.
15. Public Access Control (PAC). Entry doors controlled by a guard or receptionist with electric door lock release.
16. Use of temporary badge system, to identify all visitors, with the strict use of visitor's log.
17. If possible, a walk-through metal detector (WTMD) at the entrance.

18. Iron grille work for ground floor windows.
19. Comprehensive burglar alarm system. Don't get over-sophisticated, a watchman is best.
20. Install Close Circuit TV (CCTV) in the entry area, with a suitable VCR capability to monitor and record all people who through the PAC.
21. In a very ideal world (and a deep pocket), one would also look to identify a Helicopter Landing Site (HLS).
22. If possible, establish an 'airlock' system where the visitor is held between two locked doors until the guard or receptionist releases one of the doors. Ideally, the receptionist or guard would be behind bullet-proof or shatter-resistant glass.
23. A 'Silent Alarm' should be installed between the guard or receptionist, to alert the VIP office and security control room in the event of an emergency. It could be linked to a buzzer or flashing light. The 'Sally Port' entrance is of vital importance if an office entrance is directly off the street. It prevents a 'charged entry' and buys time.
24. Install CCTV to monitor the street as well as the PAC if appropriate.
25. If occupying the ground, give consideration to making the windows smaller and re-inforcing the walls to reduce potential bomb damage and risk to employees.
26. Power Source - endeavour to ensure that there is a secondary 'back-up' power supply.
 - a. the power sources should be checked daily and form part of the security routine and assignment instructions.
 - b. only allow vetted companies and their employees to work on the supply.
27. Air conditioning - again there must be regular inspections of the AC system to prevent tampering or the introduction of gas. The system should be made tamper-proof.
28. Site the post room away from both the VIP suite and any sensitive areas eg. computer rooms and telephone switchgear. Consider 'blast attenuation' devices for the post room such as a 'bomb bin' in which to place any suspect device.

VIP Suite

Again, if you are able to exert influence in the choice of location and construction of the VIPs office or suite, then the following should be considered:-

1. The VIPs office should be in the centre of the building or floor. This can obviate both the risk of 'stand-off' sniping and eavesdropping. It is often difficult however, to get your boss to choose an office with no natural light or view.
2. If the office has to be against an outside wall then, not overlooked and not on the same side as the car park.
3. You would ideally want to have a completely self-contained suite of offices for the VIP, which would include a waiting room, secretary's office, security control room and all toilet facilities - a separate VIP toilet off the VIP office. Often a fully equipped kitchen and dining room can be contained within the suite.
4. The suite must have restricted access to those staff who are authorised entry and to no-one else.
5. The personal secretary's room should be co-located to the VIP office, as should the Security Control Room and both have direct access to the VIP office. The general visitor waiting area must not have access to the VIP office but should be via the secretary's office. Always endeavour to create zones of protection in depth.
6. 'Safe Room' - from the VIPs office, he should have fast access to a secure and 'hardened' safe room. This could be his personal bathroom or lounge area. The safe room should be additionally hardened to the extent that the walls should not be simple stud partition, but brick and consider inserting hardened mesh between the layers of brick. A product called 'Securilath' from 'Expamet' would be ideal between the cavity wall. The door should be of reinforced material with a drop bar or strong bolt. As with the residence safe room, there must be some form of 'comms' in the safe room ie. dedicated mobile phone. If there is no possibility of a separate safe room, then all efforts must be made to secure and harden the main VIP office.

7. If the office has windows, consider shatter-resistant protective window film, such as 'Mylar' which will protect against flying glass in an explosion. Note, there are now products available such as that from 'Achidatex' who have developed a ballistic wall-covering which provides wall reinforcement against outside blast damage. It is a wall-covering about 2mm thick and is bonded to the plaster on the inside of the wall with acrylic cement. One application is the protection of space within a building from blast damage.
8. A 'silent alarm' between the PA's office and the VIP office and control room.
9. A panic button or buttons installed in the VIPs desk and office.
10. The necessary security kit should be some or all of the items listed in the residential security chapter.
11. Don't locate the post room near the VIP suite - see previous.

The layout of the office in terms of furniture, fixtures and fittings are done in such a way as to inhibit a visitor with ill intent and assist in the ease of protection of the VIP. The following are essentially some do's and don'ts:-

1. Install visitors in low, soft easy-chairs, angled away from the VIPs desk, which makes sudden moves very difficult.
2. Remove any heavy objects from the VIPs desk which could be used as a weapon. The same applies to any object in the room.
3. The boss's desk should be very solid and as large as feasibly possible, particularly it should have good depth and width. This prevents anyone quickly getting over or around.
4. The boss's chair should be of the large swivel variety. Both the desk front and the chair back can be hardened as required, if the threat suggests. It is not always in the interests of the client's image to have a BG in his office during meetings. If you are then you must be able to intercept any move towards your Principal.
5. Don't slouch in an easy chair, but sit on a straight-backed, high chair.
6. Place any article such as a low table between your boss's desk and the visitors.

7. A minimalist approach should apply to fixtures and fittings in the VIP suite which facilitates easier searching when occasion demands.

8. If possible, install a two-way mirror between the control room and VIP office.

Procedures

Having established the physical and control aspects of the premises, be that electronic or human, we need to look at the various Security Procedures that must be instituted. We will need procedures for dealing with the following:-

VISITORS

PARCELS/LETTERS

TELEPHONE CALLS

WORKMEN/CLEANING STAFF ETC

STAFF VETTING

In many ways, the procedures are no different from those we would put in place for the residence, but there are some other considerations which should apply.

What is different is usually the sheer volume of visitors, letters and calls that come into the office. Particularly with calls, it is impossible for security to vet every call to the office, but like mail, they should at the very least, segregate and vet all calls and deliveries that are destined for the Principal.

The SAP should go to clear the office and look for signs of entry and devices. There should be a regular sweep of the VIP suite, but this should not be predictable ie. the first Tuesday of each month.

Visitors

Procedures will be very similar to the residence and often the residence may well be used as the office or at least an extension. The decision on the procedures for visitors to the office is determined by the overall threat and situation risk.

With a high threat, a visitor's vehicle would be screened - photos may be required in advance to vet the occupants - all briefcases would be searched, together with the vehicle and there may be some form of body search, if only by electronic means.

Supervise workmen at all times. Be suspicious of inappropriate work ie. burst water pipes in summer.

It may be necessary for a visitor to be escorted at all times when in the building. Always endeavour to keep visitors to an appointments system, although it is never in reality possible, particularly with close business associates and friends. Make sure that:-

‘WHAT THEY BRING WITH THEM - THEY TAKE OUT’

Screening

Given the volume of letters and parcels, consideration should be given to mailbomb screening equipment. The expense of such equipment may only be justified by threat or risk, particularly if a company office is abroad in a generally high risk area. A cheaper alternative, is the use of a spray. There are a number of aerosol sprays on the market which quickly detect minute traces of explosives on letters and parcels. Again, if security is not able to inspect all incoming mail, then the office staff responsible should have received training in what to look for in a ‘suspicious package’. All this is part of the following:-



Suspect device screening equipment. It will detect the detonating device of any explosive material, and will screen a parcel up to the size of a telephone book.

Business Operation Security

One definition fits the bill:

“A process to deny potential adversaries information about corporate executives, procedures, capabilities and intentions, by identifying, controlling and protecting corporate vulnerabilities that are susceptible to hostile exploitation.”

- As with the residence, install a paper shredder.
- Ensure a 'clean desk' policy is in operation and adhered to.
- Install one or two secure safes or cabinets for sensitive information.
- Instigate regular 'electronic sweeps' of the VIP suite.

- Restrict the flow of press releases and understand the exploitation value of high corporate profile, particularly when abroad in a less than friendly environment.
- Don't allow executive travel information to be dealt with by anyone except his PA.
- There should be 'no' computer access to his travel arrangements.
- No names on doors of Senior Executives, desks, car park spaces.
- Key control.

Teach Employees Surveillance Detection and Reporting!

- Inculcate into employees, the need to be observant and pay attention to such things as people loitering in common areas, particularly at the beginning and end of each day and during lunch times. They should learn to restrict the request for information from casual inquiries or people who seem to have little knowledge of the nature of the business.

- They should be alert to non-bonified enquiries, callers who refuse to give their number and unidentified callers. Visitors or callers who show more interest in the nationality of the Chief Executive and Senior Management.

- Employees should be briefed to spot things which are not right and they should become part of the 'early warning system'. As with domestic help, employees should be suspicious of and report sightings of people taking notes or using hand signals, cameras, binoculars, telephoto lenses, camcorders, car telephones, short wave radios near or at the office - (see Appendix 2 - 'Suspicious Activity Reporting Checklist').

Actions On

1. Establish a fire plan.
2. Implement a Bomb Threat Plan with a 'Bomb Search Procedure'. Identify and delegate certain individuals with the task. Install recording devices on certain phones to recall bomb threat calls or extortion demands - maintain a log of bomb threat and any threatening calls.
3. Establish a plan on finding an explosive device.

Again, the above differ in no great detail from those procedures and drills one would implement for the residence.

Appendix 1.

Bomb Threat Call Checklist

Record the exact language of the threat: _____

Questions the person taking the call should ask:

When is it going to explode? _____

Where is it? _____

What kind of bomb is it? _____

What does it look like? _____

Why are you doing this? _____

Who are you? _____

Operator should try and ascertain the following:

Voice on the phone: Man Woman Child (circle) Age _____

Excited Loud Calm (circle) Intoxicated YES/NO _____

Language spoken _____ Regional Dialect _____

Other comments _____

Background Noise

Children Aircraft Traffic Typing Machines Music (circle)

Other Noises _____

Distinctive telephone signal tones.* _____

* **Note:** Sometimes it is possible to distinguish long distance and intercity calls, as well as calls from pay telephones, by their signal tone. This information should be noted when available.

Experience with this type of call YES/NO _____

Please describe _____

Date _____ Time of Call _____

Length of Call _____ Incoming Line Number _____

Call received by _____

Appendix 2.

Suspicious Activity Reporting Checklist

Suspect

Height: _____ Weight: _____ Sex: _____ Hair colour/length _____

Race/Nationality: _____

Clothing (hat, jacket, pants, shirt, footwear etc): _____

Distinguishing features (glasses, moustache, beard etc): _____

Walks with limp: _____ Scars: _____ Birthmarks: _____

Other: _____

Activity

Time of sighting: _____ Location: _____

What was the suspect doing? _____

Any use of a camera, binoculars, telephoto lens, camcorder, shortwave radio, tape recorder or other devices, note taking, drawing/sketching, or hand signals?

Vehicles

Make & Year: _____ Colour: _____

License Plate No. _____ 4 door/2 door/other: _____

No. of occupants: _____ If departed, direction of travel _____

Other Information

Did anyone else see the above suspect, activity or vehicle?

YES/NO _____ If yes who? _____

Full name of person making this report (please print and sign name)

Short Stay Security

Hotel Security

If you are operating in London, then the logistics of arranging your security requirements present few problems. Management and staff are used to the needs and demands of personal security for VIPs and early liaison with both senior management and the hotel's Chief Security Officer, should secure good co-operation.



***Short Stay Security!** - a hotel is still considered as a residence if that's where the Boss lays his head. With Executive Protection, we are more often operating out of a hotel than we are a fixed residence. Ritz Hotel - Madrid.*

Whilst we are considering Hotel Security under the heading of 'Location Security', there is a large amount of Advance work that would be done prior to taking occupation of the hotel. If you have had the opportunity to do an Advance, then the Hotel Advance Checklist at the end of this chapter may help.

As part of the Advance work, the operative who is tasked with the job should endeavour to introduce himself to the senior management and senior Housekeeper of the Hotel. Be prepared with a comprehensive list of your requirements. He will also need to establish the logistics of feeding the team members, particularly if the Control Room is going to operate 24 hours. Room service hours may need to be extended, if possible. If not, drinks and sandwiches must be pre-prepared prior to cessation of room service. In some hotels it is possible to secure 'kitchen privileges' to allow as much flexibility as possible and also 'mess' with the hotel's resident security personnel.

A VIP in the hotel enhances both image as well as profits and the smooth running of his visit secures these advantages for the hotel in the future. Some hotels are known to be more 'secure' than others, which may influence choice and certainly when abroad, the threat assessment must include those hotels where security is above average. Choice, particularly in terms of security will be determined by the assessment, but on many occasions the choice of hotel is a 'fait accompli' and the boss's personal choice, for a number of reasons, convenience, food, ambience, comfort may all conspire against the choice from your security point of view. Often we are tasked to look after a visiting foreign businessman, where the hotel has been booked in advance. Rooms may already have been allocated and the opportunity to arrange matters to your best interests may have been lost, but one should always endeavour to re-arrange the accommodation if it is not too late.

A good security company will endeavour to take over as many of the organised duties and management tasks as possible. Security should be financially independent from the main party at all times. They should be equipped with credit cards and when abroad, security personnel need to be able to make arrangements quickly, without resort to a company office when dealing with matters such as car hire and travel arrangements, which will also require separate billing.

Points to Consider

Against the Hotel

- Easy access in and out for everyone - you have no control.
- No control over staff.
- You have little, if any control over the general security of the building.

For the Hotel

- Easy administration - meals, laundry etc.

Broadly, Hotel Security divides itself into four broad areas:-

Hotel Surroundings

As with office selection, you should be concerned with being overlooked from adjoining buildings, particularly entrance and embus/debus points, as well as public rooms or dining rooms. You may well want to use a secondary entrance for embus/debus.

General Security

One would ideally want to treat the hotel as a 'defended area', with strict access controls. This is impossible for a civilian CP team and in practical terms, nearly impossible for a Police one. An hotel, by its very nature has open access and one usually has to rely on the resident hotel security to do their job. Improvements in the internal security of hotels is

happening constantly. Better hotels allow travel in the lift by means of a 'card swipe' with your room access card before either the lift can be called and then once inside, before a floor can be chosen. It is not foolproof, but it is certainly an important improvement over having total free access to floors. Access to floors from stairs is limited to those people with cards.

Manpower would rarely allow, but it may be possible, to have a man tasked with watching for suspicious persons. Unfortunately, in a number of foreign countries, this would amount to nearly everyone who used the hotel. In reality the 'defended' space needs to be drawn closer in than the hotel perimeter. Should you place a man in a strategic position, he must have radio contact with the ops room. A 'man' in reception, whilst unable to spot anyone other than the most obvious of villains, still serves a useful purpose, as he should detect any VIP who leaves the hotel without giving notice.

Certainly, before departing from the hotel, a member of the PES should have been stationed at the entrance to detect anything unusual or suspicious.

You should know who occupies adjoining suites and also be establishing good liaison with the hotel staff, have a good 'inside track' to useful information.

Always check with the floor waiter as to the activity level of near occupants. Late night noise will be a problem.

In the mornings and before every departure, the Team Leader must have ensured that all vehicles, drivers and escort team members are ready. There will need to be a good half hour allocated before any departure, to have a final briefing and update everyone on itinerary changes. If you are working with foreign security personnel, ensure you leave enough time for briefing to be translated. You can't go over the detail too many times.

Security of the VIP Suite

The 'Advance Party' in liaison with the hotel security manager, should select a suite of rooms that offer the best natural defence in relation to the nature of the accommodation. This is not always a guarantee that the VIP will have the best room, but the difference will be subjective.

In some hotels, a separate floor is now designed as a 'VIP' floor, with separate and speedy booking-in arrangements on that floor. This can make life a lot easier and as a perimeter within the hotel, can be easily guarded.

General Rules for Suite Selection

- Not below the height of a thrown object. This means the second or third floor up.

- Don't, however, choose the very top floor, as this can necessitate a long time in lifts, with a lot of stops.
- Avoid being above the 6th floor in case of fire and the need to evacuate.
- The room should not be overlooked either from the pavement or adjoining buildings.
- There should ideally be no adjacent balconies and free of other external access such as a fire escape.
- The rooms should be at the end of a corridor so as to prevent access to every one else other than hotel staff. There should ideally be adjoining rooms for the VIP, security and members of the party.
- Establish what is above, below, all round.
- Avoid rooms with false ceilings. It is too easy to conceal explosives or bugs.
- The VIP suite should not be adjacent to or opposite stairways and lifts.
- Select a suite which, ideally, has no connecting doors to other rooms, corridors or service areas.



The Marco Polo in Almaty, Kazakhstan with balconied floors. The floors run all round and make positional choice irrelevant. Good VIP suites with substantial, bullet-proof doors.

Procedures

- The suite must be fully searched and secured before being occupied and once the search is complete, no-one should have access unless accompanied by a member of the team. You may want to sweep both electronically and with something which has four paws and a wet nose.

- Lock and remove keys from all the adjoining doors in the suite and endeavour to restrict access and egress by the Principal to only one door. You must know he can only leave by one route. If necessary the door can be electronically linked to the control room.
- Consider the use of a portable alarm and surveillance system (see photo on page 25). These can be carried in a brief case and can provide a comprehensive package of CCTV, PIR and Contact Alarms for night. Panic buttons for the VIP suite should also be considered and smoke detectors.
- Try and fill up adjoining rooms with party members and operatives, as they become free.
- All the suite keys should be located in the control room and the main door key or card should be held by the protection officer guarding the suite.
- Dependent upon the ‘threat assessment’ and the ‘geographic risk’ which, as we know, can be entirely different - consider guarding the suite over a 24-hour period, even when the VIP is not in occupation. No hotel staff or repairmen are allowed access without being accompanied.
- All telephone calls must be routed via the control room if possible.
- Ensure that windows are covered from direct line of sight and that curtains are drawn at night.

Security Within The Hotel

Often you have to accept your VIP having free rein to wander the hotel as he sees fit. He may want to use a range of facilities and whether he is accompanied or not, sensibly depends on Threat and Risk, as well as the client’s own preference. A low threat client in a high risk city in a low security hotel may need accompanying at all times. Often it is sufficient to know simply what he intends to do, particularly at meal times. You should know when he’s going to eat, with whom and then you can be there in advance. He will see you and you will know that he is okay. You can book a table for his party that suits his likes and your imperitives. Be sensible in looking after him in an hotel environment. Remember the rules on alcohol and make sure that what you are drinking does not resemble alcoholic beverage. Take the opportunity to liaise with him after the meal.

Finish first, wait in the lounge area so he has to pass you on his way out of the restaurant - you can then tie up any loose ends or get any updates on the next day’s itinerary.

I've worked on jobs - not many - where I've stayed in a different hotel to the Boss. In London it's not too much of a problem, particularly if you have 'personnel' who will be maintaining a watch over a 24 hour period or you have video surveillance to a 'non-sleeping' Ops room. If you're abroad however, with limited manpower and no 24 hour cover, you have to rely on your Boss to act with common sense. Once you've gone off duty, you can exercise no control over his actions - good or bad. In such cases, you must brief him on the dangers of leaving his room or hotel once he's settled in, or you think he is.

If you have separate rooms from your boss, even to the extent you may be on separate floors, then brief him on personal security. He must lock and then double lock the door and you may want to equip him with a room alarm for the door or have some comms. with you. Discourage him to use room service after he has settled in and ensure he knows not to answer the door under any circumstances to unexpected callers. A door wedge is another useful piece of kit that both you and he should make use of.

Control Room

In the ideal world, particularly in the event of a long stay, security will need an ops room. Often this may be the team leader's/BG room, but if at all possible, the following should be ideal.

- Sited opposite the main VIP suite door and between the hotel traffic and VIP suite.
- At least two security in attendance and one female BG if required.
- There should be good communications from the suite and in third world countries this may involve portable satellite communication equipment if sat. comm. is not available through the hotel telephone system.
- Consider comms between the VIP suite and control room.
- All deliveries of whatever nature must be via the control room for checking.
- If possible, remove beds - put in tables and chairs.
- Bulletin board or chalk board.
- Local phone book.
- Maps with routes to all locations.
- Hallway table (checkpoint).
- All vehicle keys and spares.
- Fire escape route maps.
- Emergency phone numbers 'posted'.
- Extended telephone call.
- Itinerary.
- Any diagrams.
- Operative assignments.

Kit

- Portable alarm kit.
- Portable surveillance kit.
- First Aid Kit.
- Company forms kit.
- Radios and charger, spare batteries.
- Voltage converters.
- Flashlights.
- Fire extinguishers (hand portable).
- Notebook computer and portable bubblejet printer.
- Portable fax machine.

The Control Room can also be used as a 'Safe Room' for the valuables of party members whilst out or at dinner, swimming or training etc. Items should be sealed in an envelope before you take custody of it and all briefcases locked. You will probably be charged with responsibility for storage or disposal of sensitive documents, particularly if board meetings are taking place in the hotel. Ensure records are secure and disposed of properly - don't let paper pile up.

In many third world countries, select a 'burn pit' and burn all paper records at the end of each day, prior to cleaners coming in. This more applies to fixed locations such as remote client offices as distinct from hotels.

Hotels General

- Make yourself familiar with all the fire exits and fire fighting equipment (or lack of it).
- Re-arrange the suite furniture if necessary, particularly where the phone is sited in the VIP suite.
- Endeavour to arrange for secure garaging of the VIP vehicles, this may not be available at the hotel. If abroad, you may need to find a secure, guarded location, some way away from the hotel.
- Establish clearly defined limits, known to both the Principal and his staff and hotel staff.
- Restrict the handling of the VIPs luggage. If hotel staff do take charge of the baggage, endeavour to have someone accompany them.
- Meals should be taken from the existing menu.
- The usual restriction of information is paramount. Leave no notes, papers, travel documents on view in either the control room or VIP suite.
- Sweep the room daily for bugs. If you can, take a hand-held signal strength indicator and small tools for a physical search.

Keep a detailed list of all expenses, particularly tipping. The CP room can incur sizeable expenses, particularly if items such as 'packed lunches' for day trips have been charged to the room. Establish well in advance the protocols for expenses and who pays in the short term.

Venues

Restaurants

The following are the general rules which one needs to take cognisance of. Try and get a boss to vary routines with regard to eating out. Using a variety of places is preferable to the same restaurant at the same time each Saturday night and you may also wish to discourage the use of a restaurant if the area it is in increases 'risk'. This is particularly true when abroad.

- Never book a table in the Principal's name (that having been said, in some restaurants if you don't use his name you won't get a table).
- SAP to discreetly recce the restaurant in advance. They should be familiar with all entrances and exits, layout of washroom facilities, embus/debus problems and parking. Profile will be important and a discreet 'drop off' will need to be planned so as not to raise the profile.
- The Principal's table must be in a secure position, not en-route to the toilets or exits and not near a window.
- Know the 'dress code' expected. It can't wait until you see how your VIP is dressed. It's okay if you know the restaurant - ensure compatibility if you don't.
- The PES and drivers who are tasked to remain outside, need to ensure that they do not attract undue attention to themselves. Don't group around, Don't sit in vehicles. Find a dominant position and dress down if required.
- The BG and PES members, if dining separately, must always be one course ahead of the Boss and usually this means missing a course out. Brief the waiter that you always needs to be ahead and require your bill in good time.
- Always be equipped to pay not only your own bill, but that of the Principal's party if required. Liaison beforehand and general instructions will have outlined the requirement for your role in dealing with any administration.
- Never sit with the Principal unless invited to do so. In very formal restaurants, it will be impossible for the BG to eat on his own and on such occasions a Boss will normally exhibit sensible consideration and invite you to join the party. There may be a bar where you can 'plot up' and watch what happens, yet be discreetly out of the way, having eaten prior to departure.
- You must establish with your boss an 'early warning system' that he is ready to leave. You may need two minutes or five minutes to ensure that everyone is in

place and if vehicles have been required to be parked some distance away, brief your Boss before he sits down on how much notice of 'a move' you will need.

- Always try and maintain discreet comms with your PES members and/or with the vehicles.
- If at all possible, rotate PES with the vehicle with people inside so as to keep the profile low.

Formal Dinners

- Ensure you know the dress code and comply.
- With prior liaison it is often possible to secure a table reasonably close to your charge, yet in a position to observe all doors.
- Vet the guest list and if necessary ensure your VIP is not seated in close proximity to anyone who, by their nature, would raise the risk to your client (a book guild dinner sounds innocent enough, unless you saw Salman Rushdie would be occupying the table adjacent to your client).

NB - Formal dinners may be part and parcel of more specific Public Appearances.

Public Appearances

By dint of his position, your VIP may be simply an attendee at such a function, or as a consequence of his status and expertise, may be the focus of attention. Such events range from official opening ceremonies, awards ceremonies, speeches and, on occasions, inspections. Your problem will be that such events are well publicised and those individuals with 'ill intent' can find suitable cover and camouflage within all that is going on. Quite often, your VIP may be there, simply as an invited guest, but you should maintain 'situation awareness' at all times. A client with a low threat could put himself in a high risk situation by attendance at public meetings, particularly if it is one where there may be contentious political issues at stake, or an AGM for his or another company where shareholder dissent is envisioned. A 'winding up' meeting of creditors, presents a serious challenge.

'Prepare Early'

- Liaise with the Police and other 'friendly' forces eg. stewards and event security.
- Liaise with the host to scrutinise the guest list and programme so as to be able to influence matters for favourable security.
- Establish estimated time of arrival and departure.
- Liaise with that person who is responsible on-site for security eg. factory manager, office manager, security officer.
- Establish their bomb threat procedure.
- Brief individuals who will have contact with, or be presented to, the Principal.

- If you have no direct control, endeavour to influence the vetting of staff and security.
 - Ensure that refreshments are available, not only for the Boss but the whole team.
- Check all vehicle arrangements - car parking, general security and pros and cons of proposed embus/debus points. You may want to embus from a different exit when leaving.
- Conduct a detailed survey of the building and endeavour to establish a tactical appreciation of the venue.
- Radio checks for the building and surrounding areas, particularly between the PES and the parked vehicles. You may need to resort to mobile cellular phones.
- Arrange suitable rostrum security.
- With prior liaison, endeavour to identify a room suitable as a control room should the duration of the event be for some hours.

Prior to Arrival

- The SAP to 'travel and report' on the security of the route.
- Buildings and surroundings of 'tactical' importance eg. Stand off locations are searched and secured (a procedure usually reserved for Police authorities).
- That the event security as working, effective security measure in place, eg. searching handbags and briefcases and cloakroom checks.
- That all security considerations are in place and working.
- Final comms check.

If your Boss is there as a speaker or the principle attraction, then the following need also to be addressed.

Rostrum Security

When a VIP is on stage at a rostrum, he is particularly vulnerable (eg Prince Charles and Malcolm X). He may be there to give a speech or present prizes or simply be one of a number of VIPs on stage occupying a more passive role. You will need to arrange the following, but again your ability to influence matters may be limited.

Seating

If your Boss is the attraction, he or she will probably be positioned centre stage of the rostrum. If possible, get a lower seat for him and have the adjoining seats occupied by members of the PES. Tiered seating to the rear is also an advantage. You may wish to position a PES member off-stage in the wings and you may also, should the threat or risk demand, consider 'hardening' the lectern.

Audience Control

Endeavour to have a good gap between the audience and the stage. This may mean moving the seating back or if fixed, it may necessitate keeping the front one or more rows empty. If it is an award or prize giving, then the next row of seats will be occupied by those who have to go onto the stage. This row and maybe one other should only be half occupied to allow people to go on stage from one side and exit from the opposite side and take up an empty seat in their row. This does not congest the rows and makes it harder for an attacker to go unnoticed. You may then wish to station PES members at the ends of the row behind and also strategically around the audience. They must be able to intercept an attacker early on.

The BG in the event of an attack, must concern himself solely with the Boss and giving him body cover. He should evacuate him off stage into a designated secure room or to the vehicles. He is not there to fight and should leave any engagement to the PES.

Theatres and Cinemas

Book the tickets for all the party so that one or two PES members sit behind the Principal with a team member at each end of the row. Failing this, if you have a number of people in your party, then book the whole row with a PES member at one end to prevent anyone attempting to take the seat which may be empty and you should locate yourself at the other end next to your boss. Don't put your boss in the middle of a row. If you have to get him out quickly, it won't happen if he's in the middle of a row and you're stumbling to fight your way out.

- Be near a fire exit. Some old theatres, particularly abroad, are fire traps.
- Carry a small 'mag lite' type torch.
- If you can book a box, do so, or arrange a private room for drinks in the interval. Arrange for a PES member to order drinks early for the interval to prevent queuing and stress.
- A good recce to see how easy it is to get your vehicles close to the exit at the end of the performance is essential. You will find debussing at the venue probably okay but the embus as everyone is leaving at once, a nightmare. It may be preferable to walk to the vehicles than to have them 'boxed in' and vulnerable whilst stationary. Even on foot, you are always better on the move.
- If possible, leave the venue early or wait until the rush dies down.
- Avoid a crowd or 'press' of people.

Liaise with the theatre or cinema management. Establish their procedure for a bomb threat. Over previous years, some large stores and cinemas accept bomb threats without taking any action. This doesn't mean that you wouldn't in the circumstances and you must insist that any threat be advised to you.

Shops and Department Stores

With your average executive protection, or when looking after minor Middle East royalty, shopping presents little increased danger or risk. In the larger, prestigious stores, you also enjoy the benefit of store security, both in the form of uniformed guards and plain clothes store detectives.

Your main problem in a large department store can be losing your charge. It takes only a fraction of a second for your Principal to be lost in the crowd. Stay as close as you can to your Principal whilst he is at counters and particularly in lifts and crowded areas. Such advice may seem obvious, but you need four or more pairs of eyes to operate in a large, busy store.

In single shop units, whilst an initial recce is usually essential, it is not always necessary to stay in the shop with your Boss. Take the opportunity to liaise with any back-up PES, particularly if more detail of the itinerary ahead has been disclosed further to your embarking on the shopping trip. Your principle problem, if shopping in town, is your vehicles, as they often have to 'circle' your general area and the opportunity to have some communication either in person or on the radio should be taken as often as possible.

Having vetted the occupants of the shop, you always have the choice to stay inside the unit, or as previously advised, wait outside. Should other occupants enter the store, then you would be advised to re-enter if you were outside, until such time as you were happy about any new people.

Be familiar with the layout of all major stores that you are likely to visit.

CHAPTER 6

SEARCHING PREMISES

The object should always be to search and secure any premises your Principal is due to visit. Reality, however, dictates that often the SAP has only a limited amount of time, access or requirement to search premises. The requirement, as always, is dictated by the threat and the other aspects are often limited by the simple fact that in non-Government service, one is often unable to secure the same level of co-operation or facilities that the Police, say, may enjoy. If housing a politician in a hotel or pre-searching and securing a lecture venue at a public meeting, they could if they so desired, employ the specialist assistance of a Technical Support Unit or the Dog Section.

It still pays however, to look at how a building search would be carried out if we had both the resources and freedom of movement and then look, as with all CP procedures, how we can ‘round the corners off’ and apply realistically what we are able, when we are able.

Use local knowledge to assist in the search, eg. a caretaker or boiler man to assist in the search of boiler room or cellars, a plumber for pipes, electrician for wiring etc. If you can’t find such a person on site, check whether you have any ex-tradesmen on the team who would have such knowledge and identify things that may be out of place, quickly.

A search may be one of the following:-

- Intensive Intensive Search Zone (ISZ)
- Routine Routine Search Zone (RSZ)
- Other areas

ISZ

This would constitute the Principal’s own office or VIP areas in the domestic residence. Ideally, it should include adjacent rooms - marked in red on building diagrams and keep the ISZ to a minimum as a search is time-consuming.

RSZ

The remainder of the buildings and grounds. After being searched, premises should be secured by:-

- Physical presence
- Physical barriers
- CCTV
- Electronic alarms

Degrees of a Search

- a. Intensive search eg. ISZ and also in a high threat situation.
- b. Routine search - normal level of search in medium/low threat situations.
- c. Short notice search - best effort possible given time constraints.

In each instance, it is to find the following:-

- Explosive devices or booby traps
- Weapons
- Undesirable persons
- Surveillance equipment

You will ideally need the following:-

- Eyes!!
- Torch
- Plans/diagrams - to assist during recce phase and briefing
- String
- Plastic strips
- Screwdrivers
- Pliers
- Mirror
- Overalls
- Coloured ribbon
- One time seals
- Use of ladders - if available
- Someone familiar with the property

In addition, depending on the task as briefed, you may require the use of vapour detectors, metal detectors and electronic surveillance detection equipment (NLJD) and dogs.



*A comprehensive search kit.
If the team was regularly involved in detailed searches, certain skilled individuals would specialise.*

The search team will have been briefed on the following:-

1. The approach
2. Areas of responsibility
3. Time allowed for the search
4. Anyone else involved eg. Dogs, Technical
5. Time of VIPs arrival
6. Any other relevant info
 - a. Threat
 - b. Intelligence/MO
 - c. Current situation

There should be some order to the operation and it will usually have the three phases:-

- 1. Recce and planning**
- 2. Search**
- 3. Physical securing following search**

Search Team Leader

Note a search team can consist of one man, but ideally there should be two plus a team leader, who is responsible for the following:-

- Control the sequence of events - ensure that all areas are covered.
- Record results.
- Observe the search - ensure it is conducted in the correct manner.
- Deal with 'finds' - should report initially to overall CP team leader.

The search team should, ideally, be dressed in loose, comfortable clothes to allow maximum mobility.

Search Procedure


If relevant, you will need to start with OUTSIDE. If you are searching a hotel room on the 12th floor, unless overlooked and potentially the subject to 'stand-off' attack or surveillance, this would not apply.

There would ideally be 2 x 2 man teams. They would work diagonally around a building, both teams in the same direction. Should a device be encountered, there will only be two people at risk at any time.

They will check the following:-

- Shrubbery
- Flower beds
- Driveway
- Manholes
- Vents and appliances eg air conditioning
- Down pipes
- Disturbed soil
- Suspicious vehicles - particularly those closest to the position of the VIP within the building
- Windows and grilles
- Search carefully the entrance
- Make use of the windows for a visual examination inside.

The area, particularly that closest to where the VIP will be, should then be guarded.



Search Procedure

1. *Outside*

INSIDE

The search will then move inside. With limited resources, you must, in the majority of cases, split your search into priorities. If you have limited time and manpower, then with the assistance of plans and knowledge of the VIPs location and areas to be visited, colour code your prioritised areas.

RED - The most important area where a device will definitely kill.


AMBER - Preferable to search

GREEN - All other areas

The search should be carried out, accompanied by someone who knows the premises.

‘Watch where you put your feet’ - ‘How you handle things’ and ‘See, don’t just look’.

The guide should unlock the doors etc. Hopefully, you should have been able to check the doors from outside if a ground floor room. If you can, then enter the premises nearest the mains power - turn the electricity off. In practice this is not always feasible.



Search Procedure

2. *Inside*

BE SYSTEMATIC

In a room search, whatever pattern you adopt is okay, providing everyone involved is working to that pattern eg:-


- 1. Begin in a specific location.**
- 2. The floor or ground.**
- 3. Ground to waist level.**
- 4. Waist level to eye level.**
- 5. Eye level to ceiling.**

If possible, use 2 x 2 man teams who will work around the room in say a clockwise fashion.

- **Walls to include light fittings and curtains.**
- **Ceilings with light fittings.**
- **Furniture and all electrical appliances.**

Examine:- (particularly for the ISZ)

Panels, door frames, windows and look for evidence of tampering. Check carpets and wall coverings, pictures and any other items such as desk furniture. Remember, surveillance devices can be designed as plugs, calculators, pens, pen sets and built within a host of other office items. You may wish to mark items searched with coloured ribbon, or with a 'one time' numbered sticky label. Move all furniture, look behind pictures, switch on all lights and eventually electrical items - all cupboards, and the carpets if possible, and search all link passages and access points to other rooms.



Searching a clear space with mirrors will work if you are looking for a person, but with anything smaller, you'll have to get up there.

If the threat level is such, you'll have to get into floor space. In civilian CP work, the likelihood of this may be remote.



You would complete a similar search of those rooms you felt relevant, given threat and time constraints and then secure the rooms. If you are unable to guard all the rooms, then lock the rooms and keep charge of the keys. Consider the use of 'one time' security seals for doors, windows, phones and plug sockets which if broken, cannot be re-applied and indicate intrusion. When all the rooms have been searched, turn the electricity back on and test the electrical appliances. If necessary, re-arrange the furniture eg. desk, chairs and phone from line of sight through the window. Should you find a suspect device then - DO NOT TOUCH - the a C's apply:-

CONFIRM - CLEAR - CORDON - CONTROL

CONFIRM

This need not be by electing a committee to come to a decision. Trust the man on the ground. If as team leader, your team member believes he has found a device, believe him.

Remember -

'The first look is free. Do not go back for a second - the price you pay may be your life'.

Report the find, but do not use a radio within 25 plus metres of the device. The person finding the device should stay around to brief the police and bomb disposal people and a sketch of the device will help.

CLEAR

Evacuate the area out to a safe distance. Remember, a half pound of explosive is not too deadly in itself, but flying glass is. Leave windows and doors open in the room the device is in. The IRA bombing of Manchester has revised everyone's thinking about the 'safe distance' to clear out to. Injuries were suffered out past 400 metres. It was a lorry bomb, but it re-emphasised the very peculiar nature and paths a bomb blast can take.

CORDON

Phone the police - warn the main VIP party to divert if en-route or delay leaving. Control the situation until the authorities arrive.

The confirmation of a device being suspicious can be helped by the application of common sense - is an object totally out of place? - utilise the last person or staff who would be familiar with the layout and fixtures and fittings. Give cogent reasons for the suspicion.

ATO will need to know the following:-

- Size
- Wires from the device - a sketch will always help
- Your route in
- Exact time of find
- Distinguishing marks
- Nearby hazards
- That all doors are open for a wheelbarrow
- Leave the lights on in the room in which you found the device



Consider the purchase of a Bomb Blanket for suspicious items although they can sometimes make life difficult for the Bomb Disposal people.

CHAPTER 7

TRAVEL SECURITY

General

Given the nature of the lifestyles of the prominent and wealthy, travel is a regular feature of most VIPs existence. The most important aspect of VIP protection is Preparation, and nowhere will you have as much to do in preparation work, as you will with travel and all its implications, particularly travel abroad. Good preparation allows you to be pro-active and in charge, not always having to react to crises. Journeys commonly fall into three main categories:-

1. DAILY

Usually between home and office. We can include in this category, weekly regular journeys which may be of a social, business or sporting nature.

2. SHORT NOTICE

This may mean you have as long as 24 hours notice down to 5 minutes. The journey may be a 'one off' and totally unfamiliar to the team or it may be a familiar one which happens occasionally. Time allowing, one should always endeavour to plan and reconnoitre.

3. SPECIAL OR SPECIFIC

This could be from home, say, to France. Usually pre-planned, possibly even up to a year or so in advance. Possibly well publicised and requires substantial planning and liaison. You may be on unknown ground.

The first and third of the above, cause most concern from a security point of view. Routine and predictability in the first instance and the publicity and time for planning by the opposition in the third. The short notice or 'fastball' journey, whilst causing the most logistics and management problems is usually the most risk free - if we didn't know about it prior to it happening, its reasonably certain the opposition don't.



Almati airport - Kazakhstan. Awaiting arrival of a private jet. Over the other side of the mountains is China. Logistics in such areas can be a nightmare.

1. Collect all information from prior trips to the same location.

2. Collect all information on up-coming trip:-

- Proposed itinerary
- Official guest list
- Ground transportation (and, if relevant, air)
- Hotel accommodation
- Special health conditions
- Entertainment planned
- Billing arrangement/budget
- Media

3. Make preliminary telephone calls

- Contacts
- Hotels
- Transport
- Police (RSO)
- Aircrew (charter)

Confirm your own accommodation in advance.

Later in this chapter we will look at the implications of each and then expand on the requirements and principles to adhere to when organising a journey by road. Before that however, some general travel factors need to be considered.

Movement Details

Timings - arrivals and departures

Latest and earliest

Flight number and terminal, which section of train, customs procedure, visas required. Vehicles available, back-up procedure if flight cancelled or late and similar with train.

Privacy of Principal

If at all possible, ensure he or they have privacy. Secure a whole compartment.

Security of Baggage

Whilst you don't want to carry it, often you'll have to, but whatever, you will have to ensure it is within your control at all times, unless it is obviously in the hold of the plane. Count the number of pieces and ID all of them. Keep track of it at all times. If manpower allows, a team member should be allocated to the baggage - not as a handler, but to check that all the baggage that goes on - comes off.

Provision of VIP facilities

If there is a VIP lounge and VIP customs procedure, then book early to secure access for your Principal on arrival and departure. Sit with your VIP, even in a VIP lounge. Do not leave him unless you are immediately backed-up by a PES member.

Accommodation, Refreshments and Meals

Try and get an adjoining room, compartment or cabin to your Boss. Liaise with waiters and stewards as everyone should come to you first. The Principal should lock his door and answer it to no-one but you. On the Moscow - St. Petersburg railway, even this may not be enough as they remove the whole door, having first introduced gas into the compartment prior to the robbery.

Liaison - Security/Reception Agencies

Liaise with all outside agencies that can assist in both security of the journey and its smooth passage. Travelling is fraught with logistics problems and any additional assistance is of value. Security personnel in foreign countries can usually exert far more influence at ports and airports to speed the passage of an individual, than we enjoy in the UK. Know your 'in-country' procedures and shortcuts.

Establish Secure Translation Services

Your best option is to have the linguistic ability within the team. Failing that, the services of an interpreter recommended or employed by a security firm you know 'in-country'. Often, the client company will provide an 'in-house' interpreter. If you can, unknown to the client, get him or her 'vetted' for any 'connections'.

Currency

Have foreign currency available and small denomination US Dollars. Often, in former Easter Bloc countries, the currency of taxis is Dollars - and they never have change!

Vaccinations

Ensure you have all your team members vaccinated if required and be well prepared for local health hazards.

Visas

Final checks that all visas are current and appropriate.

Safe Houses/Rooms

Should an incident occur or threaten, where are you going to go? RV points, comms, ensure all the team members and the VIP know.

From other passengers. Who is travelling with you - are they under a separate threat which raises the surrounding risk to your client. Is the means of travel a known safety risk? eg. Moscow to St. Petersburg rail link. Advise an alternate if you feel risk exceeds the convenience. Stay close to him/her at all times.

Communications

There must be good, reliable communications between the Team Leader, Team, Base and the VIP. He shouldn't 'wander off' without telling you his intentions and you should know all aspects of the travel arrangements, timings and what is expected. Get your client and his company people into the habit of bringing you up to date on all changes to the itinerary, even if they are only proposed changes so that you can begin your 'appreciations'.

Train

If you are travelling by train, endeavour to secure as much accommodation on each side of your Principal as the budget allows. Where compartments still exist, secure at least one and sit the Principal near the window. Know the scheduled stops - when and where. The BG and PES must have a good, permanent view of the VIP compartment and also the platform, when stationary. Make sure on sleepers, that the VIP compartment is booked in a false name, as the passenger's name is usually on the door outside.

Air Travel

Board the aircraft immediately behind the Principal and alight immediately in front of him. Baggage on last - off first. That having been said, in many small charter jets, the luggage has to go in first to the rear of the plane and off last. Consider the use of a 'baggage vehicle' so that movement of the VIPs is not hindered waiting to load the luggage into the main

vehicles. Remember though, a VIP who gets to a hotel without his baggage is going to be pretty pissed. Sit immediately behind him on the flight and keep as much baggage with you as possible. Detailed Advance work is required for Airports, whether travelling by Charter of Commercial Airline. You must know:-

- The hours of operation
- Locate the VIP area
- Locate the restrooms etc
- Establish the booking-in procedures and time required
- Establish embus/debus points which leave you as close to the main terminal as possible
- The most convenient and secure parking if a long wait prior to arrival is anticipated
- Establish procedures for declaring Firearms
- Any special seating requirements
- One operative to hold all the passports
- All baggage claim checks with one operative
- ‘Courtesy of The Port’ - will you get it?

Although we will look at the specifics of Route Reconnaissance later, we need to look at the whole aspect of ‘**Advance Work**’.

Security Advances, as our American cousins like to call it, is the preparation and pre-visits that goes into any travel arrangement and may involve the following stages if the budget allows:-

- 1. Pre-advances (planning stage)**
- 2. Trip advances (finalise arrangements)**
- 3. Visit advances (immediately before he arrives - really as we know SAP work)**

The goal of all the above is:-

- **To avoid all surprises**
- **Planned contingencies**
- **Avoid hazards and vulnerable situations**

In reality, stage 2 is usually combined with 3, particularly if the visit is abroad and the journey an expensive one. It must be considered a luxury to have any Advance opportunity.

The object of the Advances is as follows:-

- a. To arrange all accommodation**
- b. Transportation arrangement**
- c. Special event arrangement**
- d. Security/Police liaison**
- e. Assessment of emergency/evacuation services**
- f. Public relations during all of the above**

You need to remember that in the preparation stage, you have a ‘trade-off’ in the conflict of having to disclose the identity of your VIP. Assess the threat and risk and the balance of necessity.

The Advance evolves as follows:-

- 1. Pre-departure preparations**
- 2. Initial duties on arrival**
- 3. Site surveys**
- 4. Transport arrangements**
- 5. Emergency services**

1. Pre-Departure Plans

A. Collect Information

- Itineraries, dates, times, type of trip or visit.
- Guest list, titles and numbers in group.
- Account billing arrangements and budget.
- Special requirements of VIP.
- Special medical requirements.
- Proposed transportation requirements and accommodation.
- Prepare prelim Threat Assessment and Risk Analysis.
- Establish threat category and risk.
- If abroad - visa requirements, immunisation, language etc etc.

B. Contacts by Telephone with

- Main contacts (VIPs or Security Companies)
- Accommodation - Hotel, Residence.
- Transportation - ground, air, other.
- Police/Intelligence - local Constabulary and if abroad, RSO (US), Chief Security Officer (UK).
- Vehicle rental.
- Any major engagement locations.

You should endeavour to make appointments with all of the above. If, however, you are travelling abroad, it is more likely that your contact calls will be made within the UK, to establish the names and numbers of people you need to speak to when you get on the ground.

C. Plan your Itinerary for your Advance

- Prioritise your tasks - time/threat.
- Prepare your Survey Itinerary - Hotel etc.
- Prepare a Checklist of all your questions, queries, intelligence required etc.

2. Initial Duties on Arrival

A. Make efficient use of time

At the Airport

Collect as much information as possible, remain observant and get completely familiar with the main topography etc.

- eg. maps, routes, local plans and places of interest.
- general airport topography, parking, baggage handling, departure lounges, arrival areas.
- check-in procedures.
- rental car situation

Eventually, you will have a Route Recce and SAP work to the airport, so take the opportunity to get as much information and intelligence during your first visit as possible. You won't have the opportunity when you depart, given your natural time constraints.

In transit to the hotel, observe

- traffic and main landmarks
- routes and condition, time en-route - use a map to orientate yourself and look for alternatives
- general topography
- if in a taxi, ask questions - ask about traffic congestion and when - times and distances - high crime areas etc

When you arrive at the hotel

- establish 'check-in' procedures and formalities
- observe general layout
- lobby and services, stairs, elevators
- parking and congestion
- exits and entrances
- baggage handling procedures
- baggage security facilities
- establish secretarial/office services within the hotel
- fire escapes, routes and procedures

You can drastically improve your boss's booking-in time with good pre-preparation. 'Check In' for him and then, depending on the threat, a cursory search and secure his suite. You will then have his key in your possession and, on arrival at the hotel, its then straight up to the room. This only works, if you've gone out in advance of the main party arriving.

B. Remain in contact

Call your office first

- up-dates (before you unpack)
- changes to general orders
- notify any main contacts, interpreter, local security team leader that you have arrived

C. Appointments and Site Survey Priorities

- Call and confirm all appointments (prepare to be highly frustrated in most third world and former Soviet bloc countries)
- Set your priorities and prepare your checklist

D. Area Familiarisation

- Learn your way around
- Locate all your itinerary stops
- Establish your financial requirements, either necessary cash float required or local purchases needed and obtain approval for necessary expenditure (maps for example in many foreign countries can be a very substantial cost)

3. Site Surveys - see Residence, Hotel - Chapter 5.

4. Transportation

5. Emergency Services

I can't stress too much the importance of 'Advance Work'. For a 2-day visit with an itinerary which may take in 8+ venues and 2 dinners, you will need 3-4 days of 'in-country' advance work. Simply organising suitable vehicles in good condition can soak up a whole day in some countries, if you're not careful.

The site visits need to be detailed and, if possible, run at the same times you will run them on the actual days. You need to identify the correct doors - often not the one you have in the itinerary which may be a postal address. You need to know how to get through the security, which floor your visit will be to and where exactly the office is. You need to know the capacity of the lifts and most importantly, how the debus can be done ie. how close and what will it be like on the day. If you recce on a Sunday, it's going to be totally different, particularly with most 'downtown' areas on a Monday morning.



A Sunday morning venue recce. Discussing with the security guard the feasibility of this location as a debus point on Monday.

If the offices are closed during the recce, you need to talk to security to gain as much knowledge as possible about the office layout etc. You can't be too detailed - check, check and check again - it will hit you in the face if you've got any detail wrong when you next debus with your people on the actual day.

CHAPTER 8

VEHICLE SECURITY & SEARCHING

More often than not, your main and preferred method of transport with your Principal will be by car. In some ways, however, you are actually at your most vulnerable when travelling by vehicle. A study of terrorist tactics will reveal that the majority of attacks have been against VIPs whilst in their vehicles and probably within yards of their home or their place of work. There is often a false sense of security created when travelling in vehicles, but in reality you are in an environment where freedom of movement is restricted, where choices of reaction are stunted due to lack of manoeuvrability, where the cover you have is a thin skin and where ability to respond is hindered by a variety of conditions. Reliance, even on an armoured vehicle, is a false sense of security (see 'Terrorist Tactics' - chapter 3).

Against modern weapons, armour can be of little or no defence. The lack of cordons of security of overlapping manpower, equipment and systems, make travel by car a potentially dangerous business. A vehicle or convoy's progress can be severely hindered by design and its options for escape often limited. The routine and habit which pervades most journeys by car is the greatest danger and by far and away a VIP is defined by his routine in a vehicle. He will predominantly use a car for daily travel to and from work and to regular social engagements and all too often he will have his own favourite vehicle which closely identifies him and his entourage.

Ideally, all security drivers should be trained BGs and if at all possible, do not use general chauffeurs and if you have no alternative, endeavour to train that chauffeur in the various driving procedures and emergency drills. However, the animal that makes a chauffeur, unfortunately, is not the animal you can best train for tactical driving. After weeks, months or years of painstaking cleaning every day and avoiding the slightest scratch, it can often be anathema for a chauffeur to use his most treasured possession as a battering ram, the attempted kidnap attempt of Princess Anne clearly illustrates the folly of using drivers untrained to some level in tactical evasive driving.

Vehicle Security

It has to be considered an act of gross folly to leave your residence and be blown up in your own vehicle. Even feeling safe and secure in your own residence is an act of mental folly and with the best endeavours a vehicle, whilst not being used, should still be secured and if possible, guarded, even whilst in the residence grounds. The level of threat determined by the assessment is the point of reference to decide the necessary vehicle security procedures. A Cat. I. threat would require a vehicle to be garaged under lock and key, the garage alarmed and also guarded 24 hours. In the real world this is not possible, where for most commercial operations, the threat would usually be in the 2 - 3 Cat. risk. Resources, manpower and conditions would not allow that total element of security, yet it is negligent not to endeavour to attempt to provide the security for the vehicles commensurate with the threat.

Garaged • Guarded • Secured



An advanced, battery operated explosives detector. A vapour and particulate sampler, this detector from Allens is suitable for detecting both commercial and Military explosives, including RDX and PETN.

You will always read in CP training manuals that any vehicle left unattended for any period, even if only for a matter of seconds, must be searched and secured prior to use. In reality, and we come back to the level of threat, the search may be a cursory examination which lasts simply two minutes, or if the threat so determines, two hours or more whilst the vehicle is pretty much stripped down to its constituent parts. This latter option would only be embarked upon if you were looking after a Cat. 1 threat, usually the preserve of those official protection team from military or government service and even then, this degree of search would be unlikely, because if you had reason to believe the vehicle was that 'suspect', you would simply 'sack it' and get another.

Many of the general vehicle security procedures are outlined in the chapter on Personal Security, dealing with the briefing we should give our Principal. Many of those are of course equally applicable to ourselves, particularly those concerned with general vehicle security.

Time is the critical factor in the terrorist's ability to plant a device. A device which could devastate the whole vehicle and a good deal of the surrounding area could be planted in a matter of seconds, but equally it could be discovered as quickly. If time has been on the terrorist's side, then a cursory examination is not going to find it.

Terrorists have the ability to buy, hire or steal a vehicle of the type they wish to target, on which to practice, both means of entry and how to secrete a device. The device may be activated by pressure, tilt, movement, electrical, thermal or chemical. Devices fall into three main problems:-

- 1. The device planted quickly, either lent on, balanced on or having been quickly planted.**
- 2. A device planted for some time and reasonably well secreted.**
- 3. The Car Bomb - a device which has required a large amount of time to plant, but which will turn the whole vehicle into a bomb, as distinct from a vehicle with a device planted on it.**

It pays to remember that the device may be planted in such a way as to deceive by means of the obvious. A cereal box or a similar innocuous package in the vicinity may easily contain a device.

If a vehicle has been for repairs or service, try and have someone stay with it and if a new vehicle has been delivered, then a full search will be required. Never send a vehicle to an unknown garage. A vehicle left ungaraged overnight in the grounds of a residence, even where that residence is guarded with a residence security team, there will be a need for that vehicle to be searched each morning by the driver. Such a search is likely to be cursory, and measured in minutes as the threat must be low enough to have allowed the vehicle to be left in the open and unguarded. A driver must never fall out of the habit or routine of a daily search.

It takes a terrorist only a matter of seconds to fix a device on a vehicle as he walks past and stops to, ostensibly, tie his shoelaces. A device, secured magnetically, measuring only 6" x 2" will be sufficient to demolish the car and its occupants.

Vehicle Search

Like searching a room, vehicle searching must be methodical. If possible, the driver should enlist the assistance of another operative. What we are about to describe is a full vehicle check but without a vehicle strip. This is a reasonably comprehensive search, which again would be carried out if the vehicle had been unattended. The care, detail and degree of search is all linked to the circumstances pertinent to the threat and again it may take an hour or two minutes.

When do we need to search a vehicle?

- Daily before use
- After servicing or repair
- After being left unattended

What are we looking for?

- IEDs plus -
- Brake cables cut
- Wheel nuts loose
- Sugar in petrol tank
- Clutch/brake/other oil okay eg. engine fluid drained off
- Damaged tyres (remember spare)
- Radiator okay

The vehicle and surrounding area should be sub-divided in a conscious manner and these areas of responsibility allocated to search members.

Ideally, there should be a minimum of two people for the search and, if manpower allows, you may want to employ the services of a third person who would act as team leader for the search and co-ordinate the procedure and record all aspects of the search as completed.

Anyone not actually involved in the search, should be kept at a safe distance.

Remember - no radio equipment to be used during the search - all radios turned off!

Remove watches with alarms and remove pagers.

Some basic search equipment:-

- Mirrors
- Torches
- Plastic strips
- Screwdrivers - flat and Philips
- Pliers
- Vehicle tools
- Overalls

Some sophisticated search kits may include mine detection equipment, snifter, x-ray machine and illuminated probe. As always, budget and threat dictate the level of kit required and available. The most comprehensive equipment suppliers in the UK are P.W. Allen & Co, Swan Lane, Evesham.

Before commencing a search, it is important to establish the *raison d'être*.

- Is it a search which is simply routine?
- Has the vehicle been left unattended, which, in the light of the threat, would give cause for concern?
- Is there a specific reason to suspect a problem? - if there is you should be calling the Police by now.
- Is the proposed next journey an indication of the type of device ie. mountainous or hilly terrain (barometric device)?
- Details of the last search and details of when last service.

Stages of the Search

Surrounding Area

Remember - a device may be away from the vehicle, but triggered by it. Look for disturbances in the ground, footprints/tyre prints and marks where a lever or jack may have been used. Car park, garage and doors, the immediate surrounding area, drains, freshly cultivated areas, hedges, culverts. Each person should start diagonally opposite sides of the vehicle and make a complete circuit. You are looking for oil or fluid patches and look for pieces of broken glass, fresh pieces of paper, tape, string, pieces of wire. Check for oil spillage or tyre imprints where the vehicle may have been rocked backwards and forwards to insert pressure switches under the wheels.



If manpower allows, a search team leader can be appointed to co-ordinate the search. He will not get involved in the search, but record the areas covered and ensure nothing is missed in the sequence of the search. He will also confirm the presence of a device. He will be in a position well away from the vehicle.

Coachwork

Pay close attention to the paintwork, chrome, mirrors, bumpers, hubcaps, windows, filter cap, light fittings. You're looking for signs of tampering, forced entry, smudges, oil marks, fingerprints etc. At no point touch the vehicle whilst carrying out the inspection. Also, beware of half closed doors. Whilst inspecting the coachwork, take the opportunity to look inside. Look for hanging wires on the inertia reel seat belts and switches in the 'on' position.

Wheels and Arches

Again, without touching the vehicle, check for cuts in tyres, brake pipes, check that no sharp objects have been inserted into the tyres, and wheel nuts have not been loosened. Without using your hands to feel, which could dislodge something, check carefully the inside of the wheel arches and on top of and behind the wheels. A magnetic device may be easily secreted within the wheel arch. To prevent this, keep arches well greased or under-sealed.

Underneath

Check the whole of the chassis, prop shaft, engine compartment and the whole length of the exhaust pipe. Check the inside of the wheel area. You're looking for devices attached to both the main floor pan or on the exhaust as well as above the petrol tank. You're looking for oil leaks, cut pipes, heat sensitive devices near the exhaust - in fact anything out of the ordinary. Know the underneath of your car. Next time its on the ramp, take a polaroid. Also consider sealing as much of the floor plan as possible. Whilst mirrors are extremely handy for a cursory examination, particularly if you wanted to quickly inspect visiting vehicles, in a vehicle search you need to get underneath - mirrors can make you lazy. Don't miss the springs, shock absorbers and transmission parts for fine wires such as fishing line, attached between moving parts and a device. Be especially careful to check the area beneath the driver and passenger seats.



If the threat so dictates, then a search underneath must involve getting under the vehicle. Mirrors are fine for a cursory examination at, say, the Residence entrance, but when searching properly, mirrors won't do. Always keep overalls in the Ops Room for the search. An operative won't get under in his suit or in the wet. Don't leave the overalls in the car!

Note:

At this point, the sequence of search may differ as dictated by a number of factors. At some stage you need to disconnect the battery and a school of thought reasons that, whichever area it is in, you should tackle next, which will usually be the engine compartment. Equally as relevant is the means of opening the bonnet which may only be from the interior so that may come higher up in the sequence.

Don't fall victim to a pre-set sequence that you have read about - apply common sense. In this instance we will tackle it in the following order which assumes we need to access the interior to open the bonnet and I'm always disinclined to work on the boot, which involves lifting the spare out, until the rest of the vehicle is checked, as this can cause a disturbance to the balance of the vehicle.

Boot

(Assuming it opens independently). Remove all items from the boot and check the whole boot area. Check the spare for condition. If the car has been left unattended, you may need to open the boot remotely. Check carefully around the petrol tank. Check the spare for condition of the tread, pressure and to ensure there are no cuts in the tyre wall. When lifting the lid, carry out the procedure you will read with regard to opening the bonnet.

Interior

Inspect the whole of the inside through the windows for anything suspicious (therefore keep the inside always tidy and uncluttered). Open the door slowly whilst checking for attached wires and whilst your companion watches through the opposite door window. This is one of your greatest sources of danger. Use a plastic strip for feel as well as your sight. As the door opens further, inspect in more detail the hinge area. The same sequence must be repeated for all four doors. Ensure initially, that there are no wires leading from the courtesy light. Do not operate any switches at this stage. Consider opening a rear door first if you are unhappy about the front.

Use the '**Key In - Knee In**' method to help control the door. It should be a recommendation not to use car mats, but if you do, these must be very carefully checked and removed. Leave the doors open until the whole search is finished.



Doors must be opened carefully. Use a plastic strip to check for wires as the door is slowly opened. Another team member must look through the door window on the opposite side of the car to look for any wires.

One searcher to the rear and one to the front and systematically work from the floor upwards - consider only one person works at one time. Check under floor mats, under and inside the seat, arm rest, ash trays, door pockets and panels, pedals, air ducts, radio/cassette, speakers, glove compartment, sun visors, parcel shelf, rear window shelf, head linings and any other areas peculiar to the make of the vehicle, which may be used for concealment. Then a thorough search of the interior. Do not rest on the seats whilst you inspect elsewhere until you are satisfied there is no pressure device in place.



A comprehensive search of the Interior. Don't lean on seats and ensure a detailed search sequence is adhered to. The search team leader must use a vehicle search card to ensure all areas are covered.



As the bonnet is released from inside the vehicle, it must be held down against the pressure to spring up. The plastic strip can then be used and whilst one person slowly lifts the bonnet, his partner can visually inspect for wires.

Bonnet


Release the bonnet under pressure ie. one person holds the bonnet down, whilst his companion releases the catch. He can then visually inspect for attached wires etc. whilst his companion slowly raises the bonnet on command, after releasing the safety catch. He must use the plastic strip to 'feel' for any wires or obstruction and a bonnet which is not 'spring loaded' must be blocked to prevent closure at this stage. When satisfied, the bonnet can be raised. Generally, the advice is to disconnect the battery at this stage, but one must be concerned with triggering a device activated by a collapsing circuit. Be very careful to ensure that no other wires are attached or disengage the terminals from a distance - sounds easier than it is.

Search the engine compartment slowly - look especially at places where power can be drawn eg. battery, ignition and also spaces created by the car body. Look carefully at windscreen washer reservoir (dried seeds, peas, rice) - leave the bonnet open until the whole search is finished.



Searchers must be careful not to touch the wheels or arches as they could dislodge a device rested on the wheel. Hubcaps will need to come off and wheelnuts checked to ensure they have not been loosened.

A full inspection of the engine compartment can now commence. Know your vehicle - will you spot alien wires? going onto the clutch, brake, accelerator linkages and the steering column. Check the carb, air filters, access panels, fuse boxes, lamps and wings. Check the radiator and in particular, the fan - remember some fans are activated electrically when the coolant reaches a certain temperature. You can then either test the vehicle with a 'long tow' to rotate the wheels and drive shaft. If you're still not sure, use a ramp. You'll certainly find a 'tilt device'.



Be familiar with your vehicle's engine compartment. If you're not, things secreted may actually be seen, but won't register as being out of place. Be careful when disconnecting the battery - a collapsing circuit will detonate a device.

Final Checks

Leaving the doors open, start the engine, check all electrical equipment - indicators, lights, wipers, horn, heater, radio. Take a short test drive and go through all the gears as well as reverse, and check brakes, listen to the engine sound - is it okay? Do your checks with as few people in the vicinity as possible.

Should a suspect device be found, then instigate the **4 C's - Confirm, Clear, Cordon - Control** (see chapter 6).

The Principal's car should be kitted out as follows:-

1. Alarm/vibration system/immobiliser
2. Radio pager system.
3. Locking bonnet, boot, petrol tank, wheel nuts.
4. Polaroid of engine compartment and underneath.
5. Consider a fibreglass covering for the whole of the bottom or undercoating.
6. Wire mesh in the exhaust.

If you are regularly involved in vehicle checks, you should prepare a 'Vehicle Checklist' - this will list the make, model, body type, doors, index number, location and date, day, time. It will list the search procedure in its designated areas and detail the specific areas of search. It is a good tool which should be used wisely. By detailing specific areas of search, an area peculiar to make and model may be missed. Allow skilled individuals the initiative to operate. Remember - when involved in any search, either vehicle or building, when reporting, you must not report the area as 'clear', report that "*you have searched, but found nothing*", - remember - **the Absence of Evidence is Not Evidence of Absence**.

Short Check

With low threat levels and if you are short of time, particularly where the vehicle has only been left a short time then a 'short search' can be carried out, looking at the following areas:-

- Surrounding area
- Exterior of car (coachwork)
- Wheels and Arches
- Underneath

Vehicle Search Card

- | | | |
|--|---|----------------------------|
| 1. Behind bumpers/valances | - magnetic | - tilt/time |
| 2. Under wheel arches | - magnetic | - tilt/time |
| 3. Tyres and wheel hubs | - | - pressure/electrical/time |
| 4. Springs & shock absorbers | - | - push-pull/electrical |
| 5. Transmission | - | - pull/electrical |
| 6. Exhaust system | - | - thermal |
| 7. Bonnet | - | - pressure/electrical |
| 8. Engine block | - wired to coil/
start motor/alternator | - electrical |
| 9. Battery | - under or behind | - electrical |
| 10. Air filter/heater | - | - tilt/air pressure/therm |
| 11. Manifold/radiator | - | - thermal |
| 12. Fan/lights | - | - electrical |
| 13. Steering columns/
switch/brakes | - | - pressure/push-pull |
| 14. Boot | - | - pressure/electrical |
| 15. Mats/spare wheel | - | - tilt/time |
| 16. Petrol tank | - around on/under/in | - tilt/chemical/time |
| 17. Doors | - | - pressure/electrical |
| 18. Seats, mats | - under | - pressure/time |
| 19. Facia | - under/behind all
switches/heater/
fresh air vents/
glove compartment | - electrical/pull |
| 20. Arm rests/seat belts | - | - electrical/pressure/tilt |

CHAPTER 9

EMBUS/DEBUS PROCEDURES

General

A Principal will carry out most of his journeys by car and the two most vulnerable points are when he embuses and debuses. At this point, the team loses the relative protection and manoeuvrability of the vehicles, has to quickly organise as they make the transition from one mode of travel to another and deal with the possible unwelcome attentions of the press and public.

In order to counteract the threat at embus/debus points, a series of drills have been developed to minimise the risk of attack or harassment. The following basic principles must be applied:-

1. No rushing.
2. Maintain correct distance between team members.
3. Distance between vehicles - at halt, no more than 12 inches.
- 3a. To allow manoeuvring room, however, it is usually best for the PES driver always to be able to see the wheels of the VIP vehicle.
4. All round observation and alertness.
5. Body cover at all times.
6. Vehicles to stop as close to the entrance/exit as possible.
7. Entering vehicles - always adopt the 'backside first' method to avoid getting feet and legs caught in the door and so as to give all-round observation for as long as possible when entering.
8. Be flexible.
9. Full principles of mobile security - windows up, doors locked as soon as all in and open only at last minute.

Ideally

- The driver will remain behind the wheel.
- Engine running.
- Vehicle in move-off gear.
- Hand-brake off.
- Foot on foot brake.
- Door open until Principal is in the building.
- Vehicles should be called forward between 5 to 10 minutes prior to departure.

The following considerations should be taken into account:-

- The threat and MO of terrorist organisations
- The Principal's habits ie. seating preference etc
- Scheduled and unscheduled stops
- Walking Drills
- Aim for orthodox where possible
- Use alternative approach
- Telephone back on arrival (coded)
- Maintain good security for the vehicles whilst stationary
- Use household and office staff as additional eyes and ears

Moving from vehicle to building should be done as speedily as possible without rushing. Generally, if operating as a 'sole BG', let your Principal enter the building first and reverse the procedure on the way out. If faced with a revolving door, use a side door which is commonly always there. If locked, be in the compartment behind your VIP or in front on the way out. Rapidly scan pedestrians and nearby buildings on alighting.

The BG and PES give 'bodycover' to the Principal until he is in the vehicle and the doors are shut.

The Drills

Embus and Debus drills fall into two categories.

Orthodox

This is where the relationship to the building and position of the vehicle means your Principal can exit the vehicle on the same side as the building and not have to cross the road or walk round the vehicle or both. Hopefully, your Principal is happy to sit in the seat we prefer.

Unorthodox

Where the Principal either has to cross a road or walk round the vehicle. Essentially, there are two/three variations on the unorthodox embus/debus. Remember, the Boss should sit in the left rear seat behind the BG. This means on the perfect orthodox debus, he is straight out and on his way. Personal preference means that he or she might, despite your best efforts, always sit behind the driver, then even what should be orthodox is thrown out of the window, as the client has then to shuffle across the seat if you insist on opening the rear near side door or, alternatively, exiting on the roadside. It does happen and their inclination to exit on the roadside is stronger when they have a companion sitting next to them in the rear nearside seat.

The other variations of unorthodox are in a one-way street, parking on the right when your target building is on that same right hand side - again this involves a shuffle or an exit on the roadside. Across the road to the target building when no alternative presents itself and you may be facing either the wrong way or the right way, but in either case certain choices present themselves.

It often happens, that out of courtesy, your Boss if he is with a companion will allow that person to enter the vehicle first and then walk round the vehicle to enter on the offside, which really 'buggers' matters up.

If you have a client who prefers the offside seat, then you have to come to some agreement as to who will open his door. Quite often, despite correct procedures, it may have to be the driver if your Principal is disinclined to wait for you to come round to his door.


The drills are further complicated by either having only one car, two cars or even three vehicles in the escort. To simplify matters, we will restrict our look at the various options and drills to one and two cars. It isn't possible to detail the drills for every eventuality nor for every variation of manpower and with all CP work, good reconnaissance of embus/debus points will at least give you some good working knowledge as to how best to arrange affairs. If a recce is not possible, endeavour to have reasonable map appreciation and apply common sense to how best to make matters work.




*Embus - orthodox.
Situations you find on the ground are never the same as they
were in practice.*

Debus - Orthodox - Single vehicle 1 BG

1a
Entrance




1b
Arrival



The VIP's door should be in a direct line with the building entrance where possible. Doors are kept locked as long as possible and the VIP remains in the vehicle until the BG opens his door for him, so as to have as much protection for as long as possible. If we assume the building is a 'safe area' then the VIP can lead, followed by the BG, checking for danger from behind and the sides.

Diagram 1c


Embus - Orthodox



In this case, the danger will be to the front and the BG will lead the VIP out from the building, reversing the procedure from the previous page, but remaining aware of the danger from the sides, will open the VIPs door, which should have remained on central locking until the last minute. He will ensure the VIPs door is secure, quickly enter the vehicle - backside first, doors are locked and the vehicle pulls away.

Debus - Unorthodox Single Vehicle - 1BG


Pre-plan your debus. If you know that you will have to face an unorthodox debus, endeavour to decide in advance, either that the VIP will exit from the vehicle on the target building side or he will exit on the opposite side and walk round the rear of the vehicles. Traffic conditions will have a part to play and often it is safer to exit the vehicle on the pavement side, particularly as this gives you control of the VIPs door. The position of the VIP/BG is then the same as previously. In this instance, the rear of the vehicle should be lined up with the entrance on Dia. 2.



Reverse the procedure for the embus, but consider entering the vehicle on the road side. Traffic hazards are less of a consideration when getting back into the vehicle. Where you have a situation where your Principal always sits on the 'wrong side', you have problems. Not only do orthodox embus/debus become unorthodox, but you're always on the wrong side to open the door on a debus.

You should consider using the driver to open the door. A Principal should not be allowed to open their own door onto traffic, but seldom will they wait for you to get there. As BG, you can wait by the rear nearside to pick up your boss. Or rear offside, if you are able to get there in time with the driver opening the door.

Dia. 3.



Two Car Drills

The addition of a 'follow' vehicle gives greater flexibility and strength in-depth. The prescribed drills we'll look at, are where the escort vehicle stops behind the lead VIP vehicle, but again this isn't cast in 'tablets of stone'. It may need to stop alongside, in front or at an angle.

The follow vehicle may need to overtake the VIP vehicle and accelerate to the deepest point to have men on the ground, (should occasion demand), in advance of the VIP vehicle drawing to a halt. In very low risk situations, the follow vehicle may 'peel off' to a car park or location away from the Principal's vehicle so as to lower the profile - be flexible. If the threat is low, it may not even be necessary for the PES to alight from their vehicle. Use common sense and good planning alongside a good recce.

Its important to remember that these formations and drills we're looking at were devised by teams where the threat necessitated a more high profile approach to the subject, but we need to bear in mind the nature of commercial Executive Protection ie. LOW PROFILE.

We'll look first at a situation where the back-up vehicle has only one other PES member along with the driver.



Two car Embus - Unorthodox.

As an Embus happens quickly, you can make full use of the road as shown here. If the road is busy, you may cause a minor obstruction, but at least you will be able to keep the cars in contact.

Debus - Orthodox - 2 Vehicles - 1BG - 1PES

The PES member from the rear vehicle will move ahead to enter the building first. Don't get in the way of the Boss.


**Stage 3
Entry**



**Stage 2
En-Route**



**Stage 1
Arrival**




Emb us - Reverse the procedure and make sure you're positioned correctly for entering your vehicles without unnecessary crossing over. This puts the BG on the left of his VIP.

En-Route




A. Debus - Unorthodox 2 Vehicles - 1 BG - 1 PES

With only 1 BG and 1 PES, the following will work satisfactorily. After exiting the vehicles, the positions for the escort en-route and when entering the building are as for the Orthodox shown on the previous page.



Emb us - Reverse the procedure. If you only have a short street to cross, then maintain the 'single line' so as to pass between the vehicles. In other circumstances, 'form up' en-route as per the debus. With the presence of the additional PES member it allows the BG to adopt his normal position behind the Principal, with the PES member exiting the building first.




Consider exit and entry to vehicles on the side closest to the target building.

Debus - Orthodox 2 Vehicles - 1 BG - 2 PES - 1 SAP


It may be that you have an SAP team at the venue which may consist of simply a driver and one SAP member. If they've not 'leap-frogged' or kept a low profile, then these personnel can be used in the embus/debus procedure. The SAP man will remain behind on departure.

Stage 1a - Arrival and Entry



1b Embus - Orthodox

Exit




En-Route



Debus - Unorthodox + 1 SAP

With an Unorthodox Debus, the SAP man will move from the building to cover the door of the VIP vehicle nearest to him. As the main party reach the pavement, he will take the lead and be the first into the building.

1a.




NB As the SAP man reaches the door of the VIP vehicle, it may be that the Principal will move across the seat to exit on the pavement side. If this happens, the SAP man must be prepared to open the door and the other escort members act accordingly.

Embus - Unorthodox


The SAP man will exit first and move to cover the door of the VIP vehicle nearest the target building.

1b.

Stage 1 - Exit




Stage 2 - Embus



As with the orthodox Embus, the SAP man will stay behind. There may be instances where he has been left behind as his SAP colleagues have 'leap-frogged' ahead. In this case he can boost the PES and join the convoy as an additional escort member.

Debus - Orthodox - 2 Vehicles - 1 BG - 4 PES



This is the classic ‘come dancing’ high profile manoeuvre, to cover all your bases and give all-round body cover. ‘2’ covers the rear door and window, with ‘3’ and ‘4’ effectively checking left and right. They may close in as required to assist the all-round body cover as the Principal and personal BG move towards the building. Distancing will be dictated by profile and density of pedestrian traffic. The Team Leader - No. 1 - has a choice of going to the venue entrance as shown above, or going to the VIPs door to ‘escort’ him into the venue. If the latter is the case, the BG can then go in front.

Embus is simply the reverse of the procedure.

NB When debussing, don’t close the VIP door behind you, as you’ve closed off your means of escape. When you’re safely in the building, either the driver or a PES member will close the door. Beware of illegal entry into the vehicle whilst the door is open.

CHAPTER 10

ROUTE SELECTION & RECONNAISSANCE

General Background

Whilst in broad terms, a Principal is vulnerable to kidnapping or assassination whilst located or in transit - evidence shows that he is more at risk whilst in transit. Statistics vary, but between 50% to 80% of kidnappings occur whilst the victim is in, or near his own vehicle, probably close to his residence or office.

It is critical therefore that whatever the journey, a very basic preventative tactic is to vary the route and timing of Executive commuting. Varying routes demands an appreciation of the alternatives available, their pro's and con's and pre-planning several routes offers benefits:

1. It makes it easier to co-ordinate avoidance patterns whilst en-route, time and vehicle within the overall protection plan.
2. The Principal becomes familiar with the territory between office and home and acquaints him with safe havens - police, fire and ambulance stations and side streets and roads, should he at times be on his own and need to take some evasive action.

As we have stated at the beginning of this chapter, there is a false sense of security whilst in a vehicle. We have abandoned with our Principal the 'security in-depth' of the residence or place of work and/or the sophisticated security devices and additional benefit of numbers of people and now find ourselves in a 'non-hardened' inflexible vehicle convoy, at the mercy of speed limits, traffic conditions, weather, road works and other natural and not so natural hazards. The risk rises substantially whilst we are mobile and we endeavour to negate that increased risk by large amounts of planning, detailed route selection and reconnaissance.

Journeys commonly fall into three main categories:-

- 1. DAILY**
- 2. SHORT NOTICE**
- 3. SPECIAL OR SPECIFIC**

General Principles of Route Selection and Planning

- Avoid routine - all aspects.
- Insist on accurate timings.
- Select a route that allows the maximum safe speed (NB. shortest not always safest).
- Apply the 'need to know' principle.
- Correct vehicle for the journey.
- Plan alternative routes.
- Have sufficient men and vehicles for the task - if you can spare the men and vehicles, use both vehicles that will be used on the day as it gives people an opportunity to appreciate any problem areas with regard to convoy control.

In this chapter, we are only really concerned with the first two, but in any case, the procedure to adopt in all instances is pretty much the same. It differs only in that often you have little time and equally often you are faced with little alternative choices. If we look, however, at the 'Phases of Planning' of a SPECIFIC journey, it will give us all the factors to take into account and then we can apply what is possible in the real world.

PHASE 1 - SELECTION OF ROUTES

Always do a map study - ideally pick the widest/fastest route with least vulnerable points, always check the maps are up to date Air photos - computer generated routes (Auto-route Express).

PHASE 2 - ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

A detailed inspection of the route, that is the main and alternate - the safest route is not necessarily the shortest. Break the route into sections with times for each section. For the recce, use a vehicle similar to that to be used on the day and drive as you would on the day - time routes to match the programme - try and do the recce at the same time and day and in the same direction.

PHASE 3 - PLANNING

This will have all the fine detail ie. Embus/Debus points, selected route, vulnerable points (searched ad secure space) and manpower available - preparation of route recce cards, straight line route plan, route timetable etc.

PHASE 4 - ORGANISING SECURITY

Use of outside agencies. Report lines. Nicknumbers. QRF.

PHASE 5 - JOURNEY ITSELF

All timings must be adhered to and attention paid to the vulnerable points identified earlier.




Waiting for the 'off'. By this stage, everything that can be planned has and everything untoward should have been thought of, assessed and contingencies prepared. Everyone should be thoroughly briefed and be clear on all 'Action On' drills.

After an initial map and ground appreciation, the route recce is the vital element in all journeys. Lets look at as many features as possible that may have an effect on the safety and general success of the journey.

Vulnerable Points

1. Heavy traffic
2. Traffic lights - red lights - parked cars
3. Quite unlit areas
4. Roundabouts and junctions
5. Overlooking features
6. Tall buildings
7. Tunnels, bridges, culverts
8. Level crossings and bottlenecks
9. Thick scrub and trees
10. Gradients
11. High banks, sharp bends, narrow roads
12. Known terrorist, high crime, lawless areas
13. Areas of combustible material
14. One way streets
15. Radio blackspots
16. Arrival/Departure points
17. Large hoardings

*The hoarding, or what remains of it, behind which the Fiat Tipo was hidden in the attack on the Jewish bus in Hungary.
(see Chapter 14).*



Additional Information

1. Exact mileage
2. Time en-route - recce the route at the same time the proposed journey will take place (eg rush hour)
3. Safe havens - police, fire, ambulance, army. Names and locations of doctors en-route. Know all the telephone numbers. Know the type and range of facilities available at the hospital ie. emergency admissions etc.
4. Radio blackspots - cellular phone blackspots
5. Public telephones - denote coin or card. AA and RAC boxes
6. Service and support facilities
7. Recovery facilities
8. Know of local events - fetes, fairs, shows or demonstrations
9. Know of proposed roadworks - diversions
10. Know of proposed movement of heavy loads
11. Proposed weather
12. Ideal Embus/Debus points and dangers inherent, and problems at rush hours
13. Parking at venues
14. Places of interest en-route
15. Weather conditions



A protest camp which was the base for a major demonstration in a European city during an operation. Its essential to find out when demonstrations are planned. Often, as was the case here, they've got no idea themselves.

It may pay to look at No. 3 in more detail as you require a large amount of detail about the
- **Hospital Resources**

- Detail the facilities at all hospitals en-route or near the locations
- Routes to the hospitals from all the itinerary visits
- Know exactly where the emergency room is and the emergency admissions

Hospital Selection

- a. Private, public, military clinic
- b. 24 hour emergency room
- c. Is it a shock/trauma unit
- d. Burn centre
- e. What specialists are available
- f. Heli-pad
- g. VIP loos plus rooms for security

You also need to know whether the local ambulance service is:-

- Private
- Public
- Volunteer

In some former Eastern bloc countries, a ride in an ambulance is likely to finish anyone off

- know the response time

A journey, unless daily/routine, would be the subject of a specific Operation Order (see Chapter 19). A movement order would necessarily contain the weather for the journey.

You may task the SAP members and/or proposed VIP and PES drivers to carry out the route recce. They may seek assistance from outside agencies ie. AA, who will provide an 'ideal route service' or computer programme ie. 'Autoroute Express' which can equally provide an up-to-date route choice and alternatives.

Divide the route into stages of 15-20 miles and calculate the average speed for each stage. Endeavour to time the routes to match the programme you have been tasked with and always have contingency plans ready in case something goes wrong.

Having gathered the information, it has to be embodied, cogently, into a route recce report. On the next page is an example of a linear representation of a route recce. An A3 version should be pinned on the wall of the Ops room, with A4 or A5 copies in each car, along with the OS map of the area to be travelled. The simplicity of the linear representation is that a journey with many twists and turns even over many miles, can still be compressed into a single line.

General Security Considerations

The security considerations differ for all 3 types of journey. The risk relating to the special or specific journey is that, as we have said in a previous chapter, concerning the pre-trip publicity. The danger and, increasingly so, is the routine for patterns of timings and route that we face in daily journeys or regular trips. The one which is least problematic from a security aspect is the short notice journey, where there is no pattern or routine to detect and little, if any, advanced warning.

Accept that your Principal is most at risk when mobile in vehicles and that by carrying out detailed recce work, you lessen that risk considerably. As with all real situations, it is more probably, the commonplace incident which will occur to throw a spanner in the works of even the best laid plans. If you overplan, but make no provision for contingencies, you will most surely get caught out.

Contingencies allow you to have options in the event of losing vehicles, losing communications, and having itinerary changes thrown at you at short notice. We mention later, that an over-reliance on comms. kit will inevitably lead to problems when they cease to work. From experience, this will always happen when you need to rely on them.




A Sunday venue recce. Ideal conditions and traffic for a debus - however, on the day things are never how you see them unless you can recce at the same time, in the same conditions, which is usually highly unlikely - see below.



The reality! On Monday morning - chaos incarnate. The debus actually took place in the third lane. Here we'd managed to move the Principal's vehicle into the second lane. You have to fight for every inch to try and get the vehicles parked in the correct order of march for the embus.

Linear Route Recce Card

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE



CHAPTER 11

VEHICLE ESCORT PROCEDURES

Before setting off on a journey and whilst en-route, due attendance must be paid to some standard procedures and the usual list of do's and don'ts. Drivers must be trained BGs who enjoy a high standard of driving skills and should have attended a course in offensive and defensive Evasive driving.

General Rules

- Know your vehicles.
- Choice of vehicles.
- Brief all passengers.
- Accurate timings.

It is essential that you do your best to insist on accurate timings. Establish the time your boss wants to arrive at a specific location, work backwards from your 'time en-route' from your recce and advise as to the time you will have to leave. Be firm - leaving late could put everyone in a flat spin, cause tensions resulting in poor convoy work and endanger the VIP if speeds become excessive to the point of being unsafe.

If asked how long a journey will take and what time to leave - always give yourself a margin and give them a 'soonest and latest'. The soonest is when you would like to leave - the latest is that time which could cause being late for an appointment and require an unacceptable speed en-route. Given that information, it is then their decision when they leave, knowing the consequences.

Choice of Vehicle

Often we, as operatives, cannot influence choice but, ideally, we would like to see the following:-

- Autobox, power steering

- Central locking doors and boot.
- Air conditioning.
- Runflat tyre system.
- Vehicle suited to normal tasks.
- Good power to weight ratio.
- Reliability.
- Not overly ostentatious eg. sober colour scheme.

Depending on the threat level and available resources, you should also consider:-

- Engine run-on protection.
- Armouring, preferably with lightweight kevlar or similar.
- Self-repairing fuel tanks.
- Full air-filtering system.

Ensure you have the correct and most appropriate vehicle for the journey eg. four wheel drive in snow or poor conditions, or one equipped with air conditioning in summer.

The driver must have complete familiarity with the vehicle, its mechanics and handling characteristics and know the driving under all conditions and be familiar with the vehicle's characteristics when braking at speed. He must be a mechanic and a good first-aid technician as well as a driver.

Brief all passengers with a driver's introduction, which asks all passengers to report anything suspicious, and on the actions they should take in an emergency.

Ensure departure procedures are always followed (vehicles searched and secured if necessary).

1. Engines to be warmed up before departure
2. Check outside the residence immediately prior to departure for any suspicious vehicles or individuals
3. The driver should adjust all equipment to suit his comfort ie. seat belt, steering, mirrors
4. Lock all doors and boot
5. Windows closed or open no lower than two inches
6. Sunroof closed
7. VIP to sit in the rear, behind the BG on the opposite side to the driver
8. Check comms. are working, but not immediately prior to departure, so as not to 'warm off' the enemy
9. Ensure you have time to carry out all the pre-driving checks eg. POL., lights, brakes, indicators, tyres etc.

10. Drivers must be fully competent in radio procedures and equipment and be prepared to use a phone if comms. fail. Communications should be established between all vehicles and arrival and departure points.

11. Any SAP vehicle some three minutes only in front of the VIP vehicle if on a daily journey

12. A first aid kit should be carried inside the car - not in the boot.

The vehicle should also carry a crowbar, sledgehammer, a comprehensive toolkit and a search kit. At least two respirators should be carried inside the vehicle, plus fire extinguishers, some tools and spares (bulbs, fan belts, good map book or maps, jump leads).

13. The driver should keep the vehicle clean and tidy at all times and ensure that all the equipment in his vehicle is readily available and accessible at all times.

14. A route recce card must be carried in the vehicle and the driver must be fully conversant with the position of the safe havens, motorway entry and exit points and have good map appreciation. If an attack occurs, it is not the time to start studying a route recce card or map.

Remember - you are vulnerable when in a vehicle.

On The Road

1. The driver should also fasten his seatbelt. There is ongoing controversy over the BG and the use of a seatbelt, but he must be aware of the law and not draw undue attention to the vehicle by not wearing one. The VIP should always wear a seatbelt.

2. Drive at the maximum safest speed, taking into account the road and weather conditions and the vehicle's capabilities. Pay attention to driving and traffic conditions.

3. Drivers must be constantly aware of vehicles or obstacles which may cause his vehicle to be blocked. At a halt, always plan an escape route such as breaking across fields, crossing traffic lanes, side streets and turnings and fast reversing.

4. 'Safest Position' - is the safest position to drive on the road, given the actual and potential dangers as they may exist.

a. He will be able to maintain a good view which will be increased by a slight deviation.

b. He can stop the vehicle safely should the vehicle in front of him suddenly brake.

c. He can extend his braking distance so that a following driver has more time to react.

d. He can move up to an overtaking position when it is safe to do so.

5. Accelerator sense - 'the ability of the driver to vary the speed of the vehicle by accurate use of the accelerator to meet changing road and traffic conditions'.
6. He must manoeuvre smoothly at all times.
7. When cornering, he should position early either nearside or offside, to see around the bend quickly and maintain stability - endeavour to straighten a winding road.
8. A driver must visually scan the area several hundred yards ahead where possible, or anticipate, by the use of intelligence gathering, where the road will go ie. use of tree lines or telegraph/lighting poles. He must be alert for hazards such as objects in the road ie. bricks, timber, potholes, pedestrians, straying vehicles and anything out of the ordinary. His 'commentary driving' training should ensure he maintains a 360 degree awareness at all times.
9. The driver should not stare at dividing lines or at an area immediately in front of the car's bonnet as this can lead to 'road hypnosis' and he will switch off. This may happen on long motorway journeys.
10. The driver must not allow himself to fall into a false sense of security. He must remain alert at all times. Everyone's well-being is in the hands of one or two people - the drivers.
11. Drivers should not engage in conversation whilst driving, play the commercial radio or become distracted by activities within the car.
12. Whilst waiting, do not 'bonnet' or 'nosy-park'. Never leave the vehicle unless ordered to do so by the team leader, but equally never sit in the vehicle if parked for a long time, then don't leave the vehicle unattended but find a position of dominance to watch the vehicle if unable to stand close-by.
13. Do not open doors for occupants unless you are the sole BG/Driver and a one-car drill is in operation.
14. Borders - when abroad there should be efficient forward-planning, to ensure the convoy has a speedy progress without undue delays. All paperwork, passports and weapons should be thoroughly checked. Reconnaissance of border procedures is essential.
15. Always know your exact location, so you can summon assistance accurately, if needed.

Convoy Control and Procedures

As with single vehicles, there are some general rules which need to be reasonably closely adhered to and addressed before we can get into convoy drills, or as we more commonly know it - Tactical Driving or 'Tac Driving'.

Should an escort vehicle accompany the VIP car, then other considerations now apply. Additional vehicles could be as high as 5/6 should other family members, corporate colleagues or connected individuals accompany the Principal.

However:-

1. The PES 'back-up' vehicle is only concerned with the VIP and with no other vehicles.
2. The driver must be as familiar with the threat assessment and enemy MO as any other team member. He should know what to expect.
3. The vehicles involved, in this case the VIP and PES back-up vehicle should be closely matched in performance.
4. The VIP driver must signal well in advance, turns and stops, so as to assist the back-up driver in being able to secure in advance a lane for the VIP vehicle and allow correct positioning.
5. The PES driver must keep a constant and close watch on the VIPs car - anticipate unsignalled turns and stops, stay close when traffic is heavy and drop back when traffic is light. The maximum distance must never be more than 50 metres, whatever the conditions, but the closest position would be dictated by the conditions that apply. One needs to drive close enough to prevent any intrusion by another vehicle between the two cars, but always leave enough room to manoeuvre.
6. Lane procedure dictates that the PES vehicle will always be offset either nearside or offside.
7. All vehicles approaching from the rear must be checked by the PES and monitored before being allowed to pass.
8. There must be efficient communication between vehicles with the suitable use of minimum code words.
9. The VIP driver must be considerate of, and drive at all times, not only for himself, but the follow vehicle. The very safety of men in this vehicle depends on how well the VIP driver operates. He must not lead them into dangerous situations by a selfish act.

10. The VIP driver must not attempt to intimidate or bluff other drivers. He may have the right of way, but it is not worth the risk to contest this, if other traffic refuses to concede.

11. Other cars must not be allowed to get between the VIP car and escort vehicle.

ALL DRIVERS MUST BE AWARE OF CONVOY PROCEDURES AND DRILLS AND THE ACTIONS TO TAKE IN AN AMBUSH.

Two Car Drills

In civilian CP work, it must be considered a luxury if resources extend to an SAP vehicle and a QRF vehicle, but often you will enjoy the benefit of a PES vehicle as back-up. As outlined in the general notes about the PES, is a follow-car which provides:-

- a. Protection to the rear of the convoy and vetting of all overtaking vehicles to the extent they can prevent vehicles from overtaking the convoy.
- b. Create room/provide cover in heavy traffic.
- c. Constant anti-surveillance.
- d. Instant reaction to incidents.
- e. The PES can block the road to the rear of the convoy if required and also to the front, should a threat materialise from that quarter.
- f. Primarily, the PES can place themselves between the VIP and threat from whichever direction that threat may come.
- g. They can provide emergency transport in the event of breakdown of the VIP vehicle or its loss in an attack and can supply additional manpower should the worst happen on the journey.


The position for the PES vehicle is always to the rear of the VIP vehicle and it is with this position in mind that the following two car drills have been developed to *'afford the VIP vehicle the most comprehensive protection from the PES vehicle.'* The convoy must always allow itself 'Room to Manoeuvre'.

Whilst we are going to look at the 'by the book' convoy procedures, you must always remember that as a civilian, 'non-official' convoy, strictly adhering to procedures is likely to get most people on the road 'pissed-off'. The resultant attention and horn-blowing directed towards your vehicles causes unnecessary attention and embarrassment to the VIP. If, by not using indicators, you run the risk of causing an accident - be sensible. The real world is not the same as Government service.




A 7-vehicle convoy including a baggage van and 2 police motorcycle escorts (not in shot). Whenever you have a convoy of this size, your main concern will only ever be to keep the PES back-up car and Principal's vehicle together. Don't forget that the baggage van, if the Principal's luggage is in there, needs to stay with you.

DIAG 1. Two Vehicles VIP and PES Back Up




The PES vehicle is offset to the offside for good visibility. This would be the position for most straight road use.

DIAG 2. Dual Carriageway




The PES effectively blocks the road to vet vehicles from the rear - then will pull over to allow them to pass. **DON'T ABUSE.** Without a blue light on top you will very quickly send people into dementure.

DIAG 13. Left Hand Bend




The PES is offset to the offside for good inter-visibility. The VIP vehicle should be centred or offset slightly nearside.

DIAG 4. Right Hand Bend




The PES is offset to the nearside to see early around the bend and also on the inside. The VIP vehicle is centred or offset slightly to the offside. The VIP vehicle should not exaggerate being too offset, particularly on a very sharp bend as it puts the vehicle in danger from straying, oncoming vehicles.

DIAG. 5 Motorway




The PES sits in the outside lane to vet vehicles from the rear then pulls over once vetted. He will not allow a vehicle to come between the convoy.

DIAG 6. Left Hand Turn at a Junction



The PES must endeavour to cover as much of the right and 'buy the lane' first for the VIP vehicle, whilst giving it cover. It is not practical to attempt the manoeuvre at a narrow entrance where the position of the PES would put it so far over into the path of the vehicles turning left off the main road.


DIAG. 7 The Right Turn



If possible, the PES should block the road from the left to allow the VIP vehicle to gain the lane. Another 'upsetter' unfortunately. When exiting from a narrow road, you will have to reach a compromise with the drill, as both cars may not fit abreast.


ROUNDBABOUTS

DIAG 8A A First, Left Exit




If a left turn, the VIP vehicle is sheltered from the right by the PES, who falls behind as they both exit.

DIAG 8B Exit to the Right or Straight on




The vehicles approach the roundabout on a dual carriageway and exchange positions on the final approach, with the VIP vehicle moving to the offside, PES to the inside. The VIP vehicle will now travel around the roundabout close to the centre as would be the procedure for an exit to the right or straight on. The PES vehicle will, however, shadow the VIP vehicle by travelling on the outside of the roundabout, all the way round until they exit, at which point, positions would be reversed and normal convoy procedure re-adopted. The PES vehicle is providing the cover to the VIP car from an attack from any road entrance.

DIAG 9 Entering the Motorway



The PES will stay in the offside lane of the slip road and be first onto the carriageway to 'buy' the lane for the VIP vehicle to enter. Vehicles will then move into normal motorway convoy positions.

DIAG. 10 Exiting the Motorway



Know your exit! The VIP vehicle moves to exit lane as PES moves to slow lane then exit lane, then adopts the normal procedure to block from the rear.

Summary - Tactical Driving

Speed

Maximum safest possible speed, given road and weather conditions and your driving ability. High speed for the circumstances should be used very carefully and only by those who have been trained to a high standard.

- Travel within legal limits.
- Be fully aware of the vehicle's capabilities.

Room to Move (Convoy Control)

Don't get hemmed in! The usual position for the single escort vehicle is to the rear of the VIP car so as to:-

- Provide cover for overtaking.
- Create room/provide cover in heavy traffic.
- Constant anti-surveillance.
- Instant reaction to incidents.

Make maximum distance 50 metres, but will close up in heavy traffic. Don't lose 'Room To Move' and don't be so close as to risk an accident.



A 3-car convoy in a European city. To keep 2 vehicles together is very difficult, to keep 3 together can be a nightmare.

Extra Vehicles

Depending on threat levels, the position of the VIP and available resources, there may be the following:-

- Motorcycle outriders.
- Back-up vehicle, admin vehicle, baggage van.

- Escorts from Police.
- Oversight (helicopters).

Laying Procedure

- PES car must be offset to VIP car.
- PES must have a view of the road ahead of VIP car.
- PES must have a view and control of vehicles to rear of convoy.
- Give all hazards a wide berth. Do not be driven into situations by other drivers or pedestrians - they do not have the responsibilities you have.
- Procedures for motorways - entering/overtaking/leaving.
- Procedures at roundabouts.
- Procedures for junctions/traffic lights/heavy traffic etc.

Route Recce - see specific chapter.

Boundary Changes

- Customs.
- Passport control.
- Timings.
- Embus/Debus.
- Weapons
- Flying changeover of escorts.



Going through the basics prior to going out and doing it for real.

Communications

- Vehicle to vehicle.
- Vehicle to arrival/departure point.
- Vehicle to oversight.
- Vehicle to Police/Military.
- Codewords/nicknames.

Observation and Awareness

This is the key to it all.

CHAPTER 12

ANTI-AMBUSH DRILLS

As we have seen in the section on ‘Terrorist Tactics’, the ambush is a very popular tactic which has often been employed in rural and urban areas very successfully. The ambush is the ideal military operation in that it gives to the attackers, every advantage - surprise, choice of ambush site, time, fire power and, if the circumstances are not to their choosing, they can abort and wait until another day.

It is the element of surprise which strongly favours the success of the attackers. Those first few seconds are all that matter. It could take a good driver 5 seconds to escape an ambush but if that 5 seconds is lost through shock and surprise, then the opportunity to escape is gone forever. Once an attack starts, the odds are in favour of the terrorist and once an attack starts, the options and choices diminish. We must recognise the risk. Most vehicle ambushes happen on the way to work, although there is, seemingly, a statistical shift happening to attacks taking place on the return journey from work.

People talk glibly about the change of routine and route, but with the best will in the world it is often impossible, in a large number of cases, to find an alternate route within a block of the residence or the office. Alternatives do not present themselves until we are passed this point and further away from the area. Also Executives are successful because they work longer than others and are disciplined individuals and getting them to vary times by as much as an hour will be a great, if not impossible problem. Reality will win the day although we must do what we can.

If we reconsider the elements of Personal Security, the threat pyramid perfectly fits the requirements of evasive driving. ‘**CONCENTRATION AND OBSERVATION**’ are the elements of ‘**AWARENESS**’. This subconscious state of mind is usually the product of weeks of ‘commentary driving’ without which, no real state of total, constant, subliminal awareness is present in a driver. Without the training in commentary work, no self-

affirmation that one will stay alert or 'switched on' will be of any use. A driver's mind will wander like everyone else, particularly when numbed by the passing of a daily routine drive. The conscious mind, even when directed to stay alert, will do so for only a very brief period.

For those people unable to find or afford a suitable Tactical Driving course, then take up an Advanced Driving course. The commentary work is invaluable. If there is no AWARENESS there is no time for EVALUATION, however brief and, as a consequence, no time for AVOIDANCE. These three factors of threat are mutually supportive - miss out the first and you don't have the other two.

Constantly re-train and test your driver on his observation skills - ask him for colours, descriptions of occupants and VRNs of vehicles when passed. Get him to describe pedestrians, cover the mirror and ask him what's behind. All these somewhat simplistic and banal actions help to keep him on the ball. If he 'switches off' you're all in trouble. Remember - the style of ambush or attack will often be indigenous to the country you are in. Despite your best efforts, some situations can be almost impossible to defend against. Rocket attacks, as in the case of the killing of Samosa, where maybe only a single person is involved, is often impossible to detect as with the roadside bomb.

We can only repeat - don't let training centre solely on how to get out of an ambush when it happens - train to recognise the signs of one before it happens.

Attack Recognition

- Predictability - avoid it!
- Abnormality

a. Route - recognise a route abnormality, something out of place on route eg. refuse truck on Monday instead of Wednesday.

b. Behaviour - recognise a behavioural abnormality (ie. unusual activity or lack of activity).

In the kidnapping of Aldo Morro in the '70s in Italy, the street vendors usually present at the site of the attack were absent on the day. All real attacks make some use of a disguise which by virtue of not being real, involves abnormality. If we can spot the abnormality we can penetrate his guise eg. the pram used in the Hans Martin Schleyer kidnapping in Cologne in the 1970s and the 'blocking' car which came down the street the wrong way - in many countries this may not seem abnormal, but in Germany it most certainly is. The problem is the boredom of constant routine, particularly with regular car journeys. The great

tendency is to switch off and nothing, as a consequence, that is out of the ordinary sinks in. Trained people switch off. Don't do it.

Six Fatal Mistakes

- 1. Becoming complacent** - the same routine day after day dulls alertness.
- 2. Not reacting** - this is exactly what the terrorist wants - they rely on that dead time of shock and inertia to gain advantage.
- 3. Not allowing an exit point.** Maintain distance for manoeuvre - a useful pointer is to ensure you always have a view of the two tyres of the car in front. (In the attack of Hans Martin Schleyer in 1977, the police car to the rear of Schleyer's Mercedes ran into the back of his vehicle as the ambush happened).
- 4. Vehicle location** - a lack of awareness of primary and secondary routes, safe house, safe havens and knowing at all times the gear your vehicle is in.
- 5. Skills** - no basic skills.
- 6. Panic** - in most cases people panic and the day is lost. Panicking is an absence of training - we act to a conditioned response good or bad.

As we look at anti-ambush drills, it will pre-suppose you know some driving skills such as cadence braking if your vehicle does not have ABS.

"The object of braking is to bring the vehicle as quickly and rapidly to a stop, maintaining steering control."

Cadence braking is the alternative to mastering the near impossible skill of Threshold Braking, where you are instantly able in a fraction of a second, to brake using perfectly 80% of the maximum braking intensity so as not to lock up the brakes and lose steering ability. Such skills is beyond the realms of most human beings. In ambush after ambush, the victim locked up his brakes, lost steering ability and crashed into what it was he was trying to avoid. Cadence braking allows steering to be maintained and avoids a skid taking place. Cadence Braking linked with turning could save the day. These days with modern cars, certainly at the top end of the market, having ABS as standard, Cadence Braking would seem superfluous.

This might be the case when working in the UK, but certainly abroad in either the third world or the former Soviet bloc, then you would not be able to rely on a vehicle being

fitted with ABS. Skill at the wheel, no different than skill at arms or skill in unarmed combat, is a learned one and we need professional tuition to teach us the high speed driving techniques and evasive manoeuvres which may one day save your life or that of your VIP. Remember, however, with high speed evasive techniques, that speed reduces your ability to carry out other evasive manoeuvres and increases your chances of a fatal collision. Again, don't let training concentrate solely on how to get out of an ambush when it happens but train to recognise the ambush thirty to sixty seconds before it happens.

Before we look at specific techniques and procedures, we need to review some basic principles.

- 1. Protect the VIP. Should an attack occur, the BG must, as is his task in every situation, provide body cover. This will usually involve him diving over his seat to cover the VIP who should be on the floor. Usually you need to remove the head restraints from the front passenger seat.**
- 2. Remove the VIP from danger.**
- 3. All actions fast and aggressive.**
- 4. Use appropriate drills to the circumstances. Never attack an ambush unless absolutely necessary.**
- 5. Beware of double-ambushes and decoys.**

Your anti-ambush drills depend on a number of factors, but essentially these three broad occurrences will dictate your drills.

- a. Launched too late**
- b. Launched prematurely**
- c. Perfectly timed**

As an addendum to these 3 broad scenarios one must add and consider the significance of having:

- 1. A partial block**
- 2. A complete block**
- 3. Blocks front and rear**

An immediate summation of the situation and suitable reaction leads to an appropriate drill.

The drills which are appropriate are dependent on there being a single vehicle or multiple vehicles. We will look at both single and two-car drills where an escort vehicle is provided as a rear back-up. We have not, in this book, looked at the situation of having a lead car, with the exception of an SAP vehicle, as it is often inappropriate, certainly with regard to profile and can be an overly expensive option for a civilian EP team. Also a lead vehicle has often been unable in a real incident such as the Herrhausen assassination, to affect any real improvement in the situation.

With the drills we are going to look at, there are some general points which should be made.

Remember

The object is not to fight - it is to flee - however, to flee, successfully, often requires a high degree of aggression and an immediate trained response. You must also know where you are fleeing to - have a Safe Haven ie. Police, Fire, Ambulance or Army base.

Never involve yourself in a high speed chase as you seriously increase your chances of serious injury or losing the day.

Techniques

In 70% of all attacks, the driver will be hit. Of only 30% of those that escape, the driver remains unhurt. As a driver, you need to lower your profile and assume a 'slouch' position, but still be able to control the vehicle. Terrorists will endeavour to stop a vehicle by stopping the driver. A 12-volt strobe, plugged into the cigar lighter can throw out a strong 'blip' of light and affect the aim of a sniper.

If you are hit from the rear, try and anticipate the impact and brake to lift the rear of the vehicle and prevent locking (cars don't explode when being rammed or when ramming. Jags, Mercedes and BMWs, are fitted with an inertial fuel cut-off).

In any evasion manoeuvre, all the weight in the vehicle needs to be as low as possible. Impacts are the best forms of defence in evasive driving. Always lessen the impact to your vehicle - a broadside hit will lose you control and momentum - always avoid being hit at 90 degrees. A car is a balanced machine and you must know the effects of weight transference and use it to advantage when making a hand-brake or power turn by using a pre-roll left or right.

Attacks on moving vehicles have followed one or two patterns which can be summarised as follows:-

- 1. Stationary Cut-Off**
- 2. Moving Cut-Off**

We will look first at

Stationary Cut-Off (Roadblock)

Any roadblock has been planned with the benefit of surveillance, as they must know times and routes. Avoid the necessity of having to apply your Action On Drills by staying constantly alert to surveillance.

Should the worst happen, your actions depend on the variable factors we have mentioned, that is that the block may be **Late, Early, Perfectly Timed** and may also be **Partially Blocked, Fully Blocked** and also the block may have been **Perceived in time** or **Perceived late**.

The Drills will either be **Defensive** or **Offensive**.

Defensive are the 'Escape to Rear' options, but be aware of being blocked to the rear.

Offensive tactics are those where ramming will need to take place.

Ramming, if done properly, will severely shock, stun, kill or injure the attackers and 'buy back' the element of surprise. A 4,000lb vehicle at 10mph develops 160,000ft/lbs of energy. This energy can be transmitted to the attackers via their own vehicle. Even with considerable front end damage, a vehicle will still run.

Remember - being early or late for an appointment is better than not getting there at all - **AVOID ROUTINE**.

Moving Cut-Off or Moving Attack

The drills are aggressive and most often rely on impact. Never 'side swipe' a chasing car, as you are likely to lock up two vehicles and in doing so present a perfect target for all the fire power to be brought to bear.


To foresee an attack, we are usually over-concentrating on what is happening ahead and it is important always to have someone looking back to detect an anticipate a problem coming from behind.

'Counter Attack for Your Survival'

Sometimes your only hope of survival may be to counter attack - do so with aggression.

Single Vehicle - Defensive Tactics


1. Handbrake Turn or 'Bootleg' Turn



30-40 mph in the dry
20-25 mph in the wet


**Apply enough handbrake to lock the rear wheel and keep the handbrake on.
The mistake is usually in applying the handbrake at too fast a speed.
With 4-wheel drive vehicles, come off the power and then back on for a power turn.**

2. The 'Y' Turn



The 'Y' turn is the least dramatic of all the evasive manoeuvres, but that is in its favour. Care must be taken when reversing to ensure that there is no obstruction behind and beware of a block to the rear.

3. 'J' Turn




- Always know the gear your vehicle is in.
- Check mirror, don't wheelspin and slow down.
- With your palms down and thumbs up, turn the wheel violently and rapidly when your reversing speed is at the critical point, usually 25 mp.
- When round, into a low gear and accelerate away.

SOME MISTAKES

- Doesn't know reverse, fumbles, doesn't check mirror - could be accidentally blocked to rear, not coming off the accelerator, doesn't turn the wheel rapidly enough, not shifting at correct time and accelerating too hard and loses line, together with wheelspin and loss of traction.

2 Car Drills


1A.



If a block is perceived, the VIP vehicle must give a signal either by sounding the horn or any other approved signal. Signals can be visual and/or audible. The PES vehicle will, at speed, accelerate in front of the VIP vehicle and, if appropriate, return fire, lay down smoke whilst sending a contact report.

Ideally when travelling by vehicle, a panic button should be available or a very loud clear Klaxon horn in the VIP vehicle.


1 B.



At an approved signal, both vehicles will reverse as rehearsed and move out swiftly.

- Don't wheel spin
- Don't stall
- Ensure you are aware of what is behind you when reversing
- Endeavour to keep a suitable distance between the 2 vehicles in case it proves impossible to move out.

2. Blocked Front and Rear



If blocked front and rear, the manoeuvre illustrated in 1B will be ineffective and you will need to escape on foot.


- Ensure vehicle spacing allows cover from both doors and vehicles.
- Return fire
- Give smoke
- All PES to exit to form all-round body cover and escape to rear



If blocked front and rear, the vehicles must be formed up in such a way as to provide all round protection whilst the VIP is moved out of the car, suppressive fire laid down with smoke if appropriate and the whole party escapes to the rear to any available hard cover.

The photo at the top illustrates how the positioning of the vehicles gives cover by interlocking both vehicles doors. When escaping, a complete shield of bodies is provided to the Principal as shown in the photograph above.

3. VIP Vehicle Disabled



If the VIP vehicle is disabled, the PES must manoeuvre into a suitable position to give cover whilst the VIP is collected.

- Return Fire
- Smoke
- Contact report
- Reverse smoothly into either a 'Y' or 'J' turn'. It would be safer to effect a 'Y' turn if the PES vehicle has been angled.

Techniques of Ramming

Roadblock

- **Slow down, cadence braking, don't lock up and so lose steering and crash into the block**
- **Shift into low gear and**
- **Brake suddenly, when approx. 1 to 2 car lengths away**
- **Pick a point to ram (right rear wheel arch) and when your bumper rises after braking - GO**
- **Keep on the accelerator**
- **Don't swerve**
- **Drive straight through**


You will transfer more than sufficient energy to the blocking car to move it around its own engine weight. Attackers should be stunned, shocked, injured or killed and put off.

- You must endeavour to push the vehicle out of the way
- Don't give the game away
- Hold the gear lever so it doesn't jump out
- Accelerate all the way through the manoeuvre
- Thumbs out of the wheel
- If locked up, 'shake' the wheel to dislodge the two vehicles
- Don't veer off from your target area of the rear wheel arch and hit the bumper which can cause you to lock up - hit the axle
- NEVER HIT BROADSIDE
- Break visual contact as soon as possible
- Don't resort to high speed chase
- AT NIGHT USE HIGH BEAM

Every drill is pointless, whether Defensive or Offensive, if, under the shock of an ambush, your instinct is to hit the brakes and lock up. Even on some expensive models, ABS can still be an option. If cadence braking is not an instinctive trained response, you will be dead. When you lock up, you can turn the wheel all you want but you won't go anywhere.

A 4,000lb vehicle is still only on 21 square inches of rubber at each corner. Cadence braking will bleed speed quickly. Five good hits of the brakes will drain 8-10mph each hit, with no loss of steering control. Whilst you might commonly drive ABS vehicles in Britain as a matter of course, when abroad, particularly in the Third World, this may not be the case - **PRACTICE.**


4. Ramming - Single Vehicle Block



- Slow down, cadence braking, don't lock up and so lose steering and crash into the block
- Brake suddenly, when approx. 1 to 2 car lengths away
- Pick a point to ram (right rear wheel arch) and when your bumper rises after braking - GO
- Keep on the accelerator
- Don't swerve
- Drive straight through

Double Vehicle Block


5A.



With a double vehicle block, you must make a rapid decision as to your appropriate course of action. The two alternatives are shown in illustration above and in Fig 5B on the following page.


One choice is, as in Fig A, to hit one of the vehicles on the rear which will push it into the other vehicle. Your ramming procedure is as described before. If the vehicle you are about to ram at the rear is tight against the kerb at the rear, then it may be more appropriate to ram as shown in the next illustration.

5B.



Your other choice is to push through the middle as in Fig 5B. and dislodge both vehicles. Your choice will depend on a number of factors such as the spacing, if any, between vehicles, whether they are lined up facing each other, meaning that you will be pushing against the weight of two engine blocks. Whether, in only hitting one you will, in fact, jam all three vehicles together. Any decision must, however, be made quickly.

Fig 6.



Under no circumstances, attempt to drive around a block.

You will be exposed broadside to fire and your intention must always be to shock or seriously injure the occupants of the blocking vehicle by ramming. Anyone standing behind a blocking vehicle is likely to be killed or seriously injured.


At 20mph, there would be no shock to you.



High speed driving and shooting from a moving vehicle is an integral part of PES training.

Moving Vehicle Attacks and Moving Cut-offs

Fig 7. Raking Fire



If you are being followed, do not get involved in a high speed chase.


- Don't side-swipe a vehicle alongside as you may get locked up and it will then give your attackers a full field of fire.
- Cadence brake and turn off.
- If necessary, U-turn on a dual carriageway.

Always be suspicious of following vehicles with multiple occupants. If faced with the possibility of raking fire, you will need to deny the attackers full use of all outlets.

This may mean manoeuvring at speed to the side where you face the least fire power.

High speed braking, linked with a ramming action as illustrated in Fig 9. may be your only option, should contact not be broken under braking. If your high speed braking is successful, then 'Y' turn, 'J' turn or change carriageways as appropriate.

Moving Cut-Off - Single Vehicle Fig 8.




When faced with a moving cut-off, your best option will be ramming. Lower the occupants profile. The BG will, as per drills, cover the VIP.

The ideal position to ram will be behind the rear wheel and as with any ramming technique, you must hit and push.

Do not side-swipe.


Drive through and brake visual contact.

Fig. 8B.



Impact at the rear of the cut-off vehicle is less ideal as a choice. But if you have been unable to anticipate the cut-off early, you may have no option.


Fig. 8C.



Impact to the front wheel area is the least favourable of impact points as it may cause the two vehicles to lock up and provide the attacker with a full field of fire.


If the vehicles do lock up, shake the wheel and endeavour to accelerate through.

Fig 9. Rolling Block - Two Vehicles



**Your only escape from a two vehicle Rolling Block is to ram, if your nearside exit is blocked and you are unable to mount the kerb and escape.
You must hit the front right of a vehicle alongside and the left rear of the vehicle in front.
If you feel you have locked with either vehicle, accelerate through, but shake the wheel**


Fig 10. Kerb Jump



To escape a potentially dangerous situation, your only choice may be to jump the kerb. This may allow access to the other carriageway or exit to a side road etc. Mounting a kerb takes practice but can be an excellent evasive measure. Below 30mph, you will lose control and above 45 degrees, the angle of attack will often be too severe and cause a tyre to blow. Even a high kerb can be tackled with practice. At 30mph you can climb a kerb as high as 6 - 12 inches with no loss of control. Watch out for the terrain at the point you mount the kerb. You can combine a 'ram' and kerb mount together in an escape. Don't stand on the brakes and resist all braking as this loads weight onto the suspension and adds force to the wheels, tyres and steering.


Motorcycle Attacks

Fig 11A.



As illustrated in Fig 12, if the motorbike is allowed to move into position, they are able to put rounds through both the back window and side window.

Fig 11B.



Give him a harder target to hit. To do this, there must be a sharp change of angle and variance in speed. This will restrict fire through the rear window and appears to the cyclist that is about to crash and is in imminent danger. Motor cycle attacks are probably one of the most common methods of assassination in a number of South American countries. In Bogota, nearly all attacks take place on motorcycles and the assassins are often of school age. Be vigilant and keep a lookout for parked vehicles with multiple occupants and motorcycles parked with a pillion passenger.

CHAPTER 13

WALKING DRILLS

Sometimes referred to as Foot Drills, or Formations, this is the area where the PES really earns its money. There will always be some occasions when the Principal, either by choice or circumstance is obliged to depart from the relative security of his residence, office or vehicle and move on foot. The first rule of walking drills is:-

Travel By Vehicle Wherever Possible

It may be part of his profession as a Politician to be seen, or it may simply be for convenience, relaxation, recreation or business. **Foot Formations have been developed which combine formations of the PES to suit the circumstances encountered and Action Drills to accommodate a variety of unforeseen and threatening changes in that environment.**

Walking with a VIP as a Bodyguard is probably where the greatest potential for conflict will arise between profile and security. A Boss can become paranoid about 'showing out' and being surrounded by his team of escorts. Even a high risk Principal such as royalty or senior government heads do not surround themselves with a tight cordon of heavies. This is more often reserved for the ego-driven pop stars of this world. Rather a boss will say, *"I don't want to see any security whilst we're out."*

PES profile is actually more than a two-edged weapon. Whilst high profile can be a deterrent, certainly to the unsophisticated opportunist, low profile will not deter the street thug as he is not, unfortunately, trained in the subtleties of surveillance to know that a seemingly wealthy individual has around him four or more bodyguards. High profile, whilst a deterrent, will most certainly draw attention to a client, which is what you don't want. Low profile will be spotted by the trained professional who will look for gaps or opportunities presented by a 'crack' in procedures or a reliance on habit-forming patterns that the team

may have fallen into. In the chapter on Terrorist Tactics, you will see that even a well-ordered professional protection team is still not a deterrent, but even a challenge to the determined terrorist.

The formations you see customarily illustrated for foot drills serve only as guidelines to a PES. They are not cast in tablets of stone, rather they are ideals which form part of a fluid constantly changing pattern. A PES on foot is like fluid through an ever-changing pipe.

Given this ever-changing nature and pattern of streets, traffic, pedestrians, natural hazards and the inevitable configuration of shops, there can be no rigid positions. The BG, despite a personally favoured or recommended position, must adapt to the ever-changing situation as it develops around him and the VIP party.

At the very least, the Principal should be accompanied by two BGs. In a 'low level' threat, however, one person may fill a variety of roles and we will cover this aspect later. Even two men will have difficulty in covering their individual arcs of 200 degrees (all arcs must overlap), so as to maintain a complete 360 degrees. After a while you will learn not to keep constantly looking at your boss - he's not the problem! You will eventually sense where he is so you can use your eyes for all-round observation.

As a PES member, you must also be aware of signals from the team leader or personal BG. These may be hand signals, usually pre-arranged and although you will have general guidelines to work to, these are not absolute and you must use personal initiative. A PES member may be the only one at that moment who perceives an area of danger and must cover it - this may have to happen without initial reference to anyone else. At all times he must ensure his eyeline doesn't simply operate up to the seven foot mark. He should be scanning buildings as well as people, but also develop a good instinct about people - Policemen develop it - so can you.

The number of people within the PES will always dictate a basic formation. Ideally, a BG with five PES has infinite choice of formations, whereas a BG with only one or two other protection officers has limited choice and resultant immediate action drills. The event itself will also dictate the formation. A Principal playing golf will be a different problem than when he is making a public appearance.

As with all procedures, there are some basic principles that we need to consider before looking at some basic formations.

Adaptability

As we have said, the formations must be adaptable and fluid. Changes of direction must be accommodated easily by the PES and often without the ability to communicate verbally. The boss can't find himself tripping over a PES team member who looks like he's formation dancing. A man must instinctively be able to fill an appropriate gap should one of his colleagues respond to an incident. Your boss's habits and general unpredictability will also influence how adaptable you will need to be.

Body Cover

Whatever the profile requested by the client, we should never sacrifice security for appearances. The BG wherever he is, should either be within arms length or within striking distance. Again, the Principal can't keep tripping over you if you are his personal BG and a good working rapport will only really develop over a period of time. There is no book written that can convey the nuances of how a BG develops an affinity with his boss. If body armour is available and required by dint of the threat - wear it - if it can be done unobtrusively. Many VIPs are paranoid about wearing a vest and will seldom do so.



Above - constant practice is required to be able to quickly 'take down' your Principal. Correct distance, a smooth draw and constant control are all required so as to react quickly and keep control.



Above - Once down, you must give as much body cover as possible and get rounds down. Taking the VIP to the ground is a last resort, but may be your only choice if no hard cover is available.

Correct Spacing/Image

This is dependent upon the constraints of the *situation* on the ground, the required *profile*, and level of *threat*. Often the control of the spacing will be in the hands of a PES member other than the BG. He will be the 'link man' between the BG and other team members and will signal changes in formation with preset visual signals out of sight of the VIP. The formations chosen are dictated by the image to be conveyed. Adapt formations so as not to interfere with the Principal's image - remember, you are also there to protect the VIP from embarrassment.

The BG, if right-handed, is usually directed to stand behind and to the left of the VIP, within arm's reach. In reality, rarely will one maintain that position and you must always bear in mind that the text book drills have been devised by those authorities that would, on most occasions, have armed BGs on the ground. In the civilian world, where 90% plus of the time we would never be armed, we can be far more flexible as to the position we would place ourselves in to provide suitable, instinctive cover for the Principal.

Good Cover Plan

All escort members must have a pre-determined area of responsibility, sequentially overlapping, and these are, jointly, areas of observation and fire. The PES must act as a team and as a consequence, must constantly train in team tactics. Avoid obvious natural hazards - try to steer the VIP away from enticement into alleys and cul-de-sacs. Discourage crossing wide, busy city streets, particularly abroad. At best, it can split the team, with some stranded on the wrong side and at worst, it is highly dangerous.

Vigilance

This is where the PES earns its money. Each member needs six pairs of eyes. One pair for the VIP to ensure they know at all times where he is, second guessing where he's going. One pair for their other team members and one pair to keep a vigilant watch for suspicious characters, vehicles and any general hazard within their 'arc of responsibility'. Remember - 'constant awareness is the cornerstone of good security'. Each PES member is responsible for his arc, but must be at all times, aware even without looking where his team and VIP party are. If an incident should occur or develop in a PES member's arc or sector, he must warn the team and deal with the problem as dictated by the trained drills and his own judgement on their application. All arcs should overlap to give 360 degrees of cover.

Route Reconnaissance

The following notes on safe haven often pre-suppose that you have some prior knowledge as to such safe havens as a police station or hospital and a team should, if at all possible, try and keep to a route which you have already recce'd. When on foot, this is rarely possible, unless your Principal is following a detailed itinerary of events that you have had an opportunity, as a team to rehearse. With most occasions on foot, you are usually assessing the opportunities to get your boss into hard cover as such opportunities present themselves. When however, you have specific pre-arranged events, then you need to have carried out a detailed recce. Times between venues are essential, radio blackspots and, vitally, how close you can get your mobile back-up to where you'll be on foot. The vehicles may need to leapfrog or simply 'shadow' if possible, but you need to know how practical either option is, well in advance of your boss getting on the ground. Use maps to plan and to advise.

Safe Haven

Each team member whilst out on foot, must always be on the lookout for a safe haven. This may be any physical protection, from a low wall which could provide concealment and hard cover, to a shop or building with security, to a police station, fire station or hospital along the route - **'Be Prepared To Divert'**. In most European cities, a bank with an armed guard makes a good safe haven.

IF YOU STOP - PES TO 'FACE OUT'

As well as the difficulty of operating fluid, effective formations which can adapt to changing circumstances, the team must have a well rehearsed range of **Immediate Action Drills (IADs)**. These **'actions on'** - must be instinctive, with each man being able to cohes with the other team members.

Diversion

No matter how thoroughly the route/schedule has been planned, as we have stated above, be prepared to divert if circumstances so dictate. This will take tremendous confidence on the part of the team leader or personal BG, who may be acting on instinct as distinct from an obvious threat. There are 3 principles which must be intrinsically part of the IA Drills.

1. Fast, Aggressive Action

Whilst CP work is essentially defensive, it is only that because an attacker will, more often, have the element of surprise - that is we have action and reaction. Unless an attack is observed at a very early stage, a PES will always be reacting - however that reaction must be fast and aggressive. The law states that the force used must be only that necessary to negate the threat, but in the heat of exchange, such niceties should be left for the manuals. There must be no doubting that the threat is negated so as to inhibit any escalation of response.

1.



These 3 photos show the PES practising an aggressive response to a threat. If the threat is close, then the response must be to counter-attack and close down his angle of fire. A fast, aggressive response is the only thing which will win the day.

The PES closest to the threat will counter, whilst the rest of the team will provide body cover and move the VIP to cover or mobile back-up. You would be putting rounds down as you run towards the assassin.

2.

Only if the threat is close, would you counter attack. If the assailant is some distance away, then, unlike this photo sequence, the 2 PES closest the threat would provide cover with 'fire and movement' as they tactically retreat with the main party.



3.

2. Priority

The priority is to continue to give body cover. A PES member who needlessly involves himself in an affray which could have been adequately contained by another team member, has neglected his first priority. That priority is always to give body cover and to assist in moving the VIP swiftly away. Commands, instructions and signals will not work in such confusion. Only good practical team work, the result of hours and hours of drills will win the day.

3. Correct Drills

Like the basic formations, there should be a preferred IAD for a given situation. Whilst well-rehearsed tactics are the foundation for a team's response to any given situation, individual initiative must always play a part. This is particularly true in the world of civilian close protection, where regular team training is a luxury. The majority of budgets for the provision of a protection team rarely allows a rota system which allows time for team training, as would be the case in any military or government CP organisation. Quite often, a team will find itself on the street, having only come together the day before. Very few long-term, permanent teams exist in the civilian world and each member more often has to rely on the unspoken initiative of his other team members to act in the appropriate manner and in accordance with some reasonable drill.

No-one on a civvi CP team actually ever wants to ask his colleagues what they will do in a given set of circumstances. Liaison between BG and his driver, assuming that person is a trained security driver and not just a chauffeur for the event, is often quite good, as they fall into a good working pattern of procedures. Within the main body of the team, unfortunately, there is little consideration to IA Drills.

Responses To Attack

The PES and BG have the job of defeating an attack without reducing the protection being offered to the Principal. It must always be remembered that an attack could be a diversion which draws the PES into a situation which exposes the VIP to the real attack.

The following are the basic attack scenarios with recommended and appropriate responses:-

1. Nuisance

The pushy photographer, anxious, well-intentioned autograph hunter etc - care must be taken in handling such people so as not to cause embarrassment, press attention, or legal action.

2. Verbal Attack

A verbal attack may be only the start of a more serious and violent assault and the tendency to ignore it can often be unsafe. Ideally, the following should happen:-

- a. PES should close the box in. A circular formation is produced as the people close in.
- b. Should the verbal assault continue or the individual follow the party, then the principal should be moved to safety. (Endeavour not to move your boss through a hostile crowd unless there is no alternative). It is obviously inappropriate to physically restrain or deter someone who is making a verbal attack.

3. Physical Unarmed Attack

For me there is a dilemma here, as good self defence assumes that unless you know categorically to the contrary, in the first instance you treat every attacker as armed. In the case of a perceived unarmed attack, each team member must make a personal judgement on the appropriate response and, as they are likely to be the first person in the line of attack, it can only be left to that person to make such appropriate judgement. The following is on the assumption that that team member has made the assessment that the attacker is definitely unarmed.

- a. The PES member nearest will 'deal with' the attacker and rejoin the escort ('deal with' is left to the judgement of the member in question). It may be sufficient to simply 'ward off' and rejoin the party.
- b. Whilst this is happening, the other members of the PES close down the box tightly around the boss and move him to safety. Don't detach two or more people to deal with one attacker. If it is a diversion, the Principal will have no body cover and in most cases, three people to deal with one attacker only end up confusing each other.

4. Thrown Missile Attack

Missiles, whatever their nature, can cause serious injury, at worst, or embarrassment to your VIP. Close in and remove him to safety. Don't engage anyone physically, which is probably what they want, so as to heighten the embarrassment factor.


5. Handgun or Knife Attack

- a. As before, close down the box and give all round body cover.
- b. The PES member/members closest to the threat must make that instinctive decision to engage the attacker if he was not able to anticipate the attack. If armed, the PES members, if the attack occurs on a flank of the box as distinct from the corner, should close down the angle of fire and engage aggressively.

Aggressive response can change an attacker to a defender in a split second and divert him from his original goal of shooting or stabbing your principal, to one of survival. Engaging an attacker who is 20+ feet away is, however, pointless. Again, those PES members who are between the attacker and the principal, should engage the attacker whilst closing down the angle of fire to the VIP, but the fire will be defensive as they ‘pepperpot’ back with the main PES party, who will be moving the VIP away. With a pistol, the best you can hope for is to lay down some suppressive fire. Volume will be important.

“NO PLAN SURVIVES CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY”

Clauswitz



When an attack occurs, the opportunities for panic and confusion are many. The attack on former President Ronald Reagan clearly illustrated the necessity for personal initiative. The chances of commands and strict procedures working are remote. What's more important is that the team can still work through individual effort. What one man sees or knows about a situation may not be obvious to his colleagues and he must carry the day until some co-ordination can be restored. Team drills are only a function of individual procedural responsibilities.

6. Grenade Attack

Identify the object thrown and give a clear loud shout 'grenade'. Throw the principal to the ground and give full body cover by the PES and BG. Standard procedure for a grenade - ears covered, mouth open, legs drawn up and feet to the grenade, should all be borne in mind, but given the few seconds within which to react, a perfect result may be hard to achieve.

Any opportunity to engage the attacker with firearms should be taken if the attack is perceived beforehand. Be aware of the VIPs age and physical condition when throwing him or her about.

7. Sniper Attack

Close the box in. Engage the enemy if at all possible or practical, if again all you have is a hand gun. A volume of suppressive fire if an attacker's position can be identified may buy a few seconds within which to move the boss to hard cover, but will do little else. We keep talking of moving the Principal, but this is not simply a physical act. Strong, loud verbal commands must be given by the BG to his boss, so as to give him a direction or point of reference. These commands must be practiced, along with the drills. The opportunity to throw your boss around a field in practice will not arise, but he should be aware of what actions you're likely to take, given certain incidents.

8. Vehicle Attack

Not a common occurrence, but one you must have some prepared Immediate Action Drill for. The geography dictates whether you can get your VIP to cover. Don't engage with firearms, but endeavour to seek some hard cover or safe haven.

Situation Awareness

This is what will save the day. The constant on-going evaluation of the risk as it rises and falls in line with the changing environment, must become a natural action, carried out by all members. It isn't necessary however, to maintain a state of paranoia, as equally it isn't necessary for a BG to shadow his boss everywhere.

If a Principal goes into a single unit shop, yes you go in with him, but if after checking out the situation and who else is in the shop, you don't need to stay. Take the opportunity to get some comms with your 2 I/C. You may need the opportunity to get him to move the vehicles to a certain RV, particularly if the walking itinerary is unplanned. Try and brief the PES members on what you know or think is happening next. The Principal will come to appreciate when and where he can expect to turn around and find you there or not there. Be sufficiently confident as a BG to be able to tell your boss where you are going and what you are doing.

Mobile Back-Up

Whenever the main party is on foot, endeavour to have, at least, the VIP vehicle closeby and available to evacuate your boss if necessary. This sounds a great deal easier than it is in reality, as often it is not possible to have one or two vehicles if you include the PES car, to move at a walking pace, particularly on a busy main road in a city centre, possibly in one-way traffic. Often the vehicles will be unable to stop for a period and then catch up, particularly where there is no parking available and the whole exercise can become extremely fraught.

Recently, whilst working in Moscow, we had a VIP driver who was a Russian national, who saw the benefit, if only to himself, in leapfrogging past the main party who were on foot, anticipating what he thought was the continuing direction. Unfortunately, on one occasion, the main party, after he had leapfrogged past us, turned round and walked back the way they had come, leaving him high and dry. We were without not only any mobile evacuation, but the boss no longer had a vehicle should he have chosen at that time to terminate his walkabout, the driver then had to negotiate some 10 lanes of Moscow road to be able to get back in contact with us.

If circumstances dictate, get your driver to stay back a reasonable distance. Should an incident occur, he can get to you in seconds, even over a few hundred yards, which is better than him trying to back up at 40mph against the flow of traffic.

Foot formations test the metal of all team members. In the civilian world of executive protection, the boss will 99% of the time insist on a low profile operation. He will not want to see his PES members and often you may arrange matters so that your boss does not even know he has an escort section out with him.

Again in Russia, as an example, we had our Russian team members treat the operation as if they were running a surveillance operation. This even applied to vehicle drills as well as foot formations. They 'shadowed' the main party, which consisted of the Principal, myself as BG and his own people and as a consequence, maintained an extremely low profile. The only problem with this is maintaining awareness of the surrounding threat. The brief they were given by default makes them watch the main party, to the exclusion of the surrounding arcs and this must be borne in mind when briefing team members, who will be with you, but who must remain unseen.

Versatility is the key, mated with great chunks of common sense. On training exercises we conduct in the UK, where we may have a team in a busy local market town, we've often left behind a team member who 'lost' the party.

Keeping a low profile whilst watching for threat, anticipating a change of direction and whilst not trying to appear like a shoplifter, pervert or furtive loony who stands out like ‘bulldog’s bollocks’, is an achievement and work of art all by itself and very few budding BGs ever manage it.

Body Protection Formations

The formations for foot drills we will look at, have been handed down from the military and police. More often, they have been derived from experience gained whilst escorting their charges on very formal ‘walkabouts’, public engagements and where their Principal is out to be seen.


The formations are very formal in construction, but in reality, such formations as you will see described, are really only starting points from which you can adapt to each situation you encounter.

An ‘Open Box’ in the civilian CP world may mean you have one PES member actually on the other side of the road. If your boss is out shopping in a rural village, without any pre-planned itinerary, its impossible for all the PES to fit on one narrow pavement. The ‘box’ can expand to accommodate the environs, threat, image and required flexibility. It may be your boss is visiting retail outlets on business and whilst there may be a general plan, often you must leave the PES to adapt according to what they find on the ground. If you attempt to rigidly follow the following formations in the real world, you’ll bugger up.

ADAPT DON’T ADOPT

Formations

Fig 1 - Open V 1 BG - 4 Man PES



A reasonably good formation for both image and adaptability. It can be closed down reasonably quickly and PES 1 and 2 are within good distance of the Boss.

Fig. 1B. shows a variation on a theme of the 'Open V'.

Fig. 1B.






Fig. 2 - Open Box




Gives poor protection but favours the image. It works on low threat and where there is a low density of people. People can be allowed in the box if the threat is such that you need not be suspicious of every single person whilst out on a shopping trip.

Fig. 3. - Closed Box or Circular Formation



Good security, but bad for image. The Boss cannot be seen. Use when there is a high risk or a high density of people, where the 'vetting' of on-coming pedestrians cannot be achieved within a reasonable time frame. If the threat dictates, no-one should be allowed in the box.

Fig. 4. - All Round



Similar to the 'V' formation, but with the front two PES closed in. Again, poor for image, but good in a press of people.

Fig. 5. - One Protection Officer



This only illustrates the position the BG would be in if he were right-handed, as the position allows the BG to reach his Boss at arms length, give body cover and draw his weapon.

Reality dictates, as we say on every page, that you must adapt. If you're simply walking down the street with him, you look stupid in this formation and you will likely walk alongside. See Fig. 5B.

The side you choose is dictated by the potential threat and logistics. If he's window shopping and the shops are on his right side, you're going to have to be on the left. He may also be with other people and quite often you cannot adopt a position alongside and usually don't need to, as they will probably be engaged in a conversation you're not party to, therefore fall back or advance to pre-check people coming towards you.

Fig. 5B.

Fig. 5C.



Fig. 5D.



The point that's never taught in the manuals is 'Pace'. If your Boss and, say his friend, are engaged in conversation, and ambling slowly along, then you need to be at the rear, as people will be overtaking you. If your party is, however, in a hurry, then the press of people is from the front and that's where you need to be so you can 'buy' some space for your Boss. Don't get that close he feels he's tripping over you. See Fig. 5D.

Fig. 6




A good formation for most events. You can close in quickly, but sometimes you may be 'blind' to the front, also your Boss is without any accompaniment which can make him stand out.

Fig. 6B.



Consider moving up alongside. See Fig 6B. This is better for both the image and for the view in front. It is simply 2 people walking along, having a conversation. Your other PES member is close at hand, but may not be perceived as part of the party.


Fig. 6C



A formation which allows an 'advance' man should a problem be perceived as coming from the front. The distance between all 3 people dictates who can give body cover.

The dotted circles indicate the alternate variation as dictated by the circumstances on the ground.

Fig. 6D.



Another variation on a theme. If your Boss has solid cover to one side, then the 2 PES can cover the open side.

Be aware of any openings or alleyways that may appear on your Principal's side, as these will need covering by the lead team member.

Fig. 7 - 3 PES




The classic formation.

Whilst there is an open front, there is good ability to give cover quickly.

The formation, however, is too close for a good image. Unless you have a wide pavement upon which to walk, you will have problems.

Fig. 7B.




This variation with one PES in advance, with the choice of sides dictated by both physical factors and the potential for problems.

You need to play some ‘scenario’ work, think of places you know ie. shopping precincts, roads, shops, hotel foyers, lifts, stairs, theatres etc. and then endeavour to work out the way PES would flow with 1,2 3 etc and a full complement of five people. You will soon realise that no formation lasts longer than a few seconds and has to constantly flow into adaptable positions. Remember, however, that whatever the formation, your arcs for each individual should still give you your 360 degrees.

This is not easy with small numbers of PES, as the extent of an individual’s arc is obviously much greater. Also remember, however, that the level must obviously be low if you’re on your own or with one other PES member. Keep a pair of eyes in the back of your head.

Fig. 8 - Areas of Responsibility & Arcs of Fire



As described elsewhere in the text, the classic box formation is used simply to illustrate the interlocking areas of responsibility and arcs of fire. With only 4 PES, the arcs become extremely wide. Remember arcs have to overlap. From this starting point however, the formation alters, each team member must be aware of his own arc.

CHAPTER 14

BOMB AWARENESS & RECOGNITION

The picture on page 44 shows the effect of an explosive charge on what, in this instance, was a 2.8 tonne armoured Mercedes belonging to Alfred Herrhausen, chairman of Deutsche Bank, who was assassinated on 30th November 1989. Only 22lbs of TNT placed on a child's bike blew the Mercedes some 82 feet across the road.

The Improvised Explosive Device (IED) has become the most popular method of attack by terrorists worldwide and is high on the list of criminal extortionists. IEDs are popular because:-

- **no need for close contact • chance of success is high • publicity • easy to make.**

It may pay to look at the dynamics of explosive material and the injuries they can cause. Explosives are substances which, when detonated are very rapidly expanded to large volumes of gas. When the explosion is confined by a bomb, grenade or other casing, such high pressures will rupture the casing, imparting high velocity to the resulting fragments. The remaining energy then produces a blast shock wave and the displaced air creates a blast wind. The shock wave created by the compression of the surrounding air is not dissimilar to a large amplitude soundwave. The rapid rise in pressure can be in the order of hundreds of thousands of pounds per square inch and the blastwave moves away from the source as a sphere of rapidly expanding compressed gas.

The velocity of the shockwave in air is over 3,000 metres per second, although it will soon fall to the speed of sound, depending upon the nature and composition of the charge. Like soundwaves, blast pressure waves will flow over and around any obstruction like a wall and affect anyone mistakenly sheltering behind it. The pressure level at 90 degrees to the direction of travel of the shock front is called 'Incident Pressure'. There is a suction, or negative pressure, which follows after the blastwave, but although much less than the positive pressure, is ten times longer.

A blastwave will travel much faster through a liquid or solid, due to the greater density of the material. Blast injuries in water are more severe at a great distance. Direct contact with armour plate during an explosion will result in more serious injuries. There are three other physical factors which need to be understood regarding blast injuries. A condition known as 'Spalling' results from the shearing forces created on a body where the different densities, reacting differently to the pressure wave, causes a pressure pulse, which compresses and heats small air bubbles as it passes over. The compressed and heated bubbles expand and implode with an explosive force. As the blastwave passes over the body, it creates specific damage at the surface of the tissue. An eardrum that will rupture at 7lbs per square inch and the lung at 50lbs per square inch, will suffer severe damage. If the blast pressure is high enough, similar damage will be occasioned to the abdomen, causing severe disruption. The lungs can also be crushed between the diaphragm, which rises violently under the ram effect of the pressure-driven abdomen.

Blast Wind

The rapidly expanding gases displace an equal volume of air. This air travels immediately behind the shock front at very high speed, creating a dynamic pressure. At some distance away it may blow a person over, causing a variety of injuries. Closer to the explosion, there will be a traumatic amputation - the mass movement of air will actually blow limbs off. In the immediate vicinity of the explosion there may be total disintegration of the body.

An explosive device is usually constructed in a way that, contained with the blast wind, will be high velocity fragments of metal or flammable material. The PIRA petrol bomb, where one pound of explosive attached to a one gallon can of petrol placed against an outside wall, door or attached to a window grille, sent a fireball some 30 to 40 feet and successfully destroyed whole buildings.

General Bomb Management

1. Establish/Assess the probability of an actual or threatened bomb incident to your Principal, Residence, or other site.
2. Estimate the consequent damage:-
 - Physical
 - Psychological
3. Plan effective PREVENTATIVE measures to reduce the likelihood of an incident.
4. Develop Control and Containment techniques to reduce the consequent damage if an incident, real or threatened, does occur.

Explosions in confined spaces such as vehicles or buildings are even more devastating than in the open. Devices may come in many guises:-

1. Package Bomb

May be any type of package, even a carrier bag. They can be left innocuously anywhere in or near a building or vehicle.

2. Incendiary Device

Consists of combustible material in something as small as a cigarette packet or cassette box. Pushed down the back of a settee or similar, it can cause severe damage.

3. Car Bomb

A small amount of explosive on or in the car, detonated by a variety of means, will demolish a vehicle and its occupants. The devices may be of the explosive or fire bomb type. Cars packed with explosive and left in a strategic position will devastate large buildings, or if timed correctly, kill specific targets whilst in convoy - a popular method of assassination by the Italian Mafia, most recently used against investigative magistrates.


4. Letter or Parcel Bomb

Explosive or incendiary material in large or small quantities can be delivered by post or parcel delivery with devastating consequences.

5. Bomb Threats

A bomb threat can have a serious effect on the operation of a business and the confidence of its employees. Whilst experience shows most bomb calls are made by hoaxers, every care must be taken to evaluate the call and act accordingly.

The blast from an explosive device in its spherical form travels up as well as along and windows above ground floor level are also liable to shatter and cause casualties. Ordinary window glass subject to blast, shatters into sharp-edged pieces including long slivers. At high velocity, these pieces can cause severe injuries or death. Furthermore, blastwaves can penetrate into a building and shatter internal glazing such as borrowed lights to corridors. Since corridors are usually circulation and escape routes, borrowed lights and glazed door panels often need protecting as well (see Chapter 5 - Office Security). Shatter-proof film or possibly the use of laminated glass which missile-forming properties are very much less than those of ordinary glass. Polycarbonate sheets over glass will also assist, as will approved net curtains or drapes in the residence or VIP office.



The three photographs on this page illustrate the potential for devastation that can be wreaked by a car bomb. The attack was against a coach of Soviet Jews on their way to Ferihegy Airport in Budapest.

Perpetrated by Palestinian terrorists, a Fiat Tipo, packed with 20 kilos of plastic explosive in its boot, was detonated by a radio working on the 400-500MHz range from some 150 feet away.

Due to the ever present threat of attack, the coach was preceded by a Police car, followed immediately by another Police car bringing up the rear. The bomb contained steel balls and more by good luck than anything, the main force was directed away from the road. The lead Police car took most of the blast, with two Police officers being seriously injured. Occupants of the coach sustained minor cuts. The device was detonated prematurely. On the left is the remains of the billboard that the Fiat was parked behind.



Left: Remains of the Fiat.

Right: The Police lead vehicle and the bus.



Remember - Don't site the VIP suite overlooking a car park area or main road.

Don't site your mail room in the middle of the building. In an office, the damage is already done if a suspect package is not checked until it is in the mail room, at which point, if it is discovered, it is now in the middle of the building if that is where the mail room is situated. The effect from a confined blast in a building can be devastating. It's effects will not be restricted to the room in which it detonates.

Currently, no company can feel safe from being the recipient of any incendiary device. They are easily constructed from household materials, yet their potential for devastation is out of all proportion to their size. The incendiary or small letter bomb is still a current threat, although at the time of writing, the incidence of reported suspect packages in London has fallen by 80%, given the IRA ceasefire. The incidence however, of incendiaries in retail or meat packers targeted by the extreme elements of the Animal Activists is holding steady.

The attraction of the letter or parcel bomb to a terrorist, extortionist or crank, is that he can reach the innermost sanctums of an operation, be it a company, politician or businessman., whilst remaining remote. Devices, given the ingenuity of construction, particularly in battery technology and electronic timers, can mean the perpetrators can be thousands of miles away when the explosion takes place. The Brighton bomb was placed some three months prior to being occupied by Conservative Party members for their conference, but also illustrated the folly of having untrained people carry out search procedures.

An any Improvised Explosive Device (IED), you will find the following:-

- 1. Time and Power Unit**
- 2. Detonator or Igniter**
- 3. Explosive or Incendiary mix**

and Optionally

- 1. An Arming Device**
- 2. An Anti-Handling Device**

The old acronym '**HIT**' helps in understanding the requirements a terrorist is looking for:-

H - Hide - The terrorist must have a concealed hiding/firing point

I - Initiate - Must have a means of initiation

T - Target - Must be there at a specific time

Confusion often arises with the terminologies, particularly that relating to the anti-handling device and 'Booby Traps'. A bomb designed to be operated, say, by 'remote control', may have an anti-handling device. This is so as to score a hit should the device be discovered prior to the proposed time of detonation and is considered to be 'booby trapped'. However, a device designed to explode as a result of being initiated by the intended victim is generally referred to as a 'booby trap'. A device may therefore be either booby trapped or a booby trap in its own right. In either case it is **VICTIM OPERATED**.

Also, an arming device can be the initiator for the bomb. In the case of the Pan Am bombing, three Barometric switches were used as arming devices and finally to initiate the device. The first two armed the device on reaching a prescribed altitude on its journey to Frankfurt and then to Gatwick, the third switch at 12,000 feet completed the circuit and initiated the bomb. It will pay to look in slightly more detail at the main elements of a device and methods of initiation.

Time and Power Unit

As was illustrated with the Brighton bomb, the ability to control to within a few seconds, months later, an explosion, is one of the deadliest attributes of a bomb. This allows a perpetrator to be miles away from the event and to precisely target the explosion timewise.

In the event of the Brighton bomb, the terrorists had, however, to guess as to which room Margaret Thatcher would be staying in. The time element can be controlled in a number of ways.

Timer Operated

Command Operated

Victim Operated

- Timer**
- mechanical ie. alarm clocks, watches, candle, barometric etc.
 - electronic ie. video timers etc.
 - chemical ie. a chemical which will eat through to initiate a device.

- Command Operated** - Command wire
- Remote Control

Victim Operated (or delay devices)

This could be by a variety of means - by say, opening a car door, sitting on a seat, starting the vehicle, moving away, opening a package, turning on a light etc.

- 'Anti-Lift' ie. Trembler device
- 'Anti-Tilt' ie. Mercury switch
- 'Anti-Open' ie. Micro switch, or simply making contact
- Heat/Light operated
- Pressure on/Pressure release - - - Tension on/Tension release
- Electrical ie. engine, light switches etc
- Photoelectric

Power Unit

In the majority of cases, the power to initiate a device will be by battery. This could be as small as a 1.5 volt watch battery for an incendiary device or a car battery attached to the end of a command wire. Flat batteries such as those contained within modern polaroid film packs are powerful and concealable. Battery technology is such that the construction of an explosive or incendiary device is made relatively easy. Size of battery is less important if the device is 'command' detonated. A car battery will be perfectly adequate. Other power sources may be mechanical, chemical, light or people.

Detonators and Igniters

A detonator is needed to supply the initial boost to the main explosive charge. Detonators can be commercially obtained or home-made. They are all essentially the same, with a small explosive charge contained within a metal tube, wired so as to connect to the power source.

There are many varieties of detonator, some delay based, either a slow fuse or working through a chemical reaction such as the action of acid on a soft metal spring, eventually activating a plunger onto a detonator.

An igniter for an incendiary mix needs to be nothing more complicated than a bulb where the filament is exposed and placed within an incendiary mix. When a current passes through it, the filament glows hot and ignites the mixture.

Explosives

The lax security at quarries and mining operations has provided a regular supply of commercial explosives such as Gelamix, Quarex and Frangex. Modern Dynamites, are now very stable and most make no use of the classically unstable element, ‘Nitro-Glycerine’. Commercial explosives are much ‘slower burning’ than military types and produce a far lower energy output. Placed and packed carefully, however, it is equally as devastating in the hands of terrorists as military explosive.

The support provided to terrorist organisations by many former Eastern bloc countries also gave easy access to such products as the ubiquitous Semtex (a mix of ROX and PETN). Other military explosives such as PE4 have found their way into terrorist hands. TNT is still the classic military demolition explosive, usually foil covered to prevent the ingress of moisture and sometimes coming with an integral detonator. There are many varieties of initiation devices available to terrorists, particularly chemical or simple percussion delay devices.

By choice, however, terrorists favour the use of ‘plastic’ explosives or PX. Safe to handle, totally benign until a detonator is added and malleable. It can be sawn, moulded and abused without any problem, plus it is odourless and non-toxic. Plastics come in many forms and most are based on conventional RDX combined with a plastic polymer. Home-made explosives such as ANFO and ANAL and CO-OP mix are all easily constructed and in reasonably large quantities, very effective. They need to be delivered in large quantities of many hundreds of kilogrammes to be equally as effective as a moderate amount of military explosive, but if time and circumstances favour, they can be devastating, as the security forces in Northern Ireland know only too well.

Incendiary mixes are usually all home-made from simply household items such as weedkiller and sugar. The proportions dictate the degree of burn or explosion one wants to achieve. Incendiary devices, as small as one contained in a cigarette packet, can result in the ultimate destruction of whole buildings, with damage running into millions of pounds.

Explosive material will either be high explosive (HE) or low explosive (LE). HE is more ‘brissant’ than LE, in other words, it has a high shattering effect, whereas LE is used to push and shove.

Low Explosive (LE)

Must be contained
Won’t work when damp
Prone to friction/spark
Will not cut steel

High Explosive (HE)

Needs no containment
Okay when damp/wet
Not affected by spark
Cuts steel

Low Explosive is usually - black powder, smokeless powder, home-made. Such items as Harpic, fertiliser, petrol or diesel oil, soap flakes, sugar, paint thinner, battery acid are all possible ingredients for LE mix.

Arming Switch

A device may need to be carried some distance before being placed in-situ and in order to facilitate its safe handling, it may need to have an arming device. Such a device would be necessary with any bomb designed to be initiated by 'tilt' or 'trembler'. A letter-bomb, whilst under construction, needs to be safe until sealed, at which point, an arming device such as a pin or wire can be removed, hence the need to look for 'tell-tale' holes in a suspect letter or package. The barometric switch is another version of the arming switch and may also be the initiator. A single switch to complete an electric circuit may be incorporated in a device.

Victim Operated

Such devices require the compliance of the victim to initiate the explosion. This may be a simple 'pressure on/pressure release' device, using such household items as a mousetrap or clothes peg. In both cases, on release of the pressure eg mousetrap, a circuit is formed and the detonator ignited or with a clothes peg under the wheel of a car, which on moving on, pressure is applied to close the circuit.

Pressure devices could be simply constructed from the pressure mat, integral to most burglar alarm systems, or it could be made from tin foil and soft foam layers which could be placed within a car seat or in a room under a mat. Micro switches can be bought for pence and constructed into anything the victim may open, such as a book or box in the post.

Light sensitive switches can be used, but the safe construction by a terrorist and its subsequent arming, is often a dangerous complication. Heat sensitive devices can be attached to the exhaust manifold of a victim's vehicle. The mercury tilt switch, bought for a few pence at Tandy electrical stores and used in the assassination of MP Airey Neave, is simplicity itself. The tilting of mercury in a small glass vial will complete a circuit and initiate the charge.


These are advantages and disadvantages of the choice of initiation and it pays to summarise these.

Initiation	Advantage	Disadvantages
Remote	Easy escape and time accurate	Can be jammed, lose line of sight and a device can be prematurely detonated by a device in a vehicle which emits a permanent radio signal
Command Wire	Accurate, can't be jammed	Often easily detectable and easily cut by accident
Timer	Leave and go	Often unreliable, the longer left, may be found
Booby Traps	Victim operated, leave and go, post or deliver	More difficult, dangerous to construct (resulting in some spectacular own goals). Set off by accident or by the wrong person.

NOTE - An explosive letter-bomb can be sent through the post in an envelope no thicker than one quarter of an inch. A package up to 22lbs in weight can be sent through the post.

A system must be established in both the residence and the office to screen incoming mail. Investment in a variety of technology, from x-ray machines to discriminating metal detectors and vapour analysers are worthwhile. The outlay, as always, will be determined by 3 factors : **1. Level of Threat** **2. Regional Risk** **3. Depth of Pocket**

A cheap hand-held, non-linear junction detector can greatly assist in screening incoming mail.



Examples of a Cassette Incendiary, showing the time, power unit and incendiary mix, a favourite device of the Animal Liberation Front. On the left of the photograph is a simple device illustrating the use of a spring-loaded clothes peg and power unit, suitable for a number of purposes.



Remote Control Device. Remote control unit with the device installed in a cigar box. The range of such a device, whilst only measured in 10's of metres, can still make an effective terrorist weapon.

Recognition

- Small packets with unusual postmarks, foreign mail from unusual sources and special delivery.
- Unfamiliar handwriting or incorrect spelling or typing, particularly foreign.
- Any small books arriving, particularly anything unrequested.
- Titles on address, but no names.
- Restrictive markings such as 'Confidential', 'Personal' etc.
- Excessive postage.
- Mis-spelling of common words.
- Oily stains or discolouration.
- No return address.
- Excessive weight for its size.
- Lop-sided or uneven envelope.
- Rigid envelope, either card or metal stiffening.
- Protruding wires or tin foil and small holes or pin-pricks.
- Excessive securing material such as masking tape, string etc.
- Visual distractions.
- Unusual smells ie. almonds or ammonia.
- Any springiness. Be suspicious if it feels springy, but does not bend - be careful.
- Hold up to light to see any unusual outline.

Actions On Finding a Suspect Device

Remember the effects of a bomb inside a building are far more severe than when out in the open. Some Do's and Don'ts:-

- Do not open any suspect package
- Don't over-handle suspect packages
- Never bend a suspect package
- Get the client away whilst your other Immediate Action Drills take place
- Don't place a device in water
- If the device was found in a building, try and remember exactly where the device is with a description.
- Don't accept delivery of any unexpected package
- If you have grounds in a residence, select a flat open area away from the main building to place the suspect package. If not, then place on a flat surface in a room close to the door of the building. Remember, whilst the explosive blast in an open space may be reasonably safe, windows will still be blown open up to a long distance.
- Don't place a device near flammables
- Don't select a safe area near gas or other service lines
- Don't use radios within 30 to 50 metres
- Don't put anything on a device (pressure switch)
- Don't bring devices into a building
- Remember, delivery of a suspect device could be a hoax to get the VIP into an open space

(See Chapter 6 on Room and Building Search)

Don't simply condition your thinking to believe that 'suspect packages only contain explosive or incendiary material. There is a growing practice of sending 'nasties' in the post. These can range from pins, to razor blades, broken glass and needles. Don't ignore the dangers of an innocuous envelope - it can still contain a threatening letter or an extortion demand. Always inform the police, don't throw away and don't ignore them.

CHAPTER 15

WEAPON SELECTION, HANDLING & CONCEALMENT

If Unarmed Combat for the Close Protection operative could realistically take up a book in its own right, then a complete dissertation on this subject could probably fill four, but at the end of it we'd also equally be none the wiser. No other subject matter contains such divergent views on so many aspects and I've tried to give a somewhat different slant on the process. I've concentrated on Handgun selection, although touched on the role of shotguns and full autos. For most operatives, it will be the exception that they will get to carry a weapon in the civvy field and out of that small percentage, even fewer will carry a full auto weapon. Shotguns, particularly where a large estate is involved, can be a standard piece of kit, although no-one will own up to carrying one for any more concrete purpose than culling the local rabbit population. The scene we set for the whole of this chapter is one where the operative is abroad.

Single BG drills. Fast, accurate weapon handling with a VIP slung over your shoulder is somewhat of a challenge. At the same time, you will be tracking backwards, hence the exaggerated crouch, which gives good control of your Principal with your backside.



That being the case, predominantly, the weapon will be a handgun. There may be a wider variety of weapons in the residence and carried in vehicles, but we are going to concern ourselves with the handgun side of things. Broadly, you'll be faced with either a Revolver or Semi-auto Pistol and we'll look at the pros and cons of both, but before that we need to examine the role of the handgun per se, whichever the variety, and dispel some myths.

Primarily, the handgun is a defensive weapon. It's accuracy, out past 25ft, under severe stress conditions is poor and, realistically, ranges of 10-15ft, given the situations we envisage the weapon would be used in, is probably more like an effective range. In training scenarios I regularly see people miss man-sized targets from 3ft under stress and time constraints. If artificially induced, pressure can so dramatically effect accuracy, just think what being stabbed, shot at and bombed might do to your aim. We're constantly bombarded with statistics about handgun engagements with regard to the AVERAGE distance of a confrontation, number of rounds fired, hit-rate, reloading characteristics etc, but one needs to carefully analyse the source. We all quote statistics to support our individually preferred manner of tuition but, for most of us, the stats. we quote are those from the very large body of case history from the North American police and FBI experience. Whilst relevant in a broad way, in some areas the experience doesn't relate to CP work nor, equally, does the British Police firearms thinking which influences their CP firearms approach. No CP body of case history of any size exists to prove any point or theory one way or another. A commonsense approach to application, tinged with some intellectual work on the likely scenarios one can foreseeably perceive, tested against the experience of others in similar situations may get us some way down the road. Before moving off elsewhere, some statistical information may prove thought-provoking and set the scene for what you are about to read.

FBI summary of officers killed, together with police gunfight data, has remained consistent - 92% of all fire-fights occur within 20 feet, with 6% out beyond 50 yards, resulting from sniping incidents and nearly all officers killed are within 10 feet of their assailant, with half dying at 0-5 feet. In 1988, most NYPD shootings were within 7 feet and the hit ratio was a startlingly low 11% (*'Making a Cop', Ranchlin, 1991*). The FBI's 1992 Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted Report, covered a 10 year period in which 650 officers were killed by firearms, 500 by handguns. Distances were 367 killed at 5 feet or less and given that 500 died by handgun, the proximity at which the majority of engagements took place is truly quite frightening. The NYPD's own, very detailed analysis, published each year of 'Firearms Discharge - Assault Report' shows that from 1991 to 1993, with nearly 1,000 shooting incidents as a body of experience, 52% took place in the dark and 50% were at less than 21 feet. The average number of shots fired by officers was only 4 and the average hit rate is only 16%.

How relevant? These statistics are for trained police officers who, often, are responding to a call and are preparing to attend a potentially dangerous scene. They may have weapons drawn and be prepared mentally for the worst, even then the hit rate at ranges, measured sometimes at punching range, is between 10-16%. Imagine then how difficult shooting would be if, from nowhere out of a crowd, you were faced by a gunman with a drawn weapon letting off rounds - a hit rate of 2%?? maybe, an instinctive desire to cover up and drop? a fumbled draw? - whatever the result, don't believe that what you calmly practice on the range will be how its actually going to work.



The Steyr TMP (Tactical Machine Pistol). One of the best full - auto weapons on the market. But if you found yourself in a CP role where you need full - auto weapons, check the remuneration part of your contract. You don't need it.

Always bear in mind that as a CP operative, you're likely to be **Reacting** to a situation - not in charge of it from the start. What works for an armed undercover Robbery Squad officer isn't translatable, as he may be able to 'get the drop' so to speak. In CP work, the boot will be on the other foot. I'd first like to go back a few years and look at some influences on handgun work.

In 1929 a major in the US Army Coast Artillery Corps, Wm D Fraser published a book called '*American Pistol Shooting: A Manual of Instruction in Modern Pistol Marksmanship*'. It was a book which, whilst being primarily a target shooter's guide, contained some advanced theories on combat shooting and his breakdown of the elements of combat shooting are as relevant today as they were sixty years ago.

- **Suitable Pistol**
- **Accessible carrying position**
- **Properly made Holster**
- **Skillful Pistol manipulation**
- **Natural, accurate gunpointing**
- **Coolness and self-control in action**

If we were to go back as far as 1906 for a synopsis of the thinking on the first point above, ie. 'Suitable Pistol', we would need to be a 'fly on the wall' at the invitation of the American Ordnance Department, to manufacturers of revolvers and semi-auto to submit their designs for competitive testing. As a result of the trials, subsequently held in 1907, the Cavalry Corp took delivery of 200 .45 pistols, manufactured by Colt. There was a substantial resistance to its adoption and much support for continuing with the preference for revolvers, was assisted by the success the British were having against the Boers armed with semi-auto Mausers. The attractions of the semi-auto were, however, undeniable ie. (as stated at the time)....

- Reduced recoil, improving accuracy and reducing a tendency to flinch
- Facility of re-charging, especially in cold weather and when on the move
- Greater capacity of rounds in the magazine than is carried in any revolver cylinder

In 1907, the military thinking about the handgun was as accurate then as it is today. They understood it as a weapon of last resort and that when brought into use it would be in an environment of extreme necessity. They understood the ranges would be short and the length of time of engagement usually brief. They summarised the requirements as follows:

- **Certain Effect (stopping power)**
- **Speed of manipulation**
- **Ammunition capacity**
- **Accuracy**
- **Safety**



One of the most radical designs of pistol since the Browning. The H & K P7 'squeeze cocker' is, in the author's view, the best pistol for a CP role. The problem is that with the larger capacity M16, the butt size is large, even for a big hand. It also feels top heavy when in the holster. If you can sacrifice some capacity then the P7 M8 is the ideal choice.

They recognised the pistol as, a 'personal weapon of protection' - that in skilled hands it was convenient, accurate, reliable and safe, but that in untrained hands, that there was more danger from accidental discharge than from the revolver.

The Ordnance Dept. issued a pamphlet in 1912, 'Manual of the Automatic Pistol' and without the date on it you wouldn't know it wasn't written yesterday and it echoed what we readily accept that the handgun is a weapon of last resort, but in that role it is ideal for the job. They referred to its limited range and to the planning required to have it accessible and to hand if needed. The interesting aspect of the manual was its realisation that pistol work is essentially 'Grab & Shoot'. They stressed a 'great rate of fire' and 'snap shooting'. However, the proposed underlying training in the Manual was firmly based on the 'Marksmanship' school, emphasising 'slow fire', target orientated shooting as the 'foundation' of combat shooting.

This polarity in combat pistol work has continued since then to the present day, where until only recently it has dominated Police and Military thinking as to how training should accomplish effectiveness. The classic 'off hand' duelling stance became the basis of all marksmanship dominated pistol work. This continued with formal procedures for training in 'Principles of Marksmanship'. Unfortunately, the empirical experience of those who were at the sharp end of pistol confrontations had no forum for the dissemination of knowledge and were voices in the wilderness.



The 'modified' Weaver stance. Whilst not ideal from a number of aspects, it is still the stance 'of choice'.

With practice, it's practical advantages for turns, pivots, fire and movement, all conspire to outweigh the more static Isosceles stance.

The problem is that the Weaver constantly creates a two-handed approach and experience suggests that in a firefight, stress leads to 'instinctive' one hand shooting.

Lost was the experience of the gunfighter of the old west and although a lone voice could be occasionally heard, the mould was set. At times however, that mould was broken by certain individuals whose experience and strength of purpose were too strong to ignore. Such a man was William Ewart Fairburn who, in the early years of this century, as an officer in Shanghai Municipal Police was instrumental in bringing about the most radical changes to the use and training in handguns. The International Settlement in Shanghai was unquestionably, at that time, the single most lawless place in the world, with acts of crime and terrorism running at epidemic levels. Organised gangs of professional kidnapers roamed the streets armed with the latest in full and semi-auto weapons and when caught would use them.

Conditions in which the police fought were the filthy, tightly packed, poorly lit, overcrowded maze of Chinese buildings, against Chinese, Korean and Japanese gangsters, skilled in a variety of Martial Arts and the use of weapons. The Queensbury rules and 'principles of marksmanship' proved totally ineffective in combating such violence.



A weapon that if Fairbairn was alive today he would have felt completely at ease with, the CZ 85 has to be one of the best 'out of the box' pistols available today. Based on the Browning design, it is a traditional pistol, but for reliability, accuracy and cost, it is one of the best.

Fairbairn, with others, developed combat concepts and training systems for pistol, knife, stick and unarmed combat that, due to its success, was to eventually find its way into all Commando training and for training the special operations people in the British SOE, (Special Operations Executive) and the American OSS (Office of Strategic Service) during the second world war, as well as the American Marine Corp. It was Fairbairn who thought of the first 'Killing House', or 'Mystery House' as it was called then and also the 'Double Tap', but most importantly he realised the one vital aspect of training.

From 1910 to 1919, Fairbairn accompanied nearly every patrol that was involved in a shooting or was likely to be involved in one. From that he ascertained what *natural instincts* came into play when a man was under fire or was faced with a knife or threatening situation. As a consequence, his training in the use of handguns duplicated both the conditions where engagements took place and natural instincts into account. He knew his men would crouch under fire and was quite clear how they would angle their bodies and

extend their weapon arm under a variety of conditions. He trained to accommodate these instincts. He knew that his officers would only ever have a fleeting glimpse of a target, light would be poor and they would have unstable footing, with noise and explosions going off around them, as well as being on the move. The accepted 'principles of marksmanship' was no basis for training a man to survive in such conditions.

I've summarised it as follows:-

TRAINING TO INSTINCT

Over the years, we have been much influenced by target competition work from slow fire, to even the more Combat and Practical Pistol competition disciplines. There is much of value that has come from the culture dish of 'Practical Pistol', but equally there is so much 'padding' that the core element of effectiveness is lost.

Fairbairn developed his method of '**shooting to live**' instruction where his men would be trained to instinctively fire in two shot bursts (double tap), without ever bringing their weapons to a 'line of sight.' Fairbairn knew that at times of stress, a man would look at his opponent not at the sights of his weapon and that weapon alignment should be taught to be instinctive.



The beauty of the Weaver position is that one can move into other shooting positions with ease and the same grip and relative body position remain unaltered. Kneeling should be a temporary position if in the open, with a brief drop to the knee to take a shot with a lowered profile and then up and off. Don't settle onto your back heel.




If you're some distance from the threat or behind hard cover, then you can settle into the 'sniping' kneeling position and settle onto your rear heel. Not shown in the photograph on the left is the elbow position, which should be braced against the inside of the left knee, with both then pressing against each other. Don't rest your elbow on the top - bone to bone - as they simply rock about and provide no stability.

The arguments over Stance and Grip for a handgun will rage into the distant future to when man is shooting 'Ray Guns', as will the argument about the choice of Revolver or Pistol. Whilst, ultimately, a matter solely of personal preference - remember in a CP role when abroad, choice of weapons will probably be a 'fait accompli'. You won't have a choice, but get what you're given. As a consequence, you must be familiar with as wide a variety of both pistols and revolvers. You need to know the mechanical differences, shooting characteristics, stripping, carry problems of as many weapons as possible. Resist the temptation to have a personal favourite. All handguns have a different 'natural pointing ability' and will feel different when speed drawing and endeavouring to achieve a natural 'hand/eye co-ordination.

Caliber is again a consequence of the weapon you're given but, predominantly, you are likely to be given a semi-auto in 9mm cal. Despite what you may read, the 9mm is a 'stopper' with the correct load. American Police engagements indicate that the chances of re-loading in a firefight are negligible and although police work can't entirely influence CP thinking, the inclination would be to have as large a magazine capacity as possible, but don't ignore your speedloading training. If you can carry spare mags. do so.

For many people, the more 'natural' pointing ability of the revolver gives them a better chance of accuracy, but cylinder capacity must eventually militate against their choice. The problem with semi-auto pistols is traditionally one of safety. To be brought into use quickly, a pistol needs to be in what has come to be known as 'Condition 1' - locked and cocked - a round in the chamber, hammer back and thumb safety on. Ultimately, as safe to carry and operate as a revolver on double action, it has always seemed a problem for some authorities to accept that a weapon can safely be carried all day in that condition and be drawn and used without cause for concern. Hence the drive for a 'safe' pistol and for me, we've simply ended with a situation where 'we've painted legs on a snake'. I refer to the double action pistols with a de-cocking lever, designed to safely lower a hammer into a double action mode, after chambering a round.

Accuracy gained by having a single action pull with a traditional pistol is now lost as a much harder double action is required for the first shot, giving a totally different, and slower cadence for the first 'double tap'. Only the 'squeeze cocker' H & K P7 has, for me, been a truly innovative development in pistol design since Browning first sat down at his workbench. Glock's with their trigger safety, less so, and the majority of DA's you can bin. Their development has been driven by the American police authority's need to provide safe, but regrettably emasculated pistols to police officers who are unable to train with enough rounds through reasons of economy. This has resulted in such weapons as H & K's double-action pistol which is simply that, a pistol that will only operate from a double-action mode. If much further development (sic) occurs we'll eventually see cylinders introduced into semi-autos.



Taking safety to a point of impracticality. The H & K USP in it's worst form is solely double-action. In the text I refer to developments which are so ridiculous as to reach a point where they put a cylinder on a pistol. Well with this they are almost there. The ultimate example of 'painting legs on a snake'.

Even Fairbairn recognised the constraints that economics caused in operating safely. As his Chinese officers were restricted to only 32 rounds as a 'qualification' course of fire in training, Fairbairn felt unable, from a safety aspect, to allow his men to carry locked and cocked. He didn't even allow them to load and unload themselves and the magazine was inserted into the weapon for them by another officer after the weapon had been holstered, before they left the station house. The weapon, carried in Condition 3, was then, on being drawn 'actioned' to chamber a round and cock the hammer. Fairbairn had the safety pinned back so as to be inoperative.

After nearly 30 years, I've never had a safety problem with working from leather, with the pistol having been in Condition 1. Safety is a function of training, correct practices and correct adherence to safety procedures, and, fortunately, as civilians, we are not constrained by any wider economic issues apart from the depth of our own pocket, we should endeavour to put as many rounds down range in training as we can.



Prone. If you are going to be somewhere for a time and you've no cover, you're going to have to get down. Be aware that you lose vertical vision when on the ground. The position shown allows the greatest mobility and flexibility of shooting positions than being flat on your belly.



The Prone position illustrated above, is the one that allows the greatest flexibility of movement. By pushing the bent leg down and bending the straight leg, you can effectively shoot from 5 o'clock, all the way round to 7 comfortably. You'll also find that you are able to shoot with a higher elevation than if you were in a basic, prone isosceles, where you will find it difficult to shoot high.


Lets first of all look at how a weapon is carried.

Holsters

Holsters are 'Situational' - by that I mean they are not simply a means of carrying a weapon, rather that their design, position and use are related to a variety of situations where the wearer may find himself requiring access to a weapon under or over a range of clothing, again, themselves dictated by 'situation'.

One may be stationary, mobile in a vehicle, formally dressed, casually dressed, sedentary all day or very active. One may even be in a pair of swimming trunks on the beach. A person may also be constrained in how he is able to draw a weapon due to the logistics of a situation and all these 'tactical' factors inhibit and condition holster use design. The following aspects essentially dictate the use and design of holsters:-

- **The nature of the weapon**
- **Security**
- **Speed**
- **Concealment**
- **Clothes to be worn**
- **Right or left handed**
- **Existing preferences or prejudices**




A good CP holster, this pancake type from Gould & Goodrich has 3 slots for a variety of positions, a reinforced paddle thumb break. It can be worn tilted on the shooter's strong side or straight up for a cross draw should the situation demand. A flexible piece of kit.

A vital point to bear in mind is that the greatest influence on how a weapon is drawn is not the type of holster, but where it is worn. A police officer, choosing a holster to be worn in an overt role would be wanting security and accessibility. He would have a holster with a top strap, covered trigger guard, steel springs integral in the design to keep the weapon secure and grab free.

A CP role asks for another factor to be taken into account 'Concealment'. Concealment unfortunately is an inhibiting factor to accessibility. The need to be covert with handguns has led to the development of holsters which can be worn -

- **Behind the hip**
- **Small of back**
- **Under the arm**
- **Within another carrying device eg 'Bumbag'**



When casually dressed, the 'bumbag' holster is a must. It takes considerable practice to draw a large frame auto from such a holster, but all the practice is worth the effort. Once you've recovered from the 'Velcro burns' you should have quite a slick draw.

This photo illustrates a 'cross draw' position, but you can move the bag more to your right and thereby facilitate a very short, fast standard draw.

Hip holsters can either be worn on the belt or inside the pants (ISP). Broadly, they can be holsters designed to be worn 'strong side' (weapon hand side) or used in a 'cross draw' mode.

PROs and CONs

Ankle Holster

Of little use in a CP field and are more the preserve of the undercover policemen. If one was to spend every minute sitting down, then it may have a part to play.

Shoulder Holster

It's advantages are purely 'situational'. It has to be the ideal carry when a large degree of car work is involved, as its accessibility is not hindered by sitting down. Also, in certain formal social engagements, where a jacket with tails is worn, then a hip holster can be untenable and one may have to resort to use of a shoulder holster. In other circumstances, a shoulder holster is not an ideal 'concealed carry'.

By definition, a shoulder holster involves a 'cross draw', where the weapon is held either in a vertical position or in a horizontal one - but forward. There is nearly always a 'thumb break' system of closure, but with practice, speed of draw is good. The major disadvantages are in the cross draw.



The two ways to carry in a shoulder holster. Left - in the vertical position and right in the horizontal mode. The latter suits a medium size pistol as distinct from a full frame semi.

To encourage 'instinctive point and shoot' ability, we need to co-ordinate our natural pointing/eye link. This action is like punching ie. we don't watch our punch when we strike a target, nor watch the fist on its journey, we watch the target and our co-ordination of hand eye when involved in pistol work, happens the same way. Pointing and punching are naturally co-ordinated for us and we should use them for weapon alignment, without recourse to those traditional principles of marksmanship, where every point of reference is aligned in the first instance with the eye. If we *swing* a weapon, however, to acquire a target, we lose the co-ordination of hand and eye and so it is with a 'cross draw', where we have to swing the weapon in an arc to the target and then endeavour to stop its swing at the right time. Swinging past and over-compensating all come into play.

Such delay, whilst measured in fractions of a second, together with suspect accuracy, all count, unlike the hip holster draw, where it is relatively easy to align the weapon onto the target early. With a draw from the shoulder holster, you have to wait for the swing to settle on the point of aim, also creating in nearly every instance, a 'long arm shot' whereas, if occasion demands, one can adopt an instinctive shot from close to the body when drawing from the hip. At very close, even touching range, extending your arm is the last thing you want, as your weapon can be deflected or ripped from your grasp and your shooting hand and arm can be jammed across your chest as you attempt to draw, losing all leverage advantage.

Hip Holster

These come in a variety of designs, construction and material. They range from 'clip on' to 'belt slide' with a vertical hold or with an 'FBI tilt'. Awkward to wear for long periods in a vehicle they are, however, the favoured holster of choice. The draw can be effected quickly and the weapon lined to the target and ready to shoot long before it may be in its final ideal position. Its use is complicated far more by clothing than the shoulder holster, where two hands can easily effect a smooth draw, but practice in clearing a jacket with either the strong hand on the way to the draw, or with the weak hand from the back, makes perfect. From the draw, the weapon can be aligned and 'punched' to the target to maximise the hand/eye co-ordination.

I use the word punched advisedly, as the punching action must not end with any impact which will throw the point of aim down. A more correct terminology would be point. Stability of the holster during the draw is important and holster construction is such that there is usually complete rigidity in the holster, with no play either with the holster or belt combination. A spring, thumb break or tensioning screw will keep the weapon held firm during active movement, yet give smooth, unrestricted extraction on the draw.

General

If you have to carry a weapon, then don't restrict your ability to use it. If you wear a topcoat, keep it unbuttoned as with a jacket. Ensure nothing, such as a loose shirt will impede the draw. Coming out with nothing but a handful of woolly jumper is not advised. Try methods of weighting a coat pocket to assist the 'sweep' of the jacket to clear for the draw. Personally, I find this creates inertia, particularly if you hook the coat in the middle as your hand moves back for the draw. Don't wear gloves and don't get involved in carrying anything ie. parcels, suitcases, flowers, presents etc.

Reloading

Practice speed reloads with both revolvers and pistols and establish how best to carry what you're going to reload with. A well honed reload with a semi-auto can be as fast as you could fire a round, but whilst revolvers get more complicated, with practice, they can be reloaded quickly. Speed loaders for revolvers are seldom as convenient to carry as a flat magazine with 15 rounds for a pistol.

A body of evidence says, however, that reloading in a fire fight is not a common feature, but that shouldn't negate one's thinking on carrying a good supply of ammo and how best to reload quickly.

Stance, Grip, Target Acquisition

'TRAIN FOR INSTINCT'

W.E. Fairbairn was the leading exponent, through personal observation of 'behaviour under fire' and he categorised such behaviour and personal preferences of his men. He was able to conclude that - "**Stance was a function of distance**". He was primarily interested in people's instinctive reaction in a fire fight and noticed the predominant variations were broadly that the stance was 'open or closed' to the target and that his men would shoot either one or two handed. Again, the predominant factor was the distance between them and their enemy and here we enter a minefield.

Stance

Over the years, the influence of the so called 'Weaver' stance, with the angled body and pushing/pulling opposing grip has come to dominate in certain quarters of combat pistol shooting. In its defence, it has a lot going for it and allows good 'fire and movement' and ease of getting into 'positional' shooting such as kneeling and prone. It allows 'turning' and 'turretting' more easily than say the FBI or 'Isosceles' stance and as a training stance from which work as a foundation of instruction it is more than suitable. We must remember though, that its so called inventor, Jack Weaver of Lancaster, California, was above everything, a competitive shooter and, its effective use in 'Practical IPSC' competition,

popularised by Jeff Cooper has given it a pre-eminence that often doesn't allow room for the more 'instinctive' reactions to a fire fight.

Don't believe the bollocks about the stance absorbing recoil, a stance allows you the best platform for engagement and most flexibility of movement. Unfortunately, the instinctive reaction to crouch under fire prohibits instinctive movement and consequently the argument at this point in favour of the Weaver stance can weaken. The Weaver stance in its various guises has a long history, pre-dating we are told, its supposed introduction by Jack Weaver in the South Western Combat League matches of the '50s and later. A book called 'Shooting' written by a then Colt Firearms representative, John Henry Fitzgerald, showed a picture of him in the so-called Weaver stance, back in 1930. The argument of stance is actually a 'red herring' and it is more importantly the choice of shooting one-handed or supported with the other hand which is the real argument.

There will never be a successful conclusion to the argument as there is no correct solution or ideal. What works at the time, works. It's that simple. What's important is that we train people in a way that will provide responses as close to the natural instinctive response as possible. There is little point spending countless hours trying to *'make water run uphill'*.

Grip

One Hand/Two Hand

In a CP role, particularly in a 'one to one' role as BG with no back-up PES, it may be necessary with the weak hand to either fend off or hold your Principal, whilst drawing a weapon with the strong hand and immediately you're two handed, training becomes redundant. This scenario as described, tends however, to disguise the main argument and that again is a person's instinctive reaction when returning fire which, more often, will be to shoot strong hand only.

Two handed shooting was adopted by the FBI as far back as prior to WW2, when they allowed supported shooting from behind barricades at ranges out at 25-50 yards. From the 'Isosceles' one can shoot both single and double handed and when single handed, one can shoot with an angled posture. It allows a 'combat crouch' (an instinctive reaction under fire), but disallows mobility, particularly when completely square on and shooting two handed, unlike the modified Weaver which allows far more flexibility for fire and movement.

Two handed shooting obviously has its place and is advocated by those people who favour the requirement of a 'flash site picture' as distinct from the 'instinctive' shooter. Personally, I do not feel that the two schools of thinking are in any way contrary as again, the argument

is purely dominated by distance. A two handed hold increases stability and therefore accuracy of the weapon, particularly when firing multiple shots ('double taps') and also lessens the chance of a weapon being torn from your grip.

Remember - you're coming under fire and will have to React. **Speed of draw, target acquisition and trigger release** have to be a smooth continuous movement and your training needs to be as close as possible to your natural instinct.

The Draw

Whether you are at 30 feet or 3 from your target or enemy, one thing remains constant - the speed of the draw. At 20 plus metres, once the weapon is out you may feel relaxed enough to take a two handed grip in a Weaver or Isosceles stance, gain a good 'Index' sight picture and loose off a round. At 3 feet you will probably be squeezing the trigger as your weapon has just cleared the holster and aligned with the targets. It's only distance that dictates the process of target acquisition and stance and grip variables, but the one constant factor must be a fast draw. Of all your various drills and practices, this is the one that you can repeat 10,000 times and it won't cost you a penny. Its a 'dry' training drill that you should practice until you're sick of it. Practice it standing, walking, crouching, falling, sitting and running, but practice it. Practice it with a variety of outer layers of clothing, from loose shirts to jackets and top coats.



The draw from the Weaver stance. From a concealed carry, the jacket must be well clear of the holster. Note the index finger outside the holster and stiff until such time as it can safely acquire the trigger.

Irrespective of the range and the speed and cadence of shots, the draw is always the same - fast. You will never be fast and accurate, however, unless you are smooth. Practice to be smooth before you bleed the speed into the draw. If you go too fast too soon you will simply be jerky and robotic. Note the slight drop of the forward shoulder to present the butt of the weapon better to the hand and create some air between the back and the butt for the hand to slip between.

Accuracy is affected by two factors when drawing:-

1. A poor grip

2. A jerky, robotic action (as if you were still working by numbers)

If you acquire a poor grip on a weapon whilst in the holster, it will only get worse once its out and you're firing. If you're not smooth on the draw, the 'jerky' action will negate the body's automatic sensing system which co-ordinates hand/eye and brain.

The draw can be broken down into the following parts:-

- target acquisition
- the thumb draws across the top of the abdomen, catching the jacket, the thumb is really to help locate the jacket as it is the little and adjoining finger that actually catch the jacket. The jacket must be flung over the back and anything less than a really vigorous movement will simply allow the jacket to fall back over the butt of the weapon.
- as the fingers hook the jacket, the lead shoulder can be dropped slightly and the rear hip, behind which the pistol is sitting, can be canted back slightly, which helps present the weapon to the hand and also allows the jacket to stay behind more. This is only really practical in a Weaver position. This also allows the hand to fit between back and butt.
- the web of the thumb is dropped down over the butt plate with the index finger down and stiff outside the holster.
- the weapon is drawn vertically up with a high arm lift and then pivoted almost immediately to align with the target.
- as the weapon is pushed towards the target, at a point appropriate, the safety can come off or the cocking lever squeezed and the shot taken. The point appropriate for the safety to be released is dependent on the situation ie. training or for real.

The choice of grip and stance all have a part to play in the draw, but its unchangeable characteristics are speed and smoothness. Start off slowly, keep the whole thing one smooth action and then 'bleed' the speed into it as your actions become more automatic. The jacket, if of the box variety, may be pulled back from behind by the weak hand, but this won't work with a vented one.



The 'speed rock'. At close ranges you may need the speed of a short draw with the weapon firing as soon as it leaves the holster and is pointing at the target. The only concern is that there is a natural tendency for people to push the weapon towards the threat, even if close. In a way it's part of a natural instinct to want to, in some way, cover your face. Short draws do have their place and should be practiced.

Whilst in the learning phase of the short draw, it's essential that someone checks your weapon position. As the pistol leaves the holster, it should pivot as if the weapon hand has a screw going through it and into your ribs, around which the hand and weapon rotate. The butt rests on the hip bone. In that fixed position wherever you point the body, the weapon will point.



Speed and Accuracy

The two are often seen in conflict and often accuracy can fall in relation to increased speed, but the importance of getting a weapon into action quickly cannot be stressed strongly enough. Waiting in an undercover van, weapon drawn on 'robbery' detail with known 'faces' to identify and the advantage of surprise, the stance and weapon support that a police officer would adopt cannot be cross referenced to a CP situation, but in police training manuals you will see this influence and also that of the basic principles of marksmanship. In a CP role, the first you may know of an engagement is when a round comes through your car window. Its too easy to be clinical and classroom-like in the preparation of a training package and disregard '**Instinct and Reality**'.

If you come under fire and your priority, correctly, is to get your VIP away, then you need to keep an assailant's head down. You need to divert his attention from being the attacker to being attacked. He needs to come under fire quickly and whilst it would be ideal if you hit and stopped him in the first instance, in reality the best you can realistically hope for is 'suppressive fire'. Distance also dictates the feasibility of being accurate. If all you have is a hand gun, it will probably only buy you time to escape. Put rounds down as quickly as possible, endeavour to be accurate, but above all else, be instinctively quick in getting into action.

Target Acquisition

This means what it says - not just acquiring a 'site picture', but establishing your target. Incoming fire has a source. To be on aim before acquiring a target will cause a loss of hand/eye co-ordination. The head turns, eyes acquire the target at the same time as the strong hand goes for the weapon. The grip on the weapon at this stage is critical as a weak, imperfect grip will only ever get worse, never better. And when rounds are 'loosed off', a poor grip will become exaggerated with recoil. The target is visually acquired and the weapon drawn and 'punched' towards it. A round can be let off the moment the barrel is pointing towards the target. The eye doesn't need to see both the target and the end of the barrel for the body to co-ordinate with the brain.

Keep both eyes open. Under stress, we develop tunnel vision and if you've ever been involved in a fight or highly stressful situation, you'll know the feeling. Narrowing your peripheral vision any further by closing one eye is not recommended. If you need to close an eye to obtain a perfect 'site picture', then I would submit your enemy is too far away to bother shooting. At the distances likely to be involved, I also question the necessity of having a 'flash site picture'. As it means you've waited for a complete posture before you engaged with a view of weapon/target. With tunnel vision, the narrow tunnel within which your site has now to appear, on line with the target means an even longer time before you can let a round off. Your mind can still co-ordinate your barrel to the target, without your

eyes having a part in the process. I'm not talking about 'hip shooting' rather that your weapon is out in front, but not necessarily playing a visual part with your eye co-ordination and the target.

As we have said previously, in a fight you don't maintain a site picture which includes your hands, feet, elbows and the target. We instinctively concentrate on the target and are even able to hit a particular target on the body whilst looking elsewhere ie. we can easily hit a man with body shots while we look at his eyes. The same goes for pistol work. We are close enough to the target to be able to accurately shoot 'centre of mass' in an instinctive fashion. What I personally feel suits me, however, should not have application across a wide range of individuals own preferences and if we lose sight of a person's own behaviour and instinct, we are going against the first tenet of training.

Positional Shooting, Turns and Pivots

At Combat Shooting's basic level for CP work, you will need to be skilled in the following:-

Normal Safety Procedures (NSPs). Until you are competent to handle a weapon safely under all circumstances, you will be unable to practice any drills on a range. At all times you must treat every weapon as loaded, not point a weapon at anything you do not intend to shoot and during a course of fire, have your weapon pointed down range at all times. When on a firing point you will not handle your weapon or any weapon that may be on a table. If your weapon is in your holster it will stay there at all times.

Safe Handling of a weapon must become instinctive but not so instinctive that you become unaware of your actions with a weapon. You must constantly have a conscious awareness of the weapon's muzzle and remember 'touching triggers - tragedy'.

You will need to be skilled at the following basics:-

- Working from stances
- The draw
- Weak hand shooting
- Positional shooting - standing, kneeling, prone
- Turns/pivots - right turns, left turns, 180 degrees turns and pivots
- All the above must be practiced whilst on the move as well as when stationary
- Short draw/hip shooting
- Punch to buy time
- Body cover/weapon handling - with multi-directional threats



In the early learning stages of giving body cover and returning fire, there is a tendency to shoot low, particularly if you need to get rounds off as the weapon leaves the holster. At close ranges you will always put the rounds in the knees without some effort to correct the aim.

As training advances, there must be the inclusion of:-

- Shooting from a moving vehicle and team drills
- Advanced barricade work
- Low light shooting and 'torch and pistol' work
- Stressfire training
- Basic hostage recovery
- Advanced team drills - fire and movement
- Counter attack techniques
- Use of pyrotechnics

All the above with handguns, shotguns and, if abroad, full auto SMGs.



The start of training is the 'punch to buy time' drill. Resist the tendency to want to strike the face. Someone committed to a draw will carry on regardless. Hit the shoulder on the weapon side and hit it hard. If done properly, it will almost spin your opponent round. If he's just acquired a grip on the weapon, it will often fly out of his grip, but at worst he will be completely off line to take a quick shot which buys you time to draw and shoot. You acquire the weapon as you hit and rock back to shoot. Punch to buy time is the only way at close range that you will have a chance against someone who has the drop on you and is already going for his weapon. You won't outdraw him.!

Body Armour

Body armour is 'role specific'. The armour required to provide protection in a war zone would be different from that required by a police officer, which would again be different from that required by a CP operative.

A practical, all-purpose vest does not exist. A vest which would need to give protection against a range of battlefield threats from high velocity rounds, to fragmentation and even armour-piercing, would not be appropriate in a CP role. Such a vest, to give as much all-round protection as possible, would have a high collar, groin flaps and hardened further with ceramic or steel plate inserts. It would be worn as an outer garment and would, by its very design requirements, be extremely overt. In a CP role, the requirement is predominantly for a vest to be covert when worn either by the Principal or members of his CP team.

Body armour has a history stretching back some 50 years when, during the second world war, the FLAK (Flieger Abwehrkanone) jacket made its debut. Since then, with the developments of modern materials and the emergence of role specific products, armour has broadly divided into two compartments - Soft and Hard. Either overlapped plates or body-moulded, hard armour using ceramic or metal plates is inflexible, impractical and subject to easily being damaged. On the other hand, soft armour, particularly for our purposes, suits the requirements of being light, flexible, concealable and comfortable for long periods of wear, but will not resist high velocity rounds.



A modern vest is thin, well fitting and reasonably comfortable to wear. This vest from Bodyshield, The Basic V features 6 levels of protection and is upgradable. Manufactured by the Up North Corp. of Sweden.

The threat may be from a knife or other sharp instrument, through to .38mm, 9mm AP, 9mm SMG and HV Ball and AP rifle rounds. To facilitate the standardisation of design against a range of threats, international standards of threat apply. In the UK, these are HG1 (class 2a), HG2 (class 3a), and RFI (class 4), class 1 threats being at the bottom end with .22 LR, and .38 spec. Knife specification is now governed by the British Home Office PSDB Stab Procedure for Protection Vests (1993), which sets out the energy in joules that need to be absorbed.

As a consequence of the wide range of potential threats, the vast majority of vests from manufacturers are modular. Stab vests can be 'up-armoured' to have ballistic cover and the reverse is also possible with ceramic and/or steel plates inserted to give protection against armour-piercing and HV rounds. I would submit if you have a Principal who needs a vest with ceramic plates, then the threat would be considerably higher than that dealt with by most civilian CP teams.

In a civilian CP role, we are only ever likely to be advising on the use of soft body armour. This is not always the case, but for the majority of purposes and the requirement for low profile, it will normally be the rule. Soft body armour that can resist ballistic impact is not efficient at stopping a blade. This is because that, although bullets or pellets travel fast, they are not heavy and are easily stopped.

Pistols, particularly with their short barrels mean they are relatively inefficient at burning the propellant gases which when linked with a reasonably heavy round, give a low ballistic co-efficient number - in other words, they lose velocity quickly. At somewhere between 750 feet per second and up to 1,500 fps, with the larger magnums, low velocity rounds are easily stopped by modern soft body armour. Basically, this happens by means of weaving layers of woven aramid (kevlar or twaron), up to 25 layers. The bullet when it hits this fine weave, by its rotational movement, shreds the weaved layers, which ensnares the bullet and slows down rapidly its momentum. The small area of impact is transferred via the material to a larger area, although 'blunt trauma' is still a problem and usually needs to be dealt with separately.

High velocity rounds, on the other hand, with a high ballistic co-efficient number, have no problem in penetrating soft armour and such armour needs the addition of ceramic or metal plate. Knife attacks also cause problems for soft armour as the weave is not distorted by the penetration of the blade, which will pass through by cutting a path. A fine chain mail or plastic insert can solve the problem. It may be that the threat is unspecific but, that the regional situation demands some 'hardening' so to speak, of your Principal, in which instance a stab vest may be the answer.

Many factors go into the design of vests:-

- **Effective stopping power**
- **Blunt trauma**
- **Concealability**
- **Comfort**
- **Durability**



A well made vest should be undetectable when worn under normal clothes. Be sensible with their use. No boss is going to wear one for long periods.

For many years, the 'soft' vests, as distinct from the 'hard armour' variety have been constructed from glass fibre and Aramid (ie Kevlar). Kevlar, the 'wonder' material of the '80s, has now met its match in the latest development, the 'super wonder' material of the '90s - **Dyneema**. Dyneema is the registered trade name for a material produced by a company, DSM of the Netherlands. Produced from Ultra High Modular Polythene, Dyneema has the Highest Tenacity of any property in the world. It is lighter than water, up to 15 times more dense than high quality steel, has extremely high energy absorption and is durable, not being affected by moisture, fluids or light as in the case of Kevlar.

Supposedly, the strongest material in the world, Dyneema in its various designs can be woven or laid to give lightweight, flexible armoured products, flat or shaped. A 'ballistic' plate for a car door would weigh only 4kg/m^2 and would fit easily within an existing door panel, requiring no modification. The high sonic velocity within the fibre helps dissipate impact energy over a wide area, so giving an in-built 'blunt trauma' ability. Against AP rounds, there is still the necessity to up-armour with steel or ceramic plates, but as an all-round material in vest design, it has made the majority of stab and ballistic vests even more covert and effective.

As competition in the manufacture of vests has increased, prices of good quality vests have come down to reasonable levels. In some countries throughout the world, the use of vests by team members should be considered mandatory.



A selection of Ballistic Plates from Bodyshield, one of the best cost/value producers of vests and other Ballistic protective equipment.

CHAPTER 16

EMERGENCY FIRST AID

Civilian first aid requirements and those of the military have, over the past few years, moved closer together. The advent of Paramedic Ambulance Personnel with skills far in excess of basic first aid, more resemble a battlefield medic, although often better equipped. Trained in the use of drugs, giving fluid and the application of a defibrillator, they are clinically self-sufficient.



You've got to know what to do if it happens! Whilst the chances of your Boss having a Cardiac Arrest are probably ten times greater than him being shot, it may happen in front of you and you are going to have to act and act competently.

In many ways this is what anyone, who is part of a CP team and wants to specialise on the medical side needs to aim to achieve. Unfortunately, the training to a qualified standard has now formalised to exclude non-relevant personnel from achieving a Paramedic qualification, but that shouldn't stop the pursuit of knowledge or skills that may be life-

saving in extreme situations. How you go about this I will leave to your own ingenuity, but there are ways and means. Having the piece of paper to say you're qualified only to basic First Aid standard may have relevance within the shores of the British Isles and most of Europe, where resources to professional care is, supposedly, only a telephone call away, but if you are working in a third world country or even a former Eastern bloc country, neither communications nor the emergency services are up to a standard on which you could safely rely.

In these circumstances, basic first aid is insufficient where you need to be totally self-sufficient and by that we mean self-sufficient in both skills and kit.

Response time is a critical factor. The new European guidelines on the conventions of Resuscitation and dealing with a casualty are simply based on the effectiveness of technology, that is, a phone. In Brussels you may at all times and in most areas, find a working phone, but try in downtown Manchester, Leeds or Kiev and see how long it takes you to find a working piece of equipment from which to call for help. If you were working in Russia, outside any major conurbation, you simply won't find a phone. For years, communication has been in the hands of the security services. There are no commercial workable radio telephones, and cell phones, in their infancy, extend to only approx. 50km outside the city limits. You're on your own in any rural environment and as a consequence, if you can't do it no-one will.



You have to get 'hands on' when learning advanced First Aid. This means getting a good grounding in basic anatomy.

Also, the nature of CP work is that, in extremis, you may have to deal with a range of injuries and trauma, usually out with the scope of the civilian first aider. Blast injuries, gunshots and stab wounds all fall within the remit of the CP medic and places him firmly between the role of the civilian first aider and battlefield medic.

He must know how to:-

- **Take blood pressure readings**
- **Give fluid**
- **Carry out Endo-Tracheal Intubation**
- **Give Intra-muscular, Intra-venous injections**
- **Have a good working knowledge of drugs and their use**
- **Basic ability to suture**

This is in addition to a good basic understanding of all the accepted civilian first aid requirements. This chapter cannot in its limited space, act as a training course, but what it hopes to do is expose the range of knowledge one needs in the CP field, whilst at the same time giving an insight into certain procedures.

It is necessary, however, to outline the basic accepted conventions of first aid and the latest procedures. The aims of emergency first aid remain the same.

- **To preserve life**
- **To limit the effects of the condition ie. prevent injuries getting worse**
- **To promote recovery**

Over the years, we've had many mnemonics as aide memoires to assist in 'Prioritising' procedures we should follow eg. the old '4 B's'.

BREATHING
BLEEDING
BREAKS
BURNS

Now replaced with the 'ABC'

AIRWAYS
BREATHING
CIRCULATION

A casualty must be evacuated from the scene as soon as is practical. Preparing a casualty for evacuation is of vital importance so as to prevent injuries getting worse.



Whether we like it or not, the latest 'Rules of Engagement' require us in most circumstances to phone the emergency services. Quite rightly it has emerged that emergency Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR), whilst providing to an injured casualty an 'Oxygenated Blood Supply', is not magically, in most circumstances, going to restart the heart. Cardiac failure will usually only be corrected with the speedy application of an electric shock from a defibrillator machine, now carried in most ambulances and therefore the earlier one is summoned the better. CPR simply buys the patient time until a Defib. can be brought to the scene and the patient evacuated to specialist care.

The mechanics of CPR must be fully understood by all CP operatives. Performing Expired Air Resuscitation and External Cardiac Compression must become second nature either when on one's own or working in pairs. Constant practice of the whole process of CPR, assessing injuries, emergency actions and continuation treatment must be an integral part of a BG's training regime.

Assessment of a casualty is the first requirement and should follow this procedure:-

- **Gloves On** - if you've nothing else in your medical kit, carry surgical gloves. Blood is now a dangerous substance.
- **Danger/Hazard** - to yourself and further, to the casualty. If too dangerous - don't attempt.
- **Response** - is the casualty conscious? Determine the consciousness or level of unconsciousness.
- **Talk and Shake** - to determine if they are **Alert** or:-
 - respond do **Verbal Stimulation**
 - Painful Stimulation**
 - or **Unresponsive**

If they respond, treat the cause, if not, then ABC.

1. **Check Airway** ie. check, clear and maintain it.
2. **Check Breathing** ie. look, listen and feel (5 second check).
NB. You look along the chest as you listen and feel for breath on your ear.
If absent - 2 slow, full inflations.
3. **Check Circulation** - at carotid pulse (5 second check). If absent, begin CPR (to whatever protocol you're following), see below.

If just unconscious and history is unknown, then place a Geudal Airway in after measuring it and re-check breathing. Stabilise the cervical spine, that is neck, by putting a collar on it.

- Visual Sign Baseline (VSB) check and write them down - pulse, respiratory rate, colour, blood pressure (BP), oxygen saturation (circulation response to blanching - nail pinch).
- Haemorrhage check - quick body check for pooling.
- Full body check, full spine check and check wallet for prior history, symbols etc.
- Treat any life-threatening injuries.
- Shock - treat for shock where possible.
- Monitor - update VSB.
- Evacuation - prepare the casualty for evacuation and evacuate if you haven't already.



Airway management is the first priority in an unconscious casualty. Your medical kit must contain a good selection of different sized Geudal airways. If you've received the training, then you should always have some Endotracheal tubes in your pack.

If you were in Europe, then the protocol to follow after assessment is as follows:-

1. Unconscious, no pulse or breathing

- a. Dial 999 for an ambulance (911 for our American cousins)

2. Unconscious, no breathing, pulse present

- a. Give 10 breaths of artificial ventilation
- b. Dial 999 for an ambulance
- c. Continue artificial ventilation

3. Unconscious, breathing and pulse

- a. Treat any life-threatening injury
- b. Place the casualty in the recovery position
- c. Get help.

4. Conscious, breathing and pulse present

- a. Treat as appropriate
- b. Get help if necessary



Left: Theory is okay to a point, but there comes a time when you have to put a needle into someone. When you're prodding about for a good vein, you soon discover the depth of team morale.



Right: Being able to give fluid is essential. In cases where fluid loss is severe, it may mean the difference between life and death. If you are in a 'Third World' situation, you must be prepared to carry IV fluids.

Prior to single casualty assessment, you may have been required to assess who to deal with in a mass casualty situation. You're now into the very difficult field of 'Triage'. Triage is from the french word 'to sieve' and was a system devised during the first world war, used to process casualties into groups according to priority of treatment. It isn't a one-off procedure, but a continuing process and cannot be embarked upon by people unskilled and without a decisive nature. Whilst Triage has its place more properly on the battlefield, prioritising casualties for treatment is still learnt in our work and essentially, Triage says '**Save the Saveable**'. With limited resources in terms of kit, fluid and manpower, you apply your resources to the people most likely to have the best chance of survival.

Missile Wounding

A missile may be anything which can wound, from a bullet, fragment of grenade, bomb, shell, secondary missile such as glass, rock, splinters and even clothing.

The damage caused by any missile is a product of the nature of the tissue it strikes and the Kinetic Energy (KE) which it imparts to that tissue on impact. The energy is again a product of mass and velocity. The energy released when a missile is stopped by tissue is what causes damage and the faster a missile is retarded by tissue, the greater the damage which results. Retardation depends upon the density and elasticity of the tissue. In other words, a bullet hitting the thigh or stomach will release its energy far quicker and with more resultant injury than when passing through a lung, say, where the tissue is less dense.

We will for a moment concentrate on the missile wounding of bullets and you must understand the distinction between the wounding effect of Low Velocity (LV) rounds and High Velocity (HV). An LV round upto approx. 1100 feet per second usually results in laceration and crushing. Tissue is cut, crushed and forced apart. Such effects are not serious unless vital organs or major blood vessels are hit. Only the tissue which comes into contact with the round will be damaged and such a wound is actually comparable to the passage made by a hand held weapon. No significant energy is imparted to surrounding tissue and only minor excision (cutting away) of damaged tissue is necessary.

HV wounding couldn't be more different. Whilst cutting a path through tissue, an HV round compresses the flesh in front of it, which moves away as a shock wave of spherical form. The velocity of this shock wave is that of the velocity of sound in water - 1500 metres per second (4,800 feet per second) and although such a shock wave is of short duration, it can create a peak pressure of upto 1500 pounds per square inch. There is also the effect of 'Temporary Cavitation', a feature only encountered with HV wounding. Tissue is forced violently forwards and outwards and continues after the passage of the missile. Destruction happens in all tissues ie. muscle, liver, brain and affects limbs, the abdomen, chest and head. Solid homogeneous organs are more susceptible than say the lungs.

The cavity can be up to 40 times as large as the diameter of the missile and although it reaches maximum size in a few milliseconds, the energy released results in severe damage. Soft tissues will be pulped, small vessels disrupted and bones shattered. A temporary vacuum occurs which sucks dirt and debris into the wound, this inoculates dead tissue with debris and bacteria and makes HV wounds highly infectious. You must make a rapid assessment from all the factors involved, to determine the nature of the wounding, whether LV or HV. First appearance may be deceptive. If an HV round remains ballistically stable, a small external wound could lead to the wrong diagnosis.

Study the following:-

- Principles of Cardio Pulmonary Resuscitation (CPR), one man and two man.
- Recognition of the stages of unconsciousness. Be familiar with the Voluntary Aid Society (VAS) observation chart, which is a modification of the Glasgow Coma Scale.
- Know how to put someone in the recovery position (modern method).
- The use of airways.
 - Pharyngeal - Geudal
 - Endotracheal - Oral

You must be able to perform Endotracheal Intubation as well as be conversant with:-

- Use of oxygen
- Shock - causes and types. Recognition signs and symptoms.
- Burns, scalds etc.
- Wounds and bleeding.
- Fractures - types and traction.
- Asphyxiation and Choking - Tracheotomy, Cricoidotomy.
- Poisoning.
- Effects of heat and cold.
- Transferring the injured.
- Dressing and Bandages.
- The use of anti-biotic drugs.
- The use of pain-relieving drugs.
- Fluid replacement.
- Treatment of special injuries - crush, blast, stab.
- Heart disorders.
- Casualty marking.
- Emergency child birth.
- Joint and muscular injuries.
- All miscellaneous conditions.

Medical Kit

In many 'Out of Area' operations, your medical kit will need to be comprehensive and should be constructed to meet the following requirements:-

- Self Protection - gloves, face shields, bag and mask, mucus extractor.
- Treatment of shock.
- The establishment and maintenance of a free airway.
- The control of haemorrhage.
- The relief of pain.
- The application of sterile wound dressing.
- The immobilisation of fractures etc.
- The control of infection.
- The emergency care of injuries which require priority treatment ie. the closing of sucking chest wounds, chest tube drainage.
- Basic nursing.

However comprehensive, a medical kit should be capable of being carried by one person. Packing should permit quick orientation and easy access to the different items. A printed list of items should be included. A kit which you have at a residence may be more comprehensive than that carried in a vehicle or equally that carried on your person. In an ideal world you would want the following to be in your medical pack:-

a. Dressings

- Field dressings, various sizes (sterile)
- Burn dressings (sterile)
- Pads - gauze, surgical (sterile)
- Adhesive plasters
- Cotton wool
- Bandages (various)
- Eyes dressings

Right: Vehicle medical kit weighing in at some 40lbs. Within the main pack is a detachable inner to carry whilst on foot. If you are on foot then the kit needs to be in a suitably innocuous pack.



b. Drugs and Fluid

- Injectable analgesic, syrettes (Morphine or substitute)
- Analgesic - oral
- Tranquillisers
- Blood substitutes, IV electrolytes ie. Hartmans (Ringers lactate)
- Salt tablets
- Anaesthetics
- Anti-biotics
- Liquid antiseptic
- Surgical soap



Bag and Mask, Hartmans fluid, Airways, Laryngoscope, Endotracheal tubes, Inflatable splints and much more must be in a comprehensive medical kit.

Miscellaneous

- Scissors and cutters
- Airways: Pharyngeal, Endotracheal

- Laryngoscope
- Pins: safety
- Syringes and needles
- Field Card and Pens
- Skin marking equipment
- Ring cutter
- Needles and suture
- Tracheotomy kit
- Scalpels
- Candles, matches
- Torch and whistle
- Survival bag
- Inflatable splints
- Tweezers
- Disposable gloves
- Face Shield for CPR
- Bag and mask
- Mucus extractor
- Stethoscope
- Sphygometer



Suturing. Something even close knit (no pun intended) teams won't practice live.



Tracheotomy. The principle's the same for man or beast.

Burns

Resulting from a variety of causes, burns are highly infectious, in some cases extremely painful and, if severe, can cause a disturbance in the body's circulating fluid, sufficient to guarantee the onset of shock.

Burns may be simplistically classified as dry, scalds, electrical or as a result of exposure to severe cold or through exposure to chemical and radiation sources. Thermal injury, regardless of the cause, results in cell death and fluid loss. Serum loss from the circulating blood can reach a maximum, even into the second day of a burn, so producing Hypovolaemic shock. Burns require early treatment and fluid replacement to prevent shock taking hold.

Assessing the extent of a burn is broadly based on two factors, Body Surface Area (BSA) and depth. Depth of a burn is broadly classified as Superficial (Epidermal), Part Depth or Partial Thickness (Dermal) and Full Thickness Burns. For the unskilled person, the assessment of depth of burn is difficult and initially it is easier to make an assessment based on BSA burned and the 'Rule of 9's' still remains a useful guide. This is where the body is divided into 9%*s*, ie. front of trunk 18%, back of trunk 18%, arm 9% front of leg 9%, back of leg 9%, head 9% etc.

A partial thickness burn of 9% BSA or more will cause shock to develop. The greater the depth and surface area, the more the risk of infection taking hold.

Immediate Action Drills

- Assess the danger.
- If safe, remove the casualty from the source of the heat or vice versa.
- Stop the burning or further damage by application of running water. This may need to be up to 10 minutes to assist in rapid cooling. Don't overcool the casualty to the extent that you cause hypothermia. Chemical agents must be washed away and this should last for 15 minutes.
- Remove watches, jewellery, belts and any tight clothing.
- Cover with a sterile burns dressing or any clean non-fluffy material or plastic kitchen film after removing the first two pulls.
- Clean plastic bags for hands and feet, secured by a non-constricting bandage or the patient's own clothing.
- Monitor the patient's pulse, airway and breathing - endeavour early on to detect any signs of heat inhalation eg. scorched eyebrows, soot around the nose and mouth and a swollen and reddened tongue.
- Pain can be severe in cases of superficial burns and morphine, if in an 'out of area' scenario, given intravenously, is the drug of choice.

Do not

- Prick or burst blisters.
- Touch or interfere with the infected area.
- Apply any lotions or fats to the burn.
- Remove anything sticking to the burn.
- Use adhesive dressings.
- Cover a patient so as to make them too warm. This will induce sweating and further fluid loss.

Fluid replacement is essential in the prevention of the onset of shock. If you are 'out of area' and some distance from any emergency services, you must commence either IV fluid replacement or if the BSA is less than 15% and IV fluid such as Hartmans or Ringers is not available, the by mouth 'Moyers' solution of salt, bicarbonate of soda and water, is a good alternative if IV is not a proposition. It is unlikely that a CP team will carry any Colloid solution for IV purposes and more commonly, electrolytes will be the fluid that one will have on most occasions. Early evacuation of burns patients is essential.

Shock

Shock is the killer and everyone who may find themselves in an emergency first aid situations must be able to recognise the signs and symptoms and take some preventative action.

Still not fully understood, Shock is a 'catch all' phrase for a variety of types eg. Hypovolaemic, Septic, Cardiogenic and Vaso-Vagal. The result from whichever variety is a multiple system biological failure with a low cardiac output. This results in a deterioration of the microcirculation and severe problems with cellular metabolism in the liver, kidneys, lung and skeletal muscle.

Any wounding provokes a systemic response from the body. Pain, blood or fluid loss, tissue damage and ultimately infection all conspire to bring into play defence mechanisms. The respiratory and cardiovascular systems are affected primarily in the body's dynamic adaptation to injury. The results of the onset of shock are impaired circulation, reduced pulse pressure, rising pulse rate, colour changes in the skin, cooling of the periphery, lowering of the body temperature, thirst and apathy.

It may take some patients many hours before shock takes a serious hold, whereas in others, the onset may be rapid. The symptoms are progressive as the body compensates for fluid loss by draining blood to the core. A vicious circle with imperfect cardiac filling and inadequate cardiac output, all conspire to make shock often irreversible and finally fatal. Recognition of Shock, either through the evident extent of injury or fluid loss must happen

early on. Baseline readings for blood pressure, pulse (rate, strength, regularity), circulatory response, colour, skin temperature must all be taken and assessed as early as possible.

The onset of thirst and the growth of apathy must be seen for what they are - the onset of Shock and such conditions as nausea, vomiting and sweating may all indicate shock, accompanied by feeling faint or giddy and rapid shallow breathing.

Severe shock with a weak to imperceptible pulse, cold skin with an ashen to cyanotic mottling, a sluggish response to pinching with thumb nail, severe thirst and a total apathy to an almost comatose state, probably means you are about to irretrievably lose your patient.

Shock needs to be controlled by:-

1. Relief of pain.
 2. Fluid replacement.
 3. Constant encouragement and reassurance through dialogue with the patient.
- The mental stimulus and encouragement is paramount as the psychological implications are often equally responsible for the decline as clinical ones.

Morphine should not be used intramuscularly, as absorption due to circulatory deficiencies is poor.

You should elevate the legs if injuries allow, to improve blood supply to the vital organs. Insulate the casualty from the cold and loosen all tight clothing etc. Ensure a clear airway at all times and prevent further fluid loss. If vomiting is likely, place in the recovery position and simply moisten the lips if thirsty. Do not let the casualty smoke.

Fluid transfusion is essential in the case where serious injury has resulted in fluid loss, either externally or internally. The rule of 'replace with what has been lost' is fine if you drive around in a field hospital, but electrolyte solutions such as Ringers or Hartmans are shown to enlarge the interstitial fluid compartment and can offer a good chance of re-establishing the stability of the circulation.

If you have an oxygen supply, this may be essential in patients with respiratory impairment such as chest injuries due to blast or carbon monoxide poisoning.

A specialist 'first aid man', or Paramedic on a CP team is essential, but everyone involved in security work must have an above average working ability with advanced first aid skills.

CHAPTER 17

UNARMED COMBAT & FITNESS TRAINING

I'm always surprised by the number of people who turn up for CP training, who have no martial skills whatsoever. They've never boxed, wrestled, played Judo, engaged in the practice of Eastern or Western martial arts or never played contact sports, yet they feel they can become a bodyguard. In Japan of old, one became a bodyguard because of one's array of martial skills - it somehow seemed too late to become a bodyguard and then wonder whether in fact you could be effective. When it comes to the bottom line, you have to be able to fight and remember, you're seldom, if ever, going to be armed, certainly never if you work in this country and seldom, even if abroad. You are dependent on your physical unarmed skills, aggression training and fitness.

Close Protection is a science of **'Procedures of Avoidance'** but if these fail, you will be fighting and maybe, fighting for your life and that of your Principal. You must have a good command of martial skills - knowledge is not enough. As with any skill-based operation, you have to practice.

To balance against the above comments, I am equally amazed by the number of martial artists who believe, solely as a result of their skills, that they automatically must make good BGs. It's the same mentality that leads them to believe they will make good doormen, until they're on the receiving end of a street fighter's single disguised and deceptive technique with which he's 'put away' countless 'martial arts experts'. Martial artists simply make good material for BGs, but only that. As with door work, to have an effective system of unarmed combat, one has to strip away layers of techniques and art that have no place in the street.

'Complexity is death' in a self defence role and that is what essentially we're talking about when we look at unarmed combat, allied to Close Protection. It's just that the *self* aspect of self defence, now extends to others, such as your Principal.

Firstly we must come back to awareness and the two main aspects involved. **ACTION & REACTION**. In 99% of all situations that go wrong, Action will beat Reaction. An assailant who gets close enough to strike or stab at arm's length will win, as similarly, an attacker who is armed with a pistol and who gets within range unnoticed to get a shot off, has the advantage of surprise. A CP team will, in nearly every case, react to an event. **'Constant Awareness'** is the only weapon that can have any improving effect on the situation and being able to generate some **'timescale of anticipation'** will prevent the **'Freeze of Surprise and Shock'** which accompanies any attack. However, if you don't see it coming, you'll always be on the back foot. Self Defence in the street such as defence against a mugger requires a different approach to defence in the CP role, as someone with ill-intent towards your Principal, whether limited to hurling abuse, objects or personal attack, is not often going to engage you in conversation (as will a mugger) so as to occupy your thinking before striking. More often you'll be faced with a 'Rushing Attack' which is aimed at your Principal, where the assailant has to get either through you or around you to get at his target.

If you were to happen to see a police manual on CP Unarmed Combat, you'd think you had an answer to all situations. The pre-supposition, in these manuals, is unfortunately, that one has had time to make an assessment and then coolly, logically and effectively, apply a range of counters to control the situation. Unfortunately, such engagements will usually deteriorate into a brawl, with techniques that worked fine in practice, proving woefully inadequate and the unsophisticated and downright scruffy techniques being likely to win the day. To pre-order a range of defenses against a preset range of attacks will only guarantee in-built inflexibility when a situation doesn't seem to fit the bill. Developing a good fighter is not like painting by numbers. I'll quote Clausewitz again - *"No plan survives contact with the enemy"*.



Seated rowing with a good weight develops strong grappling ability.

You will, in every circumstance have to engage in the following:-

- **POWER**
- **SPEED**
- **BODY WEIGHT**
- **AGGRESSION**

All 4 aspects are interlinked and to my mind, inseparable. POWER is a function of 'strength in movement' - it's the moving application of strength. I've come across many heavily muscled and intrinsically strong people who were incapable of generating power in blows, kicks or with the application of controlled techniques. Quite often, possessing strength seems to create in people a lack of distinction between the two facets.

The nicety of measuring power in a fight is futile - don't measure blows as you'll never have enough anyway. Fear, tension and the surge of adrenaline all conspires to weaken your efforts considerably and will reduce what you believe to be your maximum impact potential. Having lost power, if you try and measure your impact at that point, you're working on something in the region of 20% which is probably insufficient to stop anyone.

From a legal standpoint, if you honestly believe you, or your Principal is facing serious injury or death, then you must respond with as much force as is necessary to negate the attack. Power needs to be derived from the correct application of technique to allow the greatest flow of energy from the dynamic transfer of bodyweight through a technique. Two books wouldn't be enough to cover the subject, but suffice to say you must train for power (*see the Author's 2 videos - 'Powerstrike' and 'Powerkick' - also available from Protection Publications*). A manual which gives you a chart of striking points without any thought to the power required to disable an individual is a waste of time.

Bagwork, padwork, shield work must all be brought into a training regime for punches, kicks, strikes and body charges. You must use a long bag to enable the practice of power throws and sweeps and to also practice head butts. Even biting has a legitimate part to play, for example, if you need to escape from a hold.

There is also no substitute for speed and often power can be simply a function of the combination of speed and body weight. I'm continually in awe of the 250lb American pro-football players, whose speed across the ground is close to that of Olympic sprinters, who can turn on a sixpence and 'hit' an opponent like an express train. It's probably the most effective martial art you can watch.



The Author working power kicks over 2 minute rounds to the bodyshield. Kicking in a self defence role, particularly anything higher than the knee is not to be advised, but on occasions, good powerful kicks may win the day.



Basic, heavy bag work builds punching ability, power and aggression.

Aggression is the glue which holds everything together and it's aggression which will win the day. Brilliant technique without aggression is secondary to average technique and an unbeatable aggressive attitude. The aggression I'm talking about is that which you can turn on with the same instant response as you can turn an electric light on from a switch. It's instantaneous and responds to any perceived threat or assault. In action and reaction, your first reaction is aggression, from which flows your speed and technique. Such aggression is cold, clinical and controlled. It's not hot, mindless and blind. The first is a trained response, the second a symptom of anger and lack of control (*see the Author's work on the subject - 'Fit To Fight - available from Protection Publications*).

It is inappropriate in any discussion on unarmed combat to avoid the subject of 'Fear'. Fear must be channelled to fuel aggression. In any conflict situation, you will always feel fear, usually accompanied by large shots of adrenaline and this is your fight or flight booster - use it or it will destroy you. Remember - shock victims have accompanying surges of adrenaline and this is what makes them go grey. Adrenaline which is not used instantly becomes debilitating so don't wait - ACT.

Where you are faced with the 'Rushing Attack', you must hit hard with bodyweight. FORGET THE NICETIES OF HITTING VULNERABLE POINTS.

I read constantly in training manuals how one should stop a rushing attack with blows to vital points. There is no way when somebody is on a charge and the fear and adrenaline is running through them and they are psyched up with one thought in mind - to attack your Principal, that you will coolly and calmly be able to hit a vital point and stop them in their tracks. Also their ability to feel pain under these conditions is almost nil.

The only answer is to deflect the charge or bring him down, as he will run through or brush aside kicks and punches. It probably won't happen cleanly and in the reality of the situation, you'll probably go down with him and if this happens and grappling becomes unavoidable, you must win. At this point, the rest of your team is, hopefully, doing what they should be best and that's removing the VIP from danger. Any other PES member who sees you do down and restrain the assailant is negligent if he helps you rather than stays with the Boss, despite their personal inclinations to want to assist. Always remember - any single attack may be a red herring to draw manpower away. Negate the threat and rejoin your team. If you do down and you can choke him out or strangle him, do so, he will be unconscious within seconds from a well applied choke or strangle, but remember, you're on the ground and vulnerable and in such a situation you must acknowledge everyone around you as hostile. You are in danger on the floor so use everything from fists, elbows, your head and teeth to do as much damage as is possible.

If you take him down and manage to stay upright, then in a brief few seconds, you must make a decision as to whether you need to cover your Principal or finish the threat and it may be that if in your 'honest belief' the assailant will continue with the attack, then you're the best man at that time to finish the threat and use your feet to take him out. Such action is justifiable in the circumstances.

You must always train to achieve as realistic an effect as possible.

'BLOCKING IS BOLLOCKS'

During 30 years of Martial Arts, I've lost count the number of times I've blocked, but it must run into 10's of 10's of thousands, but when it comes to the street, the opportunity to block, or the relevance of blocking is negligible. There may be an instinctive 'knee jerk' reaction to guard, usually combined with a parry, but a stylised blocking move never works.

Teaching people to block will only get them caught up with the 'chess moves' of Martial Arts. Anyone skilled will know instinctively whether their opponent is half way decent or not and single punch or kick thrown as a feint will usually draw from an unskilled person, an over-extended block taught to him by an unarmed combat instructor over a few weeks. The result is that they commit to blocking something which is not required, only to be knocked out, by a second or subsequent blows.

Skilled tacticians know that you can never go far wrong if you engage your opponent aggressively. If we exclude for the moment, knife attacks, you can't go far wrong in 'forward movement'. Backing off from an attack leaves you on the 'back foot' mentally as well as physically, leaves you vulnerable to directional changes of attack and limits your option with regard to weapons eg. fists, elbows, knees, feet, head. You can't strike hard when on the retreat, you can if all you're doing is scoring in a competition, but in the street, it won't work. More importantly, retreating and blocking attacks leaves you mentally in a defensive frame of mind, which couldn't be more wrong.

You must close with an attacker. In the majority of instances you are likely to be given 'punching distance' and this should be your first resort - forget the niceties of blocking - **CLOSE AND HIT**. I've seen it many times that people trained in blocking and countering have insufficient reactive instincts to deal with situations that do not conform to their training. If you read typical police training manuals on BG and unarmed combat, they have a suggestion for blocking a variety of strikes with suitable counters, when someone is rushing at you at sprinting speed - **it just won't work**.

You need to remember that pain alone won't stop a committed psyched up assailant. A violent man, possibly assisted by drugs, such as 'PCP' will seldom be stopped by even Magnum rounds from a hand gun, so don't think hitting vital parts will do it. One way is to 'shake his brain' and knock him out or gain a response from his Central Nervous System (CNS) to disable him. The eyes and throat might be good targets, but when it all hits the fan, the practice you did on static or pre-arranged moving targets with an opponent, are now bouncing all over the place and are extremely hard to hit.

Attacks may be broadly the following or a combination of a number:-

VERBAL
RUSHING
GRABBING
STRIKING
BLUNT INSTRUMENT
BLADE

We'll look at armed assailants later.

Striking attacks are the easiest to deal with. Forget whether your opponent is skilled or unskilled as in the fractions of seconds you have to deal with a situation, you won't be able to make a sufficiently cogent guess that will do you any good. Teaching people to make an assessment and then block or parry and counter is futile and a recipe for disaster. Average

training can only produce average results - a person must have an **'Instant Response Action'** (IRA), which will cover as many if not all eventualities.

'CHOICE AND DECISION MAKING, IS DEATH AND INJURY PRODUCING'

Not wanting to lambast any police CP training manuals, but to talk about parrying and delivering side kicks to the knee or to parry a skilled boxer's punch and side kick to the knee is ludicrous - you're simply playing their game. The same manual also describes how you should NOT get close to a skilled kicker. And they advise keeping at a distance and finding a chair to fend him off. In the middle of Oxford Street you could have a problem with the chair bit and as every skilled Martial Artist knows - the last thing you should do is give a skilled kicker distance - that's exactly what he wants.

To defeat a skilled kicker you must -

- **cover up**
- **close up**
- **sweep or grapple to the ground**



You can use a punchbag to practice a variety of techniques such as head butts. At close range and on the ground a good head butt is invaluable.

In the art of Tae Kwon-Do, for many years they banned leg sweeps in competition and the reason for this was that the style is heavily leg oriented and as a consequence very susceptible to being swept. TKD kicks are some of the best and you have to smother them, keeping out of the way won't solve your problem. A style such as TKD is not really one that would lend itself easily or sensibly to a CP role. If its sound advice, as the Police manual says, to get inside an unskilled kicker's attack, let me tell you the same most certainly holds true for any kicking attack, particularly a skilled one.


Remember your VIP's image.

Physical engagements sometimes can't be avoided and the last thing you want on your mind if an attack takes place is to think of the repercussions and hesitate. You must act, but if you prolong dealing with an attacker and it becomes a knock down, drag out, find a chair - fight, the damage to your boss's image is increasing with every second you delay in finishing the thing. I have taught for many years single blow, **'Pre-emptive strikes'** practiced on high density polystyrene pads to test impact on an opponent. Also using the **'double hip'** principle that is incorporated in all my techniques, I can knock someone unconscious with a slap - one blow and it's over. Such a technique as a slap may even go unnoticed by most of the people in the vicinity. There is a legal justification for being the first if you have honest belief about the seriousness of an attack. I can assure you that if I slap you you'll go down and stay down.

Chokes, grabs, traps, wrist and arm locks

First Principle - Don't get choked, grabbed, trapped, arm locked, or have your wrist locked. I'm not being facetious, simply telling you to stay aware. Anyone who is capable of getting that close to you to do it should have been both observable and detectable. SEE - DON'T JUST LOOK.

If someone who knows what they are about gets you in a choke or strangle hold, you're finished and I've no advice to offer apart from to rely on a team mate - forget all this bollocks about striking testicles and kicking backwards, there'll be nothing there. A skilled grappler will have those parts out of your way and will be dragging you to the ground as you go unconscious. Chokes and strangles when applied properly will work within seconds. You will read in manuals about defenses for chokes to the front, but anybody, quite honestly, who tries to choke you from the front is probably not playing with **'all his sheep in the top field'** - just knock the silly bugger out.



The importance of speed and simplicity in dealing with an attacker is vital in that you may be unaware of an accomplice or lost sight of him. By lost sight I mean the loss of peripheral vision that accompanies a stressful and fearful situation and creates tunnel vision. As a physiological trait I'm sure at some point in man's early development it served some purpose in concentrating his mind on a threat, but it blinds you to all other threats.

Left: Practising the 'double hip' for massive punching power in short range blows (see 'Powerstrike' video advert in the back of this book).

That's more than a sufficient reason why you can't take all day to take someone out. Also, as you're moving your VIP away from danger, you're subject to being grabbed, choked or encumbered by a grapple from the rear. Your 'reaction' must be instinct and instant and not considered. You cannot do two things at once. You can't deal with an opponent and carry on holding your VIP, although instinctively you tend to grip on. If your boss is also being moved away by other members of the PES, then release your hold as you'll hold everyone back.

If you're vertical grappling skills are good, throw him. Use your head to butt to the rear and your body weight to drop and disengage the 'hug'. If you can find a finger - break it, but all this is with the proviso that if he has a choke or strangle hold on, you have big problems. Should you feel a choke going on, you must immediately hit the floor hard with both feet like starter's blocks to push backwards.

Your intention is to run your opponent backwards at 100mph into any object, particularly the floor, where self preservation in your opponent is the only thing that will cause him to release his hold. If he feels he is going to hit the floor at speed with you on top of him, he will possibly release to fend himself off the floor. If you allow him to get a hold however, and maintain a stable stance, or drag you along to break your balance, then you're finished. Its an instant reaction. You must train to develop this instinctive reaction to dropping and twisting body weight to break free of bear hugs and the 'hit the ground running' instinct for chokes. If you can disengage, destroy your opponent.

Elbows - used properly, they are one of the best close quarter weapons. They are impossible to block and are like having a short heavy cudgel. You can disable most things you hit with them. Again, I use the 'double hip' to generate massive impact through a variety of elbow attacks.

Fists - give you the next range and the one you probably most often find yourself in. Fists can be covered against and a good grappler will close inside quickly faced with a good puncher, but your punching ability must be excellent if you expect to survive a street encounter. Punching is usually your first choice.

Kicks - should not be used in the street. If you're effectively able to use your feet, you have enough time to retreat with your Boss. Well trained kickers know how impractical and dangerous kicks can be in the street and even an unskilled person can often, by accident, up-end a kicker. Kicks do have their place and certainly kicks below the waist and to the knees and nerve points do have a place, but forget side kicks. If you are initially given kicking distance, then take it and kick to enable you to close the gap to punching range.

Grappling - know how! If you're outpunched and outkicked, grappling is your only resort. Grappling needn't mean the end of striking, it's an interlude to allow to dissolve and render skill harmless. You need to be an effective vertical grappler as well as being confident if you have to go to ground. Once on the ground, strike, head butt, bite and elbow.

Blunt Instruments - If you give them distance, they're like a kicker - they'll beat you to death. Don't block blows, you just end up with compound fractures and kicking will end you up with compound fractures of the shin. If you can't escape, you've got no choice but to (you know it) COVER UP AND RUSH IN - Do The Last Thing They Expect!

NB. This will come out later in defence against an armed attacker, but there is a theory which postulates that 'the larger the weapon, the more an attacker demands and subconsciously expects compliance' - an assailant armed with a club does not intend or expect to be attacked. If you can respond without warning and instantaneously as you perceive an attack, you can attack them unawares. Once inside the 'arc of attack' you must destroy your opponent - biting, head butts, gouging, elbows, use of any improvised weapon is allowed and encouraged. Bowl him over in the attack and if necessary go down with him and choke him out. If you can take an opponent down and fall on him with all your body weight, the fight could well be over.

Knife Attacks - My first advice is, in a world of free choice, don't get involved, run. Unfortunately, this book isn't about street self defence it's about Close Protection, where free choice often doesn't enter into it. You're there and you're going to have to do something. A general rule that can often hold true in the street is, 'that a shower won't stab and a stabber doesn't show' - marginally useful again in a self defence arena, but possibly irrelevant for what we need.

I'm not going to make a distinction, as I didn't with the other divisions of attacker, into the skilled or unskilled knife attacker - such a distinction is complete and utter bollocks. To say how either would act is complete rubbish. I do make a distinction normally between skilled and unskilled knife men, but by skilled I refer to professional knife fighters and you'll never meet a John Styers or a W E Fairburn in the street or in a CP situation, so we can lump everyone else with a knife into one category ie. Dangerous!

How they hold a blade and its physical characteristics are secondary to the fact that there is one inescapable truth about knife self defence and that is, you're going to get cut. Forget those photo sequences in martial arts magazines or from your 'Taiho Jutsu' Instructor or Aikido and Ju Jitsu about disarming a knife attacker with blocks, parries, wrist locks, throws, strikes and kicks - Blocking Won't Work! A blade needs no power to do damage and fast, furious cuts with speed cannot be blocked quickly enough. Kicks can be seen a mile away and legs slashed.

If you're armed then draw and shoot to stop him.

If you're caught by surprise - ward off and buy yourself time to draw and shoot to stop.

For anyone who's seen the American Police Training film 'Surviving Edged Weapons', will realise the realities of knife defence and the disadvantage you're under. **Distance/Reaction** time give an effective attacking range of over 20 feet to a rushing knife attack. Use any weapons you can improvise, chairs, sticks, a torch (maglite, ideally or similar). If you've no weapon then you're up against it. Current training systems ie. those from the states, (which have been further developed by such people in Britain as my old friend Peter Robins who whilst not only being the expert on W E Fairbairn, has kept the Defendu unarmed combat system alive), have some answer to the problem, but as before, they work on the assumption you're going to get cut. If confrontation is unavoidable, then get cut on the least vital part ie. forearms outside. The guard position allows you to close your opponent, deflect strikes, cover vital organs and when inside, immediately destroy him with successive elbow strikes. Your forearms will take damage but on a part with no vital arteries to cut. You have to practice the system to see its effectiveness. In my opinion, its the only thing that will stand a chance of working.

The 'ASP' is probably one of the most effective non-lethal weapons suitable to carry at all times whilst abroad and is particularly good for knife defence. It will carry comfortably all day in your waistband without a holster and is unobtrusive. Whilst in the CIS, I and my colleagues carry them as our principle weapon.

Defence Against a Hand Gun

For the lone psychotic or disturbed individual with a grudge, the pistol or revolver can often be the preferred choice of weapon. It is usually the weapon of choice of the lone attacker and worldwide, handguns are easy to acquire, easy to conceal and within certain respects easy to use - even by the unskilled. A long gun such as a rifle from a 'stand off' position is the choice of the professional assassin. It takes considerable skills to develop accurate sniping ability and as we've mentioned elsewhere, is pretty much impossible to defend against.

A person will have 2 main aims if he attacks with a pistol.

KILL

KIDNAP

An example of each is the attempted assassination of Pope Paul and the attempted kidnap of Princess Anne. In both instances, an attacker would need to be reasonably close to either achieve effective aim or effective compliance of his wishes. Under stress conditions, the chances of hitting a target with a pistol at anything over 15 feet is unlikely. They will want to be close.


Therefore:-

**Be Vigilant
Constant Awareness**

Scan bystanders for signs of stress, tension, nervousness, over-concentration and fear. Look for people moving towards you who seem suspicious.

Immediate Action Drills

- Give bodycover and move VIP away.
- Draw weapons.
- Shoot to stop.



AKP - Arm Knife Protector

Above: Knife protection gloves and Arm Knife protector from Bodyshield. The gloves are knitted Kevlar inserts inside quality lambskin. The arm protector will even stop a machete blow.

Depending on the numbers in the team, only those closest to the threat must engage. The PES role is to give body cover and move the VIP away using force and commands.

If the assassin is close, then the PES who engage must do so aggressively and attack the attacker. They must put down effective fire and a bi-product of trying to put him down is to distract him from the main task in hand ie. to shoot your VIP, to one of self preservation. If the distance is too great, put down effective suppressive fire and retreat tactically behind the main group. Your aim is to get the VIP away from the danger area or to hard cover or concealment if cover is not available.

Mobile back-up should always be available, but often it's not always possible to be shadowed by vehicles. Unless an assassin is spotted early and is very close, there will be little chance of disarming him or preventing him getting his first shot off. He shouldn't, ideally get a second or third off.

Kidnap

With kidnap attempts, the use of a weapon is to elicit compliance. Firing may be a last resort, certainly at the Principal, although it may be a first resort against his CP team. In many kidnap attempts where vehicles are ambushed, fire power is directed at quickly wiping out the CP team. In such circumstances, prevention through good procedures and constant awareness is the only weapon on your side.

A lone kidnapper in the street is a rare phenomenon, although there may be occasions when a situation could develop (study the attempted kidnap of Princess Anne). We touched on 'compliance through firepower' in the previous section and need to look at its implications more closely. Someone who 'holds you up' has by the very nature of their situation become 'defensive' and has adopted a defensive frame of mind. They have secured themselves behind what they perceive to be a psychological shield ie. the weapon and its implications.

Disarming

The Roles of ACTION and REACTION have now reversed. An assassin has Action on his side and the CP team can only React. A kidnapper has, however, forsaken the advantage of Action after taking people by surprise and now controls the situation through an over-reliance on the power and fear his weapon supposedly induces. Action and Reaction has now shifted to opposite camps.

A lightning fast, appropriate, surprise attack and disarming technique may well win the day - remember - Action will always beat Reaction - well nearly always!

Psychology

The surprise attack is helped by the kidnapper's state of mind. His belief in the effective deterrent of his weapon lulls him into a false sense of security. He does not expect to be attacked and, supposedly, the greater the fire power, the longer you will have to disarm him or her should you strike. You can practice to achieve technical proficiency and don't worry if your 'mate' always beats you to the trigger, as he knows what's about to happen and can't duplicate the mental state of a kidnapper.

In a real kidnap situation, what is against you is the kidnapper's keyed up mental state. In the initial stages of an attack, he or she will be most keyed up and likely to fire at the slightest wrong move being made, but unfortunately, that's the time you need to strike.

It's the point he feels he should have compliance, but more importantly, it's probably the only point where you can REACT NOT DECIDE. The longer a hostage situation develops, it has been clearly shown that even skilled people lose the will to act. It becomes a case of trying to make decisions when it always seems that a better opportunity may present itself until, eventually, the will to act is lost. It is important that the spontaneity of action is not lost in the passage of time.

In the **British Combat Association**, one of our principles of instruction is the development of 'Action Triggers'. These have been developed from many years of working in conflict situations, where decision-making has been shown to work against one. In the famous words of the photographer, Henri Cartier Bresson - 'Seize The Moment'.

By instant, however, I mean when the assailant is at close quarters. Outside of arm's reach, you can't act, certainly not against a short barrelled handgun with no leverage factor that you would get from a rifle or shotgun.

Proximity

Bring him in! - if he is not within reach, he must be induced to come closer or you must move closer to him. Being able to act out a scenario of fear, misunderstanding, indecision or a lack of compliance is walking a very fine line, but it is impossible for you to beat a handgun unless you are within striking distance. Even 'closing the gap' with arms raised, will be necessary if your assailant won't come to you.

Leverage

A very skilled pistol exponent knows that a short barrelled weapon, if kept close to the body, is impossible to have taken away. The distance an arm would have to travel in an attempt to disarm would take too long and even if you are able to close over the weapon held close to the body, leverage is practically impossible. The leverage you need to apply will only work on an extended arm and wrist. A weapon pushed close to your face is the ideal situation for you to act on. Fortunately, in most 'hold up' situations, dominance with a weapon usually means it is thrust forward to be shown and used as a tool to gain compliance.

Weapon State

Despite fear and stress, you have to be calm enough to assimilate certain information pertinent to your continuing safety or survival. Before we look at the Basic Principles and Techniques of Disarming a Handgun Assailant, we need some baseline data. We will be facing one of two options. A revolver - in either Single or Double action mode or a pistol. With modern advances in pistol technology, we can also now have a double action state to take into account.

By far the best scenario is to be faced with a revolver which will need a full 'pull through' to action it in double action mode and similar with a pistol. The time and effort this takes in contrast to letting off either weapon already cocked, is twice as long and requires three to four times the effort. Certainly, if you hit an opponent's weapon hand holding a revolver which needed a double action pull, it won't go off accidentally. There can be no 'knee jerk' reaction which can set it off.

The position of the hammer, however, more importantly, dictates the position of your first hand strike. Grasping a weapon over the hammer, and in the case of the revolver, simply over the cylinder, will prevent any action to fire taking place. A weapon cocked, where only a single action pull is required, means you need to get the web of your thumb between the hammer and the pin or your little finger in the same position, which is far more difficult.

LOOK FOR THE SAFETY. The fear and panic of a situation will effect both parties and it could still be that the weapon's safety is applied. Look at the rounds in the chamber - are there any? Or if in double action, is the chamber that will be presented empty? You must however, know the direction of rotation of cylinders for various manufacturers of revolvers.

With a pistol, hitting the front over the barrel and the top side with the palm of your hand, will push the top slide back a fraction of an inch, which will be sufficient however, to stop the weapon working. Although you can grasp the weapon at the same time and it can certainly be one of your options for disarmament, it is somewhat down the list as an action of first choice. Essentially, I'm illustrating the requirement to know the weapon state, how they function. **PRACTICE** - dry train for all disarms constantly and repetitively. As a matter of some interest, hitting the top slide 'head on' won't work for some autos, such as Seecamps modification of Colts Combat Commander - not that you're likely to be faced with one in downtown Moscow or Algiers. The above should not be taken out of context. In a dark alley you won't even be able to identify whether its a pistol or revolver and working hard to see which it is, will divert you from the main task in hand.

Basic Principles

Within half a second or less, you must have moved your body out of the line of fire of the weapon. This is why a weapon pointing at your head, strangely, makes life easier in one sense, in that a small shift will take your head out of the line. Assist the change of firing point by moving the weapon in the opposite direction to your body moving the other way. The 'equal and opposite' you need to apply, assist each other in this respect. Moving the body without any attendant arm movement always feels ponderous. NB. To hit a weapon hand when the weapon is in your face means that the movement of your arm happens below his line of sight, sheltered by his own arm; which blocks his vision. A split second before you strike, look away. You won't lose your point of aim and it will distract him.

The 'push' to move the weapon is the first part of control. A slap to one side only creates a differed problem - you need to 'Deflect and Control' - ideally you always want to block 'side for side'.

Ensure that built into that control is the flexibility to have a 'Striking Ability'. If you're so tied up holding on, you've got problems in having anything free to put him away with. Remember though - you will always have your head and a head butt done properly will finish an opponent with one blow.

Do's and Don'ts

- In the 'hands up' surrender position, raise your hands to no more than head height if you are able to get away with this. With your arms straight up, you've lost valuable distance. If the weapon is in your stomach, you need to comply with any command, but keep your hands as low as possible.
- Do not show any prior movement. Martial Artists are particularly good at explosive movement without any 'tell tale' signs. Don't give it away with the eyes.
- Always keep the weapon in a peripheral field of vision. You may glance at the weapon and appear frightened, which is a natural reaction. If you read about only looking at his eyes so as not to give the game away by looking at the weapon, this is unnatural. You would, I assure you, look at the weapon - you need to know the state.
Try and act natural - frightened!

Techniques

For the purpose of the exercise, we are assuming a right handed shooter - reverse all sequences for left.

Study and understand the mechanics of the joints. Certain moves will allow you control, but do not cause your opponent to relinquish his control. Don't let it become a wrestling match. Ideally, he must have the weapon ripped from his grasp by applying leverage in such a way that he is unable to exercise a strong gripping action and suffers considerable pain in the joints of his fingers and wrist. Whatever your preferred technique for whatever situation, remember one thing very clearly - KEEP IT SIMPLE.

Remember that the first basic principle is to clear your body from the line of fire and if doing that conflicts with having perfect leverage, then forget the leverage. You need to be out of the line of fire to avoid any instinctive or accidental pressure on the trigger and to buy yourself time to do anything.

Front Face

The more ideal and easy to work scenario. With your hands up alongside your head, your palms are only inches away from the weapon.

- Hit hard with the palm of your left hand on his gun hand, whilst at the same time, your head moves to the left and your body beginning to turn side on.
- Your fingers of the left hand wrap over the top slide and you should endeavour with your little and adjoining finger to also have a grip of the hammer.
- Fractionally behind the movement of the left hand, is your right hand, which strikes the inside of his right wrist. The two impacts, one behind the other can actually knock the weapon from his hand, but at worst, in a fraction of a second the weapon is pointing 90 degrees away from you. All this in half a second.
- Continue the turn of the weapon either towards him or upwards. If upwards, you are perfectly aligned to elbow with your right arm to his jaw for a knockout, without even letting go of the wrist with your right hand. Turning the weapon into him, you can actually effect a shot, but you must use your head into his jaw.
- Head butts take place using your head above your eye line to his face below his eye line. Any variation and you'll knock yourself out.

Variations on a Theme

There will be a variety of positions with the weapon pointed at your centre of mass, with your hands in a variety of positions, or the weapon and assailant behind you, with the weapon held low in your back or high to the neck. You need to work out scenarios for yourself with a partner, but remember the basic principles of line of fire, deflection, control and ability to strike. Just a point, forget knees to the groin. It isn't instantaneous in terms of the reaction you'll get - I have seen guys take a good hit to the groin and do a lot of damage before the pain signal gets through. Also knee attacks often require control of the body and at this point you only have control of the weapon.

Your target is either throat or jaw and think of elbow or head as your initial choice of weapon. You're within grappling range and you do not want to lose the benefit of leverage by stepping out to effect knees or kicks. Your primary concern is control of the weapon. If you've got it - great, if not, then you need both hands on it unless you're blindingly fast as a hitter. Head and elbows are both devastating close-range weapons. Use them and use them repeatedly, don't rely on single blows.

Rear

Your primary concern with a weapon pointed at your back, is to know precisely where it is. You'll no doubt read manuals telling you to take a glance. This may be your only option but can give the game away and doesn't guarantee that when you turn your head back that he doesn't move the weapon or pull it away. It's simply not sufficient just to know which hand it's in. You must feel the weapon against you before you act. This may mean stopping or slowing your pace, if you're walking or even moving slightly back if you're static - it may even mean turning round to face your assailant. If you can't see it or you can't feel it, you're working blind and the odds move substantially against you.

Practice to establish one thing - 'YOUR OWN PREFERENCE TO TURN'. Any experienced Martial Artists will tell you that they have a favourite leg to kick with, a favourite side to work with which will include a favourite method of turning or pivoting. This is part of our physical make-up - we have better balance on one leg than the other and this often dictates our ability and therefore preference for turning round - we're quicker one way and better balanced than the other. If this is the case for you, then you need to practice your turns and strikes this way - irrespective of other factors not being quite right. When you read manual remember - they are only a guide and suggestion - **ADAPT, DON'T ADOPT.**

Try to remember, we are the ones instigating the Action and therefore we've bought fractions of a second before the Reaction. Don't lose them by following a set sequence you read about or have seen illustrated that isn't dynamically right for you.

Use of the Bag and Mitts

Practice all your close range strikes - elbow, head, short hook punches on a bag or hook and jab mitts and also knee. You must develop short range devastating impact in all techniques. Knee does have its part to play if only to disable an opponent's leg. Forget complex delivery systems and complicated trapping and locking manoeuvres. They will only get you into trouble.



Develop skills on the 'hook & jab' mitts. Practice your pre-emptive strikes until you're sick to death of them. Your knockout skills will develop. Work close elbows for use in disarming techniques.

Rifle or Shotgun

Work out your own scenarios and disarms - leverage will now work better. Its nearly impossible for an assailant to remember to keep the barrel of a long gun close to his own body. Its unnatural to do it and they will always have a tendency to extend the weapon. Remember that the greater the fire power, supposedly the greater time element is on your side in terms of their reaction, as such fire power lulls them into an even greater false sense of security, where they have no expectation that anyone is likely to do anything but comply with their commands.

Work your techniques to ideally achieve you gaining the weapon. Anytime you do gain full control of a weapon, forget the head butts etc. Shoot to stop. Do not for one second not consider shooting, as the chances of them having a hidden weapon are too high to risk any further conflict - 'HONEST BELIEF'.

Over the years, there have been many techniques developed for disarming people with long guns, which have involved a high degree of twisting and turning and use of leverage in complicated disarms. They rely heavily on strength and gaining a near perfect leverage. They are dangerous and will work less often than they will be successful. The advantage of leverage is with the person who holds the weapon at you. By wanting to get involved in over-complicated moves, you lose sight of your goal which is to disable your opponent. It's pointless trying to wrestle a rifle off someone if he lets go with one hand and shoots you with a pistol.



Back and shoulder power are essential in your training. If you have to grapple anyone you need good back strength.

The basic, Parry, Control and Disable moves that I've touched on with handguns, work just as well, if not better, with a longer weapon. If you can parry the weapon's point of aim away from you and control it not swinging back on line that's all you have to accomplish. As that happens, you move inside the weapon and begin striking - once inside the weapon, you are much safer than you are when working against a pistol, where a small turn of his wrist can align the pistol back onto you if you do not have perfect control.

You are out to put him away - don't overcomplicate something where 'explosive' speed and tremendous impact of short range techniques is called for. An unconscious man even with a gun in his hand is an unconscious man. What you see your unarmed combat instructor do with compliant pupils is, well, b-----ks.

FITNESS TRAINING FOR THE BG

There are always strong and diverse views on the requirements of fitness in the CP role - the fiercest, as always, coming from the unfit. The Chinese have a saying - "*Maintain an Army for a thousand years, if only to fight for one day.*" If you have to ask why you need to train, it's probably time for you to get out of the business.

It's the mental attitude that counts. A person who trains hard and consistently, for that one percent possibility of action, is separated from the crowd and will display a totally different attitude to himself and others. In fact, in many ways, the psychological benefits of fitness training are as important as the physical gains.

- Fit people are better able to deal with stressful situations - the 'fight or flight' situation.
- People who exercise regularly have more positive feelings about their appearance, health and work. They also feel ill less frequently.
- People who train regularly have been shown to have higher esteem. Long term exercise has been shown to reduce depression. Fit and active people are less likely to smoke.

In all, you have a better adjusted, more stable, probably even-tempered, fit looking team member. A bi-product of fitness is certainly image. A £500 suit on a fub (fat, useless bastard) only ever looks like a suit on a fub. Working as a BG is as much an image problem as any other. What Principal wants to be surrounded by a PES that looks like a Mr Blobby convention just hit town.

Winning may not be everything, but making exceptional effort to, is.

Being a BG is a specialist, demanding job if done correctly and well and a correct attitude to fitness and training is integral to being able to 'switch on' and dig in when things get

tough. But fit for what? Fitness covers a host of things. The fitness needed to run a marathon, whilst commendable, is of little use to a BG. Would strength alone, however, be ideal? Any fitness training must be complimentary to the role and the BG's role, in the worst case scenario, is that he would be faced with explosive action in a stressful situation, having been taken by surprise and have to act in a co-ordinated way using strength, power and stamina, without having the benefit of catching his first wind. He may also need to sustain long periods in stressful situations, so good cardio-vascular conditioning is still important. I have always believed it is critical that STRESS is a factor that must enter into a training routine. I mentioned the marathon runner who work within, essentially, an aerobic capacity. Fundamentally, this means that the person never enters into a state of oxygen debt, rather, he is training to condition his body, over long periods of exercise to maximise the utilisation of oxygen and nutrients to energise the working muscles. By definition, the aerobic trainer never gets distressed - not in the sense I mean it to apply - although when he 'hits the wall', he'll certainly be suffering and suffering badly. Minimum aerobic workouts of at least 20 minutes per session, three times a week are required to effect gains. An element of aerobic work must be incorporated in any training routine, but sometimes it can be as a bi-product of other work, possibly more relevant work such as boxing, wrestling or a martial art.

The corollary to aerobic training is Anaerobic and this should form the backbone of a BGs training using the aerobic exercise as a warm up before moving into what can be a very stressful and painful anaerobic (without oxygen) training session.



Hill Carries. Linked with hill sprints, this training is one of the finest exercises for developing power and muscle endurance in the legs. The hill should be steep enough to make the effort Anaerobic within 60 - 80 metres.



Hill sprints, either linked with hill carries or done on their own, are the best exercise possible for developing leg power. The effort required and the suddenness of going anaerobic means that only mental aggression will get you through the training session. As usual, the author has to bring up the rear to be able to encourage his comrades from behind!!

The body has a chemistry to cope with a high level of output to take place over short periods. This could be in lifting weights or in ‘all out’ maximum effort, say, in ‘hill sprints’. The source of this short term muscular endurance is a substance in the body called ATP. ATPs are supplied by a chemical reaction in the body called Glycolysis. The reaction occurs without the benefit of oxygen, as the body, due to the heavy demand, has ceased to be able to convert oxygen to energy quickly enough. Regrettably, a bi-product of heavy anaerobic training is lactic acid, which gives that dead, heavy feeling when the active muscle no longer functions. Aerobic effect will convert that acid back to ATP.

Anaerobic training is ‘role specific’ for the BG’s job. It helps explosive movement, strength, power and short term heavy endurance. Two of the best ways to train anaerobically are hill sprints and hill carries. These should be performed in sets and with a partner.


One person will carry his partner up a steep hill, in ‘piggy back’ position for 60-80 metres and this completed, they carefully jog back down to the start. Both then sprint up at full speed over the same distance with the person who carried, being in front in order that his partner can encourage him if he slows. Come down the hill - this is one set and they now change over for the other person to carry and lead in the sprint. A good session should comprise of approx. 6 sets each. The distance covered should be altered to increase the stress element of the sprint. Leg power, mental staying power and the ability to explode into

action all improve. The session can also include some flat sprinting at the end and shuttles of high knee lift work.

Like all fitness training, the test of ability and improvement is the speed of recovery. Very quickly with this training, the ability to do more soon ceases as the lactic acid builds up to unworkable levels. Try and choose a hill that you can jog a mile to at an easy pace, so as to be able to warm up the muscles and joints, get your breathing sorted out and then stretch out before you begin the heavy work. The jog back to the car should be equally aerobic to remove, hopefully, the lactic acid.

Strength Training


Another essential for the BG is strength training, as it provides fundamental strength, not only to muscles but to connecting tissues such as ligaments and tendons. Bone density, resistance to blows and improved muscular endurance ties all the other aspects of training together. A minimum of two sessions a week and probably no more than three, would be sufficient, combined with all the other training.



Keep your weights work basic and heavy if time is a problem. Leg press is a good alternative to squatting if you have knee problems. Alternate leg press with leg extensions and leg curls. Good leg strength is essential for any combat system.

The scope of this book doesn't allow for detailed exercise programmes, but if time is a problem, work basic, heavy exercises. Break the workout down into major body parts, Chest, Shoulders, Back, Arms and Legs over those two or three days, possibly splitting legs into say, Front Thighs one day, with Shoulders and Chest, leaving Hamstrings to be worked with Back and Calves.

Biceps and Triceps can be worked on the Back and Chest days respectively, as they will already have been worked during the main body part exercises. Abdominals (stomach) should be worked on each session. They are one of the most important sets of muscles and are the first to go if exercise stops.



Heavy curls. Bicep strength is essential for gripping and grappling as well as when strangling and choking. You may want to work shoulders on the same day as back and work triceps on the day you do your chest work.

Martial Arts

Elements of all the above - strength, endurance, anaerobic, aerobic (cardio-vascular) training are all present in most martial arts and boxing and wrestling. The principle advantage is that the combative elements are of vital importance to a BG or member of a Close Protection Team.

I believe, as previously mentioned, that many martial artists are blind to reality and what works as an art form or in competition often lacks efficacy in the street. I believe every member of a CP team must have some combative ability, but I also believe, very strongly, that not everyone with combative skills can make a good BG.

We often find it difficult to train, particularly when on a job, but equally often this is an attitude problem. Things can be arranged so that training can continue and in an ideal world, training in all forms, particularly fitness training, should continue as part of a team drill.

Training is our investment in ourselves. No-one else can nor will make that investment for us.



Pick a good long hill for carries and sprints so that you can vary the distances, particularly the sprints.



Good training programmes should introduce stress and pressure.

CHAPTER 18

SURVEILLANCE

‘Surveillance is the covert observation of places, persons and vehicles for the purpose of obtaining information concerning the identities or activities of subjects’ -

by Charles E O’Hara
Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation.

In Chapter 3, in the section, ‘*Kidnapping, Prevention and Awareness*’, we looked at the terrorists requirement for information - it’s type and purpose and we also looked at how we would brief our Principal and his family on what they should be looking for, in terms of the obvious, and not so obvious, surveillance techniques whilst about their daily business. We need however, to look more closely at surveillance and how we can affect some counter measures.

The Offenders Need For Information

Attacks against executives or the prominent and wealthy (victims) are normally only undertaken after careful preparation. Victim selection hinges on a number of factors and once that victim has been selected, information gathering will be increased so as to fill any gaps and so flesh out the plan of attack.

The attackers’ actions may include careful enquiry and analysis of information, observation, reconnaissance and timing of routes, mapping, simulation of action, withdrawal and destruction of evidence. Strong emphasis is placed on information-gathering and surveillance. In short, offenders will normally only undertake an action after careful preparation and only then if all, or most circumstances are in their favour. Such information as is required about the potential victim will initially be obtained from publicly available information such as articles, news - media, but often from privileged sources such as staff lists which circulate freely within military HQs and other offices. Targets may be selected from their military, political, religious, financial, corporate or symbolic position.

Information can also be obtained from informants, surveillance or by a combination of these two. Informants may be unwitting providers of information or they may be planted or infiltrated to a position close enough to the victim to obtain the needed information.

The National Car Parks scandal and ensuing court actions was a classic example of the latter. Surveillance may be necessary to gain information on the victim's movements, habits and/or his security.

Methodologies

1. General information may be collected by:

- Stealing rubbish, phone calls, surveys, service calls etc. and by seeking general local gossip.

2. Surveillance may be carried out:

• On foot

- a. One person
- b. Multiple persons
- c. Teams

• By vehicle

- cars, vans, motor cycles, bicycles (even by aircraft or by boat).

• Fixed

- a. Observation Posts (OPs)
- b. Stakeout
- c. Technical

3. They will:

- a. Record
- b. Photograph
- c. Film

4. They will be heavily resourced

- a. Transportation, photographic, communications, wardrobe and props.

5. Target Vulnerabilities

- Home - routes to/from
- Office - routes to/from
- Times/patterns
- Choke point
- Limited/no alternatives
- Family activities and hobbies
- Pattern activity

6. Surveillance may be:

- Close
- Discreet
- Combination

Surveillance teams may make a direct approach

- Men, women and children used
- Prospective job applicants
- Reporter, service calls, surveys etc.

More often they will keep a distance either in a static location or mobile on foot or in vehicles. Surveillance is not, however, a 'one way' street and many things do militate against them operating successfully.

Surveillance Vulnerabilities

- One member of the team, at least, must be in visual contact with the target.
- They cannot control the activities or environment of the target. You 'control' when you do something.
- They are constantly having to blend in.
- They must remain constantly alert (which is difficult) all the time.
- They have a constant fear of being detected.
- Boredom, hunger and fatigue often sets in.
- Incompatible situations.

What To Look For

1. Application of Time, Distance and Direction criteria.
 - a. Repeats - persons, vehicles.
 - b. Channelling, shifting, turning and stops.
 - c. Demeanour

2. Asymmetry - what does not fit, in the given environment.

3. Gear that reveals - vehicles, communications, photographic.

4. Mistakes that reveal.

Use your area knowledge to best advantage to know what you should see and expect.

- Transportation systems/streets/traffic
- Public areas, business areas
- Commercial and Industrial zones
- Residential areas/recreation
- Hours of operation/types of people
- Locations of likely facilities
- Knowledge of maps, diagrams, photos etc.

You will then know the most likely vantage points from which surveillance can operate.

You should have a good working knowledge of surveillance methodology.

- Know the purpose of surveillance
- Know techniques
- Telltale signs
- How to spot surveillants without them knowing
- Know general capabilities of surveillance

Apply your intellect to think how you would go about the task. This should give you a clear insight into your own and your team's Patterns of Action.

- Think about your habits
- Track them and study them over a period
- Spot the vulnerabilities
- Make necessary adaptations

Surveillance and surveillance detection are opposite sides of the same coin. A thorough knowledge of surveillance methodology facilitates detection.

Know the :-

Purpose • Techniques • Technical Equipment • How Surveillance Acts and Reacts

Surveillance often means that the attackers must expend time, personnel and resources over a long period to elicit all the information needed for a successful action. Surveillance can therefore be expensive, particularly if it is difficult to pin down the patterns of movement - especially to and from work. If it becomes apparent that the proposed victim cannot be taken in transit, then possibly more resources and effort will be put into surveillance around the offices or home. It may be that the information-gathering determines a social function that would present an opportunity for attack, but to obtain this sort of information, a variety of ruses may be employed and the attackers may need to keep surveillance on at weekends and at night.

**The more surveillance there is, the more opportunity there is to see it.
The more difficult it is for the offenders to gain the necessary information on a victim,
the less attractive that victim becomes.**

Offenders normally rely on catching the victim and his security by complete surprise and off-guard. Having the advantage of surprise, the action should be easier to carry out. An action accomplished with ease by terrorists is a multiple victory.

First there is the morale-boosting effect of a successful operation, few if any casualties on their side resulting from the attack and the successful action has the propaganda bonus adding to the perceived efficiency and power of the terrorist group. A vulnerable victim therefore, is one that offers the offender a quick attack and a safe getaway. The victim's security is probably inadequate or perceived through surveillance as ineffective and unaware of impending danger.

Neither they nor their Principal are alert to the presence of the attackers, at which point, the security measures in force are often proved to be of no use.

The long periods of surveillance were there to be seen if only the people had known what to look for or been sufficiently 'switched on' to want to see it in the first place.

Common Sequence of Events

- **Target Selection**
- **Surveillance**
- **Final Target Selection**
- **Planning - plus more surveillance**
- **Rehearsals**
- **Attack Team Development - with one of the surveillance team acting as 'Trigger'**
- **Principal arrives at or passes 'X'**
- **Attack occurs, with a 90% or better chance of success.**

The attack cycle can be discouraged/interrupted at several points:

- During surveillance
- During the rehearsal stage
- During attack team deployment
- At the final execution - 'little chance'

Deterrence

We are lead to believe that a 'high profile' protective effort is designed to deter.

- That deterrence, however, is not always measurable
- Certainly does not always prevent an attack
- Can make the terrorists' target study much easier as all the security is highly visible

Low Profile and Deception

- This addresses the terrorists' weakest point, ie. surveillance
- A new target may be selected
- Low profile employs measures which do not draw undue attention to the VIP
- Surveillance by the terrorists must become, as a consequence, more aggressive and should be easier to spot by the CP team.

This may mean:

- False travel arrangements
- False vehicle acquisition
- False telephone messages
- Counter-Surveillance - particularly at choke points
- Empty convoy runs use others as observers

In summary, the terrorists' first step will be to obtain positive identification of the target, probably by photography of

- a. the Target himself**
- b. his Residence**
- c. his Office**
- d. his Vehicle**
- e. his Family**
- f. his Associates**

Once identified, the target will become subject to all forms of surveillance to establish:-

- 1. The routine of the target, his security, his residence, his office, deliveries etc**
- 2. The range and depth of existing security measures**
- 3. Vulnerable points**
- 4. Weaknesses or failures in the existing security**

Remember that the surveillance work of terrorist organisations is often done by ‘legitimate’ members of the terrorist groups. This is to say, persons who are not directly involved in acts of terrorism and who have cover stories which will stand examination by security forces.

Counter Surveillance

Essentially, Counter-Surveillance is the preserve of the security forces, where through identification of one or more members of a terrorist organisation, active surveillance will expose the possible intentions of the offenders.

Counter-Surveillance operations are usually out with the role and scope of a civilian EP operation and a detailed examination of the various techniques is really the subject matter of the techniques of surveillance in itself, which is not appropriate to look at in this book. Counter-Surveillance operations do have their place in the world of protective security and is a tool used regularly in the operations against anti-hunt saboteurs and members of the animal liberation groups. Knowing where they are and where they’re going, will often tell you what they’re likely to be up to.

Anti-Surveillance

“Anti-Surveillance is the actions taken by those concerned with the protection of a potential target of terrorism, to detect and in certain circumstances to defeat terrorist surveillance.”

The measures taken are to **LOCATE, IDENTIFY, DISRUPT** and **REPORT** surveillance of all types. You may sometimes see this referred to as: **Deter, Detect, React**. Remember ‘those concerned’ include the VIP and his family and the training, procedures and information we give him (as outlined in Chapter 1) are as important as our own observation and drills. Good anti-surveillance drills begin, not with techniques but with an attitude of mind. This attitude firmly states that you are, **‘at all times being watched by someone’** and that the perceived level of threat or risk should have no bearing on that simple truth pervading your thinking at all times.

If you do not believe you are being watched, you will have no motivation to act appropriately - BELIEVE.

Anti-Surveillance is broadly: **PASSIVE** or **ACTIVE**

Passive Anti-Surveillance

Will go on at all times and is simply a continuing awareness and observation to detect patterns or surveillance around the Principal. Passive surveillance is a Security Services way of detecting surveillance and instigating counter-measures. Such counter-measures can

in many ways endanger the VIP. Often they ask for no deviation in the daily routine so as to give no indication that surveillance is suspected in order that it may be possible to manipulate the offenders' surveillance to serve the purpose of the counter-surveillance operatives. In the less rarefied atmosphere of Civilian Executive Protection, detecting surveillance will simply lead us to a position of reporting to the necessary authorities and instigating those drills or changes to procedure necessary to provide increased protective effort and to make clear to the potential opposition that their surveillance has been detected.

Active Anti-Surveillance

The use of the following techniques should cause the enemy to show himself immediately or to pass 'eyeball' to another member of his team or vehicle. In this way it is hoped that the whole of the surveillance team can be quickly identified. The use of anti-surveillance measures should leave the potential terrorists, or others, in no doubt that their operation has been detected or, at least, suspect that this is the case. Often an anti-surveillance drill done as routine, can give the impression of being a reactive measure and can convey a message of detection, even if this is not the case. Good anti-surveillance is good deterrence.

The following are some general procedures and practices:-

1. Vary times and routes.
2. Make deliberate movements such as sudden stops, starts or changes of direction.
3. Make more than one circuit at roundabouts.
4. Stare openly at suspect vehicles or persons.
5. Use illogical routes.
6. Attempt to throw off a surveillance team by 'close shaves' at traffic lights or when overtaking, exercising due care for the safety of your Principal (in countries where such actions are a common driving occurrence, they may have less of an effect).
7. Use decoys.
8. Use a 'layback' vehicle to carry out further observation of suspects or to effect delays in traffic.
9. Use a static 'OP' on a fixed route to collate vehicles possibly on a 'follow' each day.
10. Drive off a motorway and come back on again.
11. Three sides of a square - use side routes to 'box the compass' and come back onto your road and route.
12. False use of indicators.
13. Pull into a rest area and let traffic go past.

14. Accelerate away quickly or, on occasions slow down markedly.
15. Use the 'read ahead' technique - always good personal security.
16. Do not advertise your presence - 'blend in' - (passive).
17. Ensure security of all communications (passive).

If on the very rare occasion it may happen, but you need to pass information onto a counter-surveillance team, then you would

- a. avoid eye contact
- b. not unnecessarily deviate from normal, everyday routine

Reaction - could be one of four measures:-

- a. carry on as normal
- b. blow their cover
- c. use a decoy
- d. use friendly forces - police etc.

Look For:-

1. Erratic driving.
2. Early morning appearance - remember - everyone should have a reason for being where they are.
3. The vehicle that does not overtake.
4. Motor cycles.
5. Passengers giving directions.
6. Vehicle occupants with heads bent down - map reading.

Maintain an Observation Log of:

- People with descriptions, sex, race, age etc etc and attach a 'nickname' if it helps.
- Vehicles - VINs, make, type, colour and bumps and dents.
- These must be linked with time and places and circumstances.

Liaison with a local rural population or neighbours is an essential part of anti-surveillance as well as with the local or regional security forces. There is no doubt that, with few exceptions, every terrorist attack is preceded by a period of detailed and sometimes highly sophisticated surveillance. Detection of that surveillance by the CP team will not only give the team knowledge it is being targeted, but more importantly, may dissuade the terrorists from making the attack at all.

The following, is an aide-memoire for MEMORISING/DESCRIBING people or vehicles.

Memorising/Describing

People

1. Type (T is for Target)
ie. sex, colour, race.
2. Detail - as follows
- 3 Age
 - Build**
 - Clothing** (including footwear)
 - Distinguishing marks** (tattooes, jewellery, scars etc)
 - Elevation** - height
 - Face** - shape, complexion, eyes, nose, eyebrows, ears etc
 - Gait**
 - Hair**
4. Reminds me of!
5. Nickname!

Vehicles

1. Type (T is for Target and Type)
ie. van, truck, car, motorbike etc.
2. Details - as follows
 - Size**
 - Colour**
 - Registration Number**
 - Extras** - roof rack, spots, towbar
 - Age/condition**
 - Make/model**

These days, in the real world of civilian Executive Protection, we need to be equally as concerned with the other less fatal consequences of surveillance by the following:-

1. The Principal's business partners and associates
2. The Principal's business competitors
3. Private detection
4. Professional intelligence gathering agencies
5. Investigative journalists
6. The Government

The loss of information or secrets is critical.

Electronic Counter Measures

If your Principal is the owner or Chief Executive of a large, successful and prominent business, both he and the business will be of interest to other parties. Even if your client is not connected to a Company structure, he may still find himself on the receiving end of unwanted surveillance for any number of reasons. Surveillance, as we have seen, can take many forms, but over the past few years, with the growth in technology and its falling

acquisition costs, electronic surveillance has flourished. This has been helped in the U.K. by the lack of clear legislation against the practice.

Currently there is no specific legislation against the theft of information through the use of electronic eavesdropping equipment and in a court case in the '80s, the Judge's summary actually encouraged its practice. The Breaking and Entering into premises, operating a non-approved and unlicensed transmitter and connection of a non-approved device to the British Telecom system, is all proscribed, albeit that the latter two are usually impossible to detect.

There is no legislation on the manufacture, sale or ownership of what has come to be known as 'bugging' equipment. In many ways, such eavesdropping has a legitimacy as it may cover such innocent pastimes as overhearing a conversation. There is a point, past which, however, that the unwritten rules of fair play cease. Legitimate research may be one thing, but the acquisition of information about your Principal or his Company that he would not want any other party to have, has become theft and must be guarded against.

The benefit to someone 'bugging' your Principal is that they have 'real time' information on products, strategy, meetings, security, travel etc, directly from the source and it is as it takes place not 'after the event' nor corrupted having been relayed by a second or third party. Bugs come in a variety of shapes, sizes and disguises and can be introduced in a number of ways which do not involve any physical breaking and entering. The following are the likely subject 'target area' -

- VIP Office or Suite
- Residence
- Car
- Specific Room (eg Conference)

The sources of information are as follows:-

- Telephones
- Radio Links
- Telex
- Computer
- Fax Machine
- Typewriter
- Intercom
- Dictating Equipment

Some of the above devices can actually be used as ‘communication links’ over distances or even to adjoining premises.

Information is stolen from a target area by either ‘piggy backing’ onto a system legitimately in place which is carrying information to and from the target area eg. a telephone or by installing a device in the target area which will gather information.

As both sound and optical signals will pass through windows, there are a range of devices which can be used as a ‘stand-off’ means of acquiring information. Some office equipment will also emit signals which can be intercepted, although in reality this is not usually an eavesdropping option.

The range of devices falls broadly into the following categories:-

- Hard wired systems
- Radio based systems
- Speech intercepts
- Optical surveillance

And the remote use of machine intercepts

A simple microphone installed in the target area linked by wires to a tape recorder is an example of a ‘hardwire’ system. Redundant GPO wires, old computer wires or redundant mains cabling can all be used for the installation of a microphone relayed to a listening site.

By far the majority of bugs tend to be of the radio transmitter variety. The advantage is that the information can be received at a distance away from the ‘target’ area. The information can either be listened to as it happens or recorded and can be transmitted across a variety of frequencies, varying power output to make detection difficult. Such devices may be battery or mains powered, can be small, disguised, provide excellent signal quality and are hard to detect, particularly a self-contained device. Range may vary from a few feet to many metres, depending on the density of buildings and the range of the device in a small town in Scotland would be considerably greater than one in an office in central London.

Telephone taps and radio receivers to listen to cordless telephones and mobile cellular phones is now a common occurrence, if the volume of equipment sold is anything to go by. Telephone devices may be activated automatically when a line is in use and can be hard to detect. The use of traditional analog cellular phones for passing anything but the time of day is discouraged. We are told that the new digital system is currently not capable of being eavesdropped, but it remains to be seen.

It is not necessary for a device to be installed in the target area or onto a 'line of communication' out of the target area, as surveillance can be achieved from a distance by means of high power optical equipment, or by use of laser detectors, which at a distance will pick up sound vibrations on the window of the target area. Parabolic microphones and similar can collect sound and amplify it to earphones or a recorder, we are told, from up to 1,500 feet away. Sound waves will also pass through solid objects and devices such as the pneumatic microphone can overhear sounds through solid surfaces upto 50cm thick. The device will work through windows, doors, walls. The sounds are magnified by a high gain amplifier and extraneous noise, as with the long range microphones, can be filtered out.

Choice of equipment will be dictated by a number of factors such as the type and quality of information a person is after, minimal risk during installation and the operation of the device, minimum chance of detection, cost. They will always want the odds of obtaining quality, useful information to be high. Machine intercepts for example are difficult and the results often disappointing.

Counter Measures

Counter Measures maybe as simple as pre-planning the site of the office, ensuring that the VIPs desk and telephone are not in line of sight of buildings or high ground or one can make use of a good net curtain.

Laser microphones are rendered less effective if:-

- Windows are double glazed.
- Heavy curtains with good sound absorption are drawn.
- A noise generator is attached to the window.

There must be in place, a systematic approach and procedures to combat the problem of 'electronic eavesdropping' and it is commonly accepted that the following is a reasonable summary of the measures which should be adopted.

Prevent the Introduction of a Device

When a 'gift' pen or desk set can be sent through the post, which may contain a device or where a 'cleaner' substitutes a plug containing a device, one must be constantly on one's guard. Breaking and entering is not a first choice nor a necessary choice in the installation of a device, when gifts - books, pens all containing devices can simply be sent in the post. Key control and good physical security measures with suitable alarm systems and the use of CCTV are all necessary to prevent the introduction of a device.

Construct a Safe Room

All Embassies have a safe room which, through its construction, shield both the passage of noise, vibration and radio signals. Cabling into the room is equally securely treated with filters. A safe room should be a cocoon and in its extreme form, no cables whatsoever would come into that cocoon and there would be no windows and lighting would be powered by batteries. Should communications leave the room, they would be scrambled. In the more down to earth reality of a civilian environment, one must endeavour to do one's best.

A Systematic Physical Search for Devices

Whilst a physical search has its limitations, it should not be ignored in favour of sole reliance on electronic detection systems. If you know your office or potential target area and you have effectively 'swept' the room on a recent previous occasion, then a regular physical search has its place. Certainly when working abroad, when one has limited access to electronic detection equipment, then a physical search is all that's left. It isn't possible, nor practical, however, to check cables coming into the area for their whole length.

Remember though, if you are conducting the search of a room, to secure it, any device is within your remit. You may use such equipment as torches, mirrors and tools for prising away panels etc.



A 'Broom'. Non-Linear Junction Detector

In this section we would also include metal detectors (although they are not too discriminating) and a 'non-linear junction detector', which will detect the presence of electronic assemblers. You will need however, to sweep every nook and cranny in the room and a device hidden within another electronic device may remain concealed to you. A junction detector works on a microwave signal which 'excites' electronic components and is transmitted back. It will not penetrate metal shielded devices and it cannot penetrate too deeply into a wall, where a probe-type device may be installed.

It will however, detect any device providing it contains a transistor or diodes and a device need not be active to be detected.

Permanent System to Interfere with a Device

'Interference' techniques render either a device inoperable or the information gathered unintelligible, such as scrambling or encryption devices. It is not within the scope of this book to look at scrambling or encryption devices, but you should, as an operative, have a working knowledge of the variety of equipment available. It will pay, however, to have a look at 'jamming' devices, as there is a variety of equipment on the market, but most is either dangerous or ineffective. Broadly, it includes the following:-

- **Radio Jamming** - the use of a strong interfering transmission at or near the frequency of the eavesdropper's radio receiver. The problem arises if the frequency is not known, as the jamming system will need a very high output across all the frequencies used and such jamming may interfere with all other receivers in a large area. It is irresponsible.
- **Acoustic Jamming** - this will only work if the location of a device is known, where a noise source can be placed close to it. If the location is unknown, then the volume of noise required would drown out all conversation. Noise sources can be useful if placed outside a target area so as to prevent over-hearing conversations within.
- **Noise Jamming/Microphone Jamming** - both systems are problematic and ineffective.
- **Optical Jamming** - is most effective and the simplest to achieve a result as we have looked at above.
- **High Voltage Destruction** - the system of attempting to destroy a device attached to say, a telephone cable. Such methods are irresponsible and highly dangerous. The high voltage charge used could endanger both personnel and other equipment. Also a good quality device will be 'shielded' from such high voltage.
- **Tap Defeats/Disconnects** - voltage sensing is the method which activates most telephone taps. Introduction, after a call commences, of resistance to a line will increase voltage as the current falls, resulting in the tap turning itself off. If the tap takes its power from the line, this can also be disrupted. Telephone disconnects 'unplug' the phone after calls, thereby defeating any device in the phone acting as an audio device. There is an automatic reconnect upon any incoming or outgoing calls.
- **Detection by Counter-Surveillance Equipment** - such equipment either specifically designed, or for some other purpose, (ie some electronic test equipment), will determine the presence of a device and, possibly its location by detecting the illicit signals or the effects on other equipment (eg a reduction in telephone line voltage). In this latter field, there is a commonly held view that 'line tap' detectors are inadequate and usually not very effective.

Counter-Measures equipment should:-

- Detect and locate a device with ease and within a reasonable time scale.
- Provide the option to search in silence, so that if it is policy - false information can be fed, or measures embarked upon to locate the listening site.
- Allow the user to detect devices activated during a meeting without disturbing that meeting - provide real time protection.
- Must be reasonably portable to allow ease of transportation between different target areas ie. residence and office.

The following is a summary of the various methods of detection of the range of devices commonly in use:-

Hard Wire Systems and Audio Modifications

A surveillance amplifier is used to check every wire leading away from the target area to see if it is carrying illicit signals. Such equipment must have a range of capabilities, from being very sensitive, capable and safe to connect to AC cables, provide a few volts to power up an otherwise inactive microphone. Often surveillance amplifiers are built into other large pieces of surveillance equipment.

Tape Recorder Detector

Some tape recorders, but not all, emit an ultrasonic signal which can be detected up to one metre away. The system is not foolproof, depending upon the recorder in use.

Carrier Hard Wire System

Most likely frequencies to be used are 25KHz to 205KHz and a counter measure's device will need to cover these frequencies or greater, be suitable for AC connection, Demodulated to enable listening to transmissions from more common AM and FM. It should have an auto listening facility, location finding and silent search.

Radio Transmissions

A radio transmitter will either be:-

1. Installed in the target area
- OR
2. Connected some distance away and cable-linked to the target area.

In both cases, radio transmissions broadcast from the target area to a listening site.

Transmissions from 1. will be strongest in the target area, whilst transmissions from 2. will either be weak or undetectable in the target area, according to the distance between the area and connection point. Counter measures restricted to the target area will not detect a signal if it is too weak.

NB. Transmissions are likely to be between 20MHz and 2,000MHz and the modulation is likely to be AM, FM or Subcarrier. Also the device may only transmit when there is sufficient noise (VOX operated), according to a timer or remotely controlled.

There are a number of types of detection equipment and you will need to research the pro's and con's of each system.

Broadly, these are:-

Signal Strength Measuring Equipment

Feedback Devices

Radio Receivers

Signal Strength Indicators

Have the advantage of being inexpensive, can be used by non-technical personnel and is unconcerned about the type of modulation used by the transmitter, as it registers the strength of all signals. Simple detectors are however, affected by comms. transmitters eg Police, Taxi Cabs etc. It needs to be powerful and close to the source to be effective and in urban environments usually ineffective.

A better method used by a few detectors is to measure signal strength changes across a pair of antennae. This discriminates against a distance source in favour of a local one. It is time-consuming to use and one needs to be a metre away from a device. It will not detect a non-transmitting device.

Feedback Device

Broad band so it will cover all frequencies. Incoming signals are amplified by circuitry and the result fed into an AM detector to give a 'howl-like' feedback. Pretty useless with FM or subcarrier devices, although those selling such equipment always maintain that there is some AM presence in the other two, but in its favour, the device is cheap, but even less effective than the signal strength variety.

Radio Receivers

The receivers designed specifically for counter-surveillance work have features that automate to a high degree the tuning and listening process. One popular 'counter surveillance receiver' combines wide frequency coverage, speed of tuning and auto signal acquisition. Location is achieved through measurement and display of the transmitter's signal strength. The receiver has AM, FM and subcarrier demodulators.

Tuning is by auto-analysis of many frequencies simultaneously seeking the strongest ie. likely to be the closest. Vox operated transmitters can be detected by emission of a tone and perceiving its received signal - the outgoing tone is interrupted. This can't be used for silent searches. A comprehensive counter-surveillance receiver can be used for meetings by monitoring both inside and outside the room.

Other devices such as Spectrum Analysers can be used. Telephone tap detectors are woefully inadequate however, as changes in voltage and current occur naturally all the time. Voltage and current change meters are usually insufficiently sensitive to be of use and impedance detection equipment becomes even more complex. Also 'tap defeat' devices may be effective as an alternative, but in reality only scramble devices offer protection of security of telephone conversations.

There is far more to the subject of ECM, but every CP operative should at least have a knowledge that will enable him to answer cogently should he be called on to offer advice.

CHAPTER 19

RUNNING THE OPERATIONS ROOM

It's appropriate that whilst we're looking at the siting, construction and equipment in the Operations or Control room, that we look at how it operates.

The team leader is in overall control, but may delegate the day to day running of the Ops room and team rosters to his 2 I/C or someone appropriate. That person needs good administrative and man-management skills and it may be that the team leader is also the personal BG, or heavily involved in liaison and has insufficient time to be involved in the daily routine. A permanent dedicated Ops room in a large residence or office is an ideal, but often it may be a 'make do' hotel bedroom or temporary accommodation or even a vehicle.

Wherever or whatever, the Ops room is the centre of communication for the whole team. All intelligence and current information will come into the Ops room to be disseminated to such team members as will require to know. It is the hub of the operation, as outlined in the radio net diagram (see illus. page? Chapt. 20). The running of the Ops room will, in most civvi jobs, be based around two 12 hour shifts. During the day, the person who is tasked to be I/C will probably be assisted by someone else, usually a radio operator. At night, when activity is at a minimum, then one person will usually 'man the fort', relieved when required by a member of the RST, who make take his stint in the control room. Civvi CP work is quite often a make-do operation with a lot of roles being covered by a number of people.

As the nerve centre it must be equipped with communication equipment, capable of reaching all parties who one requires regular, workable communications with.

The Ops room should display all maps relevant to the area of operation, duty rosters. Personal history of all members of the CP team, a Stat. Loc. board (see illus. page 325), so that at a glance one can tell where the resources are ie. manpower, vehicles, radios, phones, the Boss and family members and all ETAs.

A comprehensive list of communications and other essential kit is as follows:-

- Radio base station
- Hand held transceivers
- Mobile repeaters
- Chargers and extra batteries
- Adaptors
- Accessories - Covert kit eg. 'Eartalks'
- Mobile phones
- Notebook computer and printer
- CCTVs giving as much complete perimeter coverage as possible to include main entrance and exits and all secondary gates and dead ground
- Landlines and Exchange for main residence
- Direct telephone lines
- Fax machine
- Comprehensive First Aid Kit
- X-ray machine or snifter to screen mail and packages
- Fire fighting equipment
- Vehicle search kit
- Room search kit
- Bomb blanket
- Gas masks
- ECM equipment
- Mobile alarm case, to include panic alarm, smoke alarms, contact switches etc.
- Mobile surveillance kit with temporary remote cameras, cable monitoring, screens
- All Ops room documentation, office supplies and log books - rostars and manpower 'orbit'.



At the worst there should be a hand held metal detector available to screen incoming mail.

There will be maintained in the Ops room, a Radio Log, Incident Log, Visitors Log, to include VIN's (vehicle index numbers) and a Key Log. On the changeover, oncoming personnel report to the Ops room and are briefed by the outgoing team leader, although in practice, a briefing is seldom held and one would simply come on and take over from a colleague departing the previous shift, all equipment and duties. Also, in an ideal world, the new team leader should search and secure vehicles, accommodation, garages and the VIP suite, although again this seldom happens. It is essential however, to check the Visitors Log to see who you've inherited on-site, as well as who still have keys out that are due to be returned. Each BG will have a page in the Ops book eg. name, home address, second address, holidays, two telephone numbers.

There should be some easy to see system of indicating a 'heightened state of awareness' - Colour Codes will usually suffice.



A well run Ops room will have a considerable amount of information displayed around the walls for assimilation at a glance.

Operative Briefing

1. Assignments and updates.
2. Intelligence.
3. Shift to shift messages.
4. Daily events.

There should be as much updating of intelligence as possible eg.

1. Terrorist groups.
2. Criminal developments - press cuttings etc.
3. Individual threats.
4. Known enemies.
5. Potential enemies.

Itineraries - with phone numbers ie.

1. Daily visits.
2. Time schedules.
3. Major stops.
4. Traffic/Weather analysis for the day.
5. All 'route recce' cards must be displayed showing alternate routes on maps.

The Ops room must be kept neat, clean and efficient. It is operational 24 hours a day and must be to 'authorised personnel' only. All transport arrangements should be made by the control room so as to ensure security and avoid duplication.

Prior to commencement of any CP operation, the following should have been attended to:-

Detail

Plan everything with 'detail' in mind - always double and triple check everything. Ensure all your sources of information and intelligence give accurate data, not just guesses and assumptions.

Timings

Be as accurate with timings as with other information. If you can exercise control, insist on others having and keeping accurate timings eg. host venues, outside transport, other agencies etc.

Reconnaissance

See the relevant section in this book.

Liaison

Don't fall into the trap of not passing on information, both to other team members, client company - at all levels and with all interested parties.

Appreciations

An 'appreciation' of the possible problems, risks, procedures needed and responses, must be made to determine the overall operation order.

An Appreciation is used to consider all factors relevant to the planning of an operation and to determine from these factors certain criteria. Any plan which is subsequently formulated must satisfy these criteria and in this way all considerations are taken into account. A good 'Appreciation' is vital to the formation of a good plan and effective operation order.

Overview

The Aim

This is the 'mission statement' ie. the job, who to protect, when and how, low profile etc.

The Factors

- a. Threat
- b. Ground - area, residence and grounds, office, routes.
- c. Itinerary
- d. Time and space
- e. Manpower
- f. Liaison
- g. Principal (see 'Profiling' in Chapter 4)
- h. Logistics - VIP transport, own transport, feeding, dress, accomm., weapons/ammo etc
- i. Weather
- j. Enemy courses/geographic risk - MO
- k. Assessment of tasks
- l. Conclusions

Courses Open

Having drawn conclusions from all the relevant factors, it is necessary to assess the effect they will have on the options available. The aim, at this stage, is to determine two or more courses of action that lay open and list both advantages and disadvantages eg. using local security personnel as drivers and PES or taking everyone from UK/US or say a two-phase or three-phase plan. Then decide on the:-

The Plan

These must now be sufficiently detailed to form the basis of an Operation Order.

Operation Orders

A civilian CP operation is no different to a military or police one. There will be a complex arrangement of resources ie. people, vehicles, equipment with which to perform a range of tasks, usually in a variety of places, in a prescribed fashion within certain time constraints. Out of all that there has to be a sense of order and everyone needs to know their role, tasks and appropriate drills in a range of emergencies.

They need to know how to dress, how to behave, when to eat and how to perform ie. should they be ‘high profile’ when out with the Boss or be expected to operate, more commonly, ‘low profile’ drills. They must be in no doubt as to the overall Threat that dictates the level of protective effort and also any current risks as they occur.

The necessary information comes from a variety of sources, but it all needs to be collated and disseminated in an ordered fashion. Although we work for commercial organisations, if such companies had 50 years to develop a system that allowed information to be passed down the line in a structured and ordered fashion, they would simply end up re-inventing the military Operation Order which has proved to be an effective briefing system. I still feel that it is relevant in developing orders for civilian CP work and we will look at this section under the following headings and then see how the information is grouped:-

Operation Order Headings

Preliminaries

Ground

Situation

Mission

Execution

Service Support

Command and Signals

As Op Order may be for a whole job or a supplementary Order relating to a single event within that job ie. a journey abroad. What we’ll do is look at an Op Order that would be produced for a new operation, based, say, on an operation centred at a rural residence with grounds, to include a ‘pick-up’ of the VIP.

Preliminaries or Task

A broad outline of the job. Who, where, how long - basically the information that would be contained in a Warning Order (NB. should also include, we hope, how much pay). As with any Warning Order, it will tell people when and where the main Orders Group ('O' Group) will be and who's in it. Prelims may be repeated in the formal 'O' Group to give the basic scenario.

Ground

Under this heading you will have detail, supported with maps and diagrams of the residence and grounds, local area and on a larger scale, the surrounding areas. There will be information on main communication routes, road and rail, nature of the ground ie. rural, urban or suburban, local towns or close cities. Likely pick up points eg. airport, rail. Major places of interest and, if know at this stage, venues to be visited.

Situation

Who we are protecting and why. If it involves a visit to this country or, if we are going abroad, it will outline the dates of the trips, the purpose and the category we have placed our Principal in. There should be a detailed character profile (7 'P's) and all medical information, together with photographs and a full description of the VIP.

The Threat - from the Threat Assessment you will outline the extent of the threat, and the current sit. rep. of the Enemy Forces, together with their modus operandi (MO), and any latest incidents that may have relevance on your operation. There will be an outline of our own forces and groupings - RST, SAP, PES and expected dress code. Local population ie. political and cultural background, are they broadly friendly, belligerent or indifferent and their expected attitude to the Principal. Friendly Forces ie. location of police, army and emergency services.

Attachments/Detachments - we are usually only concerned with Atts. and this may be a specialist search team, counter-surveillance team, helicopter or fixed wing pilot, interpreter, foreign support group, a Quick Reaction Force etc. This section will also include a general summary of the weather, moon phases and likely clothing etc.

Mission

Always a statement *"You will protect the VIP for the duration of his stay etc etc etc."*

It may also outline who else in the family or entourage is afforded protection and it should outline the 'profile' to be adopted to carry out the mission eg. high or low. We might also include under 'Mission', a rider about rendering all assistance to ensure the smooth running of the residence, office and any journey, or travel arrangements which may help in making the overall visit a success.

Execution

There will be a general outline which will usually outline the Phases of the Operation. A CP operation to provide protection for a visiting VIP from abroad for a certain duration will have, broadly, 4 phases:-

1. Build-up, or preparation phase.
2. The pick-up.
3. The visit - possibly sub-divided into its own separate events and phases, if known at this stage.
4. The departure/drop-off.

Each operational phase is broken down into:-

TASKINGS

PERSONNEL

TIMINGS

The build-up or preparation phase may have a number of tasks, some concurrent and some running consecutively, eg:-

- Familiarisation of the residence and grounds.
- Mapping of grounds and residence.
- Route reces to:-
 - Pick-up point
 - Alternate routes
 - Major routes to towns
 - Local area and information gathering
- Locating and equipping a suitable control room.
- Acquisition and testing of equipment.
- Training.
- Staff briefing.
- Searching and securing of grounds and residence.
- Establish patrol routes, 'stags' and rostars.

It's likely that all the various tasks will be 'against the clock' as there is seldom enough time allocated to the preparation phase. At this stage, everyone will pitch in, irrespective of their final tasks.

'Co-ordinating Instructions' will detail the fine timings of the tasks and who is involved in what tasks. The later phases may be initially light on detail if at that time there is no known itinerary after the pick-up. The following should receive consideration:-

- Timings
- Order of march
- Routes
- Liaison
- Medical - what if?
- Safe houses
- Baggage security
- Guest lists
- Staff lists
- Local security measures
- Orders for use of force
- Rules of engagement
- Local ID systems
- Vehicle security
- Spare vehicles
- Helicopters if any

There will also be an outline of the IA Drills for the following:-

- **Fire**
- **Kidnap attempt**
- **Attack - shooting etc**
- **Increase in threat**
- **Bomb - warning or discovery IED**
- **Threat**
- **RTA**
- **Press**
- **Breakdown vehicle**
- **Programme changes**

Service Support

Detailed equipment list ie. vehicles, weapons, radios to include the type and how many of each. Search kits, First Aid kit, Personal kit (issued), eg. cellular phones to BGs, portable alarm system, night vision, lamps and torches, vests, respirators, sat. comm, portable computer and printer. The list is endless and only limited by the degree of threat. Feeding, vehicle recovery, cash/credit cards, dress and changes.

Command and Signals

The chain of command. Radios and frequencies - second (alternate) channel, evacuation procedure to second channel and third if required, together with attended code words. Lost comms., procedure, command order on the net, a net diagram (see illus. page 311), all contact telephone and emergency numbers. Nicknames/code words (keep codes simple).

If the above briefing was for, say, a specific journey, then you would include more detail such as:-

Weather • Lighting up times • Climate and Driving Conditions • Visibility

Under the heading of 'Ground', you would have far more detail on routes, times on route, venues to be visited, hotels, embus/debus points, alternate routes, danger points, maps and possibly models as well as any other aids.

Situation and Mission would not change much in detail. Execution would be broken down into Operational Phases of the journey with 'Actions On' relating to problems of fuel, breakdown, lost contact/comms. 'Actions On' physical assault, details of Safe Houses, alternate routes, press harassment, TV etc. Service Support would detail the 'float' in vehicles, search kit, general vehicle equipment, respirators, medical kit, personal kit and more detail on the vehicles type and numbers.

An 'Op Order' is a moving target. It changes as more information is fed into the system and co-ordinated instructions are brought up to date as itinerary details come through.

It is not necessary to look at running an operation in any more detail than we have done so far, but it is important that every team member understands their part in the overall scheme of things and how they are expected to act and re-act in a variety of circumstances. Civilian EP teams operate through mutual respect, not by dint of rank or authority. A team leader or BG on one operation will be, in a few weeks time, on a different job, seen walking the grounds of a residence on RST. Its only ever 'first amongst equals' for the job in hand at any particular time. Its unfortunate, however, how many people, when tasked to be in charge of an Op, lose sight of this.

Operational Duties and Serial References compiled on 27/8/94 17:12

SERIAL	VEHICLE	COLOUR	INDEX NO.	DRIVER	CP	PRINCIPAL	MOBILE	CALL SIGN
01	Rolls Royce	Blue	E510KYM	Fred Jay	Kevin C	Sir John	0585 678101	MIA
02	Merc 300SE	Red	E678KDB	Tony Lowe	Clint E	Rt. Hon. Hugo..	0831 456908	MIB
03	Merc 500SL	Black	M456BOY	Geff Glen	Ross P	Sir William...	0850 576890	M2A
04	Rolls Royce	Red	Q911DET	Joe Storey	Bob G	Viscount W...	0860 877609	M4A
05	Merc 300SEL	Grey	H586JKL	Roy Pine	K. White	Lady Margaret T.	0850 879650	M2B
06								
07								
08								
09								
10								

CHAPTER 20

COMMUNICATIONS

A CP Team will stand or fall in effectiveness by its ability to communicate. I'm not just referring to the methodology, but rather the attitude that needs to be bred into people about the importance of information coming up and down the line. VIPs and their secretariats need to be under no illusion as to the fact you need constantly to be brought up to date about proposed actions and movements by the Principal.

Your men need to pass on snippets of domestic information they may hear and team leaders have to remember that in the civilian world of Close Protection, they are only 'first amongst equals' and need to pass intelligence down the line when they have it. The methods of communicating information may be initially in the form of an Operation Order, either written or simply delivered and general 'assignment instructions' ie. Standing Orders. Both may be regularly updated either in briefings or in handout form.

When operational, the Ops room will keep in touch with the PES and RST in 2 ways.

- Radios
- Telephones

Radios will comprise a selection of hand-held VHF sets with a base station in the Ops room and possibly relay sets in vehicles.

- Landlines
- Cellular
- Satellite

Before looking at technology and its part in communication, we need to spend some time on other aspects. The high level of effort and time put into training routine drills is so that if and when the ‘wheel comes off’, each member of the team will be able to function, both independently, but more importantly, in a way which contributes to the required team goal. This may happen whilst the team is on foot, in a vehicle or static in a variety of locations.

The ‘independence of action’ is stressed because what will fail, in terms of both reliability and effectiveness is communications. Nelson recognised the ‘nature of battle’ that once an enemy was engaged and that as masts and flags were blown away, his captains would have to act on their own and his orders to them were that *“They could do no wrong if in such circumstances they put themselves alongside the enemy.”* I’m not saying that on all occasions we must *“put ourselves alongside the enemy”* - rather that each person must know clearly what his role will be if an incident occurs and also that he must have contingency plans should communications fail or cease to be a workable option through confusion and noise. Team members must be capable of independent action and initiative.

Communications today are no less problematic, but providing everyone knows what his role will be in the event of an ‘actions on’ or ‘lost comms.’, then the team will remain functional. An over-reliance on communications at a time of stress will only ever lead to disaster. Also for the average civilian CP operative, communications are also no more secure than they were in Napoleon’s day, when a flag went up the mast and was visible to all. Without the assistance of scrambler or encryption devices, almost our complete range of communications facilities is open to those who wish to listen. Surveillance equipment is cheap and the technology easy for even a child to use. Only the advent of Digital mobile phones has made any impact on the security of cellular telephone conversations and even now, we are told equipment is available, at a cost, capable of scanning digital phones.

So who do we need to communicate with?

- **Principal**
- **All elements of the CP team**
- **Friendly and emergency forces**
- **Our own company**
- **A quick reaction force (QRF)**

In most cases, however, we’re talking about the day-to-day liaison, but once operational and possibly in an ‘out of area’ foreign country then communications takes on a different role.

Day-to-day comms. between elements of the team have traditionally been handled by the use of portable radios with base stations at the residence or office and fixed sets in vehicles. Under normal circumstances, this will give a working communications net when in a residence and comms are required between the RST and control room and when mobile, between vehicles. Advances in technology of FM Transceivers has in some way helped to reduce the potential for confusion on the net, which can often occur when a large team is party to all communications. Dual-Tone Multi-Frequency (DTMF) encoder/decoder allows codes to be input into handsets giving the base station access to selected sets or group of sets which are suitably coded. In some cases, a ringing tone can be activated or the squelch remains closed until the set digit code is heard in normal pager mode. When the sets PTT is pressed, it's unique code is sent to the base station to be verified and identify it. Codes can be input into individual sets or groups eg RST only, or PES or Team Leaders.

There is an opportunity to establish Public Access Mobile Radios eg. taxis etc, but this would be overkill for a temporary CP Op, where all the equipment could be hired for its duration.

Increasingly, most CP Ops in the UK would seem inoperable without the use of cellular phones, but as with the radios, the analogue cellular systems are extremely vulnerable to eavesdropping. Only the new digital networks are, to any great extent, outside the capability of most eavesdroppers. With over 3 million mobile phone users in Britain, mostly operating on the two older established analogue networks, the mobile phone is here to stay. As a convenient way of sending voice or data messages when away from a landline, they are unequalled, but often poor availability of signal and lack of security militate against them. Digital technology is set to change all that - greater clarity, freedom from eavesdropping and the ability to travel abroad with your phone and, theoretically, make and receive calls anywhere on the globe.

Digital phones allow you to identify callers, send text to other phones, connect to PCs and send faxes.

Two main types of digital technology exist GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) and PCN (Personal Communications Networks), this latter one being the system used by operators such as Mercury's One-2-One and Orange. GSM, however, is the system to look to for serious international development. At present, Vodaphone has signed roaming agreements with networks in eight countries, mostly in Europe, and Cellnet some fifteen. Currently though, all is not as rosy as portrayed, with even poorer net coverage in many countries than the analogue system here, but at the present time if you need cellular communications throughout Europe, GSM is the only alternative.


The future may hold even more in store as mobile comms. is set to go totally global. By the end of the century, Iridium, a Motorola lead consortium of seventeen major companies, proposes a global coverage by 66 satellites. No part of the world would be left uncovered and with a small handset you would be in touch in even the most remote corner.

From personal experience in Russia, we had, on occasion, to rely on the Inmarsat satellite communications system to provide 'back-up' cover while outside the confines of Moscow, as no system existed either cellular or radio to enable us to communicate with our base of operations apart from landlines. Set up in 1979, the Inmarsat satellites were essentially for the marine community, the first being 'Inmarsat A', with some 20,000 users currently worldwide. The latest technology available is now 'Inmarsat M', which is portable 'briefcase' technology and is the world's smallest portable sat. phone. As with all technology, the word portable is used with some poetic license, as the briefcase is reasonably large and certainly not light. Also its operation requires you to be in a static location to obtain line of sight with the satellite and so can't be used successfully on the move. Capable of sending both data and voice, the advanced technology transfers human speech into digital format for transmission, giving considerably enhanced security.

Again, the future holds some serious advances in sat. comm. technology with 'Project 21' or 'Inmarsat P' being the development of a phone the size of mobile handsets. How this will compare and fair against a worldwide, digital cellular system has yet to be established, but any such developments that would give a CP team and its operatives handheld, worldwide, secure communications must be worthwhile.



An Ops room needs a dedicated radio operator. On occasions there may be some 20+ call signs on a net and experience is necessary to ensure effective communications.



It's appropriate to finish the book on communications, particularly when it relates to your own personal abilities and especially with regard to our ability to communicate with prospective employers.

Often an individual's ability to find work in the Industry has little to do with his ability on the job, but primarily to do with his ability to sell himself to a potential employer. There are poorly skilled people who work all the time and, in contrast, excellent operatives who always seem to struggle to find employment and the difference is solely due to communication or in some cases - bullshit.

Confidence in communicating is essential if you want to find work. Be able to express yourself cogently and confidently, work on improving both word power and diction and place some investment in yourself by being truly critical how you come across - don't be blind as to how you are perceived - be honest and try to improve your weak areas. This may be protocol, or general presentation ie. dress, but wherever the problem, you must make the effort to improve.

The world is getting smaller in one sense - ease of communications, travel and global finance, all help to create the world as simply a bigger marketplace. For those to whom the world is a marketplace, it has probably doubled in opportunity and size over the past six years or so, with the opening up of the former Soviet Bloc to 'exploitation' by the west. The Bamboo curtain raises by a few feet every year and Asia and the South Americas are all increasing the global reach of the western businessman.

Hand in hand with these markets, unfortunately, goes all the instability - politically, socially, economically and religious. The world is in fact more at odds with itself than it has been for many years. Organised crime pervades most institutions in the west and certainly all institutions in the former Soviet Bloc and, as a consequence, the requirement for people with specialist security and risk management skills increases. The marketplace is, however, complex and sophisticated and physical abilities of a military or combative nature are not solely what it takes to operate within these environments. Hopefully, this book will have gone some way to give a more expansive and honest view of the role and attributes of a Modern Bodyguard, operating throughout the world today.

Peter Consterdine

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